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Science Mega-Project Communities; 
Mechanisms of Effective Global Collaboration? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Thomas Hale and David Held in Beyond Gridlock (2017) define gridlock as the inability of countries to 
cooperate via international institutions to address policy problems that span borders; it refers both 
to deadlock or dysfunctionality in existing organisations and the inability of countries to come to 
new agreements as issues arise.  
 
In the context of addressing these problems that span borders it is analytically valuable to consider 
global science mega-project (SMP) communities that have been remarkably effective in working 
against the gridlock trend. Three of the most insightful SMP case studies are those chosen for my 
research: the Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire (CERN) community, the International 
Thermonuclear Experiential Reactor (ITER) nuclear fusion project community and the International 
Space Station (ISS) community. Previous research into these endeavours has focused on recounting 
the stories of their scientific discoveries and technical feats and innovations. This research has 
investigated the reasons behind these triumphs from a social sciences perspective. 
 
The research problem, that this thesis answers, is how do global SMPs achieve their effective 
collaboration pathways with Member States. A qualitative, ethnographic research method was 
utilised to consider the case study organisations and the people in them. Interpretivism and critical 
realism research philosophies governed the design. Three underlying hypotheses concerning start-
up conditions, dealing with constraints and governance and leadership, were tested to examine SMP 
performance. Through over seventy field work interviews, evidence was gathered, and analysis and 
validation showed that the majority of data supported the hypotheses. The analysis reveals which of 
the seven Beyond Gridlock pathways and associated mechanisms had been used by the SMP 
communities to overcome gridlock. This research identifies a new eighth pathway, concerning 
innovative funding, that it is proposed be added to the primary theory. 
 
Two contributions emerged for consideration by others in the International Relations field. The first 
shows that communities should be primed and ready to exploit shifts in major power core interests 
in order to launch new endeavours and the second is how an ingeniously designed funding system 
allows Member States to commit to projects, permits the central IGOs to operate effectively and, at 
the same time, maintains support in the Member States’ homelands.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
International Relations Background 
 
Collaboration at the global level has always been a challenge and Robert Keohane in After Hegemony 
points out that even when common interests exist cooperation often fails (Keohane, 1984: 49). More 
recently there are those who argue, such as Thomas Hale and David Held in Beyond Gridlock, that 
the complexity, interdependencies and interconnectivity of the modern world create new and grave 
global challenges that demand innovative collaborative solutions (Hale and Held, 2017: 15). They 
define gridlock as the inability of countries to cooperate via international institutions to address 
policy problems that span borders; it refers both to deadlock or dysfunctionality in existing 
organisations and the inability of countries to come to new agreements as issues arise. In this 
context it is analytically valuable to consider global science mega-project communities that have 
been remarkably effective in working against the gridlock trend. Three of the most insightful case 
studies are those chosen for my research: the Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire (CERN) 
community, the International Thermonuclear Experiential Reactor (ITER) nuclear fusion project 
community and the International Space Station (ISS) community. 
 
CERN has attracted a great deal of attention through its pathfinding science results that have 
captured the public’s imagination. It has spawned a succession of Nobel prize winners for Physics 
and several notable spin-offs. The ITER project is comparatively unknown outside of its nuclear 
fusion community although it is potentially of the greatest global significance from an environmental 
point of view. The ISS has entered modern culture with astronauts from 18 countries providing a 
continuous human presence in low earth orbit since 2000. 
 
Previous research into these endeavours has focused on recounting the stories of their scientific 
discoveries and technical feats and innovations. This research has investigated the reasons behind 
these triumphs from a social sciences perspective. Kenneth Abbott and Thomas Hale in 
Orchestrating Global Solution Networks; a Guide for Organizational Entrepreneurs (2014) identify a 
type of successful collaboration that they term as a global solution network (GSN). In my study of 
these Big Science projects, I will argue that they comprise GSNs of the highest order and have 
evolved complex processes and mechanisms to enable effective international collaboration. 
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Before exploring potential methods of collaboration to overcome the gridlock phenomenon, I will 
briefly consider the recent international relations history that has led us to where we are today. The 
aftermath of the catastrophic World War II saw widespread agreement that comprehensive 
international collaboration and global governance was needed. US President Harry Truman summed 
up the still raw emotions in his address to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco on 25th 
April 1945: “Nothing is more essential to the future peace of the world, than continued cooperation 
of the nations…if we do not want to die together in war, we must learn to live together in peace” 
(Truman Presidential Library, 1945). The UN Charter (UN, 1945) was duly signed by the 50 founding 
member nations on 26 June 1945. Following preparatory agreement at the UN Monetary and 
Financial Conference at Bretton Woods in July 1944, three accompanying institutions were created. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established to manage exchange rate stability. The 
World Bank to alleviate poverty and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, replaced in 1994 
by the World Trade Organisation (WTO, 1994), to be the international forum for negotiation 
between states and to oversee the application of trade agreements. Hopes were high, and the 
founders committed considerable resources to make the new institutions work. The pre-World War 
II utopian ideology espoused by the German sociologist Karl Mannheim (1936) seemed within grasp.  
 
In the immediate post war period, the Bretton Woods system worked reasonably well and with 
other measures such as the US Marshall Plan contributed to rapid economic growth in western 
Europe and globally. This started to unwind in the early 1970s firstly when US President Richard 
Nixon ended the pegging of the US dollar to gold in 1971 which suddenly introduced global financial 
uncertainty especially for nations with perceived and/or genuinely weak currencies. The 1973 oil 
crisis further weakened the budgets of developing nations who depended on the Bretton Woods 
Financial Institutions for loans. In what the World Bank management team termed ‘proactive 
policies’, the introduction of harsher loan conditions eroded the institutions legitimacy with the very 
developing states they were mandated to assist. The operations of these institutions exposed the 
complexity and difficulty of tackling global issues. The financial crisis of the early 1980s forced re-
examination of aid to ‘developing nations’ and by 1989, as Ngaire Woods explains, they were 
expected to meet specific policy recommendations articulated in the Washington Consensus 
(Woods, 2007: 250). These conditions aligned with fervent adoption of market-based decision 
making throughout western governments. The resultant flexible exchange rates, striving for 
balanced national budgets and de-regulation of capital markets further altered the modus operandi 
of the World Bank and IMF to the extent that nations looked to other sources of funding including 
private sources and regional solutions. The realism movement briefly faded with the end of the Cold 
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War but the march of neorealism, first explained by Kenneth Waltz (1979), reinforced the idea of an 
international system as merely a set of interacting nation state units. The plethora of new states 
resulting from the sudden break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the rise of powerful non-state 
actors added to the impression of the world being unmanageable. To tackle this the UN has 
repeatedly attempted reform, most notably under Secretary General Kofi Annan who between 1997 
and 2006 introduced several practical management improvements. Despite these efforts no 
International Organisations can consistently lead or govern characteristically non-cooperative states. 
During the second half of the cold war years (1970s to 1991) International Organisations increasingly 
struggled for funding and legitimacy in the wake of the two superpowers exercising their political, 
economic and military might. Post the cold-war, the unipolar power of the USA largely set the global 
agenda. Nuno Monteiro’s analysis shows that this was problematic not least as many nations viewed 
the US as only acting on global issues when it served its national interests (Monteiro, 2014: 207).  
 
By the beginning of the 21st century, growing pessimism found a home with the offensive realism 
ideology led by John Mearsheimer (2001); nation states, never certain of each other’s actions and 
with survival as the overriding goal noticeably retreated into entranced positions. Nations self-
interest and power politics hampered the Bretton Woods institutions from delivering on their 
stirring founding agreements. Attempts to re-bolster global institutions in the face of these 
pressures has mainly resulted in the extension of IO mandates well beyond the original founding 
agreements. IOs whose funding has been squeezed by member states, vigorously seek new 
stakeholders who can help them. These new backers then promote, either openly or covertly, their 
vested interests. This extension of mandates is therefore accompanied by the relentless addition of 
influential non-state actors, regional groupings, pressure groups and individual benefactors; all quite 
naturally with their own agendas. Fragmentation results, epitomised by the labyrinthian UN system 
of today with over 20 quasi-interdependent agencies with several funding streams (UN, 2019a). The 
ensuing inability to collectively take decisive actions on several areas of world-wide concern has 
become known as ‘global gridlock’. Examples include uncertain international trade agreements, lack 
of nation state respect for human rights, difficulties in containing and eradicating global pandemics, 
the fragmentary efforts to combat climate change, slow international agreement of cyber security 
regulation and uncertainty in governing the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I will 
explain that, although these have different consequences in different settings, their effects often 
overlap and are often contested by practioners and academics. What is undisputed is that gridlock 
between nations in international collaboration is an unwelcome phenomenon. It is the 
accompanying academic study of potential solutions that I will now examine.   
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Global Gridlock 
 
The detrimental effects of global gridlock on leading sectors of international concern including 
security, economy and the environment are analysed by Hale, Held and Young (2013). They point 
out that the damaging properties of gridlock are deeper and more wide-ranging with each passing 
year. The Trump Presidency may be marked by its unpredictability, but two factors seem certain: an 
entrenched national investment priority coupled with reluctant participation in international 
commitments. Long-standing US obligations such as the North Atlantic Treaty have been put under 
pressure and more recent ones such as the Paris Climate Agreement have been abandoned 
(UNFCCC, 2016). The UK’s proposed exit from the European Union increases multi-polarity; in how 
many areas is still to be established. Populist political movements throughout the world, even if they 
do not achieve power, are driving nationalist agendas that mainstream political parties can no longer 
disregard. I will explain that, as identified by Hale, Held and Young (2013: 278), factors such as 
multipolarity, institutional inertia and institutional fragmentation are combining to make gridlock 
more entrenched and harder to combat. In addition, the problems that need to be addressed are 
themselves becoming steadily harder to solve and the need to address them ever more urgent: 
Economic crises simmer just below the surface of deepening political problems epitomised by 
despairing refugee migration. Intense societal security issues have cross-border facets that require 
cross-border solutions. Environmental experts increasingly and rightfully bemoan the slow progress 
in tackling extensive, cataclysmic climate change. A strong world leader that can provide an example 
in fostering global relationships to address these problems also seems an ever more distant 
possibility (Bremmer, 2012; 16). This lack of any rousing global direction coupled with national 
governments’ fear of hampering economic growth undermines responsible and far-sighted 
International Organisations’ decision making. 
 
The late 20th Century saw the rise of Multinational Corporations (MNC) and the globalisation of 
production that many academics such as Stephen Krasner (2001) conclude has helped erode the 
scope and power of the State. Economic, cultural and political globalisation and their associated 
transnational forces are major topics and are not the direct subject here. In this research context, it 
is accurate to say that tough regulation of MNCs to force more accountable actions, such as in the 
environmental sphere, is both sparse and uncoordinated. Dan Plesch and Thomas Weiss (2015: 213) 
conclude that the burgeoning numbers of non-state actors have resources and energy but are not 
suited to tackling the largest global issues. They even go on to suggest that the non-state actors’ 
efforts exacerbate the issue by collectively giving the false impression that they are making 
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substantive progress. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can make good and worthy progress 
in their areas of speciality. However, their inherently uncoordinated polycentric approach fails to 
deliver material change in broader domains; it is this world of ‘overlapping communities of fate’, 
demarcated by Held (2004) that needs effective GSNs. The demand for global solutions is 
demonstrably not being met by the supply. 
 
Given this gloomy backdrop what can academics do to aid the quest for a way through gridlock? 
What are the rules of the current game and how could they be re-written to improve global 
performance? Could academics and practioners combine to design a global system to overcome the 
aggravating effects of gridlock? History suggests tangible reform is either made directly after a 
shocking event such as a world-war or in painstakingly small steps. Can this pattern be broken and 
another, more planned and effective way be found? The penalties of failing to find any way out of 
the current wide-ranging and deepening global impasses demand that no stone on any pathway 
remains unturned. Global gridlock research has never just been about describing the problems; 
although this is essential to our understanding. The literature review will show that many authors 
explore solutions and invite debate on proposals. The proposition of this thesis is that the success of 
one field of international relations, where a path of global collaboration has been remarkably 
effective, warrants extra scrutiny. That field is global science mega-project communities to which I 
now turn. 
 
Science Mega-Project communities as potential model pathways through global 
gridlock 
 
The extent to which science diplomacy can influence wider political dimensions is unknown and as if 
to highlight this general uncertainty Davis and Patman (2015) qualify the upbeat title of their work 
‘Globalisation and the Rise of Science Diplomacy’ with the phrase ‘New Day or False Dawn? Mega-
projects such as those at CERN capture our collective imagination. Scientists investigate a wide range 
of physics, pushing back the frontiers of knowledge including the search for particles that could 
make up dark matter. CERN has a long history with research and development starting in the late 
1950’s, construction of ever more capable infrastructure and experiments culminating in the first 
results from the world-leading Large Hadron Collider (LHC) in 2009. The reach of the results today is 
vast with over 3000 scientific collaborators located in 34 countries being actively involved (CERN, 
2019). CERN exemplifies the large scale, long planning, complex interfaces and ground-breaking 
technical designs that are in play in these iconic Science Mega-Projects (SMPs). SMPs are typically 
multi-national collaborations primarily because no single participating national organisation has the 
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capacity to undertake the scope, cost, and complexity on their own. The added effect of the 
collaboration is to strengthen scientific strategic alliances and share the development of expertise, 
equipment and ideas. The international partnership and sharing of the systemic risks with like-
minded colleagues and their institutions is acknowledged, declared and celebrated by the SMP 
community’s leadership as not merely desirable but essential. This starkly contrasts with the denial 
of many sovereign states to acknowledge that there is a joint need in other areas of global concern.  
 
The widespread modus operandi of large natural science projects is that development and 
construction funding rely on members’ in-kind contributions as well as cash payments. This 
guarantees that nations spend mainly in their own territories; known as juste retour. In contrast to 
centrally controlled in-cash arrangements, in-kind contributions result in control being distributed 
more widely. This dispersed power factor combined with the motive of pushing the frontiers of 
science and technology make these mega-projects extraordinarily challenging to manage. It has 
taken the greatest scientific minds with the assistance of diplomats, project managers and engineers 
to ‘find a way’ to overcome these challenges. Multi-disciplinary teams have tirelessly worked to 
develop, implement and manage effective global collaboration and this begs the question: how did 
the SMP communities achieve this? They negotiate with many of the same national governments 
and even the same departments within those nations that are stubbornly gridlocked when being 
directed by other Intergovernmental Organisations in other fields. The SMP teams are also often 
dealing with highly contentious matters outside of their core competencies. On the ITER project the 
negotiators had to agree the routine sharing of nuclear research intellectual property between the 
USA, China and Russia; nations that traditionally do not share any national nuclear information. 
What did they do differently that brought people, organisations, regulators and governments 
together to overcome obstacles and do notable deeds? This thesis analyses how SMP communities 
and their management teams have designed, built and operated ostensibly similar complex global 
collaboration models.  
 
The solutions that have been put in place are intricate and have been developed over decades. Most 
remarkedly, they have consistently delivered results and thereby created their own type of 
legitimacy. In parallel to the welcome scientific outcomes themselves, they have forged innovative 
new ways in international collaboration, improved inter-state relations and, as I will show, even 
influenced world politics.   
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Research Timeliness  
 
This section will firstly provide historical examples of where science collaborations have been the 
precursor and catalyst for improved international relations between states and then provide two 
reasons why this thesis is timely in today’s global gridlock environment. 
 
Davis and Patman (2015: 261) provide a compelling narrative of the longstanding links between 
science cooperation and international relations, where the former has often led the way. To support 
their claim they provide several examples, here I highlight three: 1) The US and USSR scientific 
communities’ interactions, even during the tense gridlocked Cold-War years, are the most well-
known linking of scientific cooperation and foreign relations. This pair of actors are central to two of 
the three case studies. 2) The 1961 US-Japan Committee on Science Cooperation, founded under US 
President John Kennedy’s leadership, helped repair what he termed a ‘broken dialogue’ between the 
two countries. The USA and Japan both contribute to CERN’s flagship LHC infrastructure and are full 
members of the other two case study communities. 3) Scientific interactions between Israel’s 
Weizmann Institute of Science and Germany’s Max Planck Society provided the first channels for 
discussions between the two estranged states after World War II. This led to the historic 1964 
agreement whereby the Max Planck Society channelled funds provided by the German government 
to the Weizmann Institute’s research projects. These ties helped lay the foundation not only for 
German-Israeli scientific cooperation, but also for the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
the two states one year later (Weizmann Institute, 2012). The acceptance of Germany back into the 
international community is a strong theme in the foundation of CERN.  
 
The thesis is timely for two reasons: firstly, due to the general urgency that gridlock poses and 
secondly because of the re-emerging recognition of the pathfinding role science and the 
organisation of international science collaborations play in global affairs.  
 
The unprecedented rise in connectivity that has led to advantages to trade and commerce has in 
parallel introduced new challenges that can quickly turn ostensibly unconnected domestic issues 
into global problems. The 2008 global financial crisis started with over-commitment by domestic US 
lenders to sub-prime mortgages. As Anthony Elson (2017), a former IMF insider, explained it was the 
poorly regulated international packaging of these high-risk loans, built on false assumptions, that 
meant the problem quickly affected shares and banking and ultimately led to a global recession. 
Security issues cross borders with ease and the very nature of potent nuclear, biological and 
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chemical weapons, heap pressure on national Governments to find universal solutions to curb 
proliferation. Environmentalists’ warnings of irreversible damage to the planet due to global 
warming grow louder with each passing month. Numerous areas of human endeavour are in urgent 
need of global coordinated actions that can start to address wide-reaching problems that cannot be 
resolved by domestic actions alone. Ian Goldin (2013) goes as far as to say that the 21st century will 
be defined by the extent to which we are able to increase the power and effectiveness of global 
institutions that are mandated to oversee and manage these areas.  
 
There are examples where the urgency described above is well recognised and science-based 
solution grass-root followers, academics, intellectuals and governments are trying to act as quickly 
as possible and in good faith. These include the scientific advice provided by global experts to the 
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction when it formulated its Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (UNSIDR, 2015). The potential for increased cooperation on 
issues related to global research infrastructures has been recognised during international high-level 
meetings on science policy and in different fora since 2007. At the first G8 Ministerial meeting, held 
in Okinawa on 15 June 2008, a Group of Senior Officials was formed to take stock and explore 
cooperation on global science research infrastructures. The now expanded group is represented by 
government officials and experts in the areas of international research facilities and international 
relations from Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Commission, France, Germany, India, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, UK, and USA. Participating countries have backed the 
enterprise and a Framework for Global Research Infrastructures (G8, 2013). The standing of science 
within society has also gained popular support with several large scale ‘Marches for Science’ taking 
place simultaneously in western capital cities to protest cuts to state research budgets; that is now a 
global movement (Marchforscience, 2019). Finally, with ever-tightening public budgets, that I outline 
in each of the case study chapters, SMP leadership and officials of the contributing members could 
benefit from academic scrutiny of their shared performance.  
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Analytical Structure 
 
This introduction has provided the research context with respect to recent international relations, 
global governance and gridlock. It has raised the prospect that examination of the actions of SMP 
communities may provide insights into potential pathways through gridlock and finally has described 
why the time is ripe for the study. The thesis main body is divided into six chapters and a conclusion. 
To answer the research problem, this thesis has at its core three case studies chosen for a close 
examination of the issues across the mega-project life-cycle. In addition to the acknowledgements 
and bibliography, there are 3 appendices: Appendix A, Selected Overview of SMPs and their 
Communities, Appendix B, Interviewee Details and Appendix C, Interviewee Questions. 
 
Chapter 1 provides a critical consideration of four strands of relevant literature. The first includes 
international relations theory regarding global collaboration and international organisations. This 
first area has an ample supply of excellent academic research material and is divided into four parts: 
realism, neo-realism, regime theory and international organisations theory. The second strand is the 
more recent and expanding body of academic material concerning global gridlock issues and 
potential solutions. The third is the sub-field of international relations known as science diplomacy. 
The final strand concerns mega-projects governance, leadership and performance issues. This last 
category has two sub-groups: general topic material which span the different mega-project areas 
and material specific to SMP communities. The chapter concludes by describing three analytical 
themes in the literature and identifies a significant research gap and ends with an explanation of the 
relevance of the literature to this thesis.  
 
Chapter 2, Methodology, starts by defining the threshold for achieving SMP status and provides the 
justification for selecting the three case studies and states the research problem: 
 
How do global Science Mega-Project Communities achieve their effective collaboration 
pathways with Member States?  
 
There are two related research questions: 1) do the subject SMP Communities utilise common 
diplomatic approaches in negotiating their founding arrangements and functioning in a collaborative 
way? 2) What - if any - are the political lessons learned by the subject SMP Communities that may 
provide clues in advancing global collaboration to overcome gridlock in other domains? The answer 
to this second related research question will lead to suggesting two contributions to knowledge.  
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The global SMP conceptual framework is then outlined to show the key determinates that underpin 
the research and the three hypotheses. The next section provides the reasons why the research 
philosophies of interpretivism and critical realism are more appropriate than others that were 
considered. The three stage (desk research, field research and data analysis and validation) 
methodological approach is then explained. How counterfactual evidence is gathered and 
considered is then covered before describing how limitations in the research are mitigated against 
and how ethical issues are handled. Finally, a chapter summary is provided. 
 
Chapters 3-5 investigate the case studies, each one employing the same format. The first section 
covers the scientific problem that led to the establishment of the IGO tasked with tackling it and the 
historical aspects that led Member States to agree to take part. The founding international 
agreement is examined with respect to its negotiation, agreement, signature and ratification. The 
IGO organs, member state voting rights, commercial and funding arrangements are then analysed. 
The second section of each case study chapter then analyses the management of major constraints 
that have affected the project IGOs and their wider communities with emphasis on the findings from 
the case study interviews. The third sections analyse the governance and leadership dynamics, 
including the organisational culture, what leadership styles have proven to be the most productive, 
levels of focality and legitimacy and plans for future developments. Each case study chapter ends 
with an appraisal of the collaborative pathways and associated mechanisms that have been utilised. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses and compares the results documented in the three case study chapters and 
comprises five sections. In section 1, I gather together the counterfactual arguments that span the 
three case studies together with my responses to each one. In section 2, I utilise the testing of the 
three hypotheses to frame the discussion. The degree to which the Beyond Gridlock pathways have 
been used by the case studies in respect of their support of each of the three Hypotheses is 
analysed. In section 3, I comment on common diplomatic, governance and leadership mechanisms 
that have been used to implement the pathways and point out where dissimilar mechanisms have 
been deployed. It is also in section 3 where the case for the inclusion of a novel 8th pathway, 
innovative funding, to global gridlock theory, is made. In section 4, I recap the common features of 
the three case studies. In section 5 I suggest two contributions to knowledge aimed at academics of 
global gridlock and those involved in inter-governmental collaboration initiatives in other domains.  
 
The thesis conclusion draws together the case for the relevance and timeliness of the thesis and 
advocates where further research could be undertaken. The thesis structure is shown at Figure 1. 
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Figure 1; Thesis structure 
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Terms, nomenclature and notations 
 
The scientific domain of the case studies means that the use of specialist terms, nomenclature and 
notations is unavoidable. The explanations for these are done here, at the outset, to avoid any 
confusion between concepts and to put the concepts in perspective. 
 
Terms 
 
Big Science 
 
Where I use the term Big Science its meaning is the same as that of Alvin Weinberg (1967) when 
introducing the phrase in his book on the impact of Large-Scale Science on the US. Namely, it means 
large research infrastructures. 
 
Noble work 
 
Noble work in SMP Communities means work of a high technical value and/or high scientific value 
and/or high monetary value. 
 
Rogue States 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of a rogue state; Derek Smith (2006; 14) points out that 
even the grouping - which in the early 1990’s comprised North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Libya and Iraq – is 
elastic and has a disputed membership. Although there is no definition there are widely held 
common characteristics of the type espoused by Elaine Bunn, who was the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy in the US DoD from 2013 to 2016. In her 
2003 paper Pre-emptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect she lists the characteristics as those 
who brutalise their own people, display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbours 
and are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction (Bunn, 2003). I will argue, in section 
5.1, that in the early 1990’s it is this latter anxiety that was the driving factor in the US reasoning to 
extend an invitation to the Russians to join the ISS. For this thesis therefore, I use the term as it 
applied at that moment of US decision making rather than be drawn in to the debate on the 
evolution of the rogue states narrative in US security policy which Alexandra Homolar (2010) and 
other academics in the security field of international relations have investigated.   
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SMP Communities 
 
SMP Communities are products of complex social, scientific, technical, economic and political 
interdependencies. They have often taken decades to form, normalise and become effective They 
also reflect the ongoing relationship between their shared aims and the everyday world constraints 
of their Member States. In this research I adapt the concept of an epistemic community which Peter 
Haas (1992) defines as a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain. 
The concept is an important one in considering collaboration in the modern world. While it is not the 
focus of this thesis its use is unavoidable in understanding the internal workings of SMP 
communities. Each case study is an example of an epistemic community that comprises knowledge-
based experts, but due to their size, complexity and global reach these are spread over many 
supporting sub-fields. This makes their boundaries difficult to define as they vary from Member 
State to Member State and vary over time. 
 
The Haas definition and the presence of diverse boundary conditions that change over time need to 
be kept in mind when the term SMP Community is used throughout this paper and the terms CERN 
Community, ITER Community or ISS Community are used in the case study chapters. At the start of 
each case study chapter I outline the special features of each community at IGO level and provide 
examples of the community boundaries. 
 
Wicked problems 
 
In this thesis I use Keith Grint’s framing from Wicked Problems and Clumsy Solutions (2008) for this 
term to mean problems that are persistent, tending to be insoluble and not presenting clear sets of 
alternative solutions. 
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Nomenclature and notations 
 
An extensive abbreviations list is provided (pages xvi to xviii). When an abbreviation is first used it is 
explained; it is then used in the rest of this thesis and only where necessary for emphasis is the 
reader reminded of the explanation.  
 
The nomenclature for the eight Beyond Gridlock pathways that I explain fully in Section 1.2 covering 
Global Gridlock Issues are referred to also by their respective number (1 to 8) throughout the thesis.  
 
The three hypotheses explained in Section 2.3 are referred to, in parenthesis, both by their number 
(1 to 3) and their description throughout the thesis. 
 
My own comments, for example when included in the abbreviation list or embedded in field work 
interviews or other text to add context and/or aid clarity, are always shown in [square brackets]. 
 
Wherever a figure or a table, is mentioned in the text, a hyperlink is provided to take the reader 
directly to the referenced object.  
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter provides a critique of four strands of relevant literature. The first section concerns the 
international relations theory with attention on nation state collaboration. This will be examined 
through the four sub-groups of realism, neo-realism, regime theory and international organisations. 
The second section examines the relatively new gridlock phenomenon. The review will cover the 
work of leading academics in the field including potential solutions that they have tabled together 
with literature that provides counter arguments to the standard views. The third strand is a review 
of the specialist sub-field of international relations concerning science diplomacy. I will briefly sketch 
the advancement of science diplomacy within world politics and how it has influenced societal issues 
in modern times. The final strand of literature concerns mega-project governance, leadership and 
performance and is divided into two parts, the first concerning general mega-project management 
issues and the second concerning the subject of this thesis, global SMPs. 
 
This thesis purposively aims high to provide a systematic investigation into a problem of incomplete 
knowledge in a pressing field of international relations: global gridlock. The literature review is by 
necessity complex in that it combines analysis of the above four strands to set the broad context of 
the performance of SMPs in the international arena. The literature review will move on to recap 
three predominant themes: primacy of the state, science diplomacy and SMP leadership. Finally, I 
conclude the chapter by identifying a research gap within global gridlock studies and explaining the 
relevance of the literature for this thesis. 
 
The libraries of Durham University, London University and Oxford University have been utilised in 
this literature review. The British Library PhD on-line archive was also accessed to examine previous 
work in related fields. The in-house documents of the three case-study IGO headquarters were 
accessed as follows:  
 
• CERN: the CERN HQ library and archive in Geneva, Switzerland was visited, and material 
accessed on-line, the UNESCO library and archive in Geneva, Switzerland was visited, and 
material accessed on-line; 
• ITER: the ITER HQ library in Cadarache, France was visited, and material accessed on-line and 
• ISS: the NASA HQ library in Washington DC, USA was visited and accessed on-line, and the ESA 
and US Presidential libraries were accessed on-line. 
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The specialist librarians and archivists of all three SMPs and the archivist section of the UNESCO 
Library in Geneva provided expert assistance with respect to locating and accessing founding 
documents that included: the UN Economic and Social Council sessions and resolutions, SMP IGO 
treaties, conventions, MOUs, common understandings, multi and bi-lateral agreements and formal 
negotiation correspondence. 
 
 
1.1: Theory regarding global collaboration and international organisations 
 
This section provides evidence of considering and understanding the broad international relations 
field that sets the context to the emergence of the gridlock phenomenon. Comprising one of the 
four elements of the literature review and to maintain balance with the others, this section 
concentrates on the influential thinkers in each of the three fields of realism, neo-realism and 
regime theory. In addition, this section of the literature review will map out the international 
organisations that are central to the current global system and analyse where the IGOs that are 
tasked with delivering global SMPs fit in to that landscape.  
 
 
1.1.1: Realism 
 
This sub-sub-section will recap what realism theory is, outline the views of its key exponents and 
critics and lastly describe how it relates to the thesis topic. 
 
Realism is not a single theory but a family of theories that have developed since the ancient times of 
the Greek writer Thucydides (471 – 400 B.C.) and have thrived in the past 75 years to the point 
where a single definition is elusive. Yet, Jeff Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (1999) point out that 
nearly all scholars who have voiced an opinion on the subject agree that what makes it possible and 
useful to speak about realism as a unified paradigm is the existence of a series of shared core 
assumptions. Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi (1999) summarise that realism is based on four key 
assumptions: Firstly, states are the principal and most important actors. Secondly, the state is 
viewed as a unitary actor. Thirdly, the state is a rational actor seeking to maximise its own interest or 
national objectives in foreign policy and fourthly, that within the hierarchy of international issues, 
national security is paramount. Power and the exercising of that power by nation states is therefore 
a key concept in realism to the extent that security and strategic issues are sometimes termed high 
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politics while economic and social issues are considered less important low politics. In the world of 
realism, the high politics dominates and sets the scene in which the lower politics is tolerated. 
 
Traditional key exponents of classic realism and their major works include Hans J Morgenthau (1948) 
Arnold Wolfers (1962), Edward Hallett Carr (1951) and Raymond Aron (1966). There have been many 
detractors of realism and enduring critical analysis includes that from John Vasquez (1997) and the 
leaders of the main branches of the central concept such as Neorealism [Kenneth Waltz, Robert 
Keohane and Josef Nye; covered in the next sub-section], Offensive Neo-Realism [John Mearsheimer 
and Robert Gilpin] and Defensive Realism [Kenneth Waltz and Robert Jervis]. I will touch on the key 
writings of the exponents of realism and its critics at several points in the discussion that follows. 
 
Given the precision of the assumptions that Viotti and Kauppi succinctly recap, it is somewhat 
surprising that there are diverse views on the definition of one of its key features: power. Three 
influential realism academics see power differently as: 
 
• The capacity of an individual group, or nation to influence the behaviour of others in 
accordance with one’s own ends, as defined by Organski (1968) in his work regarding the 
cyclical nature of war. 
 
• Man’s control over the actions of other men; the classical realism definition from 
Morgenthau (1948) in his seminal work Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace 
 
• The ability to prevail in conflict and overcome obstacles; as defined by Singer and Deutsch 
(1964) in their work on the balance of power and system stability. 
 
A fundamental difference in stance is whether power is considered as absolute and inherent 
(Morgenthau and Organski) or whether it is relative (Singer and Deutsch). When applied to states 
such as the USA the different attitude could manifest itself as an evaluation of the self-evident might 
of the US Military or an evaluation of that force in terms of its capabilities relative to other states. 
Another application would be an evaluation of the absolute fiscal power of the US Economy or its 
strength relative to other economies. In turn these different approaches lead to the question how 
do we measure the absolute or relative strength of that power? Are its resources (uniformed 
personnel and hardware) or their capabilities relative to other armed forces the right measure of 
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military power? Is it a nation’s Net National Income (NNI) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or an 
index showing these relative to other nations that is the correct measure of wealth?  
 
For this thesis, what is important is the notion captured by Viotti and Kauppi that whichever realism 
stance is taken the power of a state is dependent on the issue involved, the system in which power is 
exercised and its polarity. The latter point being whether a system is: unipolar, as with the USA in the 
immediate aftermath of the cold war; bi-polar, as with the USA and USSR during the cold war period 
or multi-polar, as with the international system today [albeit still with a very powerful USA in several 
spheres such as security]. The systems are also often interrelated, for example military capabilities of 
states are affected by the strength or relative strength of their economies.  
 
Another key defining characteristic of realism is the structural attribute of anarchy whereby there is 
no hierarchy of authority within the system in question. There is no body or central authority to 
whom states are accountable. In such a world, the realists would argue it is therefore logical to look 
out for number one and constantly update, upgrade and exercise power in all its forms to maintain 
national security. I will return to this assumption and challenge it in sub-sub section 1.1.2, Neo-
realism. For now, it is enough to say that the hard-line realist stance - that there is no natural 
harmony in the world within a deeply anarchic system - is not supported by the SMP experience 
analysed in this thesis. Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 
(1948) position that state interests are more important than any other factor is reconciled by the 
reality that states must act rationally and collaborate when there is no go-it-alone alternative. I will 
investigate whether collaborating member states see SMP outcomes - albeit collectively attained – 
as improving the likelihood of increased national power, security and thereby, eventual stable 
autonomy.  
 
A casual onlooker of the iconic case study SMPs may see them as utopian, self-governing and 
confident of their authority over states, this bluster masks the fact that basic realism theory still 
applies. The member states continue to be the controlling actors in the SMP model, allowing the 
central IGOs that authority they strictly need to deliver results but nothing more. For example, I will 
show that while SMP IGOs have design authority over the member states in key areas such as safety 
and operations, they have highly limited self-generating revenue powers, must adhere to strict 
guidelines on recruitment and workshare and are subject to continuous national oversight of 
performance. 
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The legalistic mechanism (protocols in the founding documents) that sets the boundaries of this 
granted authority mark the SMPs out as mature IGOs. Although there is a healthy debate regarding 
the authority of the central teams over the member states, the fundamental anarchic nature of the 
international system is maintained in that it is recognised that the SMP IGOs should not constitute a 
suprastate authority. The founding agreements [summarised in sub-section 1.3, Science Diplomacy 
and detailed in the separate case study chapters] precisely demarcate the limits on any granted 
authorities and define the protocols, governing bodies and voting mechanisms necessary to make 
any changes to them. The agreements are also carefully constructed to limit any mission creep that 
the leadership of SMP IGOs may wish to indulge in.  
 
One example of the required submission to realism theory can be seen at the highest level of 
management that the SMP hierarchy models utilise. Governance documents show that an SMP IGO 
Director General is invariably appointed as a diplomat and enjoys the privileges and immunities that 
this status brings. However, the appointee reports to and is accountable to the governing Council 
that comprises voting representatives from the member states. The day-to-day running of the SMP 
ventures is entrusted to the Director General [true for CERN and ITER, not the case for the ISS as I 
explain in Chapter 5] who is granted considerable autonomous authority over the staff and 
operational matters; however, the final power rests firmly with the nations who approve Director 
General appointments and re-appointments. 
 
Classic realism theory has had a series of critics including the champions of its numerous off-shoots 
including neo-realism (covered in sub-sub section 1.1.2), defensive realism (that argues that states 
are security maximisers) and offensive realism (that argues that states are power maximisers). The 
collapse of the Soviet Union emboldened critics as it seemed to highlight a general weakness in 
realism theory: an inability to foresee or explain change. This upsurge in criticism was swiftly 
rebuffed by the counter-counter argument that it was the realism of Mikhail Gorbachev and his 
advisors when he came to power that led the Soviet Union to the logical conclusion that it could no 
longer compete (philosophically and/or economically and/or militarily) with the USA and her allies 
and should therefore withdraw its forces from Central Europe. 
 
Criticism has also been made that the theory has a fractured foundation in that there are major 
inconsistencies and disagreements amongst realists. Thomas Cusack and Richard Stoll (1990) for 
example suggest that in addition to confusion amongst realists as to the importance and distribution 
of power there are also diverse views on the significance of uneven patterns of growth amongst the 
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actors in the system. To bolster their argument, they endeavour to link international relations theory 
with computer simulation within a realpolitik framework, their rationale being that no other rigorous 
models of realism exist. My position is that, while they try and play up the undeniable differences, 
they fail in undermining the veracity of the theory itself. Indeed, realism though having to be 
modified and adapted has seen off all manner of counter-arguments and survived the test of time as 
the main underling theory of international relations. This endurance is not least because we have its 
core arguments regularly reinforced in our psyche. For example, when we witness our nation’s 
leadership navigate through turbulent global events on our behalf even if we do not independently 
agree with their proposed paths. 
 
In summary, this sub-sub-section has shown that looking at the global SMPs that form the centre of 
this thesis through the lens of realism theory reminds us that states remain the primary actors in 
international affairs. Any global governance exercised by the SMP IGOs mandated to achieve their 
communities’ goals is contingent on the power politics that the contributing members exercise. I will 
show that the central leadership teams of these massive projects operate within the degree of 
management authority that the nations tolerate and permit. Jason Charrette and Jennifer Sterling-
Folker in the conclusion of their chapter on realism within Weiss and Wilkinson’s International 
Organization and Global Governance (2014) sum up the condition thus: ‘Realism provides a critical 
voice to the debate about International Organisations and global governance by drawing attention 
to power politics, reminding the discipline that despite the fluidity of international politics, some 
things never change.’ This thesis will show that the governance and running of SMPs do not provide 
an exception to this firm realism footing.  
 
1.1.2: Neo-realism 
 
This sub-sub-section will first define what neo-realism theory is, then describe the views of its key 
exponents and critics before discussing recent developments of the concept and will end with an 
account of how this thesis relates to it. 
 
While retaining many of the basic features of classical realism (e.g. states as key rational unitary 
actors and power as a central analytical concept), neorealism directs attention to the structural 
characteristics of an international system of states rather than to its component parts (Evans and 
Newnham, 1998). The system is still anarchical, and the units are deemed to be autonomous, but 
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supporters of the modified theory argue that attention to the structural level of analysis enables a 
more dynamic, inter-connected and less restrictive picture of international relations to emerge.  
 
Key exponents and their major works include the accepted founder of the neorealism movement 
Kenneth Waltz (1981; 1990), Robert Keohane (1986) and Joseph Nye who later with Keohane took a 
further step in thinking with a neoliberalist stance (1977). I will touch on their key works and that of 
other backers of neorealism during the discussion that follows. 
 
Kenneth Waltz argued in his influential book Theory of International Politics that the international 
system functions like a market which effects the actors and the results they produce (1979). He 
asserted that this market, while structured, operated in an anarchic way which limited and explained 
the actions of nation states within it. Fundamentally, he wrote that democracies and dictatorships 
could not rely on the good will of others, so always had to be ready to fend for themselves. I would 
argue that the UK and France, by retaining independent strategic nuclear weapon capabilities 
despite both being NATO alliance members, are present-day examples of this. In other words, even 
in an ostensibly civilised world order of cooperation and structured alliances, anarchy and 
preservation of national security are the underlying forces that still often drive national 
administration decision makers.  
 
Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
contrasts the shift from realism to neo-realism (1984). This book is important to this research, 
particularly as it suggests why states - in a post-hegemonic world order - collaborate. Keohane’s 
overall position is that states do have complementary interests, which make certain forms of 
cooperation potentially beneficial. Another strong theme is that institutions affect the patterns of 
cooperation that emerge. Both points, complementary interests and institutions, have direct 
relevance to the formation and operation of SMPs. I will develop this significance in the individual 
case study and research results chapters. The four post-hegemonic drivers for state collaboration 
that Keohane recognised in 1984 are still pertinent today:  
 
1) they reduce individual state costs. Reducing state costs is often a predictor of cooperation, i.e. 
states must protect their self-interest and be confident that they are not over contributing to an 
endeavour. Keohane takes this further as he believes it can also be a predictor of the establishment 
of institutions, within the boundaries of the other driving factors described here. I will show in the 
Case Study Selection Justification, section 2.1, the very high development, construction and 
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operational costs of SMPs. The advantageous leverage that states enjoy by cooperating in such 
circumstances outweigh other concerns such as perceived lack of control or national esteem. I 
return to this theme and other advantages of SMP collaborations in the Results Chapter 6. 
 
2) there is bounded rationality in working together. This notion is developed from Herbert Simon 
(1982) and is that states do not have the capability to maintain as high a degree of flexibility as 
would purely rational actors. The cooperation that is committed to does not require states to 
unquestionably accept common ideals or renounce sovereignty; limits are present even if they do 
not need to be openly stated. However, there is often an important longer-term commitment, 
beyond any state administration period, in that there is an innate anticipation of future need for 
continued cooperation. Given the long-term nature of global SMPs, described in section 2.2 (Case 
Study Selection Justification), this is a stance that has direct relevance to this thesis.  
 
3) regimes can help facilitate agreements and decentralized enforcement of agreements among 
states. Keohane maintains that regimes are practical arrangements motivated by rational self-
interested state actors to make mutually beneficial agreements. Keohane later (1986) edited 
Neorealism and its Critics that sought to reformulate the early thinking of Waltz. Keohane 
marshalled the various criticisms that had been levelled at the earlier work by the proposal of 
devising theories of new international institutions or regimes and challenging the validity of the state 
as main actor. I return to this notion in sub-sub section 1.1.3, Regime Theory. 
 
4) policies followed by one state are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own 
objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination. This last point is utilised by Keohane as a 
formal description of when cooperation occurs and includes the idea that effective cooperation 
must be distinguished from utopian harmony. I discuss this further in the ‘primacy of the state’ part 
of sub-sub section 1.5.1., Analytical themes in the literature.  
 
A distinguished critic of the importance of anarchy within the above neorealist description is Helen 
Milner who identifies the ‘discovery of orderly features of world politics amidst its seeming chaos’ as 
‘perhaps the central achievement of neorealists.’ She goes on to assert that the whole idea of 
anarchy has been overemphasised while necessary interdependence has been neglected. The key 
word here is ‘necessary’ and its significance is more pertinent now than when Milner wrote it in 
1991. In the ever-growing connectivity and interdependence that David Held and Antony McGrew 
describe in Governing Globalization (2002) there are a rising number of economic, environmental 
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and political problems that cannot be addressed by a single actor. This is true even when some 
actors do not recognise it and irrationally try to operate alone or simply ignore the causal problem. I 
will show in sub-section 1.3.2 covering science diplomacy literature, that the acceptance of 
‘necessity’ comes naturally to the SMP communities and is one of the central reasons for their 
success. 
 
Robert Keohane and Josef Nye expanded neorealism into what they argued was the better theory of 
neoliberalism, encapsulated in Power and Independence (1977). In it they explored the politics of 
economic interdependence and their analysis contained three principal themes, which they later 
observed in Power and Independence Revisited (1987) their first work had not explicitly distinguished 
from one another. Firstly, a power-oriented analysis of the politics of interdependence, drawing on 
bargaining theory. Secondly, an analysis of an ideal type that they call complex interdependence and 
the impact of the processes that it encompassed. And thirdly, an attempt to explain changes in 
international regimes which they defined as ‘sets of governing arrangements that affect 
relationships of interdependence’.  
 
With these criticisms and their rebuttals, the debate on neorealism since Waltz has been on the 
boundary and interactions between the system and the unit level states. In the Logic of Anarchy: 
Neorealism to Structural Realism, Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little (1993) point out that 
Waltz confines interactions to the unit level and that this diminishes the explanatory power of his 
theory. They credibly argue that interaction capacity stands as a third level of analysis, on par with 
units and structure; this thought weakens neorealism’s original logic. Another flaw in Waltz’s work 
that they reveal is that neorealism cannot explain the beginnings of an international system. It 
presupposes that a system exists with sustained, relatively sophisticated interactions spanning the 
globe, and why or how this communication arose is neglected. This does not match with what we 
see in the world and strengthens the case for the development of the structural realist paradigm.  
 
James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff (2001) in their commentary of Buzan, Jones and Little 
effectively argue for the broadening of neorealist theory to cover competition and collaboration. In 
the political world system of today, nations develop alliances, coalitions, regimes, norms and 
institutions for a complex number of reasons including critical international collaboration. 
Sovereignty does not mean that anarchy is incompatible with cooperation when it is logical to do so; 
I discuss sovereignty issues further in sub-sub section 1.1.4., International Organisations. The 
expanded neorealist theory also introduces the idea that it is the domestic structure of states, 
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together with the international systemic level of interactive capabilities that shapes the capacity of 
the system. I will show that this is directly supported with evidence from the case studies where the 
central IGOs must regularly take diverse approaches with different departments and ministries in the 
member nation states on the same topic.  
 
These enhancements and the adding of needed complexity tolerate more change in the system than 
neorealism allows. Buzan, Jones and Little conclude that structural realism’s foremost contrast with 
neorealism, therefore, lies in its renewed emphasis on the role of interactions wherever and 
between whoever they are necessary and occur in the system. Another interaction related 
development of neorealism that is relevant to this thesis is the proposition that states pursue goals 
in one arena that affect their pursuit in another arena. States may also attempt to solve domestic 
problems through actions at the international level. The combination of strategies is logical to 
leverage the best advantage possible for a given effort. This neoclassical realist theory acknowledges 
and seeks to explain the strategies of individual states and the fact that complex patterns of 
interactions can be in play in many arenas simultaneously (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009).  
 
The relevance here comes out of the reminder of a basic assumption of realism that ‘states must 
constantly guard against actual or potential threats to their political and economic independence 
and that national security is always the principal concern’ (Waltz, 1979). While national security is 
not directly the concern of nations in their agreement to participate in global SMPs, what is at stake 
is fundamental scientific knowledge that history tells us in many cases will in time affect economic 
and security issues. For example, in policy decisions that will help protect energy supply (ITER 
dependent) or superconducting materials know-how, computing expertise, hadron cancer therapy 
and the world-wide web that are all bi-products of high energy physics research (CERN dependent) 
or physiological findings, biotechnology techniques and advanced materials data that stem from 
lengthy micro-gravity exposure (ISS dependent). This is therefore a model example of the application 
of neoclassical realist theory: it is the need for knowledge gathering that is the driver for the 
collaboration. A need not borne out of unplanned interest but the inescapable facts that nations can 
only partly and/or more slowly achieve knowledge gathering alone and cannot neglect the area of 
concern or risk losing out in other fields that may in the longer term significantly affect national 
economic outcomes and thereby national security. I return to this notion of the nation state version 
of the social anxiety syndrome of the ‘fear of missing’ out when considering the political setting 
leading to nations agreeing to collaborate in each of the case study chapters. 
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When faced with long-standing, seemingly intractable and complex problems that the global SMPs 
must tackle, even the most powerful state, the USA, is governed by the multi-polar world that is 
eloquently described by Waltz. I will show, in sub-section 1.4.2., on SMP project management, that 
the SMP founding agreements are painstakingly negotiated. This is not least because of the need to 
accurately balance the sharing of power, economic risks/opportunities and reputational 
risks/opportunities with the state’s financial commitments. 
 
In summary, neorealism theory takes forward classical realist theory and its impact is pervasive and 
enduring. It has raised attention to the structural characteristics of an international system beyond 
the mere consideration of its component parts. However, scrutiny by leading critics has revealed 
several flaws including the focus on structure ignoring the formulation of systems and the limits of 
power. Recent neoclassical realist theory better matches real-world international relations, including 
SMP communities, by acknowledging domestic considerations, cooperation and competition 
between states. Relevant to this thesis is the notion that nations state’s long term strategies mean 
efforts in one system are purposely undertaken to strengthen a nation’s position in another. I will 
develop, in the case study chapters, how the SMP communities’ science diplomacy systems 
interrelate with other international relations sub-systems such as energy policy, economics and 
national security. 
 
 
1.1.3: Regime theory 
 
This sub-sub-section will firstly outline what is meant by the term and identify its key exponents. It 
will then describe the arguments that have led many neorealist and neoliberal scholars to embrace 
regime theory before remarking on criticisms of the idea. The summary includes an appraisal of its 
relevance to this study. 
 
International regimes encompass global issue areas as diverse as defence, trade, monetary policy, 
law, transport and the environment. Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins (1983) suggest that they 
can be categorised by function on specific issues through to multi-issue areas. This wide range of 
application demands a broad definition for international regimes which Stephen Krasner provides as 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge 
in each issue-area (1982). Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons point out that this form of words 
cleverly achieves a middle ground between order and explicit commitments while stressing the 
26 
 
normative dimension of international politics (1987). Krasner obligingly expands on the terms as 
follows: principles represent ‘beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude’, Norms are ‘standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations’, Rules are ‘specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action’ and decision-making procedures are ‘prevailing practices for making and 
implementing collective choice’. Notably, this definition does not limit membership of regimes to 
states alone. I will show, in section 3.1 that this has direct bearing on this thesis where the CERN 
community invites organisations to have observer status in its central IGO.  
 
The literature on international regimes significantly enlarged in the 1970s and 80s when scholars 
acknowledged that international collaboration was not limited to formal IGOs such as the UN but 
spread across several domains and constituent bodies. Key exponents and their major works include 
John Ruggie (1975), Stephen Krasner (1982, 2001 and 2009), Ernst Haas (1980) and Oran Young 
(1980) who later with Keohane took a challenging neoliberalism stance. Leading critics of regime 
theory include Susan Strange (1982) and followers of Hedley Bull’s interpretation of the 
international system (1977). Exponents’ and critics’ key works will feature in the following 
discussion. 
 
Krasner delineates two differing approaches to regime significance within international relations. 
The first is the idea of regimes as ‘modified structural’ phenomenon whereby an international 
system of functionally symmetrical, power maximising states act in an archaic environment. In these 
circumstances, regimes arise only when individual state decision-making fails to secure desired 
outcomes. The basic causal variables for the formation of regimes therefore firmly remain power 
and self-interest. This position is well supported by respected international relations academics such 
as Arthur Stein, Robert Keohane and Robert Jervis. The second approach moves beyond the core 
realism perspective and introduces the idea that regimes do not form and operate by accident or by 
some short-term crisis-led need but are the inevitable consequence of a logical and predictable 
collaboration. Supporters such as Raymond Hopkins, Oran Young and Donald Puchala, point to the 
multi-faceted factors that play a role such as interest, power, diffuse norms, customs and 
knowledge. They maintain that elites are the practical actors operating in an interconnected net that 
embodies their own rules, norms and principles and most certainly transcends national boundaries. I 
will also show that elite networks also feature, to a limited degree, in epistemic groups at the centre 
of the SMP communities.  
 
 
27 
 
To see how the literature sits within this thesis it is useful to deliberate which of the above two 
approaches provide the most worth in explaining the regimes that host the case study IGOs. I will do 
this by considering in turn Krasner’s five causal factors for regime development: 1) egoist self-
interest, 2) political power, 3) diffuse norms and principles, 4) usage and customs and 5) knowledge.  
 
The modified structural proponents cite the egoistic self-interest causal effect as the prevailing 
explanation of international regimes; it is a powerful argument as there are clearly times when 
rational self-interest calculation leads actors to abandon independent decision making in favour of a 
joint approach (Stein, 1982), the caveat being that the coordination need not necessarily be 
formalised or institutionalised and can operate in a semi-hidden way within already existing 
structural arrangements. The backers see regimes as the inevitable pervasive characteristic of the 
international system and that they are more common under conditions of complex interdependence 
that do not preclude self-interest but accommodate it within carefully crafted negotiated 
agreements (Young, 1982; Cohen, 1982). My thesis supports this argument and will show that it fits 
well with the SMP paradigm.  
 
The second major causal variable for the development of regimes is that of political power which 
Krasner distinguishes between ‘in the service of the common good’ versus ‘in the service of specific 
interests’. This is a complicated topic that involves leadership, markets and macro-economic factors 
amongst others. Stein, who is in the modified structural camp of regime theorists, provides a 
compelling argument that the international system more closely resembles an oligopoly than a 
perfect market (1982). State actors are aware of how their behaviour affects others as their foreign 
policy experiences will have either borne diplomatic acclaim or brickbats. Smaller states are also 
observant when a hegemon is no longer willing to offer a free ride within an existing collaboration 
and are likely to change behaviour and either become paying members or leave. This leads to a 
conclusion, supported by this research, that hegemonic decline can lead to stronger regimes where 
actors are more equally bound by shared costs and potential benefits. There is an important caveat 
however that Keohane describes in chapter 9 of After Hegemony (1984): the incomplete decline of 
hegemonic regimes. The US has observer only status at CERN and a low proportion of the workshare 
of the ITER project; nevertheless, I will show that its participation in both is key. The latent 
hegemonic status remains undimmed in the SMP governance arena, due to the strength and 
reputation of the US science and technology base, and this adds kudos and influence [for all the 
Members] to any collaboration it chooses to join. US involvement also reduces the perceived and/or 
real threat as a potent rival that could otherwise entice away scarce talent and resources.    
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The idea of norms and principles being a factor in the creation, persistence and development of 
regimes leads to an interesting argument that actors will invariably find ways of collaborating with 
other like-minded actors. Informed by the Grotian tradition the supporters of the pervasive 
characteristics of the international system, point to several examples where shared norms and 
principles have held sway. For example, John Ruggie’s analysis of post-war economic regimes argues 
that it was founded on entrenched liberalism (1975). The modified structural approach to regimes 
would reason that sovereignty is the current overriding principle that influences the behaviour of 
actors (Bull, 1977) and that other actors’ assertions lack principle, are temporary and subject to 
challenge. This causal variable has direct relevance to understanding the SMPs and I will take this up 
later in the sections on leadership in the individual case study chapters.  
 
Usage and custom are considered by Krasner as not prevailing conditions for the development of 
regimes but rather supporting factors. ‘We have always done things this way’ can reinforce self-
interest of dominant states over less powerful ones but would hardly be a convincing manifesto for 
any new relationships. Oran Young hints that transactional set-up costs in terms of the time and 
energy spent by negotiators are certainly reduced when the norms and customs of the actors are 
well known (1982). Once in operation, regimes can generate their own usage and custom protocols 
that become legitimized through longevity and positive outcomes. For example, informal 
arrangements regarding meetings can become formal protocols that support governance and voting 
rights in SMP community forums; this will also be expanded on in the governance sections of the 
case study chapters.  
 
Ernst Haas positively asserts that knowledge can enhance the prospects for convergent state 
behaviour and transcend prevailing lines of ideological cleavage (1980). In an era when expert advice 
has been shunned by some politicians the reminder of the importance of knowledge is timely. Stein 
uses the example of international health regimes regarding quarantine regulations being led by 
consensus scientific knowledge. Benjamin Cohen points out that the fixed exchange rate mechanism 
central to the formation of the Bretton Woods financial institutions was based upon knowledge 
within the US domestic institutions who had learnt from the interwar economic experience (1982). 
In the same way as with usage and custom, knowledge may well not be the driving variable when 
considering regimes, but it will certainly affect the more prevalent variables of economic self-
interest and political power. This variable also has direct relevance to SMPs as knowledge is seen by 
the communities as their main deliverable to the Members; indeed, they describe it as what they are 
in business to create. I will develop this further in Chapter 6, Research Results. 
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Regimes theory also has at its centre the concept of natural longevity once they are established; for 
example, Krasner maintains that regimes should be understood as more than temporary 
arrangements that change with every shift of power and interests (1982). Jervis agrees with this idea 
of the longer-term approach: ‘the concept of regimes implies not only norms and expectations that 
facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-
interest (1982)’. With this longer-term commitment to cooperation comes a need for changed 
behavioural considerations. For example, in security regimes Jervis raises the principle of reciprocity. 
Krasner recognizes that it is this infusion of behaviour with principles and norms that distinguishes 
regime-governed activity in the international system from more conventional activity guided 
exclusively by narrow and often short-term calculations of national interest. The notion of longevity 
applies directly to the SMP communities’ model whereby they have been in existence borne out of a 
bottom-up need for collaboration between experts within epistemic groups. I will show, in the case 
study chapters, that they are therefore measured and mature in their dealings with each other and 
in their consideration of the tactics to take with those outside of their communities.  
 
Susan Strange’s criticism of regimes as an explanation for collaboration between states is that the 
core concept is too simplistic (1982). She argues that it ignores vast areas of non-regime behaviour 
in the world market economy where classic realism dominates states, NGOs and MNCs decision 
making. Her stance is that regime analysis is on the one hand too optimistic in overvaluing the 
positive aspects of international cooperation [for example in a few successful UN agencies] while on 
the other hand undervaluing the reality of there being more areas of nonagreement and controversy 
[for example in international migration and security issues]. Finally, she argues that the trend, driven 
by the integrated world economic system, is away from regimes being any kind of panacea to 
greater international collaboration and that a return to thinking along the lines of Hedley Bull’s 
‘Anarchical Society’ is more appropriate (1977). This research supports her analysis, but only to the 
extent that understanding the bargaining and trade-offs that nations reach is at least equally as 
relevant as understanding the form of the regimes in which they operate.  
 
In summary, this sub-sub-section has provided the commonly accepted definition of regime theory 
and reminded us that membership is not exclusively for nation states. The leading exponents and 
notable critics and their respective sets of work have been recognised. The longevity of regimes with 
consequential changes in collaborative behaviour has been contrasted with classical realism theory. 
Stephen Krasner’s two different approaches to regimes were described: modified structures and the 
ideas of regimes being an inevitable pervasive characteristic of the international system.  
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Krasner’s five casual factors were then used as an analysis vehicle to see how this research sits 
within the two approaches of the overall theory, as follows:  
 
1) It is understood that egoist self-interest is accommodated within the negotiated SMP 
agreements with work-share often based on relative contributions; 
2) Hegemonic decline can lead to stronger regimes where the political power of SMP actors is 
more equally bound by shared costs, risks and potential benefits; 
3) SMP actors find a way of applying their common norms and principles to overcome 
obstacles to collaboration;  
4) SMP forums operate within formal and informal arrangements where the wider science 
based epistemic community’s usage and customs hold sway and 
5) The search for knowledge is the SMP’s raison d'être and main deliverable to the funding 
members and their respective institutions.  
 
Finally, a key criticism of the regime idea - as being too simplistic an explanation for the current state 
of the international system - was analysed. I concluded that understanding the, somewhat 
neglected, set-up arrangements were important, but this did not undermine regime theory having a 
role in understanding SMP communities. 
 
 
1.1.4: International Organisations 
 
This final sub-sub-section on theory regarding global collaboration considers the literature 
surrounding International Organisations. Firstly, I will outline which type of International 
Organisations are being considered for this study. Two parameters will then be used to examine the 
rise of International Organisations in the global system since World War II. Finally, I will then explain 
the general difficulty academics face when studying International Organisations together with how 
contingent realism theory can be regarded, through examination of sovereignty and globalisation 
themes, to assess relevance to the thesis.  
 
For the purposes of this study I have limited the consideration of International Organisations to 
those that are established by treaties, agreements or conventions signed by states. In other words, 
intergovernmental institutions or intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). Also, I am considering 
here only IGOs that are inclusive (i.e. members are solely concerned about collaborating) rather than 
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IGOs that are exclusive (i.e. where members are equally concerned about who they will not 
collaborative with, as with military alliances such as NATO). 
 
Even with the above delineations, the remaining sub-field of IGOs is vast. It includes the UN with its 
six principle organs and numerous specialised agencies and bodies, the Bretton Woods financial 
organisations, the EU and other regional political and trade collaboration IGOs, environmental IGOs, 
energy and nuclear power IGOs, educational and cultural IGOs and many other specialised IGOs. The 
field also covers scientific IGOs including the case study SMPs. As Samuel Barkin points out, when we 
then consider in a matric fashion the wide areas of human endeavour such as peace, security, 
human rights, economic, environmental, etc., that the multitude of IGOs cover, the task of analysis 
of this multifaceted tapestry is daunting (2006). To focus the analysis and given that I have already 
deliberated regime theory, the analysis in this sub-sub-section will consider the accomplishments 
and failures of IGOs and the sovereignty and globalisation issues affecting their performance.  
 
Accomplishments and failures of IGOs will first be addressed by considering the foremost of them all. 
Critics of IGOs often point to the unqualified failure of the League of Nations, founded in the 
aftermath of the World War I. The ‘war to end all wars’ was marked by its immense scale of 
destruction and loss of life. Remarkably, in the aftermath of the second global conflict the League of 
Nations was disbanded only to be replaced with an even more ambitious United Nations whose 
primary goal was to deal with international peace and security issues; just as its predecessor had 
self-evidently failed to do (UN, 1945).  
 
However, on this occasion, the catastrophic effects of total war led to widespread agreement that 
comprehensive international collaboration and global governance was required. The UN system, as it 
has become known, was set up to cover a range of activities that taken together the founders 
considered were essential to effectively tackle a panoply of pressing global issues. This study will not 
analyse the relative successes, failures and modest reforms of each of the UN organs and subsidiary 
agencies. I judge that the overall aim, of maintaining world peace, that the UN founders desired has 
been met. While there have been major proxy wars during the cold war stand-off (such as the 
Korean War, 1950-53 and Vietnam War 1954-75), regional conflicts that involved several states 
(such as Gulf War I, 1990-91) and several hard-fought conflicts such as the Ukrainian crisis that 
began in 2013 and lingers on today, there has been no outbreak of a World War III.  
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The Union of International Associations provide an annual yearbook (UIA, 2017) which records the 
inexorable rise in number of IGOs since World War II to the point where several thousand now 
operate in every area of human activity. The UIA data reveals that the creation of IGOs has levelled 
off since the mid-1990s. Hale and Held (2017) suggest this is due to a combination of factors 
including that global governance functions are now also performed by a wide range of actors and 
institutions beyond IGOs. Legro and Moravcsik (1999) argue that realists have struggled to reconcile 
their classic interpretation of rationality, prudence and self-interest with the emergence of harmony 
of state interests, epistemic cultures and the power of altruistic motivations that often lead to the 
establishment of IGOs. At best, realism has been stretched to fit inconvenient truths while ignoring 
more subtle explanations of nation’s contemporary need for collaborations.   
 
Realist and neo-realist theory have maintained that international institutions reflect existing 
structures including the relative power and capabilities of the state actors. Josef Grieco maintains 
that smaller states join international organisations to leverage their relative power compared to 
larger ones and that this is a self-interest accomplishment (1996). Contingent realism theory takes a 
more positive stance, for example Charles Glaser contends that international institutions can play an 
important role in reducing or minimizing security problems (1995). To understand which of these 
two stances better fits current practice, within the UN context and outside it, I will consider to what 
extent IGOs replace states when acting on global issues. In other words, to what degree - if any - is 
sovereignty forfeited by states to IGOs, especially set against increasing pressure from globalisation.  
 
Robert Gilpin explains how the realist interpretation of IGOs makes several assumptions regarding 
the nature of international affairs (2002). The most basic of these is that the international system is 
anarchic and has no higher authority over states; sovereignty reigns supreme. Certainly, 
sovereignty’s roots are strong, and the principle of sovereignty is embedded in state legal systems 
and even retained to a limited degree in ritualistic monarchies within democratic societies. Evans 
and Newnham highlight that the UN Charter explicitly acknowledges ‘sovereign equality’ of member 
states while exulting them to settle their disputes peacefully (1998).  
 
The sovereignty concept has been steadily eroded in modern times by two main factors. Firstly, 
numerous failures of conventional sovereignty arrangements, through the four factors that 
extensive research by the CIA funded, Political Instability Task Force (PITF) identified: revolutionary 
war, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes and genocide, (Goldstone, et. al., 2010). The second 
eroding factor has been the rise in globalisation; a topic that I will limit here to consideration of the 
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exercise of power. David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton contend 
that globalisation concerns the expanding scale on which power is organised and exercised. In their 
introduction to Global Transformations they contend that the stretching of power relations means 
that sites of power and the exercise of that power become increasingly distant from the people and 
locales that experience the consequences. In other words, globalisation involves the accommodation 
of power relations at a distance (Held, et. al., 1999). This research will show that this has a high 
correlation to the experiences of global SMP communities and that their central team’s mastery of 
this distance vis-à-vis real power arrangement is part of the reason for their success.  
 
Despite occasional partial adoption [for example, as will be shown in the case study chapters where 
states in SMP communities only give up their power to a limited degree], overall the stubbornness of 
active supporters of the principle of sovereignty have repelled any telling breaches of national power 
by supranational entities. The success, to date, of national movements in Europe to curtail EU 
federalism is an example of this robust defence. Krasner (2009) explains the continued triumph of 
the sovereign state by two factors: the breadth of the state in terms of its links with other social 
entities and the depth of the state reflected in the concept of citizenship and national identity. 
 
The limits of national jurisdiction and sovereignty are under constant debate in several international 
arenas including the demarcation of global commons such as the deep oceans, the atmosphere, 
outer space and the Antarctic (Stang, 2013 and UN, 2015). In this thesis I will show that the sharing 
of sovereignty only applies in the joint legal responsibility that the SMP agreements strictly require 
to make their communities work effectively together. I will provide evidence that the SMP IGOs are 
established as legal entities to allow contracting to be undertaken and regulatory responsibilities to 
be satisfied, but there is no broader or deeper constitutional independence granted from the 
member states. The SMP communities only transcend national sovereignties in a few essential 
operational areas even ironically in the highly globalised fields of work they undertake.  
 
This absence of doubt regarding the level of delegated authority between the central organisation 
and member states is purposeful and well thought out. Theoretical opinions as to the nuanced levels 
of state control that are given up and those elements that are retained may be intellectually 
enriching but have no place in the real world of SMP construction sites. The nature of the detailed 
and complex tasks means that there can be no ambiguity - as is the case with some political IGOs - 
over where the power lies. This conclusion is in line with that of Krasner (2001) where he contends 
that globalisation is gradually changing the scope of state control but not undermining it completely.   
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In summary, this sub-section has outlined that it is IGOs that are established by treaties, agreements 
or conventions signed by states that are considered in this thesis. The resultant IGO field is vast and 
to narrow the focus I considered accomplishments and failures and sovereignty and globalisation 
issues when considering their performance. I briefly outlined the formation of the UN, the Bretton 
Woods Financial Institutions and the rise in IGOs up to the more recent plateauing of growth.  
 
The erosion of the concept of sovereignty was examined together with the effect on IGOs of 
increasing globalisation. The discussion determined that the notion of sovereign state has endured 
even within the, some would claim, relatively utopian global SMP community’s context. This thesis 
will reinforce the conclusion that while globalisation is undoubtedly changing the scope and 
boundaries of state control it is not undermining it completely. This conclusion will be supported in 
the case study chapters by my analysis of the specialist literature including founding documents, IGO 
conventions, treaties and agreements. 
 
Section summary 
 
By comparing the review of the literature in the four areas of realism, neo-realism, regime theory 
and IGOs with respect to this study, I will now draw out common themes and differences.  
 
In common is that the power of states, as expressed within both the classic realism and more 
structural neo-realism frameworks, triumphs in the SMP community context. While there is certainly 
a surrender of sovereignty to the highest levels of management within the SMP IGOs, this is only to 
the basic limits necessary to exercise operational control over the projects. Primacy of the state is 
the first of the three predominant themes in the literature (summarised in sub-section 1.5.1). 
 
A difference is that the operation of SMPs align much more with modified structural neo-realism 
than with classical realism theory. The seven members of the ITER project often interact and 
correspond, both at technical and managerial levels with an eighth entity: the central ITER IGO. I will 
show that this central body has a respected view and legitimacy around the table with the seven 
members but is ultimately subservient to them; for example, lingering disagreements may ultimately 
be referred up to the highest governing body, the ITER Council which the members control. Due to 
their size and reach, SMP IGOs often interact with different domestic departments within states. I 
will also show that state actions with SMPs can be to intentionally influence their competitive edge 
with other states in other domains. My position therefore is that we must go beyond neo-realism 
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theory and consider modified structural neo-realism concepts to fully understand and appreciate the 
nuances of global SMP communities. 
 
Another notable difference I will show is that SMP communities do not readily fit into either the 
conventional ‘modified structural’ or ‘inevitable evolution’ approaches to regime formation that 
Krasner describes. Global SMP IGOs are by no means predictable outcomes to address wicked 
problems. I will show that they are more often formed out of ripe political moments combined with 
visionary leadership within epistemic groups that have members with shared visions and values. 
They are structurally highly complex, with founding arrangements having to consider social, 
economic and power dynamics in addition to the scientific and technical challenges and workshare 
arrangements. The leadership provided by elites within SMP networks play a part in the founding 
processes, as predicted in the regime theory expounded by Puchala and Hopkins (1983). Crucially, 
this thesis will reveal that the global rules, norms and principles these elites, with the aid of other 
experts, agree are not limited only to their areas of scientific or technical expertise but also cover 
broader collaboration protocols. 
 
There are several common elements between regime theory and IGO studies that the analysis using 
Krasner’s five regime casual factors exposed. The painstakingly negotiated SMP agreements 
accommodate self-interest and political power. I will show that these manifests themselves in the 
governing bodies voting arrangements and how valuable [in scientific communities this is often 
referred to as noble] work is fairly shared between the parties. Another common element is how the 
value of knowledge that is created within the SMPs is respected by the members and that its 
openness and distribution match best practice in IGOs in other fields.   
 
A difference between regime theory and IGO practice also concerns knowledge. The search for 
knowledge is the SMP IGO’s raison d'être and core deliverable to the funding members. States 
understand that improved knowledge emanating from the SMP IGO’s may well have knock-on 
effects in other important national-interest areas. Performance in this knowledge gathering arena 
affects the relationship with the members and provides a positive and stabilising force that goes 
beyond more mainstream IGOs who must concentrate on their more subordinate coordinating role. 
I explain this idea - of the meaningful nature of SMP community activities - more fully in each the 
case study chapters when considering their organisational cultures.   
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1.2: Global Gridlock Issues 
 
This section of the literature review examines the relatively new gridlock phenomenon; the topic 
that has particularly informed this study. The review will cover the work of leading academics in the 
field including plausible solutions that they have tabled together with literature that provides 
counter arguments to the standard views. 
 
The wide range of topics that are confronted with these issues is illustrated by the Beyond Gridlock 
chapter headings: Finance, Monetary Policy, Trade, Investment, Energy, Humanitarianism, Human 
Rights, Health, Climate Change, Cyber Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction. They have 
different consequences in different settings where, as the subject matter expert authors explain, 
they also often overlap. However, the four pathways to gridlock that Hale and Held’s earlier work in 
Gridlock (2013) identified: multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems and institutional 
fragmentation run through all the topics. Another common feature is that the difficulties stem at 
least in part from previous cooperation between states that perversely increase vulnerability to 
gridlock, in that when proven channels of communication and cooperation dry up, further routes are 
not readily available. The issues at hand in each topic are also complex and hampered by 
globalisation, stalled international negotiations, resurgent nationalism and growing differences in 
national interests.  
 
In the introduction I highlighted the view of the world as ‘overlapping communities of fate’ that 
David Held demarcated in Global Covenant (2004). I pointed out that it is this world that needs 
effective GSNs if gridlock is to be combatted. Another aspect of this is that when GSNs are 
ineffective or late in being employed then the problems that they seek to address may deepen. This 
is because unmet challenges are prone to be exploited by leading populists who encourage anti-
globalisation attitudes, a self-reinforcing cycle of negative events then ensues, captured by Figure 2: 
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Figure 2; Self-reinforcing gridlock (Hale and Held et al., 2017)  
 
Dissenting academic voices, such as Daniel Drezner, Professor of International Politics at Tufts 
University, have disputed the consensus gridlock view and argue that the global system is working 
(2014). Drezner maintains that the liberal financial world order system represented by the G20, WTO 
and IMF have many defects but is still performing not least by limiting damage to national 
economies during periods of crisis. The crux of his argument is that the great depression of the 
1930s ended with no expert consensus regarding how to reinvigorate the global economy. In 
contrast, the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis witnessed strong consensus on recovery steps 
and prevented a deepening of problems. While this has a certain logic, what cannot be denied is that 
the financial institutions, despite all their knowledge systems, inspection regimes and highly 
qualified and highly remunerated personnel, failed to predict and take preventative measures to the 
crisis itself. Counter-evidence, such as that espoused by Drezner, is collated and examined in section 
6.1 of the Research Results chapter. 
 
Equally troubling to the difficulty in finding pathway solutions is the fact that the detrimental effects 
of global gridlock are more pressing with each passing year and there is an urgent need for global 
coordinated actions that cannot be resolved by domestic actions alone. Gridlock studies then are 
undoubtedly of the moment and being pursued world-wide by both academics and practioners. In 
the UK, the University of Oxford and London University have leading scholars engaged in research as 
do the University of Massachusetts Amherst, Princeton University and Harvard University in the USA. 
Pascal Lamy former Chief of Staff for the President of the European Commission and former WTO 
38 
 
Director-General has been one of the leading practitioners involved in seeking to improve global 
governance through gridlock studies (Globalist, 2019). 
 
Studies of potential pathways that the Beyond Gridlock authors analysis show the complex processes 
required to reach effective governance in each of their specialist areas. Their research is analytically 
sound, is based on robust reasoning and leads to recommendations on policy solutions that are 
operationalizable. Seven pathways and their mechanisms are explored: 1) Shifts in major powers’ 
core interests, 2) Autonomous and adaptive international institutions, 3) Technical groups with 
effective and legitimate processes, 4) Multiple, diverse organisations and institutions coalesce 
around common goals/norms, 5) Mobilization of domestic constituencies for cooperation and 
compliance, 6) Civil society coalitions with reformist states and 7) Innovative leadership as a reaction 
to gridlock.  
 
During this research a further pathway has emerged. As I mentioned in the introduction, the 
widespread modus operandi of science mega-projects is that they rely on Members’ in-kind 
contributions as well as cash payments. The in-kind contributions system has several advantages to 
the Members, including keeping the majority of the spend in their own territory and enhancing the 
professional and social capital of the Member’s companies, scientists and engineers. Consequently, I 
propose that ‘Innovative Funding’ be added to the seven above pathways as a new, eighth, pathway. 
The full argument for this is made in sub-section 6.3.8. of the Research Results chapter.  
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1.3: Science Diplomacy 
 
This section concerns the relatively new sub-field of science diplomacy within international relations 
and is divided into two parts: firstly, I will outline how science’s role and standing in society has 
developed since the emergence of modern science in the 19th century. Secondly, I will explain how 
the science diplomacy topic is organised and where this thesis fits in to that topography. Science 
diplomacy is the second of the three predominant themes in the literature that are summarised in 
sub-section 1.5.1., Analytical themes in the literature. 
 
1.3.1: Science in society 
 
This necessarily brief run through the history of modern science collaboration is to show how the 
interactions between science and broader society have led to the time being ripe for the former to 
contribute to the debate of how we find a way through the problems the global system faces. This 
section, in keeping with the basis of this thesis, will not examine scientific advancements per se but 
rather the means of collaboration that facilitated them.  
 
Although the term science diplomacy may seem new, science has played an influential role in society 
beyond its important first-order results since the Age of Enlightenment. John Henry (2008) explains 
that European court entertainers of the middle ages fashioned impressive spectacles for their royal 
families. They often utilised mirabilia machines to disguise the true mean of surprises that left their 
audiences entertained and asking for more from the colourful protagonists. The upsurge in the 
systematic knowledge of nature throughout the 17th and 18th centuries resulted in entertainers 
being gradually replaced by more serious individuals who could provide explanations to natural 
events to affluent patrons including royalty who desired to be knowledgeable and desired to be seen 
as knowledgeable by the general population. These newly termed scientific advisors could then 
prosper in a privileged setting that allowed ideas to be shared and where they could inform their 
peers of progress through lectures and publications.  
 
A wealth of history of science literature including Kuhn (1962) show us that during the Scientific 
Revolution the nature of scientific change that had begun as an argument to counter philosophical 
claims became one itself. For example, Malherbe shows that Francis Bacon (1643-1727) 
characterised the new science philosophy with an insistence that knowledge should be used for the 
benefit of mankind rather than exclusive individuals or even exclusive nations (1996). 
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Knowledge of science to quench curiosity and support military capability became increasingly 
accessible to monarchs, governments and wider society. This increased availability had a mixed 
reception: Hooykaas (1973) provides a study of the strained relationship between theology and early 
modern science where spiritual leaders often resisted new ideas. Olson (1991) on the other hand 
provides a survey of how discerning recipients, such as those dealing with the production of wealth 
via commerce, readily embraced what science could offer. As the fields of natural science 
(chemistry, astronomy, earth science, physics, and biology) explored ever more intractable problems 
the need for collaboration steadily increased; I will revisit this in the ‘Diplomacy in Science’ 
discussion below. The scientific community organised itself into networks of researchers who tackled 
progressively harder problems by sharing ideas, results and the investigative effort itself. The Royal 
Society of London spawned a succession of other societies who marshalled the efforts of specific 
scientific domains to form collaborations and perform research within their respective communities 
(Ornstein, 1938). 
 
Spurts in scientific knowledge and influence were also borne out of major armed conflicts. From the 
mathematical models of catapult trajectories (middle ages), the chemistry of lethal gas weapons 
(World War I), the physics behind the atomic bomb (World War II), the geophysics of satellite 
surveillance (Cold War) and the energy science of laser weapons (today); scientific teams have often 
played leading roles. Setting aside moral dilemmas, national teams certainly delivered results that 
were then readily taken forward into fruitful peacetime collaborations when periods of conflict 
ended. For example, the US Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California employed several 
leading German scientists expatriated from the World War II V1 and V2 ballistic rocket projects 
(Bender, 2014 and Launius, 2018: 50).  
 
This need for interaction between like-minded individuals and groups to tackle difficult issues was 
not unique to science. It was increasingly relevant in other fields where lone participants and even 
lone nations could not succeed. At first this inter-governmental cooperation was needed to facilitate 
growth and wealth with international bodies created to set and govern trade, trade routes and 
regularise the means of distribution. Nations collaborated where their national interests benefited 
from that alliance often to exploit lucrative markets by dividing up the spoils rather than fighting 
over them. As problems then emerged that also spanned national borders the need for 
intergovernmental collaboration to tackle them was also self-evident. Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004) 
takes this further with the idea that in the 21st century, inter-governmental networks are 
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increasingly required to counter ‘networked threats’ to global issues. I will show that this theme of 
necessity to cooperate is a major driver to the formation of SMP IGOs.  
 
Science ventures have repeatedly overturned the reluctance of Nations to cooperate and there are 
several tangible illustrations of successful scientific GSNs. Their routes to formation may vary but in 
common is the tight coalescence of national, international and non-governmental science groups 
around global issues of concern. Threats to global health posed by infectious diseases outbreaks 
such as the 2014 Ebola crisis are tackled by the WHO but only through the support of trans-
governmental medical networks. The Medecins Sans Frontieres charity, International Red Cross and 
several other bodies cooperate in the field and share local and regional knowledge. They stay 
operationally up-to-date, effective and functional and have well proven associations with IGOs such 
as UNICEF and other UN agencies. Literature, such as the UN WHO Expert Panel Report Protecting 
Humanity from Future Health Crises (UN, 2016), shows us that in major medical emergencies more 
depth of knowledge and new solutions are often urgently needed but this is achieved through 
established and already functioning epistemic community networks rather than by the creation of 
any new entity. In the aftermath of such events it is also the joint conclusions of these community 
networks - rather than the WHO alone - that provide preventative strategy policy advice to 
governments; such as the US National Academy of Sciences Expert Group report on the optimal 
control of Ebola outbreaks (PNAS, 2015). 
 
Kristen Lord of George Washington University and Vaughan Turekian of the American Association of 
Science co-authored a policy paper in Science (2007) that advocated it was Time for a New Era of 
Science Diplomacy. In it they argued that ‘nongovernmental scientific organisations and individuals 
are more credible, nimbler and in many cases more respected than the US Government overseas’. 
They led a call to arms to the US scientific community in the wake of the recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Report to engage foreign public opinion through their actions. They cited three 
reasons why US scientists should be willing ambassadors at large. Firstly, they use the ITER Project as 
an example of how diplomacy benefits great science by forming iconic projects that could not be 
undertaken without the broader access they bring. Secondly, they asserted that as the health of the 
national scientific community depended on the willingness of foreign scientists and students to 
come to the US, every US scientist should play a part in ensuring that was an attractive prospect. 
Thirdly, they reminded readers that scientists are citizens too and share wider concerns about 
negative perceptions of the US abroad and were uniquely and fortuitously well placed, through 
widespread respect for American Science and Technology, to positively influence those perceptions.  
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1.3.2: Types of Science Diplomacy  
 
The traditional Natural Sciences specialisations do not provide a ready fit when we consider science 
diplomacy. Appendix A, Selected Overview of SMPs and their Communities shows that global science 
projects feature in each of the classic natural science domains. Diplomacy scholars have long 
recognised that science diplomacy considerations span these domains and need fresh demarcations 
if they are to be understood, studied and enhanced. However, as Emmeline Ledgerwood and Sarah 
Bunn (UK Parliament, 2018) point out the term science diplomacy has become more common since 
the Royal Society and American Association of the Advancement of Science (Royal Society, 2010) 
joint paper New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy. The paper was the result of a joint conference which 
concluded that the concept of science diplomacy was gaining currency in the academic circles of the 
US, UK and Japan and needed to better organise its contributions if it was to be effective in 
exchanging views with wider fields of diplomacy. It helpfully provided three dimensions of science 
diplomacy that have become widely adopted and provide a co-home [with Beyond Gridlock theory] 
for this thesis. The paper concluded that while the full concept of science diplomacy and its 
definition were still fluid it was already being actively applied in three inter-related areas that I will 
now outline.  
 
Firstly, Science in Diplomacy informs policymakers with up-to-date, impartial scientific advice on the 
range of problems facing the world. They were also needed to identify where uncertainty existed or 
where the evidence base was inadequate. Since 2005, the national academies of science of the G8 + 
5 countries have met annually to produce joint statements relating to successive themes of the G8 
Presidency. Similarly, the Inter Academy Panel on International Issues (IAP), representing over 100 of 
the world’s national science academies of science, has published statements on ocean acidification 
and deforestation, as a contributor to the UN climate change negotiations with the member states 
(IAP, 2009).  
 
Secondly, Diplomacy for Science was facilitating international science cooperation. The RA/AAAS 
joint paper challenged and dismissed the romantic notion of the scientist as a lone creative genius. 
In today’s world to be alone in science means to be cut-off from ideas, concepts, funding and 
equipment that are all needed to tackle today’s problems. Scientific enterprise is now premised on 
the need to connect with the best minds in each field; the emphasis being on the necessity to work 
in well-funded groups with cutting edge equipment. The RA/AAAS joint paper cites the CERN LHC as 
a leading example of this and argues that, due to the nature of the difficult fundamental problems, 
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the instinctive impulse towards global scientific collaboration will invariably prove stronger than any 
defensive, national strategies. I do not agree that collaboration will inevitably win over national 
short-sightedness, but I will show in this thesis that the binding centripetal force for collaboration 
gets stronger as the underlying meaningfulness and need for knowledge increases.  
 
The third dimension is Science for Diplomacy which draws on the soft power of science cooperation 
to improve broader international relations between states. This has several forms including science 
cooperation agreements (such as bi-lateral or multi-lateral treaties), new intergovernmental 
organisations and institutions (such as the ITER IGO), educational scholarships and science festivals 
and exhibitions.  
 
The three dimensions described above are useful in providing boundaries to our academic thinking 
of science diplomacy. In real world applications they often overlap considerably. For example, 
informing foreign policy objectives with good science-based advice can lead to and be part of 
facilitating international science cooperation itself. It could be argued that this thesis falls into the 
second category of Diplomacy for Science in that it is examining iconic intergovernmental 
cooperation’s, but that would be wrong. This study is about how global SMPs achieve their effective 
collaboration pathways with member states. Accordingly, it is firmly in the third category of Science 
for Diplomacy as I explore in what way science cooperation at the very highest global levels takes 
place and what pointers that may provide to improve international relations between states in other 
domains.  
 
Professor Chris Llewellyn Smith was Director General of CERN from 1994 to 1998 and President of 
the SESAME Council from 2008 to 2017. SESAME is a physics mega-project based in Jordan. His 
article Synchrotron Light and the Middle East: Bringing the Region’s Scientific Communities Together 
through SESAME provides an interesting example of this third type of science diplomacy (AAAS, 
2012). Llewellyn Smith contends that ‘CERN was conceived in the aftermath of World War II with the 
explicit twin aims of enabling science that the members individually could not afford and 
contributing to strengthening links between countries that had recently been at war. The SESAME 
project is also beyond the reach of individual science budgets and will require a range of skills that 
members do not possess on their own. The project has two aims: firstly, to ‘foster scientific and 
technological capacities and excellence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region (and 
prevent or reverse a brain drain from those regions to the west) by constructing an outstanding 
scientific device and enabling world-class research by scientists in a diverse range of fields including 
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biology and medical sciences, materials science, physics and chemistry and archaeology’. Secondly, 
‘to build scientific links and foster better understanding and a culture of peace through scientific 
collaboration in the region.  
 
Llewellyn Smith cites the success of CERN in inspiring and assisting in the creation of many other 
intergovernmental scientific organisations in Europe such as the European Molecular Biology 
Laboratory, the European Southern Observatory and the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility. 
He suggests that SESAME may not only emulate CERN’s scientific and political success but will also in 
turn inspire and cultivate other collaborations. The common thrust is that as the language of science 
is universal, scientists and SMP leaders are uniquely placed to build bridges of understanding and 
crucially trust between states, their elites and their publics. They provide a back channel of 
communication that diplomats and practioners in other domains can exploit. 
 
In summary, this part of the literature review has provided a précis of the major phases of the 
history of modern science collaboration to demonstrate that science has often led the thinking on 
the necessity for collaboration. The time is ripe for science [and as I will later explain the 
organisation of science mega projects] to potentially play a telling role once again in overcoming the 
wider gridlock problems the world now faces. The literature review has positioned this research in 
the category of Science for Diplomacy within the accepted three-part science diplomacy topography.   
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1.4: Mega-Projects Governance, Leadership and Performance Issues 
 
Mega-projects are complex endeavours and the literature covering their governance, leadership and 
performance issues is large and driven from different research standpoints. This section of the 
literature review will focus on well-respected studies by leading academics from institutions in 
Europe and the USA. It is divided into two sections: general topic material which span management 
issues of different mega-project areas and material specific to the management and leadership 
within the SMP domain. SMP leadership is the last of the three predominant literature themes that 
are summarised in sub-section 1.5.1., Analytical themes in the literature. 
 
 
1.4.1: Mega-project governance and management 
 
Miller and Lessard (2000) provide an experience-based theoretical framework that allows managers 
to understand and respond to the uncertainty and complexity inherent in what they term as Large 
Engineering Projects (LEPs). LEPs have had a contested record of success, often defined as delivering 
the planned outcomes within budget and to schedule (Bruzelius et al., 2002, Flyvbjerg et al, 2003, 
Priemus, 2007). In such endeavours, project success may mean different things to different 
stakeholders (Shenhar et al, 2001); I will show in the case study chapters that this is also the case for 
SMPs but that practioners have found ways of accommodating these variations while working 
together to achieve their shared community goals. 
 
LEPs are inevitable prone to some degree of uncertainty. During the construction phase, 
assumptions about the local geology, culture and climate that had not been anticipated may reveal 
themselves. SMPs often meet technical difficulties as they, by their very nature, develop and test 
new and unproven technologies. Mega-projects are also prone to political risks. Funding may be 
curtailed or withdrawn following a change to government priorities, long after the original funding 
has been approved. The shock decision to pull the UK out of the Gemini Observatory project being 
one example of an unforeseen change in government priorities (RAS, 2007). The sheer complexity of 
a mega-project poses challenges too. The design, planning and assembly of a complex piece of 
technical equipment require that all the components are designed so that the physical, mechanical, 
electromagnetic and electronic interfaces between them are clearly and accurately specified. 
Meticulous planning and specifications are invariably produced, but results show that they seldom 
survive intact from contact with project construction realities.  
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Stakeholders often have different views on their preferred mega-project outcomes and priorities. 
Allegiance to different baselines, differing preferences for efficiency and effectiveness, and general 
rivalry lead to competing performance narratives (Gil and Pinto, 2016). The geographical dispersion 
of stakeholders also contributes to project risk (Ivory and Alderman, 2005). If these issues are left 
unreconciled then problems may deepen and Lundrigan, et al., (2015) contend that LEP under-
performance is often a result of organisational structural development issues, rather than any 
agency or competence related failure. The ‘disappointing under performance’ they describe is not 
due solely to how the organisational structure develops. Other factors such as individual and group 
competence failings and technical issues still do play a part. Miller, et al., (2016) focus on LEPs as 
‘games of innovation’ where sponsors, experts, and stakeholders interact to form, design and deliver 
projects. Each project calls for different and multiple innovative management adaptions over time in 
the face of project events and design trade-offs. Bruzelius et al., (2002) frame mega-project 
underperformance as a problem of accountability and suggest four measures to raise it: 
transparency, performance specifications, explication of regulatory regimes, and involvement of risk 
capital. These respected LEP management study authors all have legitimate differing perspectives of 
what is taking place. Together they illustrate the necessary complexity that is involved and provide 
clues as to the wide range of knowledge, skills and practices needed to manage them. 
 
Different academic studies in the management science field also reveals that the body sponsoring 
the work can insentiently affect the conclusion. A World Bank team led by Gerry Ingram in 1994 
concluded the cause of poor big project performance lies not in planning errors but in the incentives 
facing sponsors and users (Ingram, 1994). The report emphasised that higher performance requires 
commercial factors rather than any managerial panacea and that competition instead of monopoly 
offered the best chance of success. Leonard Sayles and Margaret Chandler in their studies of major 
NASA programs concluded that to manage systems better the separate strands of management 
science, organizational behaviour and governance must be woven together. The crux of their 
concluding remarks was that managing LEPs involves political issues as much as it involves technical 
ones (Sayles and Chandler, 1971).  
 
The conclusion that emerges from a study of mega-project governance, leadership and performance 
issues literature is that standard project controls and management best practice are well known; 
how they are respected and applied varies greatly by industrial sectors. This is a conclusion 
supported by Macintosh and Quattrone (2010) who showed the tights links between organisational 
and sociological issues when tackling project management in large-scale projects. Assorted 
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management approaches are needed in different sectors. I will show, in the case study chapter 
sections dealing with organisational culture that this also applies to the SMP communities where a 
common approach that they all utilise has worked well. 
 
 
1.4.2: Science mega-project management and leadership 
 
SMP higher level management do not ignore accepted Management Science theory particularly with 
respect to LEP design and planning that I described in the previous sub-section. As I will explain in 
the separate case study chapters, their management approach does reflect the preponderant 
personality type that they employ. The situation is well summarised by Max Boisot, Marcus 
Nordberg, Saïd Yami and Bertrand Nicquevert in Collisions and Collaboration: The Organization of 
Learning in the ATLAS Experiment (2011): ‘the leadership implications of a collaboration of nearly 
three thousand members… in the face of high levels of uncertainty, risk and ambitious scientific aims 
can be achieved by complex organizational networks characterized by cultural diversity, informality, 
and trust.’ The CERN Management recognise [as it is where they largely come from] that the 
workforce is special in that it comprises highly educated, motivated and dedicated people drawn 
from varied backgrounds, age groups and cultural customs. Due to the way work is distributed many 
of this workforce are also located in the member states territories and remain under familiar cultural 
influences. The SMP leadership teams understand that their situation cannot be managed by pure 
management science, project controls, monitoring, risk registers and gateway decision gate 
meetings. Rolf-Dieter Heuer, the Director General of CERN in the critical period of building the Large 
Electron-Positron collider at CERN, agrees with Boisot, et. al., that a markedly more bottom-up and 
collective light-touch approach to decision making is needed (CERN/UNOG, 2015). 
 
Leadership in these circumstances seems to be most successful when practioners recognise that the 
best leaders are not necessarily rounded but the best teams are. Tom Rath and Barry Conchie in a 
large study of strengths-based leadership conducted for the Gallup organisation showed that 
effective leaders of the world’s largest projects surround themselves with the right people and 
create a working environment that allows those people to build on each person’s strength (Rath and 
Conchie, 2009). Another consideration that influences our discussion on SMPs is the very problems 
they are tasked to deal with. Keith Grint’s work on Wicked Problems and Clumsy Solutions (2008) 
shows the vital role that leadership plays in creating an organisational culture that succeeds. He 
frames wicked problems as persistent, tending to be insoluble and not presenting clear sets of 
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alternative solutions. He summarises his position on the leadership approach that should be taken 
by quoting the Canadian academic Laurence Peter: ‘Some problems are so complex that you have to 
be highly intelligent and well informed just to be undecided about them.’ SMP leadership is a 
predominant theme in the literature [all three are summarised in sub-section 1.5.1.] and will be re-
visited during the analysis of the case study governance arrangements and leadership. 
 
Although there has been little published academic research on the overall management of SMPs, 
there have been several workshops and discussion papers of the administration and control of their 
funding mechanisms. For example, Ferrazzani (1997) provides a wide-ranging review of the 
European Space Agency (ESA) projects which have utilised in-kind deliverables (IKD) since the early 
1970s. The members had prompted the review to re-examine their financial exposure to ESA’s 
optional programmes, that predominately exploit in-kind deliverables, and to establish joint and 
clear guidelines. Ferrazzani, who is the Legal Counsel to ESA, highlights the complexity of the in-kind 
approach and focuses on what ‘In-Kind Deliverables rules’ he recommends be adopted; 
unsurprisingly, these are made from primarily a legal rather than project management perspective. 
Although over 20 years since publication, Ferrazzani’s analysis is valuable as it covers in depth the 
ESA ‘In-Kind Management System’ assumptions. Some recommendations are internal such as those 
related to the Founding Convention, but others can be correlated externally, including cost control, 
industrial policy, contracts and intellectual property rights. Gordon (2003) provides the perspective 
of a contributing member on the day-to-day struggle between ‘Consensus and Harmony versus 
Management’ within ATLAS, an experiment undertaken on the LHC, supported by CERN. He explains 
the purposes of ATLAS financial management to be: minimising the amount of risk and cash held by 
the central administration, ensuring that attributed value of the in-kind contribution is in accordance 
with the agreed Cost Book value, clarifying the financial and contractual responsibilities and 
clarifying the technical and managerial responsibilities. 
 
Despite this introspection within specialist scientific sub-domains, the reach and influence of SMP 
communities has come to the attention of governments not least because their success and growth 
has led to higher demands for funding. A European Commission Expert Panel (EC, 2010) report 
provides evidence of the governmental-level interest in SMP undertakings, the desire to share 
lessons learnt and to standardise approaches. Recommendation 9, states “best-practice systems for 
project control and risk management have to be fully embedded in the project management 
covering technical, financial and schedule issues.” This was intimating - without saying directly - that 
while best-practice systems for project control and risk management were espoused by the project’s 
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higher management, the efforts of the central programme management offices to enforce them had 
mixed results. It also implied that insufficient rigour had been applied by stakeholders including 
Member State oversight bodies to check if the systems were well rooted.  
 
SMP leadership literature has naturally focussed on detailed practitioners’ needs to improve the 
management of these challenging projects, to overcome obstacles, and to re-arrange restrictive 
workshare arrangements to make them fit real-world realities. A further example is Ramila Amirikas 
and Pradeep Ghosh (2016) who focus on the legal basis of In-Kind Management in the context of the 
FAIR accelerator facility (based in Darmstadt, Germany) during the annual European Spallation 
Source International Workshop on In-Kind Contributions. 
 
There are exceptions to the introspective SMP project management literature, where science 
authors try and break out of their communities to reach a wider readership: Boisot et. al., (2011) 
examines the management of the ATLAS experiment of the LHC at CERN and introduces topics such 
as procurement lessons, leadership issues and e-Science but does address the reasons behind the 
successful collaboration. Harry Collins (2017) a British sociologist who in the early 1990s embedded 
himself in the collaboration building the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory 
(LIGO) experiment but provides a who-done-it rather than a how-did-they-do-it approach in 
describing their great success in detecting gravitational waves. Renee Rottner provides in History of 
the Spitzer Infrared Telescope Facility (2013) a basic analysis of the original international 
collaborations that enabled NASA’s Spitzer project and the technical and funding challenges that the 
founders had to overcome; Rottner’s main focus however is on the project management lessons 
learned (NASA, 2003).  
 
One study that stands out is that of Karin Knorr-Cetina (1999) from Harvard University who 
investigated the role epistemic cultures play in explaining How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Her 
book is important to my thesis as it is the first to systematically compare two different scientific 
laboratory cultures (high energy physics and molecular biology) and touches on topics such as how 
expert systems and processes work and whether their organization, structures, and operations can 
be extended to other forms of social order. The work is also important as it raises the possibility that 
this research may have little or no applicability to other areas of international relations and thereby 
gridlock issues. It raises this prospect by labouring the fact that laboratories are unique 
reconfigurations of natural and social orders and that the reconfigurations even operate differently 
in different fields of science. However, her analysis while excellent in the level of detail conducted 
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over many years is surprisingly limited in that it is was primarily set in one context. It was about what 
goes on within the epistemic communities of the modern scientific laboratories and the contrast in 
approaches to the discovery of knowledge between two different scientific communities. The 
weakness of the work is that it only touches briefly on why the nations agreed to form the 
laboratories or how the nations and the central organisation organise themselves to maintain those 
international collaborations. 
 
In summary, this part of the literature review demonstrates that SMPs are more than just another 
class of LEPs, to be added to the category list of bridges, dams, highways, urban development’s etc. 
They are distinctive because of their need for public funds with associated governmental oversight, 
their blending of many managerial cultures, tendency to utilise a bottom-up and collective form of 
management decision-making, their need to share risks, solve wicked problems and their provision 
of knowledge to the contributing Member States.  
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1.5: Themes in the literature, research gap and relevance to this thesis  
 
In this last section of the literature review I will firstly ascribe three analytical themes. I will then 
argue why the thesis fills a research gap and will outline the relevance of the literature to the thesis. 
 
 
1.5.1: Analytical themes in the literature  
 
Three shared themes have been recognised in the literature as it relates to the research case 
studies: the primacy of the state, science diplomacy and SMP leadership. To examine synergies and 
note any major differences between these themes, I recap the analysis and set the SMP context of 
each one in turn.  
 
It is in section 6.1. where I provide my response to all the counter-evidence, including the associated 
literature, to the hypotheses, that are central to explaining the thesis.  
 
1.5.1.1: Primacy of the state 
 
I concluded in the sub-section 1.1. on realism that any global governance exercised by the SMP IGO 
management teams is conditional on the power politics that the contributing members exercise. The 
top leadership teams of these iconic projects operate within the degree of delegated authority that 
the nations tolerate; but, no more. This thesis will show that the set-up and running of these SMPs 
do not provide an exception to this solid realism footing. SMPs also fit into recent neoclassical realist 
theory in that their set-up acknowledges domestic considerations, cooperation and competition 
between states and that complex stratagems may mean efforts in one system [science collaboration] 
are calculatedly undertaken to support and improve a nation’s position in other systems [such as 
energy policy and national security].  
 
Regime theory and international organisation literature showed that major steps have been made in 
global international cooperation often only in the wake of world catastrophes, such as The League of 
Nations post World War I and the UN, and its principle organs post World War II. The defensive 
characteristics of states alter in these periods; officials can relax the boundaries for compromise and 
a coming together of minds ensues. I will show that global SMP communities expertly ride such 
waves of change: CERN was formed in the immediate post World War II period; the ISS was born out 
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of the end of the Cold War space race. The research will investigate if this was mere coincidence or a 
more calculated tactic of the SMP pioneers.  
 
The final aspect of primacy of the state that Robert Keohane in After Hegemony prompts us to keep 
in mind is that effective cooperation must be distinguished from utopian harmony. This is true for 
SMPs, whose cooperation does not imply the absence of conflict but rather that without the risk of 
conflict there is no necessity to cooperate. They heed back to the basic human instinct of necessity 
for cooperation born out of dire circumstances. US President Truman in 1945, that I quoted in the 
introduction, articulated this perfectly: “if we do not want to die together in war, we must learn to 
live together in peace”. I echo this with these challenging statements, intentionally adding an 
emphasis to the first word of each: If we do not want to fail to understand the nature of 
fundamental physics, we must learn to make CERN a success. If we do not want to collectively suffer 
the collapse of the earth’s environment, we must learn to make an environmentally friendly 
commercial power source, such as ITER, a success. If we do not want to fail to master deep space 
travel and overcome harmful physiological effects of micro-gravity and cosmic radiation, we must 
learn to make the ISS a success. I will argue that the SMP communities revel in the meaningfulness of 
their endeavours and unshakably take on these massive challenges on behalf of us all. Once 
established, I will show that the communities have found a way of effectively channelling their 
collective efforts through IGOs that execute open actions, share risks and steadily build trust 
between states while always respecting the power and primacy of those states. 
 
1.5.1.2: Science diplomacy 
 
The literature review of the recent history of science diplomacy showed that science has often led 
the thinking on the necessity for collaboration. Science diplomacy has been present from Francis 
Bacon insisting that knowledge is for all to the formation by the Royal Academy of societal networks 
to tackle wicked problems right through to science communities bucking recent trends of national 
entrenchment by establishing iconic and successful SMP IGOs.  
 
The literature review positioned this research in the category of Science for Diplomacy that draws on 
the soft power of science cooperation to improve broader international relations between states. 
This placement reinforces the idea that as SMPs have been remarkably effective in building a 
collective spirit and evolving complex processes and methods to enable global collaboration. 
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The connected nature of society and the threats to its welfare means that active clusters of scientific 
knowledge find themselves uniquely placed to use their influence for good. Despite recent rejection 
of experts from a minority of politicians and bi-partisanship influencing which science results to 
highlight, the overall trend has been for scientists to continue to be trusted across political divides. 
The literature review confirms that expert scientific working groups and bodies inform industrial 
conglomerates, governments and several UN agencies. The potency of science, as a real and/or 
perceived, impartial back channel for building trust and understanding between countries is gaining 
traction as its legitimacy is enhanced by self-evident successes that the SMP IGOs epitomise.  
 
1.5.1.3: SMP leadership  
 
There is a long historical association between science and international cooperation where the 
former has often led the way. Davis and Patman (2015) provide many examples where science 
cooperation has resulted in better international relations between states that I covered in the 
Introduction. Can science lead the way once more?  
 
Modern management leadership literature emphasises the need for reflective management and 
develops the idea of the ‘incomplete leader’. The industrial mega-projects, that I described in the 
introduction sub-section on global gridlock are no longer led by individuals who rely on hierarchy 
and authority. Shifting ideas about leadership described by management psychologist academics 
such as Derue, Nahrgang, Wellman and Humphrey (2011) have moved through three phases of 1) 
Hierarchy and Authority (early 20th Century), Involvement and Vision (Middle 20th Century), 
Empowerment (late 20th Century) and Networks and Value co-creation (21st Century).  
 
I will show, through the data gathered in interviews that supports the literature covered in this 
Chapter that SMP community leadership and governance practices have been ahead of the three 
step shift of leadership approach described above. I will argue that although they are certainly not 
without fault, the SMP leadership teams have achieved a positive, fulfilling, work-related state of 
mind that is characterised by team members with vigour, dedication and absorption in the task 
(Schaufeli and Salanova, 2011). The reasons for this can be characterised by the collective 
management decision making observed by Markus Nordberg, Saïd Yami, and Bertrand Nicquevert in 
their study of ATLAS at CERN that I covered in sub-section 1.4.2.  
 
54 
 
The SMP community leadership have also trail-blazed advanced ways of coping with the varied 
needs of the participating states. I will develop this case in the governance, leadership and 
performance sub-sections of the individual case study chapters. My research has benefited from the 
leaders who agreed to provide first-hand insights into the diplomacy they have employed in working 
with the nations involved. I will show that distinct leadership qualities and diplomacies are an 
integral part of the SMP community’s success story. 
 
 
1.5.2: Literature gap 
 
I have shown in this literature review that the set-up, collaboration agreements and operation of 
SMP IGOs are not outside of the international relations categories of theory; there is a reserved 
place for them. However, these collaborations of the world’s leading industrial states and whose 
results will affect us all, have been a neglected area of enquiry by international relations scholars 
including those focused on global gridlock issues. 
 
With a few notable exceptions that I highlighted in sub-section 1.4.2 (Science mega project 
management and leadership) the SMP community literature has predominantly and quite naturally 
been introspective within specific scientific domains. I have also shown that while both the European 
Commission and the United Nations have commissioned reports into global science infrastructures; 
these have been primarily to inform co-ordinated national investment decisions rather than to 
reveal any cooperation insights that the SMP IGO collaborations themselves may have.  
 
The essence of the research gap argument is clear when considering the Abbot and Hale (2014) 
paper on Orchestrating Global Solution Networks (GSN); a Guide for Organizational Entrepreneurs. 
The paper has at its core the survey of 223 GSNs categorized into 10 groupings. There are no science 
GSNs in the survey. This is a conspicuous flaw but does not expose poor research practice; indeed, it 
is a landmark study of global web-based and mobile networks for cooperation, problem solving and 
governance. I believe the omission is because of the pervasiveness of an international relations 
academic blind spot whereby science collaboration is the giant sequoia tree in the wild forest that 
cannot be seen because of younger [more subject specific] trees that have grown around it.  
 
The authors highlight four characteristics of successful orchestrator organisations. They contend 
they must 1) be seen as legitimate by those with whom it works, 2) occupy a central focal position in 
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its issue area, 3) possess moral, subjective or material resources that it can offer collaborating 
organisations and 4) nurture an organisational culture of innovation and collaboration. I will employ 
the legitimacy and focality characteristics to assess the IGOs that lead the case study SMP 
communities. 
 
 
1.5.3: Relevance of the literature to this thesis 
 
I positioned this research in the category of Science for Diplomacy within the accepted three-part 
Science Diplomacy topography in the analysis in sub-section 1.3.2. I now turn to considering where it 
also fits in the ‘pathways through gridlock’ literature landscape.  
 
In the same way that the original Bretton Woods organisations were formed from the needs of that 
time, it may now be apposite to re-mould those institutions and/or their working practices for the 
global needs of today. Milivoje Panić (2011) outlines radical development thinking that could be the 
framework for a new Bretton Woods global payments system for developing countries. Leading 
academic think tanks reason and urge diplomats that these types of sweeping changes are also 
needed to overcome the entrenched stalemate of global gridlock (BSG, 2016). This thesis aspires to 
provide new and novel notions to contribute to that ‘sweeping changes’ debate and therefore take 
its place in that cutting-edge part of the global gridlock literature. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter will firstly set the scene for the research methodology by explaining the case study 
selection justification. It will then state the research problem and related sub-questions. The third 
section outlines the research strategy through a conceptual framework. The fourth section details 
the research design in five sub-sections: 1) the research philosophy, 2) methodological approach, 3) 
counterfactual evidence, 4) research limitations and 5) research ethical issues. The final section 
summarises the chapter. 
 
Literature that has informed this chapter includes: David Dooley, Social Research Methods (1984); 
Peter Frost and Ralf Stablein, Doing Exemplary Research (1992); Catherine Marshall and Gretchen 
Rossman, Designing qualitative research (1995); Harvey Maylor and Kate Blackmon, Researching 
Business and Management (2005); Wayne Booth, Gregory Colomb and Joseph Williams, The Craft of 
Research (2008) and Marian Petre and Gordon Rugg, The Unwritten Rules of PhD Research (2010).  
 
 
2.1: Case Study Selection Justification 
 
The case study selection process has been a successive one, firstly covering the cost factors, then the 
international norms used for demarcating SMPs, the attributes and criteria for global SMP status and 
concludes with the rationale for the case studies that are the focus of this thesis taking into account 
the supporting and opposing attributes for testing the hypotheses that are detailed in table 1.  
 
Full descriptions are provided in the first sections of each case study chapter; the titles, short 
descriptions and membership of each case study are as follows:  
 
1. The CERN community. The main CERN laboratory is based near Geneva, Switzerland. It is a well-
established global centre of excellence for fundamental high energy physics research. CERN has 
23 European member states (detailed in section 3.1.1 for the founding Members and sub-section 
3.3.3.1 for those that have joined since) and six associate member states: Croatia, India, 
Lithuania, Pakistan, Turkey and Ukraine. Observer states and organizations include the European 
Union, Japan, the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) the Russian Federation, UNESCO 
and the USA. CERN’s flagship infrastructure project is the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). 
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2. The ITER Project community. The project is based in Cadarache, France. It is arguably the largest 
collaborative scientific project ever undertaken with the aim of proving the commercial viability 
of nuclear fusion energy. ITER has seven members that together represent over half the world’s 
population and over 80% of the world’s GDP (OECD, 2018): the People's Republic of China, 
Europe (27 states bound together through the EURATON Treaty), India, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, the Russian Federation and the USA. 
3. The International Space Station (ISS) community. The ISS headquarters is in Washington DC, 
USA. The ISS is a unique achievement in human space exploration to conceive, plan, build, 
operate, and utilize a micro gravity research platform in a low earth orbit. The ISS member states 
are Canada, Japan, the Russian Federation, the USA, and eleven Member States of the European 
Space Agency (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). 
 
 
2.1.1: Cost factors 
 
Miller and Lessard (2000) in their work at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) use a 
practical construction cost threshold of greater than US$ 1B when defining Large Engineering 
Projects (LEPs). The figure does not consider inflation nor that there are different costs in different 
parts of the world, but it does provide an apt order of magnitude and has been widely accepted 
within academia researching mega-project management to denote LEPs. This thesis uses the same 
threshold as part of the SMP status criteria. Operating, decommissioning and disposal costs are not 
considered within the cost selection criteria but are addressed in the individual case study chapters. 
 
 
2.1.2: International norms for demarcating SMPs 
 
The role of the European Strategy Forum for Research Infrastructures (ESFRI) is to support European 
states in determining a coherent and strategy-led approach to science research policy-making. ESFRI 
comprises a well-respected body of experts from several fields who together facilitate multinational 
initiatives leading to development and/or better use of European science research infrastructures. 
ESFRI produce a bi-annual roadmap that demarcates between projects and landmark status projects; 
the category definitions run to several paragraphs (ESFRI, 2016).  
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The Group of Senior Officials (GSO) is the forum established by the G8 in 2008 to discuss and 
advance Global Research Infrastructures (GRIs). The group’s Framework for GRIs received ministerial 
level approval in 2013 and set three broad categories of GRIs (EC, 2017): 1) Real single-sited global 
facilities that are geographically localized unique facilities whose governance is fundamentally 
international in character, 2) Globally distributed Research Infrastructures formed by national or 
institutional nodes, which are part of a global network and whose governance is fundamentally 
international in character and 3) National facilities of global interest with unique capabilities that 
attract wide interest from researchers outside of the host nation. The Framework also provides a 
useful checklist of the criteria to be considered in potential global GRIs. 
 
 
2.1.3: Attributes and criteria for global SMP status 
 
Utilising these the $ 1B construction threshold, the ESFRI roadmap methodology and the checklist 
from the GSO Framework for GRIs, results in a list of over one hundred SMPs. Despite the somewhat 
inflated claims of many science communities only a select few SMPs are global in that they have: 
 
• taken decades to form into collaborations under intergovernmental treaty obligations; 
• members that span continents and operate within a global expert community;  
• a specially created central IGO or a specially created new entity within an existing IGO; 
• construction budgets in the tens of $ B; 
• funding mechanisms that comprise a combination of in-cash and in-kind contributions from 
the member states; 
• highly complex technical challenges; 
• results that are shared world-wide; 
• ground-breaking respected iconic research status and 
• high visibility within both the scientific and public realms. 
 
A selected overview of global SMPs and their communities that fall within specific scientific domains 
is at Appendix A. It is also recognised that there are science related International Organizations that 
span science domains and/or provide a global service such as the UN Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO).  
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2.1.4: Rationale for the case studies that are the focus of this thesis 
 
The final justification in selecting the three case studies is when the following attributes are 
considered: 
 
• all three case studies meet the global criteria bar outlined above; 
• they are equal in the sense of all being in the foremost position within their domains; 
• each is at a different phase within a project’s life cycle and thereby in combination provide 
an overlapping complete picture: ITER is in final design / construction phase, the CERN main 
infrastructure LHC is in mid-life upgrade / operational phase and the ISS is the final stages of 
its working life. Although concentrating on physics global SMPs, I note the wealth of other 
natural science SMPs which also only have a select few projects in the global SMP category 
[as Appendix A attests] and the global IOs such as the IPCC which is one of five bodies 
considered as ripe for further research (see p 251); 
• each have members who are also involved in other IGOs and/or other global communities 
that are functioning less well and therefore the analysis provides fertile ground to examine 
what the global SMP governance and leadership regimes are doing that the others are not; 
• access to key interviewees - that will provide primary data for testing the hypotheses 
utilising the supporting and opposing attributes listed in table 1 (p 66) - is feasible and 
• all three case studies provide ready access to founding documents, treaties, negotiation 
material, governance and leadership material including the minutes of governing organs that 
will provide reputable secondary data for testing the hypotheses utilising the supporting and 
opposing attributes listed in table 1 (p 66). 
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2.2: Research Problem and related questions 
 
The thesis investigates the international collaboration agreements, set-up, governance and 
leadership aspects of three iconic global SMP Communities: the CERN Community, the ITER Project 
Community, and the ISS Community. The trans-border collaboration needed to address global 
scientific challenges highlighted by the G8 Science Ministers (G8, 2013) means that SMP 
Communities tackling the hardest problems are often led by bespoke IGOs requiring Ministerial level 
approval. This thesis analyses how the governance and leadership regimes of these IGOs, and their 
wider communities have found a way through global gridlock. Consequently, my research has been 
driven by the following research problem: 
 
How do global Science Mega-Project Communities achieve their effective collaboration 
pathways with Member States?  
 
There are two related research sub-questions: 1) do the subject SMP Communities utilise common 
diplomatic approaches in negotiating their founding arrangements and functioning in a collaborative 
way? And 2) What - if any - are the political lessons learned by the subject SMP Communities that 
may provide clues in advancing global collaboration to overcome gridlock in other domains? 
 
Maylor and Blackmon (2005: 73) suggest that research problems have potential significance to a 
whole field of study when they link to larger theoretical constructs and/or to important policy issues. 
Leading research methodology theory of Booth, et al. (2008: 52) tells us that research problems 
stem from two places: a theoretical problem results from incomplete information or understanding, 
and a practical problem is a real-world problem with tangible costs. Booth goes on to explain that 
good research often meets both aspects. This thesis aims high as it purposively links to larger 
theoretical constructs in order to fill a gap [that I outlined in section 1.5.2.] in the international 
relations sub-field of global gridlock studies. The research has policy implications in that strategists 
should familiarise themselves with the full range of trans-border global institutions; particularly 
those that have apparently formed effective paths of collaboration.  
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2.3: Research Conceptual framework and research hypotheses 
 
The research strategy can be viewed through the SMP conceptual framework; Figure 3. The first box 
‘Formal Agreement / Creation’ is an external pre-cursor to the running of an SMP. It influences 
management in that it sets the scene, establishes the rules and provides guidelines on operational 
parameters. The second box ‘External Constraints’ comprises the myriad of constantly changing 
stakeholder aspirations, political and legal landscapes, regulations and foreseen/unforeseen events 
that the SMP leadership must navigate through and around. The third box comprises internal 
community governance and leadership aspects; the personnel involved in these activities are tasked 
with both the long-term viability and day-to-day running of the ventures. The conceptual framework 
allows us to see three key determinants that support the research: 
 
1. Understanding how global SMPs negotiate and finalise their respective IGO formal agreements. 
2. Understanding the external constraints that governing bodies, contributing members and the 
scientific community at large impose on the central organisation and how these constraints can 
affect overall performance. 
3. Analysing methods and practices that global SMPs governance and leadership regimes utilise to 
operate within the boundaries of their founding agreements and overcome constraints, to 
identify differences and map common themes that may be applicable in other fields. 
 
 
 
Figure 3; Global SMP Conceptual Framework 
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The framework comprises three hypotheses that I assert affect SMP performance either positively 
(+ve) or negatively (-ve). The hypotheses derive from three tributaries: 
 
Firstly, my earlier Oxford MSc dissertation which included two hypotheses that were of a technical 
programme management nature concerning the funding aspects of the large projects by their 
communities. The MSc was grounded in literature and theorisation that included: Nils Bruzeliusa, 
Bent Flyvbjerg and Werner Rothengatter (2002) who studied Big Decisions, Big Risks: Improving 
Accountability in Mega-Projects; Ralf Müller (2009) who considered international Project 
Governance; Janet Smart (2012) who researched Big science and big administration. Confronting the 
governance, financial and legal challenges of FuturICT; Jay Galbraith (2014) in his work Designing 
Organisations: An Executive Guide to Strategy, Structure and Process and Ramila Amirikas and 
Pradeep Ghosh (2016) who studied prosperous models for the procurement for Large-Scale Science 
Projects. This MSc work was narrow and very different from the topic of thesis. The methodological 
approach, conceptual framework and hypotheses were wholly redeveloped and expanded with my 
supervisor, Professor David Held, during this research. 
 
Secondly, the related theory underpinning the peer reviewed Global Policy article published during 
the development of the thesis that concentrated on the first of the three case studies, CERN 
(Robinson, 2018). Underpinning literature included: John Krige, et. al., (1987) The History of CERN; 
Henry Mintzberg and James Quinn (1988) in The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts and Cases; 
Kenneth Abbott and Thomas Hale (2014) in Orchestrating Global Solution Networks; a Guide for 
Organizational Entrepreneurs; Lloyd Davis and Robert Patman (2015) in Science Diplomacy; New Day 
or False Dawn and Marc Cogen (2015) in An Introduction to European Intergovernmental 
Organizations. 
 
Thirdly, the hypotheses derive from the three analytical themes that emerged from the literature 
review (sub-section 1.5.1): the primacy of the state, science diplomacy and SMP leadership. 
 
I concluded in the sub-section 1.1. on realism that any global governance exercised by the SMP 
IGO management teams is conditional on the power politics that the contributing members 
exercise. The top leadership teams of these iconic projects operate within the degree of 
delegated authority that the nations tolerate; but, no more. The final aspect of primacy of the 
state that Robert Keohane in After Hegemony prompts us to keep in mind is that effective 
cooperation must be distinguished from utopian harmony (1984). This is true for SMPs, whose 
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cooperation does not imply the absence of conflict but rather that without the risk of conflict 
there is no necessity to cooperate. They heed back to the basic human instinct of necessity for 
cooperation born out of dire circumstances. I will argue that the SMP communities revel in the 
meaningfulness of their endeavours and unshakably take on these massive challenges on 
behalf of us all. Once established, I will show that the communities have found a way of 
effectively channelling their collective efforts through IGOs that execute open actions, share 
risks and steadily build trust between states while always respecting the power and primacy of 
those states. It is these sub-themes that help form the basis for Hypothesis 1. 
 
The literature review of the recent history of science diplomacy showed that science has often 
led the thinking on the necessity for collaboration. The literature review positioned this 
research in the category of Science for Diplomacy that draws on the soft power of science 
cooperation to improve broader international relations between states. This placement 
reinforces the idea that the leadership of SMPs have been remarkably effective in building a 
collective spirit and evolving complex processes and methods to enable global collaboration 
and overcome and/or limit the many constraints that inevitably come their way over their long 
design, development, construction and operational phases [that will be detailed in figure 15]. It 
is these sub-themes that help form the basis for Hypothesis 2. 
 
Shifting ideas about leadership described by management psychologist academics such as 
Derue, Nahrgang, Wellman and Humphrey (2011) have moved through three phases of 1) 
Hierarchy and Authority (early 20th Century), Involvement and Vision (Middle 20th Century), 
Empowerment (late 20th Century) and Networks and Value co-creation (21st Century). I will 
show, through the data gathered in interviews that supports the literature covered in Chapter 
1 that SMP community leadership and governance practices have been ahead of the three step 
shift of leadership approach described above. I will argue that although they are certainly not 
without fault, the SMP leadership teams have achieved a positive, fulfilling, work-related state 
of mind that is characterised by team members with vigour, dedication and absorption in the 
task (Schaufeli and Salanova, 2011). The SMP community leadership have also trail-blazed 
advanced ways of coping with the varied needs of the participating states and the governance 
mechanisms that they collectively demand. It is these sub-themes that help form the basis for 
Hypothesis 3. 
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The supporting and opposing attributes (indicators of success and failure of the SMPs) for testing the 
validity of the hypotheses are explained in sub-section 2.4.2: Methodological Approach. Together 
the three hypotheses provide a vehicle to address the research problem, test the data and help to 
narrow down which Beyond Gridlock pathways apply: 
 
• Hypothesis 1 is that IGO agreements and start-up conditions which are concise, fair, promote 
trust and mutual support, allow flexibility in problem solving, manage host state issues and 
emphasise the primacy of the State improve performance. 
• Hypothesis 2 is that external constraints such as excessive stakeholder aspirations, changing 
political and legal landscapes, bureaucratic regulations, funding fluctuations and unforeseen 
events, while being mitigated as far as possible by IGO leadership actions, inevitably adversely 
affect overall performance. 
• Hypothesis 3 is that sound governance and leadership dynamics improve global IGO 
performance. 
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2.4: Research Design and Methodology 
 
The design needs to test the hypotheses, involve counterfactuals, offer a means of validation and 
deal with research limitations. Consequently, this section is split into four parts: 1) research 
philosophy, 2) methodological approach where the means of testing the hypotheses are addressed, 
3) counterfactual evidence and finally, 4) ethical issues. 
 
 
2.4.1: Research Philosophy 
 
This research associates with two types of research philosophies advocated by Maylor and Blackmon 
(2005: 157): interpretivism and critical realism and both have therefore governed the research 
design described below. In interpretivism the goal of the research is not to explain human behaviour, 
but to understand it and analyse what we can learn from it. This is a mainstream epistemology for 
management research and fits well here where we will be examining the diplomatic, organisational 
and leadership approaches of three SMPs with data collection through interviews and observation 
visits. This subjectivist method does have some disadvantages that will be returned in counterfactual 
evidence and research limitations [sub-section 2.4.3 and section 2.5 respectively]. Critical realism 
developed by Roy Baskhar (1975) acknowledges that researchers cannot directly know reality, but 
that knowledge of reality is ‘good enough’. This research philosophy is also apt here as it helps 
provide explanations to hidden generative structures particularly in the underlying political and 
economic patronage that the states provide to these projects. The SMP IGOs are formed from states 
desire to work together and they operate within rules and boundaries set and monitored by them. 
Critical realism accepts that this may be difficult to immediately draw out from empirical events 
which we can capture and record. Geoff Easton (2007) in Critical realism in case study research 
identifies that a critical realist approach involves developing a research problem and associated 
question that identifies a research phenomenon, in terms of noticeable events, and asks [in this 
study through the elucidation of these events by collection of primary and secondary data] what 
causes them to happen. The result is the identification of root causal mechanisms. In other words, 
this research has a completely open mind regarding what collaboration pathways the SMP 
Communities have and how they have been attained; interpretivism and critical realism will both be 
used to draw this out. 
 
The research problem (section 2.2) lends itself to taking an ethnographic method. The root of this 
method meets the qualitative research criteria outlined by Marshall and Rossman (1995) and is the 
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essence of why it is appropriate in this case; i.e. I have not only considered the case study 
organisations (the central IGOs and Member States’ interfacing organisations) but also the people in 
them.  
 
Other approaches were not dismissed. For example, the conduct of a quantitative survey of case 
study central organisation members and others in the wider science mega-project communities was 
also considered. The administrative burden of framing the survey, gaining necessary consents, 
testing and conducting it within time and budget constraints meant it was impracticable. It is not 
ruled out should an expansion of the case studies be undertaken in further research. 
 
2.4.2: Methodological Approach  
 
This sub-section covers the methodological approach which was conducted in three stages: desk 
research, field research and data analysis and validation. The three hypotheses include notions that 
are subjective in nature: Hypothesis 1 references agreements and start-up conditions that are 
concise, fair, promote trust and mutual support, allow flexibility in problem solving, manage host 
state issues and emphasise the primacy of the State. Hypothesis 2 introduces the idea of constraints 
such as excessive stakeholder aspirations and changing political and legal landscapes. Hypothesis 3 is 
that sound governance and leadership dynamics improve performance. To test the level of concepts 
such as fairness, excessiveness or soundness is problematic but not unsurmountable. For example, a 
matrix containing supporting and opposing attributes can be constructed, see Table 1. The nature of 
the research does not lend itself to simply checking off items revealed in the desk research or field 
work against this list of attributes. Instead it has been designed so that the complete body of 
evidence provides the basis for drawing a judgement, with the attributes in mind. The variation in 
success as seen by the practioners (collected through the primary data interviews) and literature 
(secondary data) is analysed and documented in the respective case study chapters and compared 
and contrasted in the research results chapter. 
 
Collectively the hypotheses provide a way to understand the three key determinants that support 
the research and thereby help in answering the research problem (section 2.2): how do global SMPs 
negotiate and finalise their respective IGO formal agreements, how are external constraints dealt 
with and how are governance and leadership dynamics handled. Once the key determinants have 
been understood then this allows the research problem and associated questions to be answered in 
the research results chapter.  
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Table 1; Thesis hypotheses - supporting and opposing attributes 
Supporting Attibutes Opposing Attributes
Hypothesis 1
Members have faith in each other underpinned by undisputed founding 
agreements and equitable start-up conditions
Central IGO can autonomously adapt its structures/processes
 
Central IGO respects the primacy of the state in all circumstances
Mistrust is rife amongst Members; founding documents are not fit for purpose 
and are regularly misinterprated
Central IGO is inflexible and lacks autonomy
Central IGO regularly tries to userp the primacy of the state to achieve results 
Hypothesis 2
Members readily support each other during times of crises
Potentially existential events are overcome; longevity is maintained 
Central IGO has legitimacy and authority to deal with
external constraints
Meaningful political/technical/cost risk sharing is practiced as well as 
espoused when dealing with constraints
Members quickly move to legal litigation to settle disputes
Major problems lead to significant project de-scoping / cancellation
Central IGO lacks authority and is not seen as having the legitimacy and/or 
means to deal with external constraints
Constraints are left to adversely affect performance because of unbalanced 
approach to sharing political/technical/cost risks
Hypothesis 3
High level decisions are based on 'one Member one vote' consensus 
wherever possible
Membership of representatives of advising organs is based solely on 
meritocracy selection by peers 
Light touch leadership approach is the predominant organisational culture
Scientific outputs are universally considered worthy by peers
Recognition of success is widely held 
The dominant collaboration Member regularly imposes its views on other 
Members in highest level decision making body
Membership of advising organs are political appointees of Members 
irrespective of meritocracy standing with peers
A heirarchical management approach dominates organisational culture
Value of scientific outputs are contested by peers
Recognition of success is limited
Attibrutes for testing the vailidity of the Hypotheses
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Hypotheses are unlikely ever to be formulated unless considered potentially valid and the first step 
in probing if the hypotheses in this research are plausible was during the case study selection 
process. The stepped selection method gradually ascertained – firstly at a rough cut level (Appendix 
A) - if any empirical instances can be found The rationale for selecting the case studies (sub-section 
2.1.4) including ready access to documents and key interviewees that will provide data for testing 
the hypotheses listed in table 1 (p 65) then resulted in a selection that warranted the undertaking of 
the detailed analysis (as documented in the case study chapters) and the painstaking comparative 
study (as documented in the research results chapter). 
 
It was not anticipated that the hypotheses could be readily falsified but rather that the detailed case 
study analysis would be where a judgement on the level of the hypothesis’s validity be made. The 
collation and examination of counterfactual evidence in sub-section 6.1 emphasised that no data 
either primary (field work) or secondary (literature) has been dismissed as irrelevant or unreliable 
evidence. Opposing evidence to each of the hypotheses is analysed at the end of the respective sub-
sub sections within sub-section 6.2 on testing the hypotheses. Examination of alternative 
hypotheses has also served to understand the problem better and identify any weaknesses or 
simplifications in the thesis hypotheses. Sub-section 6.1 will show that the balance of evidence is 
that SMP Communities are appropriate vehicles to investigate international collaborations.  
 
The circumstance that the three cases are equal in the sense of all being in the foremost position 
within their domains provided a sound background to the comparative study. In section 1 of the 
results chapter I gather together the counterfactual arguments that span the three hypotheses and 
the case studies together with my response. In section 2, I analyse to what degree the Beyond 
Gridlock pathways have been utilised by the SMP communities to support the three hypotheses. The 
analysis is framed around the three boxed areas shown in Figure 3, the Global Conceptual 
Framework: 1) Formal Agreement and Creation where Hypothesis 1 is tested, 2) External Constraints 
where Hypothesis 2 is tested and 3) Governance and Leadership where Hypothesis 3 is tested. In 
section 3, I analyse the common and dissimilar diplomatic, governance and leadership mechanisms 
that have been used to implement the pathways.  
 
The combination of Beyond Gridlock pathways that have been used by the case study communities 
in respect of each of the hypotheses are shown in section 6.2 tables 13 (p 206), 14 (p 208) and 15 (p 
210). The common and different mechanisms that have been used in each of the Beyond Gridlock 
pathways are mapped out against the three case studies in table 19 (p 237). 
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2.4.2.1: Stage 1: Desk Research 
 
The research began with a comprehensive literature review of the relevant academic material. This 
secondary data was collected through the academic and specialist SMP libraries described in the 
introduction to the Chapter 1 Literature Review. The result comprises academic literature including 
scholarly books and articles in peer-reviewed academic/managerial journals; the bibliography 
provides details of 262 items, all of which are cited in the main body of this thesis. Care has been 
taken to maintain a balance between well documented areas (such as international relations theory) 
and lesser known ones (such as science project leadership); I return to this in sub-section 2.5. 
Limiting Factors to the research and mitigating actions.  
 
 
2.4.2.2: Stage 2: Field Research 
 
Field data was collected via semi-structured interviews with world-leading SMP executives and 
academics. The full set of primary data was large with over 70 interviews; all conducted within the 
considerations of informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity, interviewee details are included 
in Appendix B. This data was supplemented by previous expert panel narratives from interviewees 
that were available on-line. The most fruitful of these was the CERN Model, Science, Education, and 
Global Public Good - CERN / UNOG Symposium, attended by the CERN DG designate, previous DGs, 
senior CERN Executives and leading UN figures, held in Geneva in 2015 over three days; all sessions 
being accessible through UN Web TV (CERN/UNOG, 2015). 
 
Primary data was collected through SKYPE interviews and through field work face-to-face semi-
structured interviews at the CERN HQ in Geneva, the ITER HQ in Cadarache, France, and the NASA 
ISS HQ in Washington DC, USA. Data was also collected at international conferences of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science in Austin, Texas and Washington DC, USA., and at a 
symposium at CERN to celebrate 25 years of operation of the LHC, held in December 2017. 
Introductions and consent to interviews was achieved with the support of points of contact in each 
case study community. 
 
The study design has at its core the research problem, related sub-questions and hypotheses that 
need to be tested (section 2.2 and sub-section 2.3 respectively). The questions were concise enough 
to reduce the problem space area but deep enough to address the fundamental issues at hand. 
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Resolving the questions this way helps keep fresh the original motivation of why it was an important 
topic (Petre and Rugg, 2004: 96). The research analysis needed to satisfy the test of ‘answering the 
research questions’ for a readership that could potentially include the wider international relations, 
global gridlock community. The data collection and analysis were therefore conducted and recorded 
in as jargon free style that the subject matter allowed. This effort is aided by the explanatory section 
in the Introduction on terms, nomenclature and notations and by the List of Abbreviations.  
 
For the primary source data, Booth et. al (2008: 82) point out that striking a balance between not 
freezing the interviewee with too scripted questions while not questioning aimlessly can only be 
overcome by determining exactly what you want to know. Interviews were therefore conducted 
individually and in a straightforward manner. Information sheets were provided to all the 
participants, describing the nature of the research, why and how it was being conducted together 
with an explanation of why they had been asked to take part. This data capture successfully 
identified, in the way that Ives (2005) describes, contextual elements in the case studies’ 
management that impacted on project success. 
 
Pre-work with the points of contact in the case study IGO HQs showed how willing subjects were to 
take part. It was important to maintain this momentum while conducting the interviews as 
systematically and sensitively as possible. Maylor and Blackmon (2005: 243) describe this as 
‘controlled opportunism’ whereby researchers take advantage of new themes to improve resultant 
theory. The few reticent interview participants were gently encouraged to relate their experiences of 
global SMP management and how they foresaw any improvements could be made and any potential 
read-across they could identify to other areas of international collaboration.  
 
 
2.4.2.3: Stage 3: Data Analysis and Validation 
 
The extensive British Library PhD archive was reviewed to see what analysis techniques had worked 
and what pitfalls to avoid in previous research that had elicited views and beliefs from international 
collaboration decision-makers. This review revealed that interviewees could be prone to answering 
research questions with lengthy answers. Therefore, to aid the process of combing the data for 
relevant themes and ideas, coding was applied during the analysis. A priori codes based on each of 
the three hypotheses that underpin the conceptual framework were used. The coding was useful in 
three ways; 1) helping to order and index the diverse data, 2) eliminating/minimising false 
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correlations and irrelevant data, 3) allowing the data to be refined in groups, thereby making 
revisiting the data easy should the research be taken further. The possibility of the data revealing 
unexpected themes was not discounted; had that possibility occurred then grounded codes would 
have been created (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
 
Validity of the research refers to how accurately it has been conducted and is notoriously difficult to 
measure in qualitative research. It is unlikely any researcher readily concludes they conducted 
themselves inaccurately with respect to data gathering and analysis. The research design has 
incorporated two internal and one external measure to gauge and improve validity.  
 
Maylor and Blackmon (2005: 158), show that the main source of error in data is typically because of 
a flawed research method. They recommend internal and external validity checks to ask, ‘do we 
have enough responses / data to justify the findings that are claimed?’ In this research an 
independent measure was to confirm with the regular University thesis review panels that the 
number of case studies and the quantity of primary and secondary data met or exceeded that of 
similar studies that had been hitherto deemed by peers and supervisors to be ‘valid’ research.  
 
A further internal validation measure was to learn from a pilot interview that was conducted to test 
if the design and approach were measuring what was sought [i.e. testing the research hypotheses] 
or inadvertently measuring another concept. The pilot produced respectable results and led to only 
minor adjustments to the wording of the reflective, open questions. This exercise also improved 
reliability of the data capture by aiding the uniformity of the interview procedure, documentation 
and conduct. 
 
External validation utilised two well cited academic works to gauge how successful the collaboration 
was between the states and the central IGOs. If the results did not broadly fit within these academic 
constructs, then this casted doubts on the data and underlying research method: 
 
Firstly, the results were mapped against two of the four characteristics of successful orchestrator 
organisations that are at the core of the Abbott and Hale (2014: 9) paper Orchestrating Global 
Solution Networks; a Guide for Organizational Entrepreneurs; [Section 1.2, Gridlock Issues form the 
Literature Review, Chapter 1]. The level and quality of ‘focality’ and ‘legitimacy’ is assessed within 
the governance and leadership sections of each case study chapter, drawing on evidence from field 
work interviews to supplement the available literature. 
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Secondly, as Claire Dunlop (2011: 5) points out getting to grips with the structure and power 
dynamics that may exist within an epistemic community is important if we are to understand their 
belief system formation. A sound belief system is a pre-requisite to effective collaboration and 
thereby results and legitimacy. The research ascertained to what extent the SMP communities 
embody a belief system around the four knowledge elements Peter Haas identified: 1) a shared set 
of normative and principled beliefs, 2) shared causal beliefs, 3) shared notions of validity and 4) a 
common policy enterprise. The external validation showed that the data did fall within the 
constructs of these two academic studies [evidence for this can be found in the Research Results, 
Chapter 6: sub-section 6.3.4 for Abbot and Hale and sub-section 6.3.3 for Haas] thus providing re-
assurance of a sound research method. 
 
 
2.4.3: Counterfactual evidence 
 
The research conclusions have the potential to challenge existing ways of tackling an apparently 
intractable problem by suggesting innovative contributions to knowledge. Such conclusions would 
only have credibility if counter evidence had also been gathered, analysed and considered. 
Reasonable scepticism would also serve to reflect on and challenge the adequacy of the research 
problem and questions themselves.  
 
Consequently, as David Dooley (1984) points out, rival hypotheses as plausible alternative 
explanations to observations and gathered data should not be ruled-out in the research design and 
methodology. The research design therefore has ensured that no data either primary (interviews) or 
secondary (literature) has been dismissed as irrelevant or unreliable evidence. The analytical 
methods of testing the hypotheses include counterfactual evidence, this has served to understand 
the problem better and identify any weaknesses/simplifications in the hypotheses.  
 
The methods of dealing with latent interviewee bias and researcher bias are covered in Sub-section 
2.5.1.4. of the Research Limitations Section of this Chapter. The collation and examination of all the 
counterfactual evidence is in Section 6.1 of the Results Chapter. The discussion in section 6.1 
demonstrates that disagreement and alternatives to the three hypotheses have been gathered, 
analysed and recorded with equal veracity to any that support them.  
 
 
73 
 
2.4.4: Research Ethical Issues 
 
The SMP points of contact indicated their readiness to assist by clustering interviews at opportune 
times to aid the participants [and thereby my efforts to conduct the interviews]. Consequently, 
research ethics approval was sought and achieved as soon as possible, this allowed pre-arranged 
interview appointments to be respected and fit in with interviewee schedules. The nature of the 
case studies means that interviewees were from varied backgrounds. Cultural customs and 
etiquettes were scrupulously followed in visits to their organisations and before, during and after 
the interviews themselves. Small details such as the correct respectful designation of the surnames 
of interviewees (e.g. adding “san” for Japanese interviewees and using Madam as the prefix for all 
French women interviewees) helped smooth the process. 
 
The research was carried out in compliance with established social science ethical codes of conduct 
and data regulatory requirements including the best practice European Commission’s ‘Data 
Protection and Privacy Guidelines’ (EC, 2009). To faithfully capture the qualitative data, the 
interviews were recorded and transcribed later; all recordings were deleted after the submission of 
this thesis.  
 
Careful consideration was given to the management of informed consent, confidentiality and 
anonymity. All interviewees were asked if they wished to exercise their right to anonymity and their 
individual choices have been respected; this is not seen as a problem for the research.  
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2.5: Research Limitations 
 
In this section, I firstly describe four limiting factors have been identified as risks to this study 
including the mitigating actions that have been taken for each one: 1) lack of research focus, 2) 
skewed data, 3) unprincipled internet sourced material and 4) latent interviewee bias and researcher 
confirmation bias. Secondly, I outline four expected limitations of the thesis i.e., what it will not do 
and highlighting how far forward the research is taken. 
 
2.5.1: Limiting factors to the research and mitigating actions 
 
2.5.1.1: Lack of research focus 
 
The field of International Relations is a broad one and there is increasing interest and literature on 
global gridlock issues. It was important therefore in this research to go from a broad area to a 
focused one. The subject matter is under researched but opportunely there was enough material 
available to avoid the risk of over specialising and narrowing the focus too much. Regular feedback 
from my supervisor and attention to detail in the collection of data was important in this respect. 
 
2.5.1.2: Skewed data 
 
When finding and interpreting other people’s existing research, overcoming the skew of available 
data (sub-section 2.4.2.1., Stage 1, Desk Research) was necessary. The risk was that the research 
would re-visit well documented areas at the expense of lesser known ones. To mitigate for this, less 
well-known global SMP material has been sought out. This material has been peer-reviewed and 
published in established academic publications; albeit less mainstream ones. Indeed, the nature of 
the research problem meant that looking beyond predictable sources was vital as would be the need 
to carefully synthesise the diverse data during the analysis.  
 
2.5.1.3: Unprincipled internet sourced material 
 
Internet based data has been treated with caution to distinguish between reliable university library 
and UN on-line sources and indiscriminate web searches. Irrelevant and derogatory articles that are 
associated with high profile global SMPs were purposively avoided; for example, parody ‘NASA’ 
websites that accompany the official NASA website or tabloid paper articles predicting the end of 
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the world during the start-up of CERN’s landmark LHC infrastructure. Internet searches were 
systematic and predominantly used keywords that stemmed from the research key concepts that 
are outlined in the conceptual framework (section 2.3).  
 
2.5.1.4: Latent interviewee bias and researcher confirmation bias 
 
Latent interviewee bias 
 
CERN is expanding human knowledge in fundamental physics that could help answer how our 
Universe was created and where we come from. ITER is endeavouring to provide a route to carbon-
free, commercial power generation that could help save the planet from global warming and change 
geopolitics. The ISS is carrying out unique micro-gravity science and building the knowledge mankind 
will need for space travel to Mars and beyond. Who would not be proud to be a member of these 
communities?  
 
Many SMPs compete with rival projects to gain formal go-ahead and be established. They have 
optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation [Flyvbjerg et al, 2003: 73 and 137, in the literature 
review section 1.4.1.] built into their founding genes as evidenced in their pre-approval phase bid 
documentation. Previous research confirmed that SMP managers are highly driven and prone to 
making hopeful programmatic decisions outside their reliable competence. Participants in Big 
Science projects are justifiably proud of their own contribution and that of the institutions and 
organisations that are addressing these types of global challenges.  
 
With the above understandable pride comes the risk of excessive defensiveness when these 
individuals are faced with criticism. Sergei Krikalev is an icon of Russian space exploration and a 
current ROSCOSMOS Director. He provided this comment in a 2017 interview when asked to recall 
‘good and bad days’ on the ISS: ‘for sure, we had difficult days, probably it is a sign of human 
memory to remember more positive things than the negative one.’ (Česká televize, 2017). I did not 
encounter this trait during the field work: pride in accomplishments was equally matched with 
acknowledgement of the failings. Indeed, it is the openness and insights into how difficulties and 
constraints have been overcome that are the key analytical material of this thesis.  
 
The collection and analysis of data was conducted keeping this latent defensive bias in mind. Booth, 
et. al., (2008: 82) reveal that experienced researchers understand that for research of any substance, 
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any one interviewee’s version of the truth is complicated, usually ambiguous, and always 
contestable. That is why they argue a sufficiently large sample of interviews needs to be conducted 
in order to even out any bias; a recommendation that has been ardently followed in this research.  
 
Researcher confirmation bias 
 
Disadvantages associated with interpretivism include the subjective nature of the approach and the 
risk of confirmation bias on behalf of the researcher. The above risk of my own confirmation bias has 
been recognised and while it can never be eliminated it can be managed; in this research by 
implementing three mitigation actions.  
 
Firstly, the research problem (section 2.2) is an open one, in that it asks how effective collaborative 
pathways have been achieved. In other words, the problem statement does not predispose that any 
SMP international relations collaborative pathways are ‘good’ or bad’; the research method is 
primarily designed to simply investigate what they are.  
 
Secondly, the desk research included the analysis of a secondary data pool that included counter-
evidence; see section 6.1. The breadth and quality of the literature was tested against similar PhD 
level studies that had been deemed to be ‘valid’ and with leading academics in the field including the 
research supervisor to ensure it surpassed this standard.  
 
Thirdly, the field work interviewee information sheets included the research problem statement and 
related questions but not the three hypotheses underpinning the conceptual framework. This 
calculated omission was to remove interviewer bias from the process and maximise the opportunity 
for complete and accurate communication between the interviewer and the respondent (Cannel and 
Kahn, 1968: 526–595). A short series of broad and open questions were put to each participant to 
provide structure; see Appendix C Interviewee Questions. The tone of the interviews was an open 
one encouraging each participant to recount in their own way what they believed was important, 
thus revealing both supporting and opposing evidence for the hypotheses. This method eliminated 
the risk of distractive prompting of the respondents by the interviewer.  
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2.5.2: Limitations of the thesis 
 
There are four expected limitations to this thesis. 
 
Firstly, the purpose in presenting common features of the SMP Communities approach (Section 6.4) 
is to support the explanation of how the global Science Mega-Project Communities have achieved 
their effective collaboration pathways. In other words, the features serve to amplify my answer to 
the research problem stated in section 2.2. Although I go on to provide two suggested contributions 
the deeper analysis of these is outside of the scope of this thesis. Consequently, as I outline in the 
Conclusion to the thesis, the follow-up to the contributions is an area ripe for further research. 
 
Secondly, I will make a case in this thesis for a novel pathway, concerning innovative funding for 
international collaborative ventures, to be added to Beyond Gridlock theory. While I provide strong 
evidence to support my case, and it features in the second suggested contribution to knowledge 
(Section 6.5), it is also not the primary focus in answering the research problem. Aspects of this new 
pathway raise the possibility of designing it into international collaboration start-up conditions and 
operations to improve performance. Although a thought-provoking idea the exposition of a potential 
new collaborative design is another feature ripe for further research.  
 
Thirdly, this thesis examines in depth three case studies; the rationale for the choice was explained 
in sub-section 2.1. Although adding other Big Science projects, such as those listed in Appendix A, to 
the analysis could add supporting and opposing evidence to the results, time and resource 
limitations prevents this increase. As explained in the Conclusion, expanding the case study pool is a 
prime area for further research. 
 
Finally, although the thesis does make some deductions regarding aspects of project management, 
this characteristic is also not within the scope of this thesis.   
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Chapter summary 
 
The series of steps that resulted in the cases studies being selected have been enumerated. Firstly, a 
recognised cost threshold, European research think tank roadmap and the output from a UN 
appointed set of experts regarding research infrastructure selection criteria were combined to 
produce a list of SMPs. The second gateway applied extra criteria (middle of page 58) that narrowed 
the field to truly global science community endeavours. Finally, the detailed research criteria 
(bottom of page 58) resulted in the selection of the three case studies.  
 
The research problem - how do global SMPs achieve their effective collaboration pathways with 
member states - and associated sub-research questions were then stated. The case was then made 
that the research meets the test of helping to fill an incomplete understanding and addresses a 
practicable. This argument had two themes: firstly, that it linked to larger global gridlock theoretical 
constructs and secondly that strategists should familiarise themselves with the full range of trans-
border global institutions, which the case study SMPs self-evidently are.  
 
The research strategy was then described through the global SMP conceptual framework, showing 
three supporting determinants: firstly, the formal agreements leading to IGO creation; secondly, the 
external constraints affecting the projects and thirdly, SMP governance and leadership 
methods/practices. The framework mapped the three hypotheses against global SMP performance: 
better defined IGO agreements improve performance, external constraints adversely affect 
performance and sound governance and leadership dynamics improve performance. 
 
The research design needed to test the hypotheses by adopting a research philosophy, following an 
accepted methodological approach, offering a means of validation, involving counterfactuals and 
dealing with identified research limitations and ethical issues. These requirements were then 
detailed through four sub-sections, summarised as follows: 
 
1) while alternatives had been considered, a qualitative, ethnographic research method would 
be utilised to consider the case study organisations and the people in them. Interpretivism and 
critical realism research philosophies would govern the design.  
 
2) a description of the methodological approach was then set out including the three stages of 
desk research, field research and data analysis and validation. Primary data would be collected 
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via semi-structured interviews with SMP executives and academics, secondary data comprised 
academic literature that would be gathered from University/Specialist Library resources. The 
data analysis included thematic coding, a pilot interview and internal/external validation to 
check that the data and underlying methodology were sound.  
 
3) The need to include counterfactual evidence was then described together with the method 
of collection and an indication where the analysis could be found in this thesis.  
 
4) Finally, the measures taken to ensure ethical issues were handled correctly were explained. 
These included scrupulous attention to cultural customs and etiquettes throughout the 
interview process and compliance with University and European Commission ethical codes of 
conduct. The overriding principle was the careful consideration and management of informed 
consent, confidentiality and anonymity. 
 
Four research limiting factors and their associated mitigation actions were then outlined: a) lack of 
research focus, mitigated by ensuring sufficient material was available to avoid over specialising, b) 
skewed data, mitigated by seeking out less well-known peer-reviewed and published global SMP 
material, c) unprincipled internet sourced material, mitigated by avoiding irrelevant and derogatory 
articles that are associated with high profile global SMPs and d) latent interviewee bias and 
researcher confirmation bias, mitigated by having a high number of interviewees to average out and 
put in place any defensive optimism bias from a minority of interviewees, framing a problem 
statement that did not predispose any solution, including in the data pool counterfactual evidence 
and taking practical steps to obviate any distractive prompting of respondents.  
 
Finally, four limitations of the thesis were then explained to indicate the scope boundaries, make 
clear what would not be covered and identify those areas that it was anticipated were ripe for 
further research.  
 
 
 
  
80 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE CERN COMMUNITY 
 
 
 
Figure 4; CERN Community at IGO level as at March 2019 
 
The purpose of CERN is to provide the world with knowledge of the fundamental laws of nature. The 
organisation also has a role in providing for collaboration among Member States (see Figure 4) in 
nuclear research of a solely scientific and fundamental character. Physicists use the world's most 
powerful and complex scientific instruments to study the basic constituents of matter. The 
instruments used at CERN are purpose-built particle accelerators and detectors. Accelerators boost 
beams of particles to close to the speed of light before the beams are made to collide with each or 
with stationary targets producing extremely high energy levels that release atomic particles (CERN, 
2019). Detectors observe and record the results of these collisions. The data is shared through a 
world-wide distribution network of researchers as well as the central teams. The analysis process 
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gives physicists clues about how the particles interact and provides insights into the fundamental 
laws of nature. The concept is encapsulated by Dr Markus Nordberg, Head of Resources 
Development at IdeaSquare: “CERN is an instrument to probe and interrogate nature itself…it is way 
for mere humans to talk to and listen to the power of nature.”  
 
The term World-Wide Lab is used in CERN’s 62nd Annual Report (2016) to succinctly convey the 
confident camaraderie of purpose. The term naturally infers the prevalence of science at the heart 
of the CERN enterprise; but this is not wide enough for this study. As explained in the Methodology 
section 2.1, the CERN Community is an estimable example of an epistemic community that 
comprises knowledge-based experts in many sub-fields making its boundary difficult to define. For 
example, as Michael Lucibella (2014:2) points out, Member States are strategic in deciding where 
CERN funding comes from in their domestic budgets; therefore, it is not possible to generalise where 
individual financial knowledge-based experts, who support CERN, fit in. Member States may also 
change over time how they fund international projects to meet shifting domestic priorities. 
Consequently, the boundary of the CERN epistemic community, even in one sub-field such as 
Finance, varies from Member State to Member State and varies over time.  
 
This first of the three case study chapters is organised into four sections that have been shaped by 
the main connections between elements of the Chapter 1, Literature Review and the separate 
hypotheses from the Conceptual Framework (Section 2.3: Research Conceptual framework and 
research hypotheses). While there is some overlap, by mapping out these associations I illustrate 
how the three hypotheses have been tested and where the results can be found: 
 
The first section will test Hypothesis 1 by examining the political contextual setting to CERN’s 
foundation, agreement of the CERN Convention and establishment of a range of favourable 
starting conditions. This relates mainly to section 1.1: Theory regarding global collaboration 
and international organisations of the literature review.  
 
The second section will test Hypothesis 2 by examining how three different types of 
constraints have been managed: a threat to its domain dominance, a political event that led 
to a funding crisis and a major technical set-back. This relates to section 1.2: Global Gridlock 
Issues of the literature review. 
 
82 
 
The third section will test Hypothesis 3 by examining governance and leadership dynamics. 
Three aspects are addressed: the organisational culture, focality and legitimacy and finally, 
plans for future developments and expansion. This relates to section 1.3: Science Diplomacy 
and section 1.4: Mega-Projects Governance, Leadership and Performance Issues of the 
literature review. 
 
The final section evaluates the Beyond Gridlock pathways and associated mechanisms 
employed by CERN and acts as a summary of the chapter.  
 
 
3.1: The CERN Convention 
 
To test Hypothesis 1 (that IGO agreements and start-up conditions which are concise, fair, promote 
trust and mutual support, allow flexibility in problem solving, manage host state issues and 
emphasise the primacy of the State improve performance) four aspects are examined. Firstly, the 
political setting, CERN Convention (1953: 29) signature and ratification process. Secondly, the 
purpose of the CERN Organisation and its wider community including hosting arrangements are 
scrutinised. Thirdly, the Organs, Voting Rights, and the arrangements concerning the DG and Staff 
are examined. Fourthly, the special conditions and complex provisions that aid CERN’s commercial, 
contracting and funding arrangements are outlined. Finally, a sub-section summary is provided. 
 
3.1.1: Political Setting, Convention Signature and Ratification 
 
The difficulties facing European nations’ science communities in the early 1950s were many and 
multi-layered. Mainland Europe and large areas of the UK were re-building from the devastation of 
World War II. Their citizens were demobilising from a total war footing and gradually returning to 
civilian life. Mainland Europe academics were scattered and re-emerging from keeping a low profile. 
The only major European country whose science community had remained complete and indeed had 
blossomed during the war period was the UK, not only because of armament research related 
funding but because she had not been occupied and her Universities had survived largely intact. 
Germany was occupied by the Allies in four zones: three with the western allies and one with the 
Soviet Union. Leading German scientists were working for either the western allies or the Soviet bloc 
depending on their fate as the victors divided up the spoils of war. The USA, UK and France were 
arming themselves with nuclear weapons which all three were progressively developing and testing. 
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The cold war, which was to last 44 years, was just starting in earnest. The perceived threat of the 
Soviet Union with her communist doctrine embarking on its own nuclear weapons programme 
dominated world politics.  
 
Against this grim backdrop, it is justifiable to ask how any effective international scientific 
collaboration could emerge. Part of the reason is the contrast between how the nations dealt with 
the aftermath of the two World Wars. Much has been written on the dissimilarity between the 
League of Nations that was formed in 1920 and the UN and its organs that were set up towards the 
end World War II and came into force in October 1945. Usually the analysis of the period centres on 
issues such as the ‘big three’ of the time (USA, USSR and UK) imposing their will on the world stage; 
a will they argued was necessary to overcome what Dan Plesch and Thomas Weiss (2015: 201) term 
as ‘the general wreckage of the League of Nations’. Pierre Auger, who from 1948 to 59 was the 
Director of UNESCOs Department of Exact and Natural Sciences, provides an alternative rationale. 
He argues that as the League of Nations did not show any interest in science, no attempt was made 
to centralise or systematically coordinate the efforts of any of the national governmental 
institutions, and as a result their work was not brought together in any meaningful way (Auger, 
1963: 10). One related non-governmental organisation, which still exists today, the International 
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) had been established in 1931. By the end of World War II, ICSU 
was recognised by UNESCO as effective in dealing with the national scientific unions. UNESCO duly 
signed an agreement with ICSU in December 1946 allowing it to distribute UN funds to the national 
unions. However, the scientific unions were under the influence of individual leading scientists, 
resulting in their actions being ineffective and they failed to set up committees on standardization or 
direct national projects into any international setting. Their actions were what Elisabeth Crawford, 
Terry Shinn and Sverker Sörlin (1993: 1-42) categorise as spontaneous rather than bureaucratic.  
 
In contrast, the UN Charter was considered and was deliberately created before the end of the war 
and avoided the mistake of linking the new organisation with peace treaties. Fatefully, specialised 
intergovernmental agencies which were formed as part of the embryonic UN system such as 
UNESCO, FAO, WHO, etc., all at least had partly scientific aims. These IGOs were part of the second 
bureaucratic mode of science organisations that Crawford et al., had identified. UNESCO and its 
precursor body the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), provided a functioning vehicle which 
scientific communities could exploit to foster collaboration in their fields. An opportunity aided by a 
European Movement born out of the successes of the May 1948 Hague Congress that had a political 
will for growth and jobs and fostered various forms of European unity (CVCE, 2016).  
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A handful of visionary scientists, including Auger, Raoul Dautry and Lew Kowarski in France, Edoardo 
Amaldi in Italy and Niels Bohr in Denmark imagined creating a European atomic physics laboratory. 
They could see that such a laboratory would not only unite European scientists but also allow them 
to share the increasing costs of large scale facilities. It also meant they could compete with the US 
scientific community who were keen to retain their post World War II technological and scientific 
near hegemony. There was consensus that the time was ripe for Europe to move, and a risk that if it 
did not there could be a significant brain drain of the best fundamental physics talent to the USA. 
 
The French ECOSOC delegation led the way with a draft resolution submitted for the establishment 
of UN research laboratories using an argument that ‘many branches of science research connected 
with the promotion of human knowledge … would yield considerably more effective results if they 
were conducted on an international scale.’ Their visionary document pre-dates the forming of 
UNESCO itself on 16 November 1946 and set in motion the chain of diplomatic events that led to the 
establishment of CERN; ECOSOC draft resolution E/147, dated 17 September 1946 (ECOSOC, 1946). 
The ECOSOC General Assembly debate and resolutions that led to the founding of international 
research laboratories under the auspices of UNESCO was another step forward (ECOSOC Resolution 
E/RES/22, 1946). The final piece of behind-the-scenes diplomacy resulted in the discussion paper 
Question of Establishing United Nations research laboratories that was the vehicle for agreement 
within the European nations of how to establish CERN (UN, 1948). 
 
French physicist Louis de Broglie put forward the first official proposal for the creation of a European 
laboratory at the European Cultural Conference, in Lausanne in December 1949. A further push 
came at the 5th UNESCO General Conference, held in June 1950, where American physicist and 
Nobel laureate Isidor Rabi tabled a resolution authorizing UNESCO to ‘assist and encourage the 
formation of regional research laboratories to increase international scientific collaboration.’ 
Michael Krause (2014: 6) describes this moment as ‘Rabi’s smuggling of the idea onto the agenda.’ 
Rabi was very well connected politically as he was a member of the US Atomic Energy Authority and 
had joined that organisation immediately following his involvement in the Manhattan Project that 
had developed the US atomic bomb. Rabi also, like many scientists who had been involved in the 
development of atomic weapons, was driven for the rest of his scientific career to the peaceful 
exploitation of atomic energy. He was the person the European high energy physics community 
needed in the international relations arena and he delivered. At an intergovernmental meeting of 
UNESCO in Paris in December 1951, a French resolution concerning the establishment of a European 
Council for Nuclear Research was adopted. Two months later at the 2nd session of the UNESCO 
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intergovernmental conference, 11 countries signed an agreement establishing the provisional 
Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire; the acronym CERN was born (UNESCO, 1952). The 
missing state, of the 12 who were to be founding members, was the UK.  
 
CERN-UK bilateral correspondence reveals an underlying scepticism of the UK establishment as to 
why, given the advanced state of UK nuclear physics and close research links with the USA, any 
collaboration with European neighbours was needed. A negative position was led by Lord Cherwell 
the Paymaster General and scientific advisor to Winston Churchill. The UK reticence was only 
overcome by the determination and skills of the few UK scientists and engineers, such as John 
Adams [a future CERN DG], who could see the long-term benefits. The UK adroitly maintained 
payments to the fledgling pre-organisation to protect voting rights as an observer state. This meant 
that when Sir Ben Lockspeiser [a future CERN Council President] was finally authorised to sign the 
Convention, the UK seamlessly became a full member, narrowly avoiding missing out on being 
involved in the formation of the organisation, with influence on its structure and subsequent 
workshare (CERN, 1953).  
 
Following signature of the CERN Convention and the associated financial protocol during the period 
July to December 1953, the national ratification processes started. The international treaty came 
into force when the instruments of ratification of seven Member States were deposited at UNESCO 
House in Paris. Switzerland, as the host state, had to be one of the seven and the final condition was 
that the financial contributions of the ratifying members had to be at least 75% of the organisations 
budget. The required number of ratifications with combined level of contributions were met, and 
CERN was created on 29 September 1954. Remaining national parliament ratifications were 
achieved by the end of 1954 and the founding 12 Member States were: Belgium, Denmark, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. This grouping looks quite natural today but was the fall-out from a 
remarkable reconciliation that was taking place at the time. Former CERN Director General, Horst 
Wenninger highlighted that in the wake of World War II, “cooperation between European nations 
was simpler in science than in other fields” and helped play a part in the overall Franco-German 
rapprochement (Davis and Patman, 2015: 9). Werner Heisenberg, as a previous war time Director of 
the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Physics in Berlin, had worked on the Nazi regime atomic bomb 
project. With his signature on the CERN Convention, Germany regained its status as a coequal 
partner within the family of European nations for the first time since World War II (Krause, 2014: 
21); the nature of this profound change within Europe is illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5; European State Alliances in 1944 compared to CERN Founding Member States in 1954 
 
The unanimous national parliament ratifications are a testament to the efforts of the CERN founding 
fathers and the trust of the governments in both them and the project. Adapting Krause’s (2014: 
134) summary: consensus had been reached through the fateful, timely and powerful combination 
of two groups: European-minded politicians and single-minded European particle physicists. The 
politicians were looking for practical ways of reorienting Europe and the physicists were looking for 
their facility. Both were also determined to compete with the might of USA science and technology 
in fundamental science and wider contexts.  
 
 
3.1.2: Purpose and hosting arrangements 
 
The Convention makes clear that purpose of the organisation has two themes: firstly, to provide for 
collaboration among European States in nuclear research and secondly to describe what the central 
organisation will do from a facilities and experimentation point of view.  
 
The first theme shows an acceptance by the Members of the necessity for collaboration and this 
permeates in all areas. It also explicitly makes clear that the ‘Organisation shall have no concern with 
work for military requirements’ and that all results will be published. This was included to combat 
87 
 
unfounded criticism and public anxiety, particularly in the UK and some local Swiss elements, 
surrounding the formation of CERN. Paragraph 7 of Article II highlights the need for a co-operate 
spirit that also avoids duplication of effort. Nodes of excellence can exist and are encouraged outside 
of the central body but must fit-in to the overall plans that the centre leads on.  
 
The second theme is to demarcate exactly what will be undertaken and thereby limit activities and 
the allocation of resources to just that, unless authorised by amendments to the Convention [the 
mechanism for doing this is described in Section 3.5.3]. This precision is a means for the Member 
States to immediately and effectively limit and manage any tendencies for the central organisation 
to indulge in mission creep. The only amendment to the convention was in 1971 to add a second 
laboratory administrative unit; a change that was reversed some 10 years later. The precision is 
enough to provide certainty of purpose but not too detailed to limit innovation and/or the means of 
achievement. Boisot et. al., (2011: 26) point out, given the technical uncertainties that must be dealt 
with, that this corresponds to what Mintzberg and Quinn (1988) label as a project adhocracy in that 
it leaves teams of experts to solve complex problems in whatever manner they see fit. This trust in 
the workforce is a crucial aspect of the management approach and relates directly to Hypothesis 3 
concerning sound governance and leadership; it is analysed further in section 3.3. 
 
The first two paragraphs of Article II ‘Purposes’ of the CERN Convention (1953) state the following: 
 
1. ‘The Organisation shall provide for collaboration among European States in nuclear research of a 
pure scientific and fundamental character, and in research essentially related thereto. The 
Organisation shall have no concern with work for military requirements and the results of its 
experimental and theoretical work shall be published or otherwise available.’ Herwig Schopper, 
Director General of CERN from 1981 to 1988, adds, in an interview for this research, colour to 
the Article: “the spirit from the beginning, was that we are not at CERN to profit we are there to 
help to achieve the common objective. A principle introduced by the founding fathers that still 
exists today.” Indeed, many long-serving senior staff voiced how proud they were of ‘their’ 
Convention, a sentiment summed up by Markus Nordberg the Head of Resources Development: 
“it is a very nicely written document and sets the scene for fostering international collaboration 
across the range of projects that comprise CERN… it provides a healthy balance between top-
down and bottom up management approaches… we owe a lot to our founding fathers both on 
the scientific side and wise people in the ministries and governments at that time who made 
that happen.” 
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2. ‘The Organisation shall… confine its activities to the following: 
 
(a) The construction and operation of one or more international laboratories (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘the Laboratories’ for research of high-energy particles, including work in the 
field of cosmic rays; each laboratory shall include: 
i. One or more particle accelerators; 
ii. The necessary ancillary apparatus for use in the research programmes carried out by 
means of the machines referred to in (i) above; 
iii. The necessary buildings to contain the equipment referred to in (i) and (ii) above 
and for the administration of the Organisation and the fulfilment of its other 
functions; 
(b) The organisation and sponsoring of international co-operation in nuclear research, including 
co-operation outside the Laboratories; this co-operation may include in particular: 
i. Work in the field of theoretical nuclear physics; 
ii. The promotion of contacts between, and the interchange of, scientists, the 
dissemination of information, and the provision of advanced training for research 
workers; 
iii. Collaborating with and advising other research institutions; 
iv. Work in the field of cosmic rays.’ 
 
Paragraph 3 of the Convention deals with precise scientific requirements and paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 
concern the CERN Council voting rights that I cover in sub-section 3.1.3. Paragraph 7 states that ‘The 
Laboratories shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent with laboratories and institutes in the 
territories of Member States … and seek to avoid duplicating research work’.  
 
The first hosting ‘Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the European Organisation for 
Nuclear Research concerning the Legal Status of that Organization in Switzerland’ was signed despite 
some raucous local opposition to the venture (CERN, 1955). An unlikely coalition of the Swiss 
Communist Party and the International Red Cross opposed the site selection mainly due to concerns 
regarding nuclear safety and threats to the long-standing Swiss neutrality. Both objections were 
proven to be unfounded but did gain traction for a while during the public debate leading up to the 
referendum in the Canton of Geneva held on 27-28 June 1953. The vote had been called following 
the recommendation of the provisional Council's third session in October 1952, that the site of the 
future Laboratory be near Geneva; Figure 6.  
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Figure 6; CERN Provisional Council's third session, Geneva, Switzerland, October 1952 
(picture courtesy of CERN) 
 
The opposition debate was fuelled by the UK based Economist Magazine that demanded re-
assurances that CERN would not be a player in the evolving nuclear arms race. The CERN archive 
reveals that despite other pressing issues the first DG, Edoardo Amaldi, realised the need to respond 
immediately to the article. His reply was diplomatic but firm and included a reminder of an 
important concession that the local Swiss opposition groups had insisted was included in the 
Convention: ‘It has been emphasised … that the European Laboratory would be a Maison de verre 
and that all the work done in it would be published and freely available for everybody. This was a 
condition for participation of some countries like Switzerland, whose delegation had made clear was 
a ‘red-line’ for them at the first inter-governmental conference…’ (CERN Archive, 1952, Document 
Number 390). The Swiss had also ensured that no part of the Convention precluded eastern 
European states from membership thereby protecting Switzerland’s neutral stance to the widening 
east-west divide, a position that served CERN well in the years following the collapse of the USSR at 
the end of the cold war in 1991 when four former satellite states joined as full members. In the end 
the referendum resulted in an overwhelming two-thirds majority in support of site construction 
going ahead (CERN, 1953).  
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Host state personnel employed in the central organisation do not qualify for privileges and 
immunities that other Member State personnel enjoy. On the corporate level, the relationship also 
allows the Organization to have a legislative home for safety and regulatory topics that permit legal 
operation. Worthy of separate consideration is the constraint due to delicate in-kind arrangements 
for the ‘host state’. John Womersley, ex-UK STFC Chief Executive and current DG of ESS in Lund, 
Sweden, commented that “the risk perceived by host states is that there will not be enough noble 
work for them.” In this context, noble work means ‘high technical value and/or high scientific value 
and/or high monetary value.’ Womersley added that “this risk has to be adeptly managed to avoid 
resentment between the parties.”  
 
All IGOs publicly declare they are dedicated to fostering good host state relations and many strive to 
keep host states content. The importance of examining CERN’s host state relations to this thesis, is 
to demonstrate that it is another feature that the Community has always, from DG Amaldi’s letter to 
today with a dedicated host state relations team, recognized is crucial to its success.  
 
3.1.3: Organs, Voting Rights, the Director General and Staff 
 
The CERN Council is the highest decision-making body and is composed of two delegates from each 
Member State; accepted practice is that one is a leading physicist and the other represents the 
national government. The Council meets at least once a year in both open [allowing participation of 
observers] and closed sessions. Each Member State have one vote. Today, this arrangement seems 
predictable and self-evidently fair. In the late 1940s, there were those who argued, in relation to the 
establishment of the UN and its organs, that there were other possibilities. With what today would 
be correctly seen as cultural prejudice American Professor Harold Urey the Nobel Prize (Nobel, 1934) 
winning chemist, argued in 1948 that ‘the inclusion of illiterate, poverty-stricken, over numerous 
masses of the far East’ constituted the major problem for the world state. The American theologian 
Reinhold Niebuhr commented at the time that what Urey was proposing was a system of weighted 
votes in favour of nations with high literacy and abundance of raw materials and industrial 
production (Niebuhr, 1949: 5). The CERN founding members were clearly in Urey’s view from the 
latter group that he favoured. This erstwhile forgotten debate reminds us that nothing is inevitable 
with the set-up of bespoke IGOs created by specific communities. There is no common rule book 
that they must follow. It is to the credit of CERN’s founding leadership and her Member State 
statesmen that they resisted prevailing societal prejudices and unanimously adopted the one vote 
per member arrangements for the highest decision-making body (CERN Convention, 1953; Article V). 
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The Convention required the Council to establish two subsidiary bodies, which it duly did at its first 
meeting in 1954: a Scientific Policy Committee and a Finance Committee. The role of the Scientific 
Policy Committee is an important one in how the community governs itself and I cover this in detail 
in sub-section 3.3.2: Focality and Legitimacy.  
 
The Finance Committee consists of representatives of all Member States and meets five times a 
year, to address budgetary, procedural, personnel and commercial matters. In June each year it 
discusses and recommends Council to approve the Annual Accounts of the preceding year, as well as 
the Medium-Term Plan, which includes the Budget for the following year. In the second half of the 
year, the Finance Committee advises the Council on the cost-variation index and the scale of 
contributions that member states need to pay. The Finance Committee has weighted voting 
whereby a 2/3rds majority [minimum of 15 of 22 states] must agree to a resolution and their 
combined contributions must be at least 70% of the total. There is a long-standing protocol whereby 
no Council decision related to key financial elements such as the budget, medium term plan and 
annual contributions is reached without a prior positive recommendation by the Finance Committee.  
 
Two other committees, not addressed within the Convention, have subsequently been set up by 
Council to advise themselves and the Finance Committee. The Tripartite Employment Conditions 
Forum, where the Staff Association, the management and the Member States consider measures 
relating to the Organization’s social and employment conditions. Finally, an Audit Committee 
provides independent, objective advice and guidance on the adequacy and effectiveness of the 
Organization’s governance structure, risk management, values and ethics and provides oversight of 
the internal and external audit. 
 
In contrast to a golden period when the budget was increasing, Herwig Schopper, Director General 
of CERN from 1981 to 1988, took over when the funds from the contributing members were being 
reduced. Tough decisions had to be taken to close existing projects and concentrate on securing 
funding for the LEP. He provided first-hand insight into how members voting was managed during 
this challenging period: “what I introduced was before each Finance Committee and each Council 
meeting there was a dinner of all the delegates and my team, where we could openly discuss serious 
questions and we asked delegates, do you have instructions to vote against something? They would 
say yes; I have these instructions and we would then ask if you are overruled by a majority then 
would that create serious problems in your country or not? Then delegates would say either if you 
overrule me, yes, it would create serious problems, or they would tell us it is manageable. If the 
92 
 
answer was the first, then we would try hard to find another solution acceptable to everyone ahead 
of any closed sessions of Council. This pre-meeting dinner forum continues to this day. There was 
then and is now an active spirit of fairness in the collaboration that we always try and maintain.” 
 
The Convention at Article VI is thorough in the terms for the appointment of the Director General 
(DG). The DG is a diplomatic appointment and enjoys the privileges and immunities that this status 
brings. This standing is also needed as the DG represents the Organisation in contractual, safety and 
operating legal contexts. As discussed in sub-section 1.1.1: Realism of the Literature Review, while 
SMP DGs are granted considerable autonomous authority over the staff and operational matters, 
the final power rests firmly with the nations. A two-thirds majority of the Council is required to 
appoint the DG for a fixed term of 5 years. At CERN, the DG is exceptionally extended for 1 or 2 years 
but has never been appointed to a further full 5 years term. This contrasts with younger Science 
IGOs, such as the European Southern Observatory, where a DG can be re-appointed for a full second 
term. Similarly, another crucial role, the CERN Council President, is limited to a 3-year term allowing 
the Member States, who elect the President, to have regular input into how governance is 
operationally exercised.  
 
On the 5th November 2014, at its 173rd Closed Session the CERN Council selected a long-standing 
distinguished Italian scientist and previous leader of ATLAS, Dr Fabiola Gianotti, as DG. The Council 
Press Release stated that the Members had rapidly converged in favour of Dr Gianotti and that she 
would be the first woman to hold the position; her five-year mandate began on 1st January 2016 
(CERN, 2014). As with all DGs, Gianotti used her prerogative to decide on the number of Directors 
and proposed appointees including, for the first time, a Director of International Relations. The ‘DG 
elect’ is chosen one year before taking office to allow a smooth transition including the identification 
of his/her immediate team. Council then ratifies the incoming DG’s organigram and Directorate level 
appointees. In the case of Gianotti, she was an ‘inside CERN’ person having led the ATLAS project; 
the established protocol is that her immediate direct reports then be from ‘outside CERN.’ This 
process enables a regular freshening up of the top-level management and allows the DG to be 
immediately at ease with the team he/she has formed. An attendee vividly recalled the first 
Directors meeting chaired by Gianotti: “I remember the first meeting when all five [the DG plus 4 
Directors] of us were together, it is extremely demanding and a huge responsibility, but it [the 
appointment process] also instils a level of confidence because we were all unanimously confirmed 
by Council.” 
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Paragraph 4 of Article VI makes a noteworthy statement that ‘the responsibilities of the DG and the 
staff in regard to the Organisation shall be exclusively international in character’. It goes on to say ‘in 
the discharge of their duties they shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from 
any authority external to the Organisation. Tellingly, it concludes with ‘Each Member shall respect 
the international character of the responsibilities of the DG and the staff and not seek to influence 
them in the discharge of their duties’. Many industrial JV arrangements aspire to similar standards 
whereby the central management team has both autonomy and authority over the JV companies 
but are often hampered by commercial considerations and company loyalties. Interviewees 
consistently attested that the CERN community crucially achieves this through living the principle in 
a combination of everything the DG and his/her staff do together with everything the Member 
States and their respective Institution’s leadership and staff do. The decisions made in the centre are 
genuinely respected as being for the good of the whole community and not any single element. 
 
 
3.1.4: Commercial, Contracting and Funding Arrangements 
 
3.1.4.1: Commercial and contracting arrangements 
 
Following on from the hosting agreements with Switzerland and France, CERN formalised the 
Protocol on Privileges and Immunities with the Member States (CERN, 2004). Legal disputes between 
CERN and its suppliers and contractors are not submitted to national courts but to international 
arbitration. CERN as a distinct legal entity can negotiate favourable terms and conditions for 
purchases of equipment and services. The commercial advantages of this arrangement are twofold. 
Firstly, for the organisation itself and include 1) exemption from value-added tax payments, 2) the 
opportunity for standardisation of procedures, 3) where appropriate, economy of scale savings, 4) 
the prospect of being an intelligent buyer with high reputation and 5) the chance to accumulate 
expert market knowledge over decades of construction, operation and maintenance. Secondly, 
there are also advantages for Companies and Institutions in bidding and being awarded CERN 
contracts, including: prestige in being associated with the research coupled with building long-term 
relationship and winning follow-up work with the Organisation and its Member States Institutions. 
 
CERN is not bound, as with other SMPs such as the European Space Agency (ESA) where a strict juste 
retour principle is applied. For example, in their portion of the ISS (Chapter 5) whereby about 85% of 
ESA’s budget is spent on contracts with European industry. ESA’s published industrial policy is to 
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ensures that Member States get a fair return on their investment. The aim is to improve the 
competitiveness of European industry, maintain and develop space technology and exploit the cost 
advantages of competitive bidding (ESA, 2018). 
 
For CERN, more flexibility in the process is allowed to aid higher management in maintaining fairness 
in the nations’ workshare. During competitive tendering, if the second lowest bidder company, who 
is compliant in all other ways and is within 20% of the lowest bid, is from a ‘poorly balanced’ or ‘very 
poorly balanced’ member in terms of its procurement share of CERN contracts then it is given an 
opportunity to ‘align’ with the lowest bid. Technology transfer and spin-off’s, such as hadron therapy 
medical scanners, are another vehicle that keep nations content with their return on financial 
investment. These spin-offs also help foster a collective pride in improving the fabric of society. 
 
The construction of CERN’s physical infrastructure and experiments is an industrial scale undertaking 
similar in size to the largest civil engineering projects, such as commercial power stations. The LHC 
construction costs were in the order of US$ 4BN with an approximate annual operating budget of 
US$ 1B. Standard project control methods for cost-control, quality assurance and schedule 
adherence are employed by CERN and the large instrument project teams. The ‘DG elect, Gianotti, 
explained in the ‘CERN Model, Science, Education, and Global Public Good Symposium’, that these 
control methods are applied with a light and sensitive management touch (CERN/UNOG 2015); I 
return to examine this management approach in Section 3.3: Governance and Leadership Dynamics. 
 
The experiment projects and other major collaborations such as for the ‘Deployment and 
Exploitation of the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid’ are not legal entities but are bound together 
through MoUs (ATLAS, 1998; CERN, 2015). Boisot, et. al., (2011: 116, 135) describe ‘buying under 
conditions of uncertainty: a proactive approach’ and ‘learning and innovation in procurement.’ Their 
conclusions can be summarised by saying that there is untapped potential for SMPs to act as lead 
users to speed up and leverage the conversion of new scientific knowledge into exploitable industrial 
knowledge. A practical example of this is the Knowledge Transfer Group whose goal is to accelerate 
innovation and maximise the global positive impact of CERN on society. Interviewees confirmed that, 
as with many aspects of CERN, this Group is not just a name but a well-staffed, effective and high-
profile part of the central organisation and plays a respected role in the wider community. 
3.1.4.2: Funding arrangements 
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CERNs funding has two strands: that for the central organisation (infrastructure and personnel) and 
that for the embedded instrument projects. The complete picture is complicated, here I only 
consider the overview of both situations. The Director for Finance and Human Resources, Martin 
Steinacher, explained that “we do every year the exercise to calculate what the contributions will be, 
based on net national income, reflecting the economic strength, this is already in the Convention 
and was a very, very wise provision.” Each Member State contributes annual cash payments both to 
the capital expenditure and to the operating expenses according to the formula of Article VII of the 
Convention and the Financial Protocol. This means that while the LHC was built by CERN using the 
money contributed to the central fund, the four giant detector experiments were funded, designed, 
and built by independent international collaborations. Michael Lucibella (2014) recognises that this 
has the advantage that if one instrument project falls behind, it does not necessarily mean the entire 
endeavour will suffer. John Krige, identifies that “For some governments, the infrastructure of CERN 
is funded from the foreign policy budget, not the science budget.” (Hermann, et al., 1987: 106). He 
added that the UK is one of the few countries to use money solely from its science ministry, 
inevitably pitting scientists against each other over whether to support the international program or 
unrelated domestic research. Krige goes on to say, “That led to incredibly bitter fights in Britain on 
how much it can afford for CERN that were avoided in other States who funded international 
projects differently.” I return to this when considering US funding to the ITER Project (Chapter 4). 
 
The ATLAS and CMS MoUs allow funding commitments from the participating Members States that 
include large scale in-kind contributions. Procurement, development, production and unit testing is 
carried out nationally before items are shipped to CERN, assembled and system tested. This 
arrangement has two major benefits to the contributing nations, making IKM a feasible route to 
participation in Science Mega-Projects. Firstly, it helps maintain alignment whereby a contributing 
nation obtains a benefit corresponding to the value of contribution that they make. It does so by 
keeping the majority of spend for the experiment collaborations in the Member State territories. 
Secondly, it enhances the professional and social capital of the member’s scientists and engineers 
who are participating in the project, leading to enhanced status for those nations and national 
institutions in the global science community.  
 
A senior, long serving Manager provided an analogy to explain the CERN funding model: “it is like an 
airport; the runway is the LHC and there is a control tower where the wise CERN management keep 
an eye that it is not too crowded, and the airport resources match the demand. Then you have the 
crazy pilots and the airlines, they fly in the happy customers who are the physicists who love the 
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airport because there is so much going on and everyone collaborates. But the funding of the two is 
separate, you have the infrastructure and everything that goes with that and you have the brains in 
the experimental projects that operate within it.” 
 
Section summary 
 
Hypothesis 1 is supported (see checklist of supporting and opposing attributes at Table 1) in that the 
Convention clearly sets the scene, establishes workable rules and provides sound guidelines on 
operational parameters; the Convention Articles provide a solid base from which the organisation 
and its community have benefited. This relates to three Beyond Gridlock pathways: Pathway 1, 
‘shifts in major powers core interests’ present as the driving force for the coalition that created 
CERN; Pathway 2, ‘autonomous and adaptive institutions’ that included granting governing bodies 
the capabilities to adapt to emerging issues and Pathway 3, ‘technical groups with effective and 
legitimate processes’ being free to solve problems without being overburdened by hierarchical 
bureaucracy.  
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3.2: Managing Constraints 
 
To test Hypothesis 2 (that external constraints such as excessive stakeholder aspirations, changing 
political and legal landscapes, bureaucratic regulations, funding fluctuations and unforeseen events, 
while being mitigated as far as possible by IGO leadership actions, inevitably adversely affect overall 
performance) I examine how the CERN Community leadership has handled three potentially 
constraining events. The first concerns its scientific domain dominance, the second a political event 
that quickly threatened its funding and the third, an unforeseen technical issue. Finally, a sub-section 
summary is provided. 
 
 
3.2.1: Domain Dominance 
 
The first event to test Hypothesis 2 concerns one rival project that had the potential to challenge 
CERN’s domain dominance. While much of this thesis discusses the collaborative facets of science, it 
is also a highly competitive field. There is a worldwide competition between groups and institutions 
to discover knowledge and to secure funds. Healthy competition is also encouraged and indeed 
essential to the way CERN operates internally, typified by the rigour employed in the detection of 
the Higgs boson. The findings were only made public when the results from the ATLAS team were 
independently confirmed by their counterparts in the CMS team. While there was a need for the 
dual confirmation there was also keen competition as to which investigational group would be first.  
 
There is also fierce competition for the best scientific and technologist talent, and this is often 
related to which organisation has the best facilities, consistent funding and reputational kudos. Here 
I will focus on one rival project that had the potential to challenge CERNs domain dominance and 
how the community countered this threat. The rival Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) being 
planned in Texas in the 1980s was so large and ambitious with construction costs, even in the 
conceptual design stage in the multibillion-dollar order, that it could only be built by the USA finding 
collaborating partner states (Riordan, Hoddeson and Kolb, 2015: 172). The scientific and technical 
successes of CERN had political consequences for the SSC. Each triumph reinforced the political will 
of the European Member States to continue patronage and encouraged individual scientists, 
technologists, research groups, and new states to join.  
 
An early CERN Device, the Super Proton Synchrotron, enabled Simon van der Meer and Carlo Rubbia 
to lead two-detector experiments that proved the existence of the W and Z boson particles. These 
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particles are responsible for weak sub-atomic interactions, and the discovery substantiated the basic 
structure of the Standard Model of particle physics, an accomplishment for which they were jointly 
awarded the Nobel Prize for Physics (entry 3 in Table 2). This success reinforced the scientific and 
technical kudos allowing the CERN Council to push on to the next step device in the knowledge that 
it would have been unthinkable for European states to collaborate on any project other than the 
new CERN LHC they were then considering. Riordan, Hoddeson and Kolb (2015: 173) convincingly 
argue that prioritising on CERN meant there were little, or no funds left available for the Europeans 
to become involved in other international collaborations.  
 
With Europe ruled out and Russian and Indian fundamental physics scientists already having access 
to CERN through Protocols first agreed in 1967, the US fundamental physics community courted 
Japan. US-Japan trade war tensions proved too big an obstacle to progress and pressure mounted on 
the project. US President Clinton (American Presidency Project, 1993) offered his public support with 
an open letter to the Chair of an influential Budget Committee of Congress that included: ‘As your 
Committee considers the Energy and Water Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994, I want you to 
know of my continuing support for the SSC... Abandoning the SSC at this point would signal that the 
United States is compromising its position of leadership in basic science, a position unquestioned for 
generations. These are tough economic times, yet our Administration supports this project as a part 
of its broad investment package in science and technology... I ask you to support this important and 
challenging effort.’ Despite this, mounting design and construction costs and pressure from rival US 
projects, persuaded Congress to officially cancel the SSC in October 1993. The US Science Historian, 
David Appell noted in 2013 in Scientific American: “although no one reason explains the 
cancellation, a few key aspects of the project stand out. The inability to secure any foreign sources of 
funding was pivotal…” (Appell, 2013).  
 
Many interviewees contended that you need both collaboration and competition and that for the 
benefit of high energy physics the whole community needs to have a healthy mix of proficiencies 
that a strong counterbalancing US capability should contribute to. There was therefore no rejoicing 
in the European science community at the SSCs demise but CERNs status as the preeminent 
fundamental physics facility in the world was now unchallenged. CERN had triumphed over the SSC 
by a combination of two factors. Firstly, scientific success was not then or now seen as a one-off but 
as part of a continuous stream of positive outcomes; this reinforced good will with the members 
including their national internal non-scientific backers. Secondly, by carefully expanding scientific 
access through protocols with individuals and institutions, increased associated membership and full 
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membership, potential partners were relentlessly detached from the SSC. The brain drain that CERNs 
pioneers had warned against was stemmed. US fundamental physicists joined those from around the 
world and increasingly flocked to CERN to conduct their research.  
 
 
3.2.2: Funding Resilience 
 
The second event to test Hypothesis 2 stems from the period following German reunification in 1990 
when payments from Germany to all international bodies were reduced. Germany was then and 
remains now the largest contributor and news of the reduction came just at the time when the 
Council had to find extra funds for the new flagship infrastructure project: the LHC. Other nations, 
led by the vocal UK, while sympathetic that Germany’s contribution would fall insisted that no 
unilateral reduction could be agreed. The Council adroitly decided to reduce contributions for all 
Members to align with the reduction needed by Germany. By acquiring distinct extra funding from 
the Host States (France and Switzerland) whose industry would gain the most from the construction, 
the funding gap was partially plugged and allowed the Council to give the construction go-ahead in 
December 1994. Chris Llewellyn Smith [a future DG] then led the efforts to convince non-Member 
States to join the LHC project with great success: Japan (1995), India (1996), Russia, Canada and the 
USA (1997) all came onboard. When Germany again reduced her contribution in 1997, the Council 
permitted construction finance through advantageous European Investment Bank loans.  
 
Another external funding constraint that was dealt with was explained by Martin Steinacher who at 
the time, in 2015, was still delegate for Switzerland in the CERN Finance Committee: “nimble 
flexibility was demonstrated when the exchange rate of the Swiss Franc quite unexpectedly dropped 
from 1.20 to parity, immediately the CERN membership for the Euro countries became more 
expensive by 15-20%, because they contribute in Swiss Francs. The CERN management held a crisis 
meeting and decided they had to do something to help and to show good will and so in 2015 the 
contribution levels for all states was lowered by 6% to ease the pressure. The situation was managed 
to the satisfaction of the member states.” 
 
Even when under budgetary pressure, the solutions reached were scrupulously fair as enshrined in 
the Financial Articles of the Convention. A principle described well by James Gillies the Head of 
Communications at CERN for 13 years up to December 2015 and current member of the Strategic 
Planning and Evaluation unit noted that “one of the most significant factors that has led to the good 
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collaboration between the member states and the central organisation is the simplicity of the CERN 
convention and the fact that it is all about collaboration between countries, mutual support when 
needed, there is flexibility and it is very, very fair, everybody pays according to their ability to pay, so 
Council sets the overall budget and then the global economic situation sets who pays what….it is a 
beautifully simple document.”  
 
Markus Nordberg the Head of Resources Development at IdeaSquare provided this analogy: “it is 
almost like a family business [with the member states] there is always some little scandal 
somewhere ….and the family effort is trying to keep this one individual at that time, happy.” He 
added regarding the budget “running an operations annual budget of over IBN Euro through 23 
governments is not a trivial matter and often there is one nation which for internal political reasons 
has difficulty in funding and that generates a little tension, but only in the sense that the other 
nations have to find a way to help; like a family. There is an understanding, built up over time, that 
things change, governments change, atmospheres change, and the majority always takes upon itself 
to help the one in trouble. The one needing help changes, not the will to help.” 
 
The field work confirmed the message from the literature that today CERN benefits from having the 
seamless mix of both in-cash and in-kind funding. Members make cash contributions based on net 
national income, reflecting the relative economic strength, to the 1 BN $ annual budget. Non-
member states have made substantial in-kind contributions during periods of need such as the 
Russian and US contributions to the LHC. In-kind contributions also feature strongly within the 
multinational experiment collaborations. 
 
Crucially, the mixture comprises just the right levels of each type of funding. It has enough cash 
contributions to allow the central organisation to make timely operational decisions but not too 
much to allow unnecessary mission creep. The community has enough in-kind work to keep its 
industrial, scientific and technological base content but not too much to hamper the central 
organisation in managing the entire facility. 
 
 
3.2.3: Overcoming Technical Obstacles 
 
The third event that will be utilised to test Hypothesis 2, occurred on 19 September 2008, just nine 
days after the LHC was commissioned and circulated its first beams of particles. A connector 
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between segments of the superconducting magnets failed and the pressure of the released cooling 
helium inside the cryostats caused catastrophic damage. Safety features worked well and there was 
no risk to the work force or the local community; but given the media hype around the start-up 
there was reputational damage to the whole CERN Community that could easily have escalated if the 
investigation into the cause and recovery had not been handled sensitively. Repairs took over a year 
and a thorough investigation found the root cause as a combination of a design flaw and 
manufacturing defect that more rigorous quality controls, throughout the process, might have 
prevented. It would have been easy for recriminations to follow, but the CERN Community took the 
opportunity to make the particle detectors better prepared, shared the increased costs between all 
the parties and put in place protocols to prevent, as far as possible, any reoccurrence. Throughout 
the shut-down the management team released open updates on the investigation into the causes, 
the repair plans, costs and progress. It was a set-back that a strong team spirit adeptly dealt with 
rather than adopting a blame culture which would have exacerbated any reputational damage. 
 
Following that event, the continued trouble-free running of the LHC since 2009 has provided a stable 
platform for ATLAS, CMS and other instrument teams. The stand-out achievement has been the 
discovery in 2012 of a new fundamental atomic particle consistent with the Higgs boson predicted 
by the Standard Model. This discovery led to the Nobel Prize in Physics being awarded jointly to 
François Englert and Peter Higgs, with citation including recognition of the part CERN played: "for 
the theoretical discovery of a mechanism that contributes to our understanding of the origin of mass 
of subatomic particles, and which recently was confirmed through the discovery of the predicted 
fundamental particle, by the ATLAS and CMS experiments at CERN's Large Hadron Collider." (Nobel 
Foundation, 2013). The CERN DG at the time, Professor Rolf-Dieter Heuer, commenting: "The 
discovery... marks the culmination of decades of intellectual effort by many people around the 
world. It is a global effort, it was a global effort, and it is a global success.” (BBC, 2013). Although the 
prestigious Nobel Prize can only be given to an individual or up to three collaborating individuals, 
CERN handles all its scientific papers in a collective way. The scientific papers surrounding the Higgs 
boson particle discovery and subsequent refining of size of the particle were cited as co-authored by 
the entire detector teams. For example, the paper that announced the ATLAS team's observation of 
the Higgs particle in 2012 had 2,932 authors, of whom 21 were listed as deceased. This ‘hyper-
authorship’ is intentional and commendable; it publicly recognises the collaborative nature of 
modern research and helps foster an espirit de corps. As Davide Castelvecchi (2015) reports in 
Nature Magazine this practice is not unique to CERN, but CERN has led the way in its adoption not 
just in physics research but in the broader scientific community. This collective approach has led to 
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calls from many, including the editorial team of Scientific American, for the Nobel Foundation to 
change its position and recognise that “Whereas a century ago a patent clerk famously divined the 
theory of relativity in his spare time, discovering a Higgs boson requires decades of planning and the 
efforts of 6,000 researchers. No one person -no troika, even - can legitimately claim all the credit” 
(Scientific American, 2012). 
 
A physicist from one of the experiment teams pointed out that “when we have secured our funding 
and we are up and running, everyone is on the [signed science] paper, we are then focused on the 
results and this helps with the collaboration and helps with building personal reputations on who 
contributes most to that collaboration. When you get arguments on major papers with big results, 
many may initially hesitate before signing their names… and there is very long peer review… and we 
have to maintain patience and flexibility which is supported by management who are on same 
page… and that maturity really matters as it means anyone can do a very exciting result and the 
originators will get the credit eventually, but we are not going to get mavericks publishing random 
results. Everyone benefits in the end”.  
 
 
Section summary 
 
These three diverse examples demonstrate that while external constraints will affect performance, 
the effects can be minimised by the community leadership navigating through and around them. 
CERN’s high reputation is borne out of its repeated scientific successes and its managerial ability to 
overcome threats, obstacles and set-backs. This capability to deal with crises as well as supporting 
Hypothesis 2, also serves to support Hypothesis 3 that ‘sound internal governance and leadership 
dynamics improve global IGO performance’; see the checklist of supporting and opposing attributes 
at Table 1. The capability relates principally to Pathway 7 ‘innovative leadership as a reaction to 
gridlock’ with regular, supporting use of Pathway 8 ‘innovative funding’ mechanisms.  
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3.3: Governance and Leadership Dynamics 
 
To test Hypothesis 3 (that sound internal governance and leadership dynamics improve global IGO 
performance) I examine three organisational features. Firstly, the organisational culture; here the 
analysis has profited from the views that were expressed at all levels within the community during 
the field work interviews on those management approaches that have been most productive and 
how criticisms have been dealt with. Secondly, I examine two characteristics of successful 
orchestrators that Abbott and Hale (2014: 9) identify: focality and legitimacy. Thirdly, I explore 
upcoming developments for CERN in an international context including how future membership may 
be managed and the community’s potential strategies regarding the next generation facility. A sub-
section summary is also provided. 
 
 
3.3.1: Organisational Culture 
 
I investigate the CERN Community culture through examples of practice and excerpts from field 
work contemporary interviews. It would be wrong to imply that the CERN central organisation is 
beyond criticism. As with any large organisation it reflects the societies from which it draws its 
personnel. The organisation suffers from gender inequality issues that beset many STEM IGOs, NGOs 
and natural sciences academia. The problem is well recognised and is steadily being addressed by 
the central leadership. There is greater equality in the non-physics dominated areas, but the 
imbalance in physics areas, while improving, is still far from parity and lags progress made in the 
Member States. A few interviewees reported on the presence of a ‘community within a community’ 
in that some physicists saw themselves as above the others in the organisation. There was also 
within the physicist community an inherent hierarchy with the theoretical physicists at the top 
followed by the experimental physicists and then those involved in the LHC and other infrastructure. 
A stereotypical ‘old-boys-network’ whereby different groups looked after their own was suggested 
to still be in play by only one or two interviewees.   
 
In any high pressure, high stakes organisation employing thousands of young people drawn from 
disparate cultural backgrounds and beliefs there will be episodes of friction and behavioural 
incidents. CERN established in 2010 an Ombudsperson whose role is to provide impartial and 
informal advice and guidance, to help resolve interpersonal disputes and to guide people in applying 
the CERN Code of Conduct (CERN, 2010). The incumbent is available to all staff and reports annually 
to the Tripartite Employment Conditions Forum which in turn reports to Council. Interviewees 
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confirmed these matters are invariably dealt with internally and with the Member States promptly, 
firmly and fairly.  
 
The prevailing organisational culture is best illustrated by direct quotations from interviewees; who 
were unanimous that CERN’s governance and leadership regimes get the clear majority of important 
things right. A senior manager provided a high level context “… the successful collaboration comes 
back to this idea of science for peace, it is a bit of a cliché almost, but it sums up so much, we get 
people coming here that are motivated by the science, they meet people from other countries and 
cultures and they have this shared passion and they discover they have a lot more in common than 
they maybe thought they would have.”   
 
A young and award-winning post-doctoral physicist made a telling observation that “as a scientist 
you are trained to think that there is a fundamental truth and this helps unify people and many 
scientists come from a background of international experience, many people go abroad already as 
students … and so, when you bring people together at a place like CERN there is already a 
component that has had that exposure in the past and what they have been exposed in the field of 
physics has been the same regardless of where they come from. They already have the mindset that 
to collaborate internationally is normal.” 
 
Dr Fabiola Gianotti, speaking at the CERN / UNOG Symposium in 2015 as the then ‘CERN DG elect’ 
stated that in her experience as the Spokesperson for ATLAS, the main reasons for the success of the 
CERN model were that: “these experiments have a very light, a very loose organisational structure 
and the leadership has no contractual power over the members of the collaborations. The Members 
are affiliated and report to their home institutes…authority comes from the intellectual contribution 
not from the hierarchy. The youngest student has a bright idea to the solution of a problem then the 
collaboration follows. Everyone can contribute in a significant way to shape the strategy and course 
of the experiment. Managerial structure is light. Some structure is needed… but it must be light and 
nimble, not to repress initiatives and ideas and creativity of individuals. Because the ideas and 
creativity are the drivers of the research. The organisation is there to assist and help particularly the 
young people to blossom and not be impeded by bureaucracy. This would be the death of research 
and science.” (CERN/UNOG, 2015).  
 
This was a view echoed by all the field work interviewees and cited by many as the single most 
important element in CERNs success. Over-dominant project leadership is rejected in the same way 
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that over-dominance of a single research perspective is rejected. Tokenism or ‘non-inclusive 
inclusion’ of team members is also not tolerated; everyone’s contributions are respected. The 
leaders of the embedded experiment teams are termed ‘spokes-persons’. The incumbents are 
elected to these positions by their peers, they have no contractual levers over the team members 
from the collaboration partner institutes. Given that these embedded projects are multimillion-
dollar endeavours with the all the project control, risk and reporting pressures that this brings, the 
fact that they work demonstrates the importance of having a first-rate organisational culture.  
 
Gianotti concluded her remarks at the UN conference with: “The key element is that people are 
animated by a strong common passion for the scientific goals of the experiments and this passion 
and the realisation that these goals can only be reached by working together is much stronger than 
the ambition and interests of the individuals, institutes and countries. Universal values like 
knowledge, transcend the political, social and economic interests of individuals and countries and as 
such are a very strong glue to bring mankind together and are a very strong ally of peace”. 
 
James Gillies the former Head of Communications at CERN believed that “one of the most important 
political lessons learned by the project governance and management regimes was that the 
Convention puts in place the structures that promote and allow mutual trust to be developed over 
time.” Trust is either there or it is not in an organisational culture and must be maintained through 
the actions of all the players. Gillies added “for the Instrument projects the spokesperson will 
normally reach decisions through consensus… the lead times for big decisions are also very long and 
this adds to the idea of the collective agreeing what is best for each instrument project.” 
 
 
3.3.2: Focality and Legitimacy 
 
Orchestrating Global Solution Networks; a Guide for Organizational Entrepreneurs (Abbott and Hale, 
2014) provides a helpful checklist to gauge how successful a central body is in managing other actors 
in the community to achieve the orchestrators goals. It is not the purpose of this thesis to describe in 
detail the achievements of this or any of the other case studies. It is important, given the case study 
selection justification criteria described in Section 2.2., to place the actions of the community in a 
global collaboration context. This is now mapped out, for two characteristics of successful 
orchestrators that Abbott and Hale (2014: 9) identify: focality and legitimacy.  
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3.3.2.1: Focality 
 
CERN is an anchor institution that acts as a well-established fundamental physics hub that people 
look to and converge around. Abbot and Hale suggest that an organisation’s centrality can be 
measured in terms of the number of interactions or working relationships between its staff and 
those of other organisations in the field. The number of people who read its publications or attend 
its meetings are similar measurable indicators.  
 
The 2016 user community figures confirm CERNs global reach with over 12 000 researchers from 
institutes in over 70 countries being actively engaged. CERN makes substantial efforts to 
communicate with the public and welcomes over 80 000 visitors each year to ‘The Globe’ visitor 
centre and runs a series of High School Physics Teacher Programmes aimed at bringing modern 
physics into the classroom. Connectivity within the Community is excellent with cutting-edge 
seminars and conferences attracting the best in the fields of science and technology (CERN, 2016). 
While these figures must be viewed with the latent optimism bias described in sub-section 2.5.1.4 in 
mind, the sufficiently large sample of third-party material bears out the undeniable focality that the 
CERN community has achieved in its central establishment. 
 
The risk of fragmentation of the community is combatted by a continual renewal process at different 
levels within the central organisations that is illustrated by three examples: First, renewal, comes 
through the constant flow of new-blood eager scientists engaged in cutting-edge work at CERN. 
Interviewees confirmed that the infrastructure teams and embedded experiment teams have a 
healthy mix of experience, middle career and post-graduate membership where fresh ideas are 
actively encouraged. Second, renewal is provided by the example of those at the very highest levels 
where top level positions are regularly rotated; I explained this in sub-section 3.1.3 regarding 
Organs, Voting Rights and the DG and staff. The CERN executives interviewed for this research all 
agreed that this renewal process fosters vitality and inclusiveness and enables the DG to be rapidly 
at ease with the team he/she has formed.  
 
3.3.2.2: Legitimacy 
 
Abbot and Hale consider legitimacy as the belief among all the actors in a community that the 
central organisation and its bodies are appropriate to direct policy. The research evidence and 
derivation of this status derives from multiple sources, here I outline the most important five. 
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First, the focality provided by Council is legitimized by the advice it receives from the Scientific Policy 
Committee that makes recommendations on the priorities of programmes and the allocation of 
research effort both within the CERN Laboratories and extramurally. This task demands members of 
the highest calibre and a practice that has continued from its first meeting in 1954 to today is that it 
is composed of leading world experts appointed by Council without regard to nationality. The 
founding members of the Committee included the most distinguished European physicists of the 
time, four of its eight members being Nobel Laureates. The Council considers recommendations for 
committee membership provided by the Chair of the Committee and that have the support of at 
least two-thirds of the members. The transparency of this co-option process whereby when a 
member leaves the Committee it is scientific esteem with peers that is the sole factor concerning 
who will be the replacement, builds confidence in its deliberations and recommendations. 
 
Second, CERN has the moral authority to orchestrate though the vastness of its membership. The 
CERN archive accession papers confirm that States view membership as essential to their global 
scientific standing. The growth in membership to the 23 states of today emboldens the Council to 
govern, or at least actively shape, the world-wide epistemic fundamental sciences research 
community.  
 
Third, it has legitimacy due to its unprecedented track record of success. The nature of CERN’s 
integrated research facility is that their major achievements over the last 65 years are models of 
collaboration across many individuals, teams and nations; an achievement that the high energy 
physics community is proud of and which was articulated by interviewees during the field work. 
CERN’s legitimacy is aided by a succession of Nobel Prizes for Physics where the recipients have a 
direct link to CERN research as shown at Table 2. 
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Table 2; CERN related Nobel Prizes for Physics (Nobel, 2019) 
 
No evaluation of CERN’s record of success is complete without mention of its most notable spin-off 
that not only demonstrates the frontier nature of its technical work but also its open culture. CERN 
has always had a need for very high computing power and by the 1980s the global user community 
demanded improved communications and information management. Tim Berners-Lee a British 
computer scientist working at CERN developed a new networking system that eventually became 
known as the World Wide Web. His core concepts are still in use today and he made his ideas freely 
available with no patent or royalties due. CERN management decided to put the invention into the 
public domain and the Internet, a global network of information and easy accessibility that was 
previously used by only a few scientists, military personnel and computer experts, was thus made 
freely available to all. Berners-Lee’s altruism was fêted by Time magazine in 1999: ‘He wove the 
World Wide Web and created a mass medium for the 21st century. The World Wide Web is Berners-
Lee’s alone. He designed it and more than anyone else he fought to keep it open, non-proprietary 
and free’ (Time, 1999). It was the fact that he was a CERN employee that provided the 
environmental culture and tools to make the discovery and allowed the act of corporate as well as 
personal generosity that unleashed it. This is one of a series of scientific/technical achievements that 
have met and exceeded the expectations of its backers. Success has bred success and enhanced the 
reputation of the central organisation, its management team and all those in the wider CERN 
community.   
1952
“for their development of new methods for nuclear magnetic precision 
measurements and discoveries in connection therewith.”
Felix Bloch
Edward Mills Purcell
Bloch
was the first Director General
1976
“for their pioneering work in the discovery of
a heavy elementary particle of a new kind.”
Sam Ting
Burt Richter
Ting
 was the LEP Spokesperson
1984
“their decisive contributions to the large project which led to the discovery of 
the field particles W and Z, communicators of the weak interaction.”
Carlo Rubbia
Simon Van der Meer
Both Rubbia and Van der Meer
were CERN physicists
1988
“for the neutrino beam method and the demonstration of the doublet 
structure of the leptons through the discovery of the muon neutrino.”
Jack Steinberger
Leon Lederman
Mel Schwartz
Steinberger
was a CERN physicist
1992
“his invention and development of particle detectors, in particular the 
multiwire proportional chamber, a breakthrough in the technique for
exploring the innermost parts of matter.”
Georges Charpak
Charpack
was a CERN physicist
2013
"for the theoretical discovery of a mechanism that contributes to our 
understanding of the origin of mass of subatomic particles, and which recently 
was confirmed through the discovery of the predicted fundamental particle, by 
the ATLAS and CMS experiments at CERN's Large Hadron Collider."
François Englert
Peter Higgs 
The ATLAS and CMS teams at 
CERN confirmed the existence 
of the Higgs Boson 
NOBEL PRIZE
in PHYSICS
Year of Award
Award Citation Recipients
Award relationship
to CERN
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Spin-off’s such as the World Wide Web and Hadron Cancer Therapy Scanners, are a practical vehicle 
that keep nations content with their return on investment. They help to foster a collective prestige 
and pride in accomplishment in improving the fabric of society. A 2014 OECD report Impacts of Large 
Research Infrastructures on Economic Innovation and on Society: CERN Case Study concluded that 
the series of global scale successes, such as the discovery of the Higgs boson, legitimise the 
mechanisms and procedures (informal and formal) that produced them (OECD, 2014: 64).  
 
Fourth, the legitimacy stems from the expertise that CERN possesses and uses. It has unrivalled 
experience in the field carefully nurtured through corporate knowledge gathering and kept up to 
date by constant exchanges of personnel and their ideas with its Member States. Despite set-backs, 
its technical success in orchestrating the design, manufacture, assembly, commissioning and 
operation of some of the most intricate fundamental physics equipment in the world is impressive. 
Industrial Liaison Officers located in each of the Member States facilitate the flow of communication 
between CERN and its suppliers. CERN central staff collectively exemplify an intelligent customer 
free from national regulatory restrictions and able to manage risk by putting in place a contractual 
system of strong controls and oversight of its international supply chain partners. 
 
Finally, another aspect of CERNs legitimacy is the increasing presence of the community leadership 
in international projects and forums outside of its primary domain. There are three stand-out 
examples: Firstly, the CERN Convention has been successfully adapted by several European IGOs and 
several former DGs have been instrumental in adapting it in the creation of the remarkable Jordan 
based SESAME alliance of Cyprus, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, the 
Palestinian Authority, and Turkey (UNESCO, 2010). Secondly, the current DG, Gianotti was one of 
seven female co-chairs at the World Economic Forum 2018 in Davos; the CERN emblem flying 
alongside national flags. Thirdly, the granting of permanent observer status by the UN General 
Assembly (UN, 2012) confirms CERN as a world-leading independent and neutral IGO from outside of 
the UN system that has transcended fundamental physics research. CERNs views and experiences 
were sought on a wide range of issues including the effectiveness of the UN Working Group on 
Sustainability Goals and global STEM education initiatives. 
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3.3.3: Future Developments and Expansion 
 
I now focus on two developments that field work confirmed are concentrating the minds of the 
CERN community leaders in the near to mid-term: Firstly, future membership and related innovative 
funding trends and secondly, planning for the next generation fundamental particle physics facility. 
 
3.3.3.1: Management of future membership and innovative funding trends 
 
The accession of a state to full membership has been achieved eleven times since CERN’s foundation 
in 1954: by Austria (1959), Spain (1961, then leaving in ‘69 and re-joining in ‘83), Portugal (1985), 
Finland (1991), Poland (1991), Hungary (1992), the Czech Republic (1993), Slovak Republic (1993), 
Bulgaria (1999) and Israel (2014). The latest addition to full membership is Serbia (2019). The only 
non-reversed membership departure has been Yugoslavia which, due to a lengthy inability to pay its 
yearly contributions, left in 1961.  
 
For this thesis, it is important to note that the community has managed this expansion in a 
measured and judicious way. Adding 11 full Members in 65 years has been a risk averse expansion 
through unanimous vote by Council respecting the primacy of Member States on every occasion. 
The reason is that this group which Nils Brunsson and Göran Ahrne term a meta-organisation 
[defined by as organization formed of other organizations] cannot be allowed to fail, as failure would 
endanger the higher organisational body (Brunsson and Ahrne, 2005: 132). The Council does not 
wish to recruit a member that may be problematic. The collective has to act in consensus, so 
everyone has to be comfortable that any new Member State will respect the responsibilities that go 
with that doctrine. Similarly, the Council has to protect the fairness of contributions that I covered in 
sub-section 3.1.4: Commercial, Contracting and Funding Arrangements. For example, it would be 
problematic in either the USA or China joining as full members. The Convention states that 
contributions are based on NNI and these superpowers would skew contributions too greatly and 
disturb the all-important existing balance. Two high level interviewees indicated that a natural limit 
may have been reached or is approaching. One of these two interviewees even expressed the view 
that to go above current levels of full membership may be counter-productive. Council meetings and 
pre-meetings would become too cumbersome and decision-making elusive.  
 
The Council has found a way to circumvent the potential pitfalls of too wide a full membership and 
has designed other types of memberships and other types of funding for special projects. At the June 
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2010 Council Meeting the status of ‘Associate Membership’ was created, open to all states 
regardless of their geographical location, as an essential prerequisite to full membership: Cyprus and 
Slovenia are currently in this category. Other Associate Member States are Turkey, Pakistan, Ukraine 
and India. Croatia has also been accepted as an Associate Member State, subject to completion of its 
national ratification process. Associate Member States pay at 1/10th the rate of their contribution 
had they been full members and receive call for tenders and vacancy notices; they do not have 
voting rights on the CERN governmental bodies. Three intergovernmental organisations, the EU, the 
Moscow based Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) and UNESCO, have Observer status 
allowing them to attend Council meetings and receive Council documents, without taking part in 
decision-making. Figure 4 shows the complete CERN Community at IGO level as at March 2019. 
 
In 2010 a notable resolution drafted by a Working Group on the Scientific and Geographical 
Enlargement was unanimously approved by Council: within boundary conditions that included 
applicant member states ‘guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law and human rights’ they would be 
considered for membership irrespective of geographical location. CERN had always been a global 
endeavour attracting the best minds regardless of nationality (birth or adopted), now the doors 
were truly open to all states in the world. Among the 58 Non-Member States collaborating with 
CERN are Australia, Brazil, China, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. 
 
The innovative method of funding for the LHC that I briefly mentioned in the first paragraph of sub-
section 3.2.2: Funding Resilience may provide a model for the future. Russia and the USA provide 
considerable in-kind contributions to the LHC infrastructure and Japan provides cash to the LHC 
budget. The go ahead for the USA in-kind LHC contribution, with a value of approximately US$ 0.5B, 
was made by Congress in 1996, the first time such a contribution would be sent overseas. The US 
Secretary of Energy, Federico Pena, commenting at the time of the CERN-USA agreement signature, 
on the 8 December 1997 that: ‘Today, we are embarking on an extraordinary scientific journey... I 
have no doubt that when the history of the next 50 years is written, the LHC and all of the science, 
new ideas and technologies its spawns will be a major chapter.’ (FNAL, 1997:1). This arrangement 
allows Japan, Russia and the USA to have Observer Member status and sit-in LHC deliberations of 
the Council and have hundreds of scientists and engineers on site during operations. Interviewees 
confirmed that this trend of expanded associated membership and tailored observer membership 
combined with carefully managed enlargement of membership is one way that a future facility may 
come to fruition.  
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3.3.3.2: Planning for the next generation facility 
 
Recently, Council has approved two major infrastructure upgrades: the LHC Injector Upgrade (LIU) 
and the High-Luminosity Large Hadron Collider (HL-LHC) project. The HL-LHC project was announced 
as the top priority of the 2013 European Strategy for Particle Physics and its funding is enshrined in 
CERN’s Medium-Term Plan. These upgrades will utilise once again the low interest European 
Investment Bank credit facility that will allow them to be financed within the agreed CERN budget 
without compromising or delaying the rest of the scientific programmes. However, at a symposium 
at CERN to celebrate 25 years of operation of the LHC, held in December 2017, it was noted by the 
keynote speaker that ‘proof of the Standard Model is not Enough!’ There are still many completely 
unknown areas such as Dark Matter and Dark energy that must be explored. While it was believed 
further LHC operation could provide glimpses of these areas through pioneering experimentation 
and major upgrades in the coming years that will increase performance, there is a growing scientific 
consensus that much more raw collision energy is needed to release the true picture. The concluding 
remarks at the symposium were that the approval of the LHC had depended on five factors: ‘a 
robust science case, its uniqueness, unanimous support of the world particle physics community, 
technical success at CERN and no major budget bump’. Approval of future major CERN projects 
would also require a ‘robust science case, unanimous support of the world particle physics 
community, continued technical success coupled with major discoveries at the LHC and a reasonable 
budget envelope’. The speaker added that public support might help and that this was previously 
not a factor as CERN was relatively unknown prior to the LHC.  
 
There are two prime candidates for a European successor to the LHC: the Compact Linear Collider 
(CLIC) and the Future Circular Collider (FCC). These two projects are competing for the hearts and 
minds of the European fundamental research community. The European Strategy Group (ESG) for 
Particle Physics, a body set up by Council [under Article II 2b of the Convention as detailed in Section 
3.5.1.] and other groups such as the International Committee for Future Accelerators (ICFA), which 
CERN staff participate in, will play key roles in recommending which path to take. The hope is that 
the LHC will reveal what the science case could be for whichever next step machine triumphs. 
Therefore, the continued success of the LHC and the associated instruments is part of the future and 
why CERN’s pre-eminence gives her the advantage in shaping that future. The FCC with a foreseen 
circumference of between 80-100 km would be comparable to the SSC (whose demise I covered in 
sub-section 3.2.1: Domain Dominance) that the US cancelled in 1993. Had the SSC been built, 
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commissioned and operated as planned then the chances of obtaining funding for a next generation 
European collider would have been critically weakened.  
 
Technological ways of dealing with the ever-increasing volume of data, stem back to one of CERN’s 
greatest spin-off successes: the creation of the World Wide Web [covered in sub-section 3.3.2.2: 
Legitimacy]. The current CERN Data Centre is a model of what computing will look like in the future, 
with very large quantities of data [about 1% of global data each day] being continuously analysed 
through seamless connectivity to 170 other data centres in 36 countries (Cogen, 2015: 189). A next 
generation collider would add to this already world record breaking daily data load and would need 
the latest state-of-the-art distributed computer facilities. Estimates are that up to 25% of the total 
costs of the next generation collider facility will be the associated world-wide computing complex. 
 
For CERNs future, if we accept this need for a catalyst or vehicle for large scale changes, then it is 
possible to speculate what that might be. Could the threat, either real or perceived, of China 
developing its own facility be a 21st century version of the 20th century US based SSC ‘threat’? One 
senior CERN executive thought there was potential for this but caveated that while this could 
perhaps gain traction in the political wings of the Member States it would not prevail as a telling 
argument within the more knowledgeable [of the technical advantages and disadvantages] global 
fundamental physics scientific community. The latter group would naturally focus more on when the 
facility could be built and its capabilities rather than its location.   
 
For the reasons explained in the Literature Review, section 1.2: Global Gridlock Issues, the obstacles 
to international collaboration are becoming greater as nations become rooted in a cycle of self-
reinforcing gridlock. National budget constraints are inevitably increasing as European politicians 
struggle with geo-political issues such as immigration and globalization. Consequently, robust, 
rational and convincing arguments will need to be developed to secure funding for the next 
generation particle physics research facilities. Solutions may be a hybrid of ideas including diverse in-
kind contributions and other innovative funding streams. The trend of expanded associated 
membership and tailored observer membership combined with extremely carefully managed 
enlargement of full membership will surely feature.  
 
As past performance is often the best indicator of future performance, it seems likely a way will be 
found to maintain CERN’s research pre-eminence across her epistemic community. That way will 
have at its core the Member States continuing to exercise ‘consensual governance’ and the high 
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level management group continuing with their ‘light-touch leadership’ approach. I contend that it is 
the combination of these two factors, over decades of operation, that have honed the international 
relations and organisational success story that is the CERN of today.  
 
 
Section summary 
 
Hypothesis 3 is supported (see checklist of supporting and opposing attributes at Table 1) through an 
analysis of ‘Science Diplomacy’ and ‘Mega-Projects Governance, Leadership and Performance 
Issues’, Sections 3 and 4 respectively of the Literature Review together with the data collected 
during the field work. Sound, consensual governance and effective, light-touch leadership can be 
seen to boost SMP performance. Analysis of GSN orchestration aspects such as focality and 
legitimacy have supported this argument. Focality is preserved by being a well-established, lively hub 
and by employing several measures in parallel to avoid fragmentation. Legitimacy is heightened 
through a combination of a meritocracy based main policy advisory body, the vastness of 
membership, continual success, deep domain experience and external recognition by world forums 
including the UN General Assembly. This governance and leadership sub-section relates to three 
Beyond Gridlock pathways: Pathway 3, ‘technical groups with effective and legitimate processes’; 
Pathway 4, ‘multiple, diverse organisations and institutions coalesce around common goals/norms’ 
and Pathway 7, ‘innovative leadership as a reaction to gridlock. 
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3.4: Evaluation of the Beyond Gridlock pathways and associated mechanisms 
employed by the CERN community 
 
While Beyond Gridlock theory shows that there is overlap between which pathways are utilised by 
IGOs in different domains, it is possible to show which principally apply. This has been done at the 
end of each of the previous sub-sections and an overall cross-referencing to the Beyond Gridlock 
pathways is provided in Table 3: 
 
Hypotheses CERN Pathway 
1. IGO agreements and start-up conditions which are concise, fair, 
promote trust and mutual support, allow flexibility in problem solving, 
manage host state issues and emphasise the primacy of the State 
improve performance 
1, 2, and 3 
2. external constraints such as excessive stakeholder aspirations, 
changing legal landscapes, bureaucratic regulations, funding 
fluctuations and unforeseen events, while being mitigated as far as 
possible by IGO leadership actions, inevitably adversely affect overall 
performance 
7 and 8 
3. Sound internal governance and leadership dynamics improve 
performance 
3, 4, and 7 
 
Table 3; Cross-reference between hypotheses and beyond gridlock pathway utilised by CERN 
 
Hypothesis 1 does provide a solid base from which the organisation and its community have 
benefited. Pathway 1, ‘shifts in major powers core interests’ was utilised during the formation of 
CERN and has been maintained through a solid respect for the primacy of the state, exercised 
through Pathway 2 mechanisms including governing bodies being given capabilities to adapt to 
emerging issues. The principles of fairness enshrined in the Convention have allowed the technical 
teams to establish Pathway 3 type workable rules and develop a project adhocracy that enables 
experts to solve complex problems in whatever manner they see fit.  
 
There are fewer pathways available to combat the Hypothesis 2 issues concerning external 
constraints and threats. The solutions rely on sound and innovative leadership and, where 
appropriate, employment of innovative funding; Pathways 7 and 8 respectively. Negative effects, 
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such as program delays, persist but are much reduced from what would have occurred without 
effective interventions. 
 
The sound governance and light-touch leadership dynamics central to Hypothesis 3 were articulated 
in the many field work interviews, a selection of which I have tabled earlier. This applies to Pathway 
3 technical teams’ performance, Pathway 4 enthusiastic participation in the global, connected 
research network that is the CERN of today and the employment of Pathway 7 innovative leadership. 
 
Finally, the data cross-referencing confirms that two gridlock pathways do not feature for CERN, 
these are ‘mobilisation of domestic constituents’ (Pathway 5) and ‘civil society coalitions with 
reformist states (Pathway 6).’  
 
In Table 4, against each of the five Beyond Gridlock pathways that do apply and the new pathway 
[concerning funding] a commentary describing the ‘mechanism for implementation’ has been added 
to establish applicability to CERN. 
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Pathway CERN Community Mechanism 
1. Shifts in major powers' 
core interests 
• Catastrophic World War II led to incentivisation for 
States through the European Movement and embryonic 
UNESCO to combine with visionary European particle 
physicists to create the Organisation 
2. Autonomous and adaptive 
international institutions 
• Governing bodies have been given inimitable capabilities 
to adapt to emerging issues and shifting constellations 
of power and interests 
• Member States have one vote each in Council; the 
primacy of the State is sacrosanct 
• Science Committee members are elected solely on merit 
by peers and are independent of national and/or other 
institutional affiliations 
3. Technical groups with 
effective and legitimate 
processes 
• Experiment team’s authority comes from intellectual 
contribution and consensual decision making; project 
adhocracy and trust in the workforce leaves teams of 
experts to solve complex problems in whatever manner 
they see fit 
• The name 'CERN' is synonymous with the very best 
scientific research standards, execution and delivery 
4. Multiple, diverse 
organisations and 
institutions coalesce around 
common goals/norms 
• Unmatched global reach: over 12000 researchers from 
institutes in over 70 countries being actively engaged 
• World-wide connectivity with very large quantities of 
data being continuously analysed through seamless 
connectivity to 170 other data centres in 36 countries 
• Centre of excellence for holding of global fundamental 
physics seminars, conferences and events 
5. Mobilization of domestic 
constituencies  
 
The data confirmed that these two Beyond Gridlock 
pathways do not feature 
 
6. Civil society coalitions 
with reformist states 
7. Innovative leadership as a 
reaction to gridlock 
• Leadership is characterised by inclusivity and equality of 
contributing disciplines in terms of voice and status. 
• Leadership has an aura of invincibility within the global 
fundamental physics community. A reputation borne out 
of its repeated scientific successes and its ability to 
overcome obstacles, threats and set-backs by fair, timely 
and consensual governance 
• See (3) above for leadership of technical teams 
8. Innovative Funding • Scrupulously fair funding formula based on Member 
State economic strength for annual cash contributions 
• Procurement protocols help maintain alignment of work 
share to contributions but are not bound by strict juste 
retour 
• US and Russian LHC workshares and the Experiment 
projects are effective in-kind contribution collaborations 
 
Table 4; Pathways though and beyond gridlock, CERN mechanisms for implementation (adapted 
from Hale and Held, et. al., 2017) 
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CHAPTER 4: THE ITER PROJECT COMMUNITY 
 
 
 
Figure 7; ITER Community at IGO level as at March 2019 (logo courtesy of the ITER Organisation) 
 
The goal of ITER is to prove that nuclear fusion can be the future, carbon emissions free, energy 
source that the world so urgently needs. It aims to do so by showing that magnetically confined 
plasmas can achieve the ‘burning’ state and thus produce more power than they need to operate. 
ITER is the essential experimental step between today's laboratory fusion machines, focused on 
plasma physics studies, and tomorrow's fusion power plants. Commercial fusion power generation 
once achieved will have a profound effect on the world-wide energy market. The importance of the 
project is captured by the statement of the current Director General, Dr Bernard Bigot when he was 
appointed: “The stakes are very high for ITER. When we prove that fusion is a viable energy source, it 
will eventually replace burning fossil fuels, which are non-renewable and non-sustainable… Providing 
clean, abundant, safe, economic energy will be a miracle for our planet.” (ITER, 2016). 
 
The project is headquartered at Cadarache, France where system design, project management and 
final construction and assembly takes place. However, the endeavour is a global collaboration on a 
massive scale arranged through an international agreement signed in 2006. Over 85% of the multi-
billion-dollar cost is funded by the Member’s through in-kind contributions and the remainder 
through cash. The EU (EURATOM states) contributes almost half, while the other six members, the 
People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian 
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Federation and the USA, contribute equally to the rest. Together the members represent over half 
the world’s population and over 80% of the world’s GDP; Figure 7 shows the ITER Community at IGO 
level (OECD, 2018).  
 
A term that is used on the project and in this research, is ‘First Plasma’ which can be seen in the 
same way that an aerospace programme has ‘First Flight’ of a development aircraft. ITER has two 
project defining milestones. The initial ‘First Plasma’ is when the device can hold a stable plasma 
within the magnetic confinement and heat it to the required extremely high temperatures; the later 
‘D-T Plasma’ is with the addition of the crucial extra nuclear component as part of ‘Deuterium-
Tritium’ operations. The predicted dates for these events have a political as well as technical 
dimension; I return to this in sub-section  4.3: Governance and Leadership Dynamics. Construction is 
very late to the original plan but is now well under way with achievement of ‘First Plasma’ currently 
forecast to take place in the middle of the next decade (ITER, 2017a). 
 
ITER is completing its final detailed design and is mid-way through its construction phase, whereas 
CERN has been in full operation for decades and has undergone a series of upgrades. Consequently, 
this second case study chapter naturally focusses on ITER’s early collaborative arrangements. It is 
again organised into four sections that have been shaped by the main connections between 
elements of the literature review and the separate hypotheses and supporting and opposing 
attributes from Table 1. While there is some overlap, by mapping out these associations I illustrate 
how the hypotheses have been tested and where the results can be found: 
 
The first section will test Hypothesis 1 by examining four aspects. Firstly, the political setting 
and finalisation of the ITER Agreement including establishment of the project starting 
conditions; secondly the purpose and functions; thirdly the organs, voting rights, the role of 
the DG and staff and finally the commercial, contracting and funding arrangements. This 
relates mainly to the literature review sub-section 1.1: Theory regarding global collaboration 
and international organisations. 
 
The second section will test Hypothesis 2 by probing how three constraints have been 
managed. Firstly, the political, logistical and collaborative implications following site 
selection; secondly, the handling of project delays and how funding has been maintained 
and finally how a regrettable development with respect to sharing project information is 
being addressed. This relates to the literature review, sub-section 1.2: Global Gridlock Issues.  
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The third section will test Hypothesis 3 by examining governance and leadership dynamics. 
Three aspects are addressed: the organisational culture, focality and legitimacy and finally, 
future national plans. This relates to two sections of the literature review: section 1.3 
covering Science Diplomacy and section 1.4 covering Mega-Projects Governance, Leadership 
and Performance Issues.  
 
The final section evaluates the Beyond Gridlock pathways and associated mechanisms 
employed by ITER and acts as a summary of the chapter.  
 
 
4.1: The ITER Agreement 
 
To test Hypothesis 1 (that IGO agreements and start-up conditions which are concise, fair, promote 
trust and mutual support, allow flexibility in problem solving, manage host state issues and 
emphasise the primacy of the State improve performance) four aspects are examined. Firstly, I 
analyse the political setting of the mid-1980s superpower summits and the lengthy negotiations that 
culminated in the ITER Agreement signature in 2006. Secondly, I scrutinise the purpose and 
functions of the central ITER Organisation. Thirdly, I examine the governing organs, member’s voting 
rights, and the role and arrangements concerning the DG and staff. Fourthly, I outline the special 
conditions and complex provisions that aid ITER’s commercial, contracting and funding 
arrangements. Finally, a section summary is provided. 
 
 
4.1.1: Political Setting and ITER Agreement Signature 
 
US President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace speech to the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) marked a turning point, following the use of the Atomic Bomb on two Japanese 
cities in 1945, in politicians publicly accepting the latent benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear 
knowhow: “… The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic 
materials for military purposes. It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. 
It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to 
the arts of peace. The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be 
reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all 
mankind (IAEA, 2017a).”  
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The Eisenhower speech provide the impetus for the establishment, some four years later, of the 
International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) as an independent agency of the UN. While the IAEA 
had two purposes: to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inhibit its use for any 
military purpose, the organisations immediate focus was on the latter. Attention was paid by those 
few nations that possessed nuclear weapons to ensure that the IAEA led the efforts to limit nuclear 
proliferation and establish international safeguards and verification regimes for fission materials 
(IAEA, 2017b). The world in this period was divided into two distinct political, economic, military and 
social rival systems, divided by what UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill aptly described as an iron 
curtain. Because of the arms race to develop more powerful nuclear weapons, the opposing ‘east - 
west’ military industrial complexes worked under strict secrecy, any nuclear research was by default 
believed to have important military consequences. Eisenhower’s speech excluded the word fusion, 
but interest in its possibilities for peaceful use had already begun in British, US and Soviet 
government undisclosed laboratories in the years following World War II (Chou, et. al., 2017: 29).  
 
Scientists on both sides of the iron curtain soon quickly understood that there were no military 
applications for magnetically confined thermonuclear fusion. Although this message would fall on 
deaf ears of any non-expert of the period, there was a rising world-wide initiative by physicists to 
declassify fusion research. A turning point came after a lecture by the eminent Russian atomic 
scientist Igor Kurchatov at Harwell, UK in 1956. The lecture is remembered for its frankness which 
included rousing prose: ‘Physicists over the whole world are attracted by this extraordinarily 
interesting and very difficult task of controlling thermonuclear reactions (Eurofusion, 2011).’ 
 
Two years later, at the 2nd Geneva Conference on the ‘Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy’, 105 papers 
were presented, detailing work performed mainly in the Soviet Union, USA, UK and Germany. The 
papers revealed that, despite the officious security classification regimes in the authors home States, 
research had been conducted in practically identical paths (UN, 1958). With the inspiration of the 
1956 Kurchatov lecture and academic unanimity as to the way ahead breaking out, the UK legislative 
secrecy finally gave way to openness. The Macmillan Conservative Government declassified 
magnetic confinement fusion research on taking office in 1957 and the USA did the same one year 
later. Since then there have been few veils of secrecy hampering the efforts to achieve the fusion 
commercial power vision. I will return in sub-section 4.2.3: Sharing of Project Information to show 
how this openness enhances cooperation and reinforces trust at all levels in the ITER Community. 
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Competing ideas as to the best form of fusion device continued to be developed at centres of 
nuclear research in several countries through the 1950s and 60s. Scientists in the Soviet Union led 
the way in 1968 when the two key criteria for fusion were achieved: remarkably high temperature 
levels and plasma confinement. The key to their success was a revolutionary device called a 
Tokamak [a Russian acronym for Toroidalnaya Kamera s Magnitnymi Katushkami; the English 
meaning is Toroidal Magnetic Chamber] invented by Igor Tamm and Andreï Sakharov at the 
Kurchatov Institute in Moscow. Once their results were independently confirmed by a UK team, the 
Tokamak quickly became the dominant concept for further research worldwide (New Scientist, 
2009). Since then Tokamaks have passed several milestones, gradually edging towards the goal of 
producing more energy than they require to operate. The chronological list of leading Tokamaks 
aptly demonstrates the growing world-wide effort: the Joint European Torus (JET) in Culham, UK 
(operational since 1983), JT-60 in Naka, Japan (operational since 1985), T-15 in Moscow, Russia 
(operational since 1988), ADITYA at the Institute for Plasma Research in Gujarat, India (operational 
since 1989), NSTX in Princeton, USA (operational since 1999 and upgraded to NSTX-U in 2015), EAST 
in Hefei, China (operational since 2006) and KSTAR in Daejon, South Korea (operational since 2008). 
Behind each leading tokamak there is an extensive national programme on which the device rests 
and a community of people drawn from different disciplines dedicated to making them a success. 
The people in these communities gradually strengthened their connections with counterparts in 
other nations and the seeds of the tightly bound world-wide fusion community of today were sown.  
 
Hand in hand with the early scientific and technical advancements came the realisation that the cost 
and complexity of a large device that could finally prove the viability of commercial fusion power 
were well beyond the reach of any nation acting alone. This awareness of the essential need for 
collaboration included the two superpowers. Leading figures in the fusion communities in the USA 
and Soviet Union began to apply pressure on their respective governments to join forces. In 1978 
the Soviet Union proposed that an International Tokamak Reactor (INTOR) should be built, and the 
IAEA held a series of exploratory meetings. The very large estimated costs and immature 
international collaborative spirit hampered by deteriorating international relations following the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 meant the idea did not gain political traction. The 
need for collaboration persisted however and in March 1982, US President Ronald Reagan sent the 
following message to the US Congress: ‘…we also recognize that, while the United States retains 
international pre-eminence in many areas of science and technology, we are no longer in a position 
to dominate each and every field. Nor do we hold a monopoly on the world's supply of scientific 
talent… There are areas of science, such as high energy physics and fusion research, where the cost 
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of the next generation of facilities will be so high that international collaboration among… nations 
may become a necessity. We welcome opportunities to explore with other nations the sharing of the 
high costs of modern scientific facilities (Reagan Presidential Library, 2017a).’ 
 
The catalyst for tangible progress was the appointment in 1985 of Mikhail Gorbachev as General 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and, by custom, Leader of the Soviet 
Union. Vast military expenditure coupled with bureaucratic central planning meant that by the time 
he took office the Soviet economy was in dire need of improvement. He quickly embarked on a 
radical reform programme and demonstrated a willingness for openness and dialogue with the West 
that his more elderly predecessors had shunned. His first international visit was to France to meet 
President Mitterrand. Accompanying Gorbachev was his chief scientific advisor and long-time friend, 
Evgeny Velikhov; they had met thirty years previously as students at Moscow State University. 
Velikhov was an ardent supporter of fusion research and was later universally accepted by the 
community as the ‘godfather’ of nuclear fusion. In an interview given in 2015 he recalled the political 
context of the times: ‘It is important to remember that another collaborative project in fusion called 
INTOR, had started in the Brezhnev times during a thaw in relations with the West. When war in 
Afghanistan started relations chilled again. As a result of these complications, Europe and the USA 
moved forward on negotiations on fusion collaboration in the framework of the 1982 Versailles 
Summit without the participation of the Soviet Union. Negotiations had stalled again however; 
therefore, I decided to deliver this idea [of fusion] to Gorbachev who was going on a visit to Paris…. 
[he] took to the proposal and invited me to the meeting. President Mitterrand immediately picked 
up on the idea of international cooperation in fusion (ITER Newsline, 2015b).’ 
 
Mike Roberts of the US DOE at the time provided a first-hand account of one of the early 
approaches: “In September 1985, I led a US science team to Moscow as part of our bilateral fusion 
activities. Velikhov proposed to me at lunch one day his idea of having the USSR and USA work 
together to proceed to a fusion reactor. My response was ‘great idea, but from my position, I have 
no capability of pushing that idea upward to the President.’ Velikhov now realised that he had to 
find a high-level route to bring Reagan and Gorbachev together.   
 
Reagan was a complex personality and a paradox: publicly a Cold War warrior but privately someone 
who hated ‘the bomb’. His Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and election in January 1985 to a second 
term, meant that the peacemaker Reagan could come to the fore. Encouraged by Mitterrand and UK 
Prime Minister Thatcher, who had also met Gorbachev when he was Deputy General Secretary, 
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Reagan considered the merits of a superpower summit. He faced opposition from hawks such as 
Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger and his deputy Richard Perle who both deeply distrusted the 
Soviets. Through careful management by US Secretary of State George Shultz and USSR Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, a reformer appointed by Gorbachev, the summit was kept on track 
and arranged for November 1985 in Geneva. The omens were not good and Weinberger, in a 
startling move at the time, made public his concerns regarding giving too much away on SDI in 
return for hollow promises of reductions in the Soviet nuclear arsenal (NYT, 1985). 
 
Mike Roberts added: “Velikhov changed his strategy, now going up directly through Shevardnadze to 
Gorbachev and across to Reagan through Schultz, as opposed to through me.” Meanwhile advocates 
including Alvin Trivelpiece (Director of the Office of Energy Research), Richard Stratford (President’s 
Senior Scientific Advisor) and Charlie Newstead (State Department) worked on the US diplomatic 
establishment to encourage fusion cooperation. Newstead in an interview in 2009 recalled the 
hostile atmosphere and several ‘shouting matches’ prior to the Geneva meeting in the White House 
Situation Room, the only place that was deemed secure enough to hold meetings on the Soviet 
proposal. ‘Once I had to close an argument saying that I had a PhD in physics, and they didn't!’ (ITER 
Newsline, 2015a). The discussions were kept in high secrecy but gradually facts backed persistence 
and the argument for working with the Soviets on fusion gained traction. A key moment is 
documented by William Martin (Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (NSC) and 
Special Assistant to Ronald Reagan (1982 - 1986) in a 2012 letter to Alvin Trivelpiece: ‘Let me recall 
our first meeting when I was serving as Executive Secretary of the NSC. You visited me in my office at 
the West Wing and brought to my attention a project with Russia involving cooperation in magnetic 
fusion. At this time, we had no positive relations with Russia…. Reagan had called the Soviet Union, 
the Evil Empire. You came to me to see what mischief I could do. Recently in my Reagan files I found 
a memo from Bob Gates – then number 2 at the CIA and future Secretary of Defense – that said: 
‘Bill, although our evaluation was hurried, we can find no good reason not to go forward with the 
magnetic fusion project.’ I then gave my okay for the project…’ (Martin, 2012).  
 
The 19-20 November 1985 Reagan Gorbachev fire side summit in Geneva entered Cold War folklore. 
The world’s media were primed to pass verdict on who had ‘won’ the encounter. While little was 
achieved in terms of arms reduction or SDI [this was to take another two summits] historians later 
concluded that the two men started a rapport and trust building that would ultimately lead to the 
ending of the Cold War some 6 years later. David Reynolds (2007: 178) summarises that it fostered a 
culture of negotiation right across the Cold War divide. While the New York Times special summit 
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report noted improved science collaboration, there was no mention of the fusion agreement that 
had been reached (Apple, 1985). With little to show the world as tangible progress the final press 
conference included the release of joint statement that maximised the positives. 
  
In contrast to previous US-Soviet summits, no pre-Summit draft statement had been prepared due 
to US concerns that it could unduly reveal negotiation positions. The final text was recorded in a 
joint letter from the Permanent UN Representatives of the USA and the USSR to the UN Secretary 
General dated 16 December 1985, ending with the same evocative words that Eisenhower had used 
in his address to the UNGA 30 years earlier: ‘The two leaders emphasized the potential importance 
of the work aimed a utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes and, in this 
connection, advocated the widest practicable development of international cooperation in obtaining 
this source of energy, which is essentially inexhaustible, for the benefit for all mankind’ (UN, 1985:6). 
For the fusion community this marked the achievement of a long planned for political breakthrough, 
reinforced when Reagan, on his return to the US, even cited ‘fusion energy’ in his address to a Joint 
Session of the Congress on 21st November 1985 (Reagan Presidential Library, 2017b). 
 
Two years later the IAEA, at its headquarters in Vienna, held the first meeting of the Quadripartite 
Initiative Committee (QIP) comprising Europe [EURATOM nations], Japan, USSR and the USA. The 
meeting’s record shows the determination of the Member’s representatives to find a way to 
collaborate on fusion despite the animosity between these states in other domains such as trade 
and defence (IAEA, 1988). Richard Pitts, a long serving ITER Science and Operations Team Section 
Leader identified that the causal driver for this is an international relations version of the social 
anxiety fear of missing out: “No-one [No ITER Member] can bet that this does not work. If you say I 
am not funding it as it may not work then you take a massive risk that it might have done, and you 
still have to find another solution.” For the QIP group and others who were to join the negotiations 
the potential benefits were significant. The economic leverage was clear: by contributing a relatively 
small amount they would receive all of the results. The name ITER, standing for International 
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, was agreed on. The project rarely spells out the acronym on 
promotional material or its website [other than the history section]. The words Thermonuclear 
Experiential Reactor could conjure up a negative view of the project inconsistent with its aims. ITER, 
on the other hand rather upliftingly means the Way in Latin.  
 
The conceptual design studies were launched, and the scene set for a landmark set of international 
negotiations that would see other Members join and some both join and leave again. Laborious 
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negotiations covered three strands: firstly, Legal work on several topics included IPR, Non-
Proliferation and Peaceful Uses of Fusion technology and material that needed 11 international 
conferences to resolve. Secondly, Decision Making protocols including the Organization Structure 
and Staffing that needed 12 international conferences and countless workshops to agree. The third 
negotiation strand concerned Site Selection where four technically compliant candidates emerged: 
Clarington (Canada), Rokkasho (Japan), Cadarache (Europe; France) and Vandellos (Europe; Spain).  
 
Following high level interventions by the European Commission, it was decided to base the 
EURATOM consortium headquarters in Barcelona. Spain then backed Cadarache as the site and with 
no one else supporting the Clarington bid, Canada withdrew from the site selection process and left 
the project entirely in 2004. The stand-off between Japan and Europe on the two remaining 
candidates was fierce. Dr Michael Roberts, the Director of International Programs of the Office of 
Fusion Energy, US DOE and member of the US Negotiation Team, provided insight on the act that 
helped break the stalemate: “[it] was Rob Goldston’s [the Director of Princeton and a member of the 
US negotiating team] suggestion to treat the decision from a practical point of view, namely instead 
of each side saying ‘my site is better’ turn the discussion into ‘what we could give the other side to 
let us have our site’. Then it was just a matter of raising the stakes until one side said, ‘OK, you can 
have it on these terms.’ That then led to the Broader Approach Agreement to solidify the terms of 
the deal.” The Broader Approach was an astute mechanism which I cover in sub-section 4.2.1. Some 
21 years after the 1985 Geneva summit, the USA, USSR and five other Members, were finally ready 
to join forces to find a new, clean energy source for the world. 
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Figure 8; ITER Agreement Ceremony, Elysée Palace, Paris on 21st November 2006 (IAEA, 2007) 
 
The formal Agreement on the Establishment of the ITER International Fusion Energy Organization for 
the Joint Implementation of the ITER Project [known as the ITER Agreement] was signed at the Elysée 
Palace in Paris on 21 November 2006 by Ministers representing each of the seven Members; Figure 
8. Below I show the lead person, and national organisation affiliation, who signed on behalf of their 
respective Member State and provide a commentary to show the final positions and compromises 
necessary to reach agreement. 
 
For the Government of the People’s Republic of China the signatory was Xu Guanhua, Minister of 
Science and Technology. It was the formal entry of the People’s Republic of China and Republic of 
Korea to the ITER negotiations in 2003 that helped strengthen the argument of supporters of the 
project in the USA that they should re-join after a gap of some 5 years. China, because of its 
population size and economic growth, has the greatest need of any Member to achieve commercial 
nuclear fusion.  
 
For the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) the signatory was Janez Potočnik, European 
Commissioner for Science and Research. The EAEC was founded by the Treaty establishing the 
EURATOM Treaty on the 25 March 1957. EURATOM is a separate legal entity from the EU, but it is 
governed by the bloc's institutions and falls under the legal jurisdiction of the European Court of 
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Justice (ECJ). Fusion for Energy [known as F4E] a joint undertaking within the meaning of Article 25 
of the EURATOM Treaty based in Barcelona was established in March 2007 to manage the European 
contribution to the project. F4E also has one Associate Member State: Switzerland. Europe had won 
the hard fought site selection battle but in doing so committed to a challenging set of long-term 
commitments that I cover in sub-section 4.2.1. The complexity was ably captured by Laetitia 
Grammatico-Vidal who put in context that the main European partner’s legal arrangements were 
just part of the overall legal agenda that the negotiators had to settle (Grammatico-Vidal, 2009). 
 
For the Government of Japan, the signatory was Takeshi Iwaya, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs. The 
final agreement of Japan to not oppose the EU site candidate was achieved after lengthy side 
discussion between EURATOM officials and the Japanese Government. The day after the ITER 
Agreement signing ceremony in Paris, representatives of these two parties re-convened at the 
headquarters of the European Commission in Brussels. They signed the Joint Declaration for the 
implementation of Broader Approach Activities. Following formal signature in February 2007, the 
Broader Approach established a framework for the EU and Japan to conduct R & D in support of ITER 
over a ten-year period. Three projects were set into motion (sub-section 4.3.3) that enabled 
Japanese industry to gain an advantage over and above what Japan’s contribution to ITER would 
normally have warranted. Another part of the site location trade-off was the informal agreement 
that the ITER DG would be from Japan and the Japanese Government provided assurances to 
increase their efforts to find a suitable nominee. I return to this in sub-section 4.2.1.  
 
For the Government of the Republic of India the signatory was Anil Kakodhar, Secretary to the 
Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy. India were the last of the seven members to 
join the project in 2005. This was achieved despite India being the only Member not to be a 
signatory to the UN Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); Table 5 (UNODA, 
2018). In one sense India’s inclusion helps to emphasise the fundamental non-military purposes of 
the project. There are no military advantages to participation, only strategic advantages by being 
part of the quest for safe, reliable and non-greenhouse gas emitting commercial power. I also return 
to India’s non-signature of the NPT when considering the consequences of Site selection in sub-
section 4.2.1. 
 
For the Government of the Republic of Korea the signatory was Woo Sik Kim, Vice Prime-Minister, 
Ministry of Science and Technology. The Republic of Korea’s close ties to the IAEA meant that it had 
an opportunity to hold bilateral meetings with the EU and the US in 2002. A letter of intent to join 
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the ITER project was sent to all parties in 2003 and legal and technical experts visited Korea. Korea 
then joined the ITER Negotiations from June 2003 as a full partner.  
 
For the Government of the Russian Federation the signatory was Vladimir Travin, Deputy head of the 
Federal Atomic Energy Agency (ROSATOM). The collaboration of the US with the USSR in the ITER 
Agreement is, as I have described in the earlier part of this sub-section, a remarkable feat of science 
diplomacy. As the evidence provided by Michael Roberts (lead US negotiator) and the letter of 
William Martin (Executive Secretary of the National Security Council provided on p 123 attest 
personal relationships between the principal political leaders and their aides were as important in 
reaching agreement as the science necessity. Other parts of ROSATOM [which at the time of 
signature was known as Ministry of Nuclear Engineering and Industry of the USSR] were then and 
remain today intrinsically involved in companies and programmes that support the Soviet nuclear 
military complex (ROSATOM, 2018). 
 
For the Government of the United States of America the signatory was Raymond Orbach, Under 
Secretary for Science, Department of Energy. US participation in ITER continues to be a long running 
political saga; Government support during the negotiations for such an expensive and risky project 
that is based outside of the US has been patchy at best (Harding, Khanna and Orbach, 2012). 
Following disagreements on the cost outcome of the Engineering Design Activity the US withdrew 
from the process completely in 1998 only to re-join in 2003. In the years that followed, the main 
legal and political hurdles included financial obligations, liability, withdrawal provisions, dispute 
settlement and the type of agreement that the US could legally enter were endlessly debated. A way 
ahead was found in 2005 when a provision was added to the Energy Policy Act that meant the ITER 
agreement could be considered as a congressional-executive agreement. Congress could now review 
the agreement regardless of whether it was submitted to the Senate for advice and/or consent. In 
practice this meant that if Congress did not object it would amount to implicit congressional blessing 
and funding. This provided the US negotiators with extra flexibility to reach agreement on financial 
obligations, since the other Members firmly rejected any agreement in which the US signature 
would be conditioned upon ‘Annual Authorisation of Funds’. The final hurdle to US backing of the 
ITER Agreement was overcome when US President Bush signed an Executive Order in November 
2007 designating the ITER Organisation a Public International Organisation. This allowed the US to 
implement the privileges and immunities commitments that Orbach had agreed to almost one year 
earlier. Since then, the US DOE has led the efforts for exceptional oversight and rigorous project 
management of ITER; I return to this in sub-section 4.2.2. (American Presidency Project, 2003). 
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Michael Roberts in his interview reflected that it had taken an extraordinary alignment of powerful 
personalities at the very top of the USA Administration to bring the US back into the Programme: “In 
the summer of 2002, Rob Goldston [the Director of Princeton] explained to John Marburger, the 
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy [and ex Director of Brookhaven National 
Laboratory], that fusion was ‘no longer his father’s fusion’ but was a now real programme with 
diagnostics, theoretical support and computer calculations; it was ‘known science’. Marburger was 
convinced and then went back and spoke to President Bush. The key was Goldston’s good 
relationship with Marburger and that Marburger was the right kind of scientist both as a fellow 
physicist and someone who would listen, think and speak to the President who would also listen and 
think. President Bush then made a speech in January 2003 that included: ’we owe it to our children 
and grand-children to join ITER, an ambitious international research project to harness the promise 
of fusion energy’. This high-level support was as important as that of President Reagan back in the 
mid-1980s and led the way for the US to re-join at the same time that China was to join the project 
at a February 2003 negotiating meeting in St. Petersburg. Michael Roberts recalled the theatre of 
the occasion: “To show the displeasure of the negotiators in the meeting room over the five-year US 
withdrawal from the negotiation, I was left to sit outside for over an hour - nothing personal of 
course, I was told later - before finally, I was allowed to lead the three of us in the US delegation into 
the room in parallel with the Chinese delegation.”   
 
Table 5 shows the disparity between which lead government departments interface with ITER. These 
also change over time. As several interviewees pointed out, at the start of the project, the US State 
Department, due to ill-advised security concerns, was opposed and the DOE was a solid backer. A 
situation reversed today with the DOE, mainly due to budget pressures from other projects, 
struggling to support the project, whereas the State Department now fully backs the collaboration.  
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Table 5; ITER Members lead governmental departments and details of accession to the UN NPT 
(as at the signature of the ITER Agreement in November 2006) 
 
The negotiating teams also skilfully included a catch-all tie-in in the event of any Member wishing to 
withdraw, which was possible after 10 years, from the Agreement signature. Driven by the size and 
length of the task ahead, the Members were deliberately tough on themselves. Article 26 (IAEA, 
2006: 19) includes the statement: ‘Withdrawal shall not affect the Withdrawing Party’s contribution 
to the construction costs of the ITER facility. If a party withdraws during the period of operation of 
ITER, it shall also contribute to the cost of decommissioning of the ITER facilities.’  
 
 
4.1.2: Purpose and Functions 
 
This sub-section analyses the purposes of the organisation from an international relations 
perspective and is based mainly on secondary data such as the ITER Agreement (2006) and 
associated documents. Article 2 of the Agreement states: ‘The purpose of the ITER Organization shall 
be to provide for and to promote cooperation among the Members … on the ITER Project, an 
international project that aims to demonstrate the scientific and technological feasibility of fusion 
energy for peaceful purposes, an essential feature of which would be achieving sustained fusion 
power generation’. This single sentence provides clarity of purpose and helps to reduce any 
tendency for mission creep by the central team or the Members.  
 
Science/
Tehnology
Energy
Foreign
Affairs
People's Republic of China ✓ ✓ 1992
EU
✓ varies by EURATOM State
(e.g. UK, 1962; France, 1992)
Republic of India ✓ No
Japan ✓ ✓ 1975
Republic of Korea ✓ ✓ 1976
Russian Federation ✓ ✓ 1970 (as Soviet Union)
USA ✓
State Dept support 
also required
✓ 1970
✓ (EC: Science and Research Directorate)
varies by EURATOM State
ITER
Member
Lead Government Department
Accession to
UN Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons Treaty
/ Year 
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Article 3 goes on to elaborate the functions of the ITER Organization to: 
 
a) Construct, operate, exploit, and de-activate the ITER facilities in accordance with the technical 
objectives and the general design presented in the Final Report of the ITER Engineering Design 
Activities… and such supplemental technical documents as may be adopted, as necessary, in 
accordance with this Agreement, and provide for the decommissioning of the ITER facilities; 
b) Encourage the exploitation of the ITER facilities by the laboratories, other institutions and 
personnel participating in the fusion energy research and development programmes of the 
Members; 
c) Promote public understanding and acceptance of fusion energy. 
 
The Article 3 functions are again succinct and focused. At sub-paragraph 1a, the importance of 
following on from the exhaustive pre-work that all Members had contributed to is underscored by 
naming the Engineering Design Activities. I will show in Section 4.2 that the level of design maturity 
that this exercise had produced was grossly over estimated and that this led to the first crisis facing 
the project community. Sub-paragraph 1b returns to the importance of keeping the Members 
satisfied that their facilities were gaining from the collaborative experience; I return to this in sub-
section 4.2.3 concerning the sharing of information. Sub-paragraph 1c recognises the need to 
promote public understanding and acceptance of fusion energy. Public knowledge of large science 
mega-projects that produce no tangible results until they are well into their operations phase is 
scant, and media attention spans short and prone to sensationalism as I described in Chapter 3 
regarding the start-up of the LHC at CERN. In the era of fake news and vociferous opponents to all 
matters nuclear, repeated public re-assurances to help allay safety misconceptions are vital. The 
fusion community works hard through a mixture of public and private channels and local liaison 
committees to provide this. The need to put ITER in the public realm was not just for educational 
purposes but also to bolster the political will of the Members. A weekly flow of official, professional 
project community news, supplemented by Members public outreach, relentlessly fills any gaps that 
elements of the media or obstructive pressure groups might seek to exploit (ITER Newsline, 2018). 
 
4.1.3: Organs, Voting Rights, the Director General and Staff 
 
This sub-section analyses the principle organs of the central organisation, the role of the Director 
General (DG) and the ITER international staff and the organisation’s governance arrangements. 
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While doing so I also provide a commentary, based on the primary interview data, on informal 
governance and accepted practice featuring those considered the least and most productive. 
 
Council comprises up to four representatives from each Member; in practice, two formal 
representatives are supported by a posse of officials depending on the topics at hand. It self-
appoints a Chairperson who serves for a maximum of 4 years. It meets twice per year and holds 
extraordinary sessions when needed. The representatives have a unique dilemma; on the one hand 
they are responsible for the delivery within specification, quality and schedule of their portion of the 
in-kind contributions while at the same time being the ultimate body that the central organisation 
can appeal to when a Member fails to meet those very obligations. I return to this juxtaposition in 
sub-section 4.3.2. It is advised by three bodies: the Management Advisory Committee (MAC), the 
Science and Technology Advisory Committee (STAC) and the Financial Audit Board (FAB).  
 
The MAC advises the ITER Council on strategic management issues such as budget allocations, the 
effective application of privileges and immunities and recommends actions to help improve the 
conduct of the project. In practice this means that if any person, specialist group or Member wants 
to gain Council approval for a new management initiative they must first seek MAC endorsement or, 
at the very least, avoid MAC disapproval. This has the advantage of providing an expert filter to the 
Council deliberations but runs the disadvantage of making operational change cumbersome. The 
current DG has now established an Executive Project Board that includes the Heads of each 
Domestic Agency that provides effective operational control.  
 
The STAC advises the ITER Council on both science and technology topics that arise during design, 
construction and operation. Members of the Committee are chosen on a basis of the combination of 
their qualifications and experience. One feature of the STAC has been to stalwartly resist cost-driven 
cuts to the scientific scope. There has been a continuous defence of several key elements that will 
feature in ITER’s experimental phase such as the number of heating methods and the number of 
diagnostics tools. Finally, the Financial Audit Board oversees the audit of the annual accounts of the 
ITER Organization in accordance with Article 17 of the Agreement and the Project Resource 
Management Regulations. In practice the audit is carried out by companies appointed on rotation 
between the Members  
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The project is currently led by Dr Bernard Bigot a respected nuclear scientist who has been closely 
associated with ITER since the early years of France's hosting proposal in 2001. As DG he is 
responsible for strategic management planning and policies and represents the ITER Organization in 
all official instances; as such he is one of two project officials to have full diplomatic status; the other 
being the Principle Deputy DG [where one is appointed]. As with CERN, this status is needed as the 
DG is ultimately the responsible person for contractual, legal, safety and operational mattes. Each 
DG is responsible to the ITER Council and is appointed for a period of five years which may be 
renewed once. The DG is assisted by a Cabinet and all the ITER Organisation staff. 
 
The ITER Organisation staff has grown in numbers from the 170 when it was established in 2007 to 
over 825 ten years later (ITER, 2017). The main reason for the large increase has been the need to 
complete design work that is then used as a basis for the Members Domestic Agencies to place 
contracts for the manufacture of the parts in their respective territories. The ITER Members decided 
not to place the project within a pre-existing organization with experience in successfully building 
complex infrastructure. Instead the organization has been steadily built up by a combination of 
recruiting experienced staff and by outsourcing. The latter has culminated in the appointment of a 
Construction Management Agent (CMA) in 2016 to handle the assembly and commissioning of the 
device. The organisational structure is top down, and many interviewees commented suffers from 
having too many management layers that has been compounded by the CMA appointment. ITER is a 
unique facility and the nuclear safety requirements for fusion components, buildings, and operating 
have needed to be developed with little read-across from other facilities. The French nuclear 
authorities and IAEA departments have had to gain experience themselves of what regulation and 
oversight is needed for this new type of machine. The entire fusion community is bound together in 
its story, from the fabricators in the Member State’s factories right through to the high officials in 
the IAEA who will ultimately authorise its use.  
 
 
4.1.4: Commercial, Contracting and Funding Arrangements 
 
4.1.4.1: Commercial and contracting arrangements 
 
During the 21-year ITER Agreement negotiation period, common understandings were also agreed as 
to the projects design, work breakdown and costs. Linked to these were how the knowledge 
generated by the project, during the design phase, construction, commissioning and operation 
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would be shared by the Members. The aim was to spread the work so as each Member gained 
knowledge through its industrial base of the processes and techniques involved. Noble high-quality 
work (CERN sub-section 3.1.2) would therefore be shared not just for cost sharing reasons but also 
for the good of the fusion community. Harry Tuinder, the former ITER Legal Advisor and at the time 
of the negotiations, the Chief Legal Advisor to the European Commission provided an explanation of 
the need for the common understandings and that, in practice, their usage may not be as intended: 
“they are interpretations that are too detailed to go into the Treaty [ITER Agreement] text because it 
would have been too restrictive on the Members… we came up with a model that is acceptable to all 
seven Members, that means there was a lot of fighting about words that in practice now have very 
little meaning.” (ITER, 2012). 
 
The negotiations regarding project intellectual property was intense and resulted in a lengthy Article 
10 of the Agreement (IAEA, 2006: 12). The key position was that the implementation of the Article 
and a supporting Annex on Information and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) would be equal and 
non-discriminatory for all the Members and the ITER Organisation itself. This principle of openness, 
given the nature of the information and impact for future development of commercial fusion power, 
is a landmark of international trust building and an undoubted credit to the tenacity of the 
Member’s negotiating teams. I return to the practicalities of sharing IPR in sub-section 4.2.3: Sharing 
of Project Information.  
 
The ITER Agreement, at Article 13, also specified that Field Teams of ITER Organisation staff would 
be hosted by each Member to exercise the central organisation’s functions and fulfilment of its 
purpose. In other words, a means of having the DG’s own people on the ground to check what each 
Member’s organisation and supply chain were doing especially with respect to Quality Assurance. In 
the event, no Field Team Agreements were ever concluded [or even started] between the ITER 
Organisation and any Member. Every Member decided it would conduct its part of the common 
understandings in their own way and saw no added value in having central ITER Organisation staff 
embedded in their organisations; I return to a consequence of this stance in sub section 4.2.3.  
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4.1.4.2: Funding arrangements 
 
The Broader Approach Agreement (F4E, 2018) allocates some of Europe’s share of work to Japan 
detailed in sub-section 4.3.3. The final Member’s funding positions are shown in Table 6:  
 
 
 
Table 6; ITER Member’s Contribution Summary (ITER, 2017b) 
 
Approximately 85 percent of the total value of contributions will be delivered ‘in-kind.’ In the place 
of cash being provided to the central organisation for it to carry out procurement, the Members 
deliver components, buildings, research results and secondee personnel. The in-kind contributions 
are divided into over one hundred Procurement Arrangements that are recorded in the common 
understandings. These Procurement Arrangements include technical specifications and management 
requirements. They are the method for the central organisation to exercise a degree of control over 
the Members by agreeing with them the terms under which the various elements will be procured, 
manufactured, inspected and delivered to the main site. 
 
The series of Management Reports and many interviewees point out that the main disadvantage of 
the dispersed supply chain is that the central organisation does not have direct control or 
contractual levers to influence performance. While true, this inherently inefficient arrangement has 
within it the motive for the project’s survival: over 85% of the value of the project is led by and 
directly benefits the Member States.  
 
ITER
Member
In-Cash
Contribution
(%)
In-Kind
 Contribution
(%)
Notes
(in-cash contrbutions are fixed)
(in-kind contributions vary slightly in any given year by 
project contractual/schedule demands)
People's Republic of China 9.08 11.21
EU 45.6 32.73 In-Kind reduced by EU-Japan Broader Approach Agreement
Republic of India 9.08 5.38
Japan 9.08 25.88 In-Kind increased by EU-Japan Broader Approach Agreement
Republic of Korea 9.08 7.81
Russian Federation 9.08 9.43
USA 9.08 7.57
Total 100 100
Approximate
% of Total Value
over Project Life-Cycle
15 85
Total Project Value is combination
over the Project Life-Cycle of
In-Cash (provide each year in Euros, but valued in IUA)
In-Kind Contrbutions (valued in IUA)
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The dominance of the in-kind funding feature can mask the cash contributions that the central 
organisation also needs. The remaining 15% of the project value is required to be paid by the 
Members in cash during the construction phase and is a considerable annual commitment. This 
funding set-up is complicated by design and I will explain in sub-section 4.2.2: Project Delays and 
Funding Resilience that while it adds resilience to the project it has inherent operational flaws that 
the management team must continually deal with.  
 
 
Section summary 
 
Hypothesis 1 is supported in that the ITER Agreement does provides a concise and fair vehicle to 
promote trust and mutual support, allows flexibility in problem solving, deals with the arrangements 
to manage host state issues and emphasises the primacy of the State. Primary interview data has 
also shown that while the Articles provide a solid base from which the organisation and its 
community have benefited, they over prescribe in some areas that have necessitated work arounds.  
 
The creation of a formal IGO collaboration between the ITER Members, given their rivalry in other 
domains, is remarkable. To have created an Agreement that covers intellectual property rights, 
export controls, peaceful uses and non-proliferation of nuclear materials is miraculous. Fusion 
pioneers such as Evgeny Velikhov of the USSR and Charlie Newstead of the USA worked tirelessly in 
bringing together their respective national leaders for the ‘benefit of mankind’ and, as this section 
has explained, for the benefit of their own community.  
 
The ITER Agreement, while an iconic piece of international science diplomacy, is not flawless. The 
field work has highlighted that the immaturity of the Engineering Design Activities cited in the 
Agreement are obvious in hindsight. The difficulties that the founder’s optimism bias produced was 
exacerbated by decisions such as the Member’s deciding not to implement central staff field teams 
in their own national organisations. Also, the failure of top-level leadership to firmly and collectively 
address the issues and conflicts that then arose added more strife to an already serious situation; I 
cover the mitigation efforts to combat these circumstances in section 4.2.  
 
The funding arrangements means that each Member can produce in their home territories most of 
their contributions to the project. This together with the punitive withdrawal penalties that the 
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founders set, have kept the Members embraced on the project despite significant and unexpected 
delays and the political turbulence that has adversely affected them in several other domains.  
 
This relates to two Beyond Gridlock pathways. Firstly, pathway 1, ‘shifts in major powers core 
interests’ where towards the end of the Cold War a set of well-placed advocates overcame gridlock 
in superpower international relations. This bi-lateral rapprochement was the catalyst for the 
remarkable seven Member coalition that created ITER. Secondly, pathway 8, ‘innovative funding’ 
mechanisms that took decades to negotiate and have both helped preserve the project and led to 
significant project management, quality control and logistical constraints that the community must 
continually wrestle with.   
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4.2: Managing Constraints 
 
To test Hypothesis 2 (that external constraints such as excessive stakeholder aspirations, changing 
political and legal landscapes, bureaucratic regulations, funding fluctuations and unforeseen events, 
while being mitigated as far as possible by IGO leadership actions, inevitably adversely affect overall 
performance) I examine how the ITER Community leadership has handled three events. The first 
concerns the consequences of the site selection including hosting arrangements, the second the 
measures taken to combat funding fluctuations and the third the handling of an unforeseen set-back 
with respect to sharing project information. A section summary is also provided. 
 
4.2.1: Consequences of Site Selection/Hosting Arrangements 
 
Optical astronomy mega-projects are only sited after painstaking studies of the local observing 
conditions; hence the cluster of facilities in high altitude, dry humidity and remote low light 
interference locations such as the Atacama Desert in Chile (ESO, 2018). Beyond these practical 
considerations, site selection on SMPs is typically fraught with political overtones. The 
considerations that led to the USA choosing a green field site in Texas for the SSC (Section 3.2.1), 
rather than a location nearby to an existing high energy research facility, had two distinct threads: 
‘technical and political’ (Riordan, Hoddeson and Kolb, 2015: 104).  
 
As analysed in sub-section 4.1.1 on 28 June 2005, after more than four years of complex 
negotiations, Cadarache in southern France was selected as the ITER site. Akko Maas, the current 
science engineering officer in the ITER cabinet of the DG, who at the time was responsible for 
representing the European Member site candidates pointed out the consequence of the lengthy site 
selection process: ‘several detailed areas of the main Treaty [ITER Agreement] could only be 
progressed once the Site was known (ITER, 2012)’. Without a decision on the Site, progress on the 
main agreement stalled. The choice was far from straightforward and the implications persist until 
today. I will consider three consequences: the first concerns political appointees to the central 
organisation and the second concerns logistics. The third relates to workshare and I cover this in sub-
section 4.2.2 when considering funding resilience. 
 
Part of the trade-off in Japan giving up its Site candidature was the agreement that Japan provide 
the DG. Kaname Ikeda was duly appointed by Council and he was succeeded by Osamu Motojima in 
2010. Both were respected Japanese nuclear scientists but took markedly different approaches to 
the role. Ikeda had been Japan’s ambassador to Croatia, and he relied heavily on a seasoned German 
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‘Big Science’ manager, Norbert Holtkamp, who he appointed as Principal Deputy DG and Project 
Construction Leader. Ikeda led the project in a diplomatic sense dealing with the Members and 
international, regional and local relations aspects and delegated day-to-day running of the 
organisation to Holtkamp. On taking over, Motojima took a more hands-on approach and Holtkamp 
departed to be the Deputy Director of the US National Accelerator Laboratory at Stanford, USA.  
 
The risks of political appointees in large scale national projects is widely accepted and well 
researched (Kelman, 2010 and Dahlström & Holmgrem, 2015). These risks are magnified in IGOs that 
have high delegated powers of the DG and his/her immediate team. Also, to change the top-level 
positions in IGOs is often more laborious than in national institutions due to the consensus needed 
from the international partners. ITER suffered from the consequences of political appointees to its 
early high-level management team. An ITER Director typified the views of many involved at the time: 
“In a sense you could imagine that the DG could be a political appointment; that is OK as it is a 
political facing role. That is reasonable. The problem has also been the next level down; there is still 
some of it left in place, but it is not as bad as it was in the first round of appointments. The next level 
are department heads and therefore should be operational managers but, in the beginning, they 
were mainly political appointees that had little appropriate skills.” The constraint of these political 
appointees has been steadily mitigated by recruiting suitably experienced replacements.  
 
The second consequence of the site selection is the effect on project logistics. The agreement of 
Spain to the rival Cadarache site was reached when it was agreed to establish F4E in Barcelona (sub-
section 4.1.1). F4E would handle over 40% of the project value contracts and manage the Japan-
Europe Broader Approach. It would have aided project communications if F4E had been co-located 
with the ITER HQ in France. Following the adoption of the French site, Europe acts as the Host 
Member. Highly Exceptional Loads (HEL) manufactured in the Members supply chain will need to be 
shipped to the French harbour of Fos-sur-Mer, west of Marseille on the Mediterranean Sea and 
then, via a specially prepared 104 km itinerary that winds its way through rural Provence, hauled by 
road to the construction site. Some 250 HEL road convoys, the heaviest of which will weigh 
approximately 800 tonnes (including the 200-tonne, 352-wheel transport vehicle), travelling at night 
to minimize disturbances to the local communities will navigate this tortuous route (ITERCAD, 2018). 
These topographical constraints have been largely mitigated by the Host Member’s planning and 
French State’s logistics efforts but still add a degree of difficulty that a coastal site could have 
avoided. 
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4.2.2: Project Delays and Funding Resilience 
 
The ITER project is very late compared to the original plan. Soon after appointment, Holtkamp 
supported by the international staff and independent Management Assessors identified and made 
known to the Members that they had grossly overestimated the maturity of the design. It is not 
possible to ascertain as to the strategic misrepresentation that may have occurred and whether an 
alternative more realistic schedule was known to insiders, as the sparse evidence is contested. What 
is beyond dispute is that soon after ITER Agreement signature a significant adjustment to schedule 
and thereby costs had to be made. A long-serving ITER Science Team Section Leader described the 
underlying reason: “The project started on the false pretence that everything was ready. The people 
who were hired quickly discovered that things were not ready, and we had a situation where we had 
a management team that was not optimised to deal with that situation. The first step was to realise 
that it was nowhere near ready, so they had to go back to the drawing board and there was a big 
design review. As a result of the design review lots of things changed and there was a delay in 
getting going and at that point the communications between the DA [Member State organisations] 
and IO [central organisation] was poor. People who do not work in this environment do not realise 
how hard communication is.” 
 
Lack of credibility of the schedule to harness fusion energy for commercial power generation has 
been a feature of the fusion landscape from the onset of pioneers raising expectations to gain 
backing and funds, all adding to common semi-serious quip that fusion is always 10 years away and 
10 US$ BN away. Efforts by the first two DGs in tackling – albeit difficult schedule issues - were 
unsuccessful in changing this perception. A report on the 2008 Management Advisory Committee 
(sub-section 4.3.1) deliberations reveals the prevailing mood. Holtkamp pointed out that ‘The clock 
ticks and the money runs…. it is as simple as that.’ For the first time the heads of the Domestic 
Agencies have joined together to explain where some of the reasons for their difficulties lie. Didier 
Gambier, the Director of the European Domestic Agency in Barcelona, is the first to take hold of the 
microphone. ‘The ITER Organization has the responsibility for the ITER design, but the Domestic 
Agencies have the money, and money talks!’ Ned Sauthoff, head of US ITER, agrees with his 
European colleague: ‘This is not a normal project. The ITER principle foresees significant in-kind 
contributions and the Domestic Agencies hold considerable resources. We thus have to find the right 
balance (ITER Newsline, 2008a)’. 
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The most telling indicator of the unexpectedness of the delay is the ten-year limit included in several 
Articles of the ITER Agreement and the Broader Approach. For example, the provision for any 
Member to withdraw from the project at ITER Agreement Article 26 only come into force after 10 
years. Ten years was the original estimate for the combined length of the construction, 
commissioning and initial operation phases. The basic first plasma is now forecast for the mid 2020’s 
almost twice that original estimate. Even considering the traits of optimism bias and strategic 
misrepresentation that Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter have described (2003: 73 and 137 and 
Oxford University, 2006) no-one foresaw that the delay would be of this magnitude. This has placed 
a considerable strain on all the Members due to the prolonged funding that the delays have caused. 
 
Overcoming global political turbulence in the period 2006 to today and broadly maintaining funding 
has taken skill and determination. For example, Tim Luce, a veteran fusion scientist and current 
Head of ITER Science and Operations noted that “When the Crimea Crisis happened in 2014 the 
Russian currency devalued by a factor of three, yet they kept up all their commitments at a 
considerable cost to their internal Fusion programs. They are understandably upset when others do 
not meet their obligations.”  
 
The problem Member currently receiving the wrath of Russia, the other Members and the Central 
Organisation is the USA that has missed a series of annual cash contributions. The US domestic 
political reasons for these missed payments are complex. Field work confirmed that the DG, Bernard 
Bigot, has taken several diplomatic steps to reach out to the US Administration including urging 
President Macron to raise the matter directly with the US President Donald Trump. Bigot pointed 
out to the Subcommittee on Energy of the US House of Representatives that ‘The United States, as 
the most scientifically and technologically advanced country on earth, is a highly valued ITER 
partner’ he went on to say: ‘The U.S. contribution to the ITER Project is 9.1% of the total. In return, 
the U.S. has access to 100% of the scientific and technological advancements resulting from the 
project. This leverages the US investment by a factor of more than 10: a solid investment by any 
measure (US Congress, 2018)’. The US DOE Report on US Participation in the ITER Project to the US 
Government in May 2016 was more positive than previous assessments of programme progress. 
One year later during another trip to brief the US House Appropriations Committee, Bigot also 
astutely met with the US Secretary of Energy Rick Perry. 
 
Bigot updated the US Congressional Hearings of the Space and Technology Subcommittee of 
Congress on March 6, 2018 on project progress. In the face of the missing payments, his testimony 
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emphasised the interdependencies between the Members: ‘a shortfall in the contributions of any 
single member … will have a cascading, strong effect on delays, cost and the disruption of fusion 
research for every other member. It is why I would like to urge the US to timely comply with its 
contribution commitments. We at ITER are committed to working day and night to make this project 
the model for international collaboration in complex science and technology. We are committed to 
make ITER a sound investment for the US and all the other members.’ He was supported in this 
request by leading figures in the US Fusion Community: Dr James Van Dam, the acting associate 
director, Fusion Energy Sciences, Office of Science, Department of Energy and Dr Mickey Wade, 
director of the Magnetic Fusion Energy Division, General Atomics (US Congress, 2018). Diplomatic 
efforts continued when Mr Perry visited the site to review first-hand project progress in July 2018. A 
way to resolve the matter is still in work at the highest diplomatic levels. The US contributions are 
currently being examined by the US Administration as part of an overall national energy review.  
 
The USA with its annual budgetary appropriations of funds is more susceptible to an oscillatory cycle 
of boom and bust and therefore more captive to political and instantaneous public opinion 
pressures. In contrast, a positive outcome of the Site selection is the stability provided by Europe 
which has markedly longer timescales to act on their commitments. The EU through the European 
Commission (EC) operates on a 6 or 7-year timeframe. No other Member, except China (who did not 
offer a site candidate), could have provided this level of supportive medium-term funding. Given the 
significant delays, this beneficial situation regarding EC funding cycle, in combination with the 
advantages of in-kind procurement for all the Members (sub-section 4.1.4.), has helped prevent 
project cancellation.  
 
The Joint European Torus (JET), situated at Culham near Oxford is the largest operational tokamak in 
the world and contributes to the ITER project research community; it is governed under EURATOM 
arrangements. Several UK nationals serve in the ITER Organisation either as EURATOM secondees or 
on individual contractual basis as citizens of a EURATOM state. The consequences of the UK 
notification to leave the EU and thereby leave EURATOM, are currently open to speculation 
(Fernando, 2016:1). The impact is being assessed by EURATOM, the UK authorities, the DG and ITER 
HQ Management Team, the F4E Management Team and the wider fusion science community.  
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4.2.3: Sharing of Project Information 
 
Attractive features that made the governments make such a large investment decision in the ITER 
project was the assured excellent return on investment and the sharing of knowledge and know 
how. The ITER Agreement enshrines the principle of sharing when two conditions are met: firstly, if 
the information is Generated Intellectual Property (GIP) rather than Background Intellectual 
Property (BIP) which companies retain, and secondly if it is for fusion research and development. 
The companies involved must declare when these conditions are met and then licence the sharing 
with the other parties involved. DG Bigot underlined this benefit while hosting the US Secretary of 
Energy, Rick Perry, on his 2018 site visit ‘it is ITER's ambition to serve as a model of successful 
international collaboration and as a smart deal and positive return on investment for the US and all 
ITER Members.’ 
 
In practice it is proving hard to collect this GIP. The experienced companies who own it are many in 
number and operate under a contractual relationship to each Members Domestic Agency (DA). The 
contract between the DA and the suppliers are confidential, so the central IGO, with no Field Team 
representatives (sub-section 4.1.4) does not know the exact IPR clause involved only that the 
requirement is included. Early signs were good, and Members were content with both the volume 
and quality of the GIP they were seeing. More recently declarations have slowed and there is 
growing discontent among the Members. Reasons for the change are contested, the most common 
one, cited by three interviewees being: ‘The main difficulty that the central organisation has in 
convincing suppliers to declare is that the contractual levers to encourage them to do so rest solely 
with the national domestic agencies.’ The inference here is that national considerations may be 
hampering either intentionally or unintentionally GIP declarations.  
 
One of the Directors tasked by the DG to raise the number of GIP declarations reminisced that 
lobbyists sold the project to their governments at its inception by the argument: “this is a wonderful 
project: we invest 9% but in return we get 100% of the shared Intellectual Property” and the 
Director pinpointed the bigger picture consequences should performance in this area not improve: 
“The total financial capability in the world for fusion development is limited, if we do not share the 
IP as originally intended then you could theoretically spend seven times the needed investment for 
any one new technology. The aim is a total global fusion saving. Global saving means that the whole 
Fusion community can have more money to overcome the big challenging technical barriers such as 
the plasma facing materials or the tritium plant. If you spend the same money on each part by not 
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sharing, it will be a disaster for the global Fusion Community. Also, as the production devices will be 
built much later the Members taxpayers will rightly ask what tangible things have been delivered? 
You said on the way to the final goal you can deliver many spin-offs, where are they?”  
 
Mitigation in this area is difficult and the Fusion Community reputation is on the line. The matter is 
receiving high-level attention from the ITER Council and the conclusion is still to be determined. 
Every technical responsible officer has been tasked to identify areas of their work that are GIP 
sharing candidates. Annual targets have been set by Council on each Domestic Agencies to declare 
GIP. The European Member has a strong team in Barcelona to manage their IP. Other DA are finding 
it a difficult task with some interviewees commenting that suppliers sometimes fail to respond to 
requests or even threaten to leave the project if coerced to declare. 
 
Section summary 
 
The operations of the ITER community tightly support Hypothesis 2 in that ‘external constraints such 
as excessive stakeholder aspirations, changing legal landscapes, bureaucratic regulations, funding 
fluctuations and unforeseen events, while being mitigated as far as possible by IGO leadership 
actions, inevitably adversely affect overall performance.’  
 
Managing constraints on the ITER project is not easy and this section has highlighted three areas 
that typify the depth of problems that have had to be overcome and in some instances are still being 
combatted. Firstly, the consequences of the site selection have included the negative aspects of 
political appointees and logistical hurdles of a site situated over 100km from the sea. Secondly, the 
effects of project delays caused by a combination of circumstances including immature design at 
start-up and ineffectual leadership to deal with the conflicts, that potential fixes demanded were a 
potent combination that almost led to the projects’ cancellation. The community did act to address 
these constraints, and the project is now on a more secure footing. Thirdly, the effects of Member’s 
suppliers not adequately declaring intellectual property has been shown to be misplaced self-
interest; a problem that the Member States are now making major efforts to address. 
 
This capability to deal with these constraints as well as providing support of Hypothesis 2, also 
serves to support Hypothesis 3 that ‘sound internal governance and leadership dynamics improve 
global IGO performance.’ It relates to two Beyond Gridlock pathways. Firstly, Pathway 2, 
autonomous and adaptive international institutions, that has been stretched to its limits in the 
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herculean efforts to overcome the technical and scientific obstacles in putting ‘A Star in a Bottle’, as 
termed by Raffi Khatchadourian (2014), while keeping the diverse Members together. I provide 
further examples of these efforts in sub-section 4.3.1: Organisational Culture. Secondly, Pathway 3, 
‘technical groups with effective and legitimate processes’ being free to solve problems without being 
overburdened by hierarchical bureaucracy is true for this case study but gains have been agonizingly 
slow to materialise. 
 
The steady success of the Pathway 2 and Pathway 3 efforts have allowed the Council to rise above 
the turmoil that has engulfed its members in other political fields since 2006. The numerous working 
level mini- epistemic communities that comprise the ITER Community have positively contributed to 
the whole. Nevertheless, this section has shown that the depth and seriousness of the constraints 
has adversely affected overall performance, demonstrated by the almost doubling of the original 
estimate for construction and achievement of ‘first plasma.’ This has allowed criticism to mount that 
will only be fully abated when the scientific results bear fruit in the later 2030’s. The Pathway 2 and 
Pathway 3 efforts have also been strengthened by Pathway 7 ‘innovative leadership’ with regular 
use of Pathway 8 ‘innovative funding’ mechanisms that I now move on to in the next section.   
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4.3: Governance and Leadership Dynamics 
 
To test Hypothesis 3 (that sound internal governance and leadership dynamics improve global IGO 
performance) I examine three organisational features. Firstly, the organisational culture where the 
analysis has taken account of the views that were expressed at all levels within the community 
during the field work interviews on those management approaches that have been most productive 
and how criticisms have been dealt with. The analysis has also benefitted from the availability of the 
bi-annual Management Assessors Reports that provide a regular barometer of performance and, 
through the results of extensive staff surveys, moral. Secondly, I examine two characteristics of 
successful organisational orchestrators: focality and legitimacy. Thirdly, I explore upcoming 
developments for ITER in an international context including how collaborations on the future DEMO 
devices may be managed and the community’s potential strategies regarding commercial 
exploitation of fusion. A section summary is also provided. 
 
4.3.1: Organisational Culture 
 
To grasp the rate of progress on a project of the magnitude of ITER is not straightforward and the 
need for independent oversight was foreseen by the founding negotiators and detailed in Article 18 
of the ITER Agreement (IAEA, 2006: 16). The importance of establishing the compulsory, regular and 
independent nature of these reviews was emphasised by a leading US negotiator, Michael Roberts 
who revealed detail of the arguments concerning its periodicity: “the US originally advocated an 
annual assessment while China thought four years more sensible.” All those interviewed agreed that 
the appointment of a Management Assessor every two years has proven to be about right: frequent 
enough to provide meaningful oversight while giving the central management team enough space to 
get on with operations.  
 
Although sensitive and/or business confidential information is not released, the Management 
Assessors reports, and executive summaries of independent review groups commissioned by the 
Council to investigate specific matters are available. This secondary data supports the primary 
research interviews in pointing to two underlying reasons behind the delays: Firstly, the 2001 design 
was incomplete as shown in the evidence in sub-section 4.2.2. Secondly, a lack of appropriate top-
level leadership in the early years failed to effectively address the first issue. DG Motojima was 
struggling to lead the project through the deep and diverse difficulties it was faced with and his 
position was progressively seen as untenable culminating in the 2013 Management Assessors report 
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including at number two of its eleven recommendations to ‘Accelerate the Director General 
Transition” (Madia and Associates, 2013: 7). Great expectations were therefore placed on Bigot 
when the Japanese agreed with the other Members that he should replace Motojima earlier in his 
five-year term than was originally planned. Evidence of the improvement in project culture following 
the change in leadership is best illustrated by primary data quotations from within the Community: 
 
A current ITER Division Head, with over 10 years on the project: “In Bigot’s dealing with the US, I 
think he has made magic. He has managed to communicate and convince major players in the US; 
which was the complete opposite before he came”. 
 
A respected veteran of the central team, who joined at its foundation in mid-2007: “What I see has 
happened is that when Bigot came in he said to the workforce that one of his conditions in being 
appointed was the amount of control including funding that he would have. Previously and 
restricting my comments to the institutes rather individuals, because of the power struggle with F4E, 
it was very difficult for the Directors to do want they wanted to do.” 
 
A long-serving and respected ITER Science and Operations Team Section Leader: “And what is good 
now is that Bernard Bigot has insisted on more central team control over the DA and much more 
dialogue, so things are clearer. How things are written is clearer, the way documents are reviewed 
and assessed is getting better and so communication channels are much improved. It also helps 
when you see that the project has come to life in the last few years. Now you hear good things, not 
just bad things. That inertia is very important and that has come from the very top… Bigot is so well 
connected that he has opened up influential contacts everywhere. Something his predecessors just 
could not do.” 
 
A current ITER Head of Department noted: “One of the things Bernard Bigot is very good at is ‘ask 
what you want’ and ‘say what you think’. Do not play political games on the project as it is viewed 
differently in different cultures”. 
 
Dr James Van Dam, the acting associate director, Fusion Energy Sciences, Office of Science, 
Department of Energy in his testimony to Congress: “The ITER Organisation has significantly 
improved its project management performance under DG Bigot and we thank him for that.” Realistic 
action plans, detailed schedule reviews and national recovery activities resulted in the US DOE 2016 
overall recommendation to stay in the project. The DOE final report stated that in coming to the 
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endorsement, the review team had ‘considered the program strategy, project management, foreign 
policy and international relations and the anticipated national budget conditions’ (US DOE, 2016).  
 
Finally, the 2016 Management Assessors report, some 13 months after the changeover, concluded 
that: ‘the creation of an engineering project culture had been instituted and was improving, re-
structuring efforts were taking place, the new DG was effective and communication and general 
cooperation between the central organisation and the Members had dramatically improved’. 
Evidence of the positive effect of innovative leadership can be seen in the reports survey of 28 
senior ITER Organisation staff who were asked seven questions including “Are you supportive of the 
new management?’: all 28 responded positively (ICRG, 2016: 51). 
 
The 2013 Management Assessor (Madia and Associates, 2013: 4) pointed out the difficulties in 
establishing a shared project culture between fusion systems designers, scientists and nuclear 
industry construction engineers. The groups have differing backgrounds, personality types and 
priorities. For example, the design groups are stereotyped as having difficulty in embracing the 
concept of ‘this is good enough.’ This view was supported by a highly experienced ITER Division 
Head: “We talk a lot about cultural differences and conflicts and people like to relate this to 
nationalities. In my opinion this is completely wrong. We do have a big cultural problem but that is 
between the Science Community and the Nuclear Industry Community which are two extremes, and 
everything is different in these two worlds and we continually have conflicts. So, scientist work one 
way which may be extreme chaotic and nuclear industry work in complete opposite way, which is 
bureaucratic, slow and blocking. It does not matter if we make progress as long as we complete the 
right excel sheet! The Nuclear Industry is big strong and blocking, but it is less blocking than it used 
to be. The Science Community on ITER has adapted and become a little stronger to push back. For 
example, Operations has never been a player, but is now becoming a player”. 
 
A long-serving ITER Director, noted with respect to analysing the project culture that: “There is not a 
single relationship. Every Procurement Arrangement Responsible Officer in the central organisation 
has a relationship with their counterparts in the Domestic Agencies; each one has a plus or minus 
that contributes to the overall depth and quality of the central organisation to domestic agencies 
relationships”. This telling observation has read across to a series of specialist mini epistemic 
communities that are led by the central organisation staff who have counterparts in the DA 
depending on their specific circumstances. For example, the mini-community led by long-serving 
ITER team leader: “I organised annual meetings and ITER became the leading entity in an emerging 
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specialist field of technology. People attended to find out what to do and went and did it, this has 
benefited everyone in the end. What we have seen is that the less experienced countries see the 
collaboration as a possibility to learn. An example is China where they have learned. It is a win-win 
for our community as they learn, and we get the work done cheaply, well and on time.” 
 
This long serving ITER team leader also supported the view of the ITER Division Head above 
regarding project culture: “People talk about the problems due to different national cultures being 
involved, I have not found this to be an issue. There is worldwide team and there is a community of 
Fusion neutronics people and we all know what must be done. In the neutronics community, I have 
no authority and a little money. It works because everyone has a common interest in progress. 
Everyone wants to be the best. For neutronics this is the best project in the world and if participants 
can hold their own here, they can hold it anywhere. The team works well because it has some very 
good people; it would have been difficult with mediocre people.”  
 
 
4.3.2: Focality and Legitimacy 
 
This sub-section benchmarks the case study results against two characteristics of successful 
orchestrations that Abbott and Hale (2014: 9) outline within their Guide for Organizational 
Entrepreneurs: focality and legitimacy. While doing so it examines the unusual dilemma facing the 
participants that I highlighted in sub-section 4.1.3., namely, that at ITER Council level the 
representatives are responsible for the delivery of their portion of the in-kind contributions while at 
the same time being the ultimate body that the central organisation can appeal to when a Member 
fails to meet those very obligations. A Member in these types of scenarios would declare a conflict of 
interest if Council deliberations stepped that way and may even exclude themselves from part of a 
meeting or a vote; the dilemma is manageable due to its limited scale. On an industrial JV the 
members would also be the first-tier suppliers but would ultimately be accountable and responsible 
to the client and his/her separately appointed central management team. What is different here is 
that, due to the way the project is set-up and funded, the Members play a significant role in all 
aspects: firstly, they provide representatives to the Council and therefore have ultimate governance 
responsibility; secondly, they are responsible for the Domestic Agencies who place contracts with 
and oversee the supply chain with respect to schedule, quality and costs of the in-kind contributions 
and thirdly, they provide the cash contributions to the central organisation who manage the project 
including, setting design requirements, exercising configuration control, oversee safety and carry out 
quality assurance all of which have an impact on costs.  
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Focality and Legitimacy concepts are therefore intertwined in a convoluted embrace throughout the 
ITER community. To aid the analysis of both features, Figure 9 provides an Overview of ITER 
Community Contributions Focality and Legitimacy of Common Enterprise: 
 
 
 
Figure 9; ITER Community Contributions - Focality and Legitimacy of Common Enterprise  
 
 
4.3.2.1: Focality 
 
The ITER central IGO HQ acts as a hub for its epistemic community but people perceive it from a 
different perspective to the way CERN acts as hub for its community (sub-section 3.3.2). Richard 
Pitts captures the difference: “This project is the absolute culmination of the world-wide fusion 
community; this tokamak design is based on the biggest body of knowledge that we have. All our 
eggs are in this one basket and there is naturally pressure that we must get it right”. He added the 
existential threat to the community that the focality of the project represents: “most people are on 
board as they see it as our only chance, for better or for worse, we have decided to go down this 
route. Some scientists still believe it is not the right way to go, but they have to support it because if 
the project goes down it takes with it the entire community. This is not the case in other larger 
research communities.”  
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Secondary data support for this position is widespread including the series of Management 
Assessors Reports, scientific journals and national assessments such as the US Congress 
Subcommittee on Energy Hearing Report, the Future of U.S. Fusion Energy Research (US Congress, 
2018). They all emphasise the focality of the project and add to the pressure on the community to 
deliver. There is a realisation that the set of circumstances that established this nuclear collaboration 
(see section 4.1: The ITER Agreement) would be impossible to repeat in today’s political climate. 
There will therefore be no ITER 2.0 project, no second chance for generations; failure is not an 
option for the planet or the fusion community. A counter-argument to this analysis is that, should 
the collaboration fall apart, then Europe would continue to build the device alone; a supposition that 
no-one in the community wants to test.   
 
The arrangement shown in Figure 9 also bolstered the domestic magnetic confinement fusion areas 
in the Member States which are burgeoning. The distributed supply network has meant that 
domestic agencies have had to learn to be intelligent hubs to control the vast amount of work that 
they are responsible for. The scale of the central design has primed specialist research and 
development activities to begin in Member States.  This research suggests that this is a - albeit 
limited – use of the Beyond Gridlock pathway 5 ‘mobilisation of domestic constituencies for 
cooperation and compliance’ mechanism. Examples include Plasma Disruption Studies in Europe at 
the EURATOM JET facility near Oxford in the UK and at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 
Tennessee, USA. ITER is like CERN in that it acts an anchor institution that acts and directs.  
 
4.3.2.2: Legitimacy 
 
It is vital that there is a belief among all the actors in a community that the central organisation and 
its bodies are appropriate to direct policy. At times that belief has wavered in the ITER Community. 
In sub-sections 4.2.2 on project delays and funding resilience and 4.3.1 on project culture I analysed 
the problems with the first round of appointments to the central organisation’s high-level 
leadership. Faced with unexpected incomplete design, the central team’s authority to direct events 
(if not its very legitimacy to exist) was challenged by Members. The Members in this period were 
also establishing their Domestic Agencies and were hard pressed to place the contracts needed to 
get components under construction. Having the DG and central teams to take the blame for the 
majority of the delays and indecisiveness was a not too hidden tactic for the Members who 
themselves were behind schedule with their elements of the enterprise. 
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Today, like with CERN, the ITER central IGO has an unchallenged legitimacy and enjoys a shared set 
of normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity and a common 
policy enterprise with its wider epistemic community. This standing has had to be earned and fought 
for. I have already described the change in leadership and improvement in project culture that has 
helped bring this improvement in legitimacy about. Further evidence of this status derives from 
multiple sources. Here I outline the most important two, in doing so, I will include counter-factual 
evidence that reveals the unyielding high stakes the ITER Community must constantly deal with. 
 
First, the Council is legitimized by the expert support it receives from two of its subsidiary governing 
bodies: the MAC makes recommendations on the management arrangements and the STAC on both 
scientific and technical issues. These tasks demand members of the highest calibre and experience. 
These requirements also highlight an inherent weakness in the arrangement that can be illustrated 
by an example from June 2008: the ITER Council asked the former Operations Director of the UK's 
fusion centre at Culham, Frank Briscoe, to set up an independent panel of experts to assess the 
project. The review group, termed the ‘Briscoe Panel’, consisted of 17 experts, with at least one 
from each ITER Member, plus three advisers. Briscoe commenting at the time that ‘Some of the 
panel members are fusion scientists, some have no scientific background at all, but they all have 
good knowledge of big projects.’ The ‘but’ exemplifies the belief that to adequately determine how 
an organisation set up and performing you really need to understand [fusion] science. In one aspect, 
this is self-evidently true due to the complexity and special ground-breaking nature of the project. It 
is an issue other SMPs face, such as ESO in the Astronomy epistemic community and DUNE in the 
high energy physics community. However, the very high focality exacerbates the risks for ITER. Field 
work confirmed that the inherent flaw is that a group within an epistemic community that are 
themselves dependent on the success of the key component of that community’s flagship project 
are unlikely to be free of optimism bias (either deliberate or subliminal). The same applies to 
deliberations of the STAC and its specialist panels with one veteran team leader commenting: “We 
should avoid the Council being incestuous with respect to the project itself. There should be more 
external scrutiny. We should have had members on the Council and the other bodies where their 
welfare is not linked to the project welfare. We should bring in five top business executives, they will 
find things you are not doing right”. In providing this counterfactual evidence I am not purporting 
that the supporting governing bodies and their many expert panels over the years of ITER’s 
construction have been in any way unprofessional; without them the project would undoubtedly be 
in a worse position. I do contend that any community as passionate and committed about fusion 
energy being the key to our collective energy needs cannot impartiality assess itself. If you are part 
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of the wider magnetic confinement fusion community, you are by default a believer in that 
approach. What DG Bigot has achieved is to reassert the moral authority of the central organisation 
to exercise the necessary project management and controls despite these types of constraints. 
 
Second, the central organisation has legitimacy due to the expertise that ITER possesses. The 
technical and scientific mini-epistemic communities are led by world-leading experts in their 
respective fields such as super conducting magnets, neutral beam, cryogenics, neutronics, etc., The 
central organisation sets the pace in these areas as it must continually make the best decisions that 
the project and thereby the community needs. This expertise has deepened as the project has 
moved - albeit slower than anticipated - forward. Secondary supporting data includes the list of 
fusion conferences that the central organisation chairs (both by hosting at the HQ and at the 
Members facilities worldwide) and the large number of peer reviewed papers that its staff have 
published (ITER, 2019a and 2019b).  
 
The undisputed focus in key domains that Figure 9 illustrates means that any deficiencies markedly 
affect project performance and therefore must be addressed quickly and decisively. I have outlined 
some steps such as the establishment of the Executive Project Board, the employment of the CMA 
and the gradual professionalisation of the second tier of leadership to match the task (sub-section 
4.1.3). The added legitimacy that these steps has fostered is currently backed by the whole 
community as evidenced in sub-section 4.3.1. Interviewees emphasised that it is crucial that those 
improved results sustain this momentum.  
 
4.3.3: Future developments and expansion 
 
There are three reasons why it is unlikely membership will be expanded. Firstly, the amortisation of 
a proportion of the costs borne to date by the founding seven members, that would need to be 
included in any joining fee, would be prohibitive; secondly, the Members believe that the long-
negotiated common understandings on workshare already covers all that is required and thirdly, 
there is no desire to share the foreseen benefits too widely other than on a commercial basis. 
Nevertheless, since its formation the ITER organisation, with the unanimous approval of the Council 
representatives, has entered into a series of bi-lateral agreements with states, other international 
organisations and institutions. A 2015 proposal to collaborate with Iran, on mainly diagnostics 
research, has been put on hold following the US withdrawal in 2017 from the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA). None of the collaborations have been undertaken by either party for a single 
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reason. For the fusion community there tends to be one or more of four main drivers: 
strategic/financial, sharing of the research load, to help fill a specific technical/scientific capability or 
scarce resource and finally, for outreach/educational purposes; Table 7 provides a summary with the 
foremost collaboration category shaded: 
 
 
 
Table 7; Summary of the ITER Organisation’s main bi-lateral Cooperation Agreements 
(with the foremost collaboration category shaded) 
Future expansion into commercial power generation is the long held fusion community vision. The 
pressure on ITER staff (sub-section 4.3.1.) to get things right is replicated in each of the national 
programmes. The future demonstration fusion power station (DEMO) devices in each of Members 
territories will be simpler than ITER as they will draw of the technical and scientific lessons learned. 
They will mark the penultimate step before the construction of thousands of commercial fusion 
power plants.  
 
 
 
  
Strategic/
Financial
Research
Specific Capability
and/or
Scarce Resource
Public Outreach/
Educational
IAEA 2008 X
Regulatory
oversight
Principality of Monaco 2008 X X
PostDoc
Fellowships
CERN 2008 X X
Research in
Superconducting Magnets
Australian Nuclear Science
and Technology Organisation 
2016 X X Fusion research
National Nuclear Center
of the Republic of Kazakhstan
2017 X X X
Mineral Resources
and Research
UKAEA 2017 X X
Research in
Remote Handling
16 National Laboratories
(worldwide)
varies X
Fundamental
Fusion Research
32 Universities
(worldwide)
varies X Education
4 National Schools varies X Education
Local Community Groups varies X Public Outreach
State /
International
Organisation
Year
Collaboration Category
from Fusion Community Perspective
(principal category shown highlighted in green)
Main
Driver/Focus of
Collaboration
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Section summary 
 
Hypothesis 3 that sound governance and leadership dynamics improve IGO performance is 
supported (see checklist of supporting and opposing attributes at Table 1) through the field work 
testimony and the analysis of ‘Science Diplomacy’ and ‘Mega-Projects Governance, Leadership and 
Performance Issues’; Sections 3 and 4 respectively of the Literature Review.  
 
Field work interviews and secondary data including management assessors reports and national 
independent review groups commissioned by the Council have stressed the importance of sound 
leadership on a project such as ITER. One person, even a DG, cannot single-handedly extinguish a 
project of such magnitude or lead it, cult like, to a promised land. I have shown that one person’s 
influence can quickly affect the community culture and thereby markedly change performance. 
Thankfully for ITER [and the world] DG Bigot has done this in a positive sense. I have shown that 
focality and legitimacy, two characteristics of successful IGO orchestrations are both well-
established on ITER. Indeed, the project and its community are focused in their efforts not only to 
make a success of the project but also to preserve the community itself. Failure of the project is 
widely seen as highly likely to bring down the entire community. With the caveat that I outlined in 
sub-section 4.3.2., regarding the complications in assessing your own work in a highly specialised 
field of endeavour, the legitimacy is strengthened through a combination of a meritocracy based 
advisory committees and the expertise of the central teams. 
 
The explanation of future developments and expansion serve to emphasise the importance of the 
project for the environmental health of the planet. The leadership within the Member States to 
develop their own fusion communities upon which their national devices sit has been given further 
impetus by the shared international experience. Direct examples being the three joint Europe-Japan 
elements of the Broader Approach Agreement (sub-section 4.3.3), the Neutral Beam Test Facility in 
Padova, Italy (sub-section 4.1.1) and the major EURATOM facility at Culham in the UK (sub-section 
4.2.2). These national communities and their ITER related facilities all contribute to the wider fusion 
community knowledge sharing envisaged by the founders. 
 
This governance and leadership dynamics section relates to four Beyond Gridlock pathways: Pathway 
3, ‘technical groups with effective and legitimate processes’; Pathway 4, ‘multiple, diverse 
organisations and institutions coalesce around common goals/norms’; limited use of Pathway 5, 
‘mobilisation of domestic constituencies for cooperation and compliance’ and Pathway 7, 
‘innovative leadership as a reaction to gridlock’.  
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4.4: Evaluation of the Beyond Gridlock pathways and associated mechanisms 
employed by the ITER community 
 
As predicted by Beyond Gridlock theory this research shows that there is overlap between which 
pathways are utilised by ITER. It is nevertheless beneficial to support the three Hypotheses to show 
which principally apply. Table 8 cross-references the pathways that have been identified in the 
summaries of the preceding sections.  
 
Hypotheses ITER Pathway 
1. IGO agreements and start-up conditions which are concise, fair, 
promote trust and mutual support, allow flexibility in problem solving, 
manage host state issues and emphasise the primacy of the State 
improve performance 
1 and 8 
2. External constraints such as excessive stakeholder aspirations, 
changing legal landscapes, bureaucratic regulations, funding fluctuations 
and unforeseen events, while being mitigated as far as possible by IGO 
leadership actions, inevitably adversely affect overall performance 
2 and 3 (aided by 7 
and 8) 
3. Sound internal governance and leadership dynamics improve 
performance 
3, 4, (limited 5) and 
7 
 
Table 8; Cross-reference between hypotheses and Beyond Gridlock pathways utilised by ITER 
Hypothesis 1 is supported through the employment of two pathways. Firstly, pathway 1, ‘shifts in 
major powers core interests’ where towards the end of the Cold War a set of well-placed advocates 
overcame gridlock in superpower international relations. This bi-lateral rapprochement was the 
catalyst for the remarkable seven Member coalition that created ITER while maintaining a solid 
respect for the primacy of the state. Secondly it is supported by pathway 8, ‘innovative funding’ 
mechanisms that have both helped preserve the project and led to significant project management, 
quality control and logistical constraints that the community must continually wrestle with. 
 
The section on Managing Constraints shows the pathways used to combat Hypothesis 2 issues have 
been steadily strengthened since the project’s inception. Pathway 2 mechanisms including giving the 
central organisation increased authority to tackle project construction and integration challenges 
and pathway 3 initiatives that allow technical groups to gradually develop a project adhocracy that 
enables sets of mini-epistemic communities to solve complex problems and navigate constraints 
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have both had a positive effect. Although negative effects such as program delays persist, I contend 
that there are good reasons to deduce that they are mitigated from what would have occurred 
without effective interventions. For example, had the ITER Community leadership delayed dealing 
with the multiple consequences of site selection, analysed in section 4.2: Managing Constraints, this 
would have stored up problems. I have shown that implementation of the pathway 2 and 3 solutions 
relies on sound and innovative leadership and, where appropriate, employment of innovative 
funding; Pathways 7 and 8 respectively.  
 
The governance and leadership dynamics section relates to four Beyond Gridlock pathways. Firstly, 
Pathway 3, ‘technical groups with effective and legitimate processes’ where they have developed 
legitimising expertise. Secondly, Pathway 4, ‘multiple, diverse organisations and institutions coalesce 
around common goals/norms’ where focality and legitimacy are knotted together in such a way that 
the community depends on the success of the central entity. Thirdly, Pathway 5, ‘mobilisation of 
domestic, constituencies for cooperation and compliance’ whereby the vastness of the project 
means that research and development studies are carried out world-wide to support the central 
goals and national follow-on devices (in most cases) complement the central efforts. Finally, albeit 
quite late as explained in sub-section 4.2.1, Pathway 7 innovative leadership is employed. 
 
Finally, table 4 confirms that the gridlock pathway ‘civil society coalitions with reformist states 
(Pathway 6) does not feature for ITER. Table 9 provides a summarising commentary of the 
mechanism in use for each of the seven pathways that do apply.  
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Pathway ITER Community Mechanism 
1. Shifts in major powers' 
core interests 
• Thawing of Cold War at US-USSR Summits in Geneva 
(1985) and Reykjavik (1986) provided opportunity for 
determined and shrewd advocated to add the fusion 
vision as a balance to nuclear weapon issues in Summit 
protocols. Led to 7 party ‘ITER Agreement’ Paris (2006) 
• Aligns with post WW II, ‘Atoms for Peace’ concepts 
2. Autonomous and adaptive 
international institutions 
• Although ITER Agreement allows weighted voting in 
Council, consensus unanimity has always been practiced; 
the primacy of the Members is sacrosanct 
• MoUs have been agreed with other nations for specific 
needs: e.g. Kazakhstan (mineral resources) 
3. Technical groups with 
effective and legitimate 
processes 
• The central team’s authority comes from ownership of 
the Project Baseline, Design Authority, Nuclear 
Operations Licensee and guidance to Council on 
balancing of in-cash / in-kind contributions 
• ITER device is the world’s most complicated man-made 
object; its design, assembly and operation demand strict 
adherence to Systems Engineering standards 
• In-Kind workshare means control of majority of supply 
chain rests with dispersed Member Domestic Agencies  
4. Multiple, diverse 
organisations and 
institutions coalesce around 
common goals/norms 
• Extensive global collaboration: 7 members comprise 35 
developed nations that together represent over half the 
world’s population and over 80% of the world’s GDP 
• Recognised centre of excellence for Nuclear Fusion 
5. Mobilization of domestic 
constituencies  
• Central funding primes limited specialist R & D activities 
to begin in Member States (e.g. Disruption Studies) 
6. Civil society coalitions 
with reformist states 
Research confirmed that this Beyond Gridlock pathway 
does not feature 
7. Innovative leadership as a 
reaction to gridlock 
• Early leadership was problematic culminating in a 2013 
Management Assessors Report calling for an earlier than 
planned preparation for succession of the second DG 
• Current DG (Bernard Bigot, France) has strong backing 
from Members and staff; he has introduced a more open 
approach to problem solving and teamwork  
• Diverse locations of technical teams continue to present 
problems in systems integration 
8. Innovative Funding • 85% of the project is funded by in-kind contributions 
whereby detailed design activities and manufacturing 
are carried out in members home territory. This helps 
‘lock-in’ to the project despite schedule/cost overruns 
• The in-kind arrangements have also contributed to 
difficulties in the central organisation exercising, through 
the Members, the required level of project controls. 
• Scrupulously fair funding formula for cash contributions; 
but currently two Members are behind in payments 
 
Table 9; Pathways though and beyond gridlock, ITER mechanisms for implementation (adapted from 
Hale and Held, et. al., 2017)  
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CHAPTER 5: THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION COMMUNITY 
 
 
 
Figure 10; ISS Community at IGO level as at March 2019 (logo courtesy of NASA) 
 
The goal of the International Space Station (ISS) is to provide a safe, common environment to carry 
out science experiments in a microgravity environment. The facility is therefore unique in that it has 
operated with a continuous human presence in low earth orbit since the Expedition 1 crew boarded 
the station in November 2000 (NASA, 2018). Construction started in 1998 and was painstakingly 
slow, requiring 37 US Space Shuttle flights, 4 Russian assembly launches and over 155 spacewalks by 
astronauts to complete. The ISS of today is a colossal structure made up of multiple interconnected 
modules that are provided by the Members respective Space Agencies. The project has captured the 
public imagination as an iconic example of international collaboration overcoming national 
boundaries by metaphorically and literally rising above them. John Holdren, an American scientist 
who served as the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of 
President Obama, captures that spirit: ‘The international partnership that built and maintains the 
station is a shining example of what humanity can accomplish when we work together in peace.’ 
(AAAS, 2018) 
 
The project has a central Multilateral Coordinating Board that I address in sub-section 5.1.3. 
However, there is no IGO or even a unitary operational mission control; each Member manages their 
respective operations from their own facilities. The US Mission Control is permanently operated by 
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NASA at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. The Russian Mission Control is permanently 
operated by the Russian Federal Space Agency (ROSCOSMOS) at Korolev just outside Moscow. The 
other Space Agencies exercise their control as required by technical and science operations. The 
Canadian Mission Control is operated by the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) at Saint Hubert, Quebec. 
The group of European nations Columbus Control Center is operated by the European Space Agency 
(ESA) and is located at Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany. The Japanese Mission Control is undertaken by 
the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in Tsukuba Science City sixty kilometres northeast of 
Tokyo. The ISS Community at IGO level is shown at Figure 10. 
 
While the ISS hardware is qualified for space operation until 2028, the end of operations is 
increasingly in sight. Consequently, this third case study chapter will focus on how the ending may 
be managed and what follow-on international space collaborations are being considered. Like the 
previous case study chapters, it is organised into four sections: 
 
The first section tests Hypothesis 1 by examining the political setting that led to the USA and 
USSR (now the Russian Federation) agreeing to effectively end the Cold War fuelled Space Race 
and enter into a partnership. The broad terms of the governing organs, voting rights and role 
of the central ISS administration will be examined. This section relates to Section 1 of the 
Literature Review regarding global collaboration and international organisations. 
 
The second section tests Hypothesis 2 by examining three types of constraints that have been 
tackled by the ISS Community. Firstly, the Space Shuttle accidents that beset the technical 
construction programme; secondly, the political events that strained relations between the 
Member States and thirdly funding shortfalls from all the Parties. This relates to Section 2 of 
the of the Literature Review that covered global gridlock issues. 
 
The third section tests Hypothesis 3 by examining governance and leadership dynamics. Three 
aspects are covered: the organisational culture, focality and legitimacy and finally, national and 
international plans for ISS related follow on space exploration. This relates to Section 3 of the 
Literature Review covering science diplomacy and Section 4 that examined mega-project 
governance, leadership and performance issues.  
 
The final section assesses the Beyond Gridlock pathways employed by the ISS and acts as a 
summary of the chapter. 
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5.1: The ISS Intergovernmental Agreement 
 
To test Hypothesis 1 (that IGO agreements and start-up conditions which are concise, fair, promote 
trust and mutual support, allow flexibility in problem solving, manage host state issues and 
emphasise the primacy of the State improve performance) four aspects are examined. Firstly, I 
analyse the political setting that culminated in the ISS IGA signature in 2006. Secondly, I scrutinise 
the purpose and functions of the ISS. Thirdly, I examine the governing organs, member’s voting 
rights, and the operational arrangements concerning the ISS astronaut cadre. Fourthly, I outline the 
complex provisions that govern the ISS’s commercial, funding and legal arrangements. Finally, a 
section summary is provided. 
 
 
5.1.1: Political Setting, Convention Signature and Ratification 
 
The scientific drive for international collaboration in space is long established. The event that 
marked the beginning of the age of space exploration was the International Geophysical Year (IGY) 
that ran between July 1957 and December 1958. Conference delegates collectively called for the 
gathering of global geophysical data from satellites. The plan was to do this in the same way that 
international polar expeditions had all contributed to geophysical knowledge up until then. Roger 
Launius, 2018: 88) explains that both the US and USSR readily took up the challenge to develop and 
launch satellites that could gather IGY type data. High level common scientific goals were equally 
matched by nationalistic driven rivalry; the Space Race start flag had been waived.   
 
Early Russian successes were notable: although highly rudimentary the Sputnik mini satellite caused 
alarm in the USA and led to a great outpouring of pride in the USSR when it was first to enter earth 
orbit in October 1957. The US response was threefold: firstly, efforts to launch the US IGY satellite 
were re-doubled, secondly, President Eisenhower established a Science Advisory Committee and 
thirdly, Congress passed legislation leading to the establishment, in 1958, of NASA. Another 
consequence was the establishment by the UNGA in 1959 of the UN Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which is still in existence today, to ‘govern the exploration and use of 
space for the benefit of all humanity: for peace, security and development’ (UNOOSA, 2019).  
 
The Cold War space race rivalry continued throughout the 1960s and 70s with US Astronauts and 
Soviet Cosmonauts pushing the boundaries of aeronautical design and their own skills and bravery. 
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Yuri Gagarin made history in 1961 as the first man in space and Valentina Tereshkova became the 
first woman in space in 1963.The Salyut Space Station was the first in orbit in 1971, two years before 
the US achieved the same with SKYLAB. Although national spending on space was climbing fast, 
there was strong sentiment in the US that it was lagging Soviet efforts. When President Kennedy 
challenged NASA, in a speech to at Rice University in 1962, to ‘land an Astronaut on the moon within 
this decade’, it was therefore as much a national public spending call to arms as a highly challenging 
technical goal (JFK Presidential Library, 1962). 
 
Despite the Cold War entrenched attitudes of the US and USSR in other domains such as economics, 
military power and politics, there were voices at the highest levels within the US administration, 
including the President himself, calling for the Moon Landing effort to be an international one. 
Kennedy made approaches to the Soviet Leader Khrushchev and in September 1963 in a landmark 
speech to the UNGA he closed with ‘Space offers no problems of sovereignty…why, therefore, 
should man's first flight to the moon be a matter of national competition?’ (JFK Presidential Library, 
1963). Any prospects of a joint effort ended with his assassination three months later and 
Khrushchev, who it was later revealed had carefully examined Kennedy’s proposal, fell from power 
the following year. The US national programme continued and led by a well-funded NASA, all the 
required elements (other Federal Government Agencies, affected States, the industrial supply base 
and the science community) worked together to make it happen including. The Apollo 11 moon 
landing on 16 July 1969 did not mark the end of the Space Race but it did graphically underline US 
superiority over its technological rivals. 
 
Following the Moon landings, the US and USSR expanded their space programmes with ambitious 
missions to observe other planets and the Sun. They were gradually joined by other nations 
including, Japan, Canada, India and China. Two European IGOs were established in 1964: the 
European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) and the European Launch Development Organisation 
(ELDO). In the early 1970’s ESRO and ELDO were merged into the European Space Agency (ESA) that 
was formally established in May 1975.  
 
The penultimate piece in the geopolitical puzzle to enable the ISS collaboration was provided by 
President Reagan in his State of the Union Address on 25 January 1984 where he set NASA high 
goals: ‘America has always been greatest when we dared to be great. We can reach for greatness 
again. We can follow our dreams to distant stars, living and working in space for peaceful, economic, 
and scientific gain. Tonight, I am directing NASA to develop a permanently manned space station and 
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to do it within a decade…. We want our friends to help us meet these challenges and share in their 
benefits. NASA will invite other countries to participate so we can strengthen peace, build 
prosperity, and expand freedom for all who share our goals (NASA, 2007).’ Consequently, NASA’s 
leadership concentrated their initial efforts on courting contributions from the Space Agencies of 
countries that were traditional Cold War allies such as Europe, aided by the formation of ESA, 
Canada who had gained experience in early space robotics, Brazil and Japan. With these plentiful 
‘Friends and Allies’ and the growing capability of NASA through the development of SKYLAB, the 
understandable question is why the US then agreed to involve the Russians in the ISS at the end of 
the 1980s. This thesis confirms that the reason was twofold:  
 
Firstly, the Russians through their long operation of the Salyut and MIR space stations had invaluable 
technical and operational experience that could be tapped. The pre-amble to the IGA (US State, 
1998: 2) spells out the argument: ‘Convinced that, in view of the Russian Federation’s unique 
experience and accomplishments in the area of space flight and long-duration missions, including 
the successful long-term operation of the Russian Mir Space Station, its participants in the 
partnership will considerably enhance the capabilities of the Space Station for the benefit of all the 
parties.’ I will return to this Russian capability when considering the management of project in 
section 5.2.  
 
The second reason concerns US strategic policy. John Logsdon is the founder and from 1987–2008 
was the Director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University. In 2003, he was a 
member of the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board and is a former member of the 
NASA Advisory Council. At the start of his interview for this thesis he explains the background to the 
US decision: “One distinction that we should make is the station before Russia and the station after 
Russia. The international partnership was in being from 1988 and then the parties decided to invite 
Russia to join and all the original agreements had to be re-negotiated. If we go back to the very 
basics at the beginning, there was in 1993 the one vote in Congress when the super collider was also 
up for a vote and probably the main thing that kept the station alive in that era was that it was an 
international project. Had it just been a domestic project then it would have been in trouble. One of 
the factors that helped keep it going was not being seen as letting the others down.” Logsdon went 
on to explain the particular aspect that applied to the involvement of Russia: “There was a growing 
opposition to the project within the Clinton administration from 1993 on to even cancel 
participation. Members of Congress proposed amendments to cut funding and one of those 
amendments was defeated by one vote. But, almost in parallel Russia was brought into the 
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partnership and one year later the same amendment was approved with a 125-vote margin. There 
was a strong desire to have Russia involved because of the technology transfer issue. They needed 
hard currency and launches of other satellites and the US sought to limit [technical know-how] 
transfers that could have taken place to rogue nations [rogue states; see section on terms at the end 
of the Introduction]. There were politically potent arguments at the time within the US for bringing 
Russia in. Allowing Russia into the ISS limited not only the money they had available for other 
projects but also the spare technical expertise they would have available for other endeavours 
involving Iran, Iraq or North Korea. In this respect having them join was highly successful.” The NASA 
Administrator, Daniel Goldin led the US team during the final negotiations that coincided with the 
height of revolutionary strife in central Moscow. He later summed up why the time was ripe for 
union of adversaries: ‘On that day of revolution, we negotiated the Russian entry into the ISS… in 
reality, both sides needed each other’ (Garan, 2015: 18). 
 
With the last piece in the political puzzle in place the International Multilateral Treaty between the 
USA [State Department] and the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of the 
European Space Agency [eleven nation states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK], The Government of Japan and The 
Government of the Russian Federation concerning cooperation of the Civil International Space 
Station was duly signed in Washington on 29th January 1998 (US State, 1998); Figure 11.  
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Figure 11; Commemorative Plaque presented by NASA 
to all other IGA signatories on 29th January 1998 (picture courtesy of NASA) 
 
5.1.2: Purpose 
 
Paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the IGA (US State, 1998: 3) emphasises the solely peaceful purposes of 
the collaboration: ‘The object … is to establish a long-term international cooperative framework 
among the Partners, on the basis of genuine partnership, for the detailed design, development, 
operation, and utilization of a permanently inhabited civil international Space Station for peaceful 
purposes, in accordance with international law. This civil international Space Station will enhance 
the scientific, technological, and commercial use of outer space.’ 
 
The dominant role of the USA in the arrangements and the key role of the Russian contribution are 
made immediately clear in Paragraph 2: ‘The Partners will join their efforts, under the lead role of 
the United States for overall management and coordination, to create an integrated international 
Space Station. The United States and Russia, drawing on their extensive experience in human space 
flight, will produce elements which serve as the foundation for the international Space Station.’ 
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The modular nature of the ISS construction and operation is a feature of Paragraph 3: ‘The 
permanently inhabited civil international Space Station [hereinafter "the Space Station"] will be a 
multi-use facility in low-earth orbit, with flight elements and Space Station-unique ground elements 
provided by all the Partners.” This modularity aids the evolutionary nature of its construction and 
future enhancement as can be seen in this statement at the end of Article 1: “The Space Station is 
conceived as having an evolutionary character... This Agreement lists in the Annex the elements to 
be provided by the Partners to form the ISS.’  
 
Logsdon describes the tiered structure of the founding arrangements: ‘The set of agreements that 
are the foundation of the partnership are at two levels. Firstly, there is the government to 
government, one single Intergovernmental Agreement level agreement that has treaty status in 
most countries but not in the US. To have it a treaty in the US requires Congressional ratification of 
two thirds of the Senate and that is always an issue. Also, one Congress cannot commit the next 
Congress to spend money. Therefore, the US is only the Executive Branch as a party to the IGA. 
Secondly, there is next level down MoUs that describe the understandings [and detail the 
deliverables] between the space agencies that are parties to the agreement.’ 
 
The IGA Annex provides an overview of the required in-kind contributions. The four bi-lateral MOUs 
between NASA and the respective space agencies of Canada, Europe, Japan and Russia provide the 
details of what those comprise and therefore act as the project technical and funding baselines. This 
is examined further in sub-section 5.1.4. 
 
 
5.1.3: Organs and Voting Rights 
 
The ISS management structure is distributed between the contributing Member States Space 
Agencies. There is therefore no prescribed IGO nor a Director General. However, there are elements 
that an IGO HQ would have if it existed, John Logsdon explains the main one: “The agreements 
established what I call “the international organisation for Space Station’ it is formally called the 
Multilateral Coordinating Board. The MCB is the governing body for the station. It meets two or 
three times per year at the programme director level and once or twice a year at the Head of Agency 
level. It is based in Houston and has representatives of all the partner agencies sitting there on a 
day-by-day basis”. Henry Hertzfeld is the Director of the Space Policy Institute at the Elliott School of 
International Affairs, George Washington University, added a caveat to that description: “It is 
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important not to overestimate the significance of the MCB. It is more the operations management 
board for the facility. The people on that are the heads of human space flight and once or twice a 
year the Heads of the Agencies come to discuss and check plans”.  
 
Article 7 of the IGA (US State, 1998: 6) describes the intention of the management arrangements: 
“Management of the Space Station will be established on a multilateral basis and the Partners, 
acting through their Cooperating Agencies, will participate and discharge responsibilities in 
management bodies established in accordance with the MOUs and implementing arrangements as 
provided below. These management bodies shall plan and coordinate activities affecting the design 
and development of the Space Station and its safe, efficient, and effective operation and utilization, 
as provided in this Agreement and the MOUs. In these management bodies, decision-making by 
consensus shall be the goal. Mechanisms for decision-making within these management bodies 
where it is not possible for the Cooperating Agencies to reach consensus are specified in the MOUs.” 
In practice, regarding voting rights of the ISS partners, Hertzfeld pointed out that: “Voting rights are 
that all decisions are supposed to be by consensus. There was a sticking point in the original 
negotiations because, although the US does not have a formal veto, in practice, the US retains a veto 
on grounds of safety and effectiveness.” There is no official record where the US has exercised that 
veto in the deliberations of the MCB or in any other areas; the skill of the ISS community members 
has been to resolve their differences in closed sessions and maintain the public persona as a model 
of consensus intergovernmental diplomacy.  
 
 
5.1.4: Commercial, Funding and Legal Arrangements 
 
Articles 5 of the IGA describes the thorny issue of jurisdiction and control of the various ISS elements 
and Article 6 covers ownership (US State, 1998: 5). The key here is that each Member retains legal 
jurisdiction over all their in-kind contributions and over their nationals that operate and maintain 
that equipment. Sole ownership of the various modules is therefore retained by the party that has 
contributed it. The public view of a harmonious, fully integrated World Space Laboratory is 
somewhat at odds with the legal realities of its operation. I return to this when considering 
organisational culture in sub-section 5.3. 
 
The required resources for a project of this magnitude and one that is by design evolutionary in 
nature have been a moving target and needed renegotiating throughout the ISS lifecycle. Article 15 
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of the IGA (US State, 1998:10) proscribes the funding arrangements and the final paragraph 
encourages the employment of a system of ‘barter’: ‘The Partners shall also seek to minimize the 
exchange of funds in the implementation of Space Station cooperation, including through the 
performance of specific operations activities as provided in the MOUs and implementing 
arrangements or, if the concerned Partners agree, through the use of barter.’  
 
These bartering arrangements have become the norm and allowed for limited central autonomy in 
an important operational aspect. How it works was summarised by Hertzfeld: “There is no central 
cash contributions; all is in-kind. There are all kinds of ongoing bartering of exchange of resources 
that goes on in operating the station where if a Japanese experiment requires more power than the 
Japanese module has available then it barters to get it. A tally is kept, if Japan wants something then 
the US wants something back; the staff of the MCB keep the tally. This goes back to the percentage 
contributions they started with and set up in the original negotiations. What is important is that the 
partners have learned how to work these things out. It is more a good marriage partnership than 
global governance. We have learned how to operate effectively within an operational partnership.” 
 
As I showed for ITER in Chapter 4, the US funding of an international endeavour of this scale is 
always difficult given the other pressing demands on public funds. Like ITER, the saving feature is 
that most ISS funds are spent in individual States that dutifully support the programme and fiercely 
defend their part of the supply chain. Logsdon recalls a typical funding scenario: “NASA leads as a 
government agency and there are members of Congress who represent NASA sites. When the Trump 
administration in its most recent budget said we are going to cut [NASA] funds in 2025, Senator Ted 
Cruz said like hell you will, and Congressman Bannon said like hell you are. Unlike most other 
government systems, it is a set of people sharing power. It is a distributed executive.” Hertzfeld 
added more detail: “NASA people are the technical people, but you have the Office of Science and 
Technology and the National Space Council, the executive at the White House level and the Office of 
Management and Budget; it is a fragmented system with NASA in the lead to push for funds.” 
 
An important feature of the ISS Treaty is the legal liability framework that the Parties operate within. 
The IGA details this in a lengthy Article 16 covering Cross-Waiver of Liability and Article 17 Liability 
Convention (US State, 1998: 12 and 13). A summary of what the negotiators achieved is provided by 
the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal (COPUOS) Subcommittee that in 2013 
comprised legal experts from the five ISS space agencies (NASA, CSA, ESA, JAXA and ROSCOMOS). 
The key task of the negotiators being ‘to establish a cross-waiver of liability … in the interest of 
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encouraging participation in the exploration, exploitation, and use of outer space through the Space 
Station’ and that ‘The purpose of a cross-waiver of liability is to prevent claims by a Partner against 
the other Partners and their ‘related entities’ for damages arising out of ISS-related activities’ with 
carefully prescribed exceptions. So, the cross-waiver elegantly creates a legal safety barrier between 
the Partners, their Space Agencies and related entities. This novel arrangement has been designed to 
co-exist with applicable UN space Conventions such as the Outer Space Treaty (UN, 1967), the 
Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement (UN, 1968) and the Space Liability Convention (UN, 
1972). The welcome outcome is that the Partners can collaborate to further the peaceful exploration 
and use of outer space through the ISS, without fear of legal claims that could arise out of the risks 
that are inherently present in such a multipart endeavour (UN, 2013). The Member States took the 
advice of their respective national legal colleagues but did not burden the project with an 
unworkable legal straight-jacket which could easily have hampered progress (Wilman and Newman, 
2018: 143 and Wessel, 2012) 
 
The IGA Withdrawal Article 28 (US State, 1998, p19) is typically hard-hitting for the period (see my 
analysis of the ITER Agreement Withdrawal Article at the end of Section 4.1.1). The ISS community 
negotiators imposed a one-year notice period on all the parties, bound ESA to deliver all the 
European deliverables even if one or more European nations withdrew and bound Canada to 
punitive conditions due to the special and integrated nature of the Canadian in-kind contribution 
[remote arm needed throughout assembly]. It also made clear that any party that did decide to 
withdraw would lose all rights and privileges to Intellectual Property and exchange of Data and 
Goods and that any bi-lateral ISS agreements in force with the USA at the time of withdrawal would 
immediately be terminated. Unsurprisingly, no partner to the IGA - at least in the public record or 
ascertained through field work - has ever suggested withdrawing. 
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Section summary 
 
Hypothesis 1 is supported in that the IGA does provide a concise and fair vehicle to promote trust 
and mutual support, allows flexibility in problem solving, deals with legal issues and emphasises the 
primacy of the State. The Treaty had to sit within the existing UN Space Conventions at the time of 
signature and be future proofed to allow for the development of the station over a long timescale; 
constraints the negotiators dealt with despite the political turmoil of the period.  
 
The decision to involve the Russian space community after the intense rivalry of the Cold War Space 
Race was a bold move. I have explained that the US leadership could see the value of the age-old 
adage: ‘keep your friends close and your enemies closer.’ Concerns regarding Congressional 
ratification has resulted in the exceptional position of the US acting as the only Executive Branch 
party to the IGA; this has allowed the US to carry out its project leadership role. The inherent 
fairness of the IGA is borne out by it never having been amended and all the Member States 
remaining in the collaboration. The bi-lateral MoUs that detail the in-kind deliverables between the 
supporting Space Agencies and NASA form the technical and funding baseline. This innovative 
funding together with the legal framework allowing litigation free progress and the punitive 
withdrawal penalties that the negotiators set, have kept the Members involved despite significant 
and unexpected delays, political turbulence and funding cut-backs.  
 
Three Beyond Gridlock pathways have been utilised by the ISS community in their set-up phase. 
Firstly, pathway 1, ‘shifts in major powers core interests’ where at the end of the Cold War the US 
political leadership sought to build bridges with the Soviet Union rather than take undue advantage 
of the other parties’ weakened position. Albert Holland, a psychologist and a key member of the US 
negotiating team tasked to bring the Soviets on board through a series of visits to Moscow, recalled 
some personal approaches in the early 1990s: ‘We brought over to our counterparts whatever they 
needed which caused the Russians to reconsider their relationship with us in a positive way. (Garan, 
2015: 43). Secondly, pathway 3 where the respective US, Soviet and other Member’s Technical, 
Scientific and Astronaut groups, following a period of lack of mutual respect, mis-understandings 
and suspicion, gradually established effective and legitimate processes that are the modus operandi 
of the station of today. Thirdly, pathway 8, ‘innovative funding’ mechanisms have preserved the 
project’s national base support and allowed for significant bartering arrangements that the 
community has successfully exercised.   
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5.2: Managing Constraints 
 
To test Hypothesis 2 (that external constraints such as excessive stakeholder aspirations, changing 
political and legal landscapes, bureaucratic regulations, funding fluctuations and unforeseen events, 
while being mitigated as far as possible by IGO leadership actions, inevitably adversely affect overall 
performance) I examine how the ISS Community leadership has handled three events. The first 
concerns the consequences of the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster in 2003, the second concerns the 
political turmoil amongst the Member States following the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 and 
the third concerns funding shortfalls by all the Member States. A sub-section summary is also 
provided. 
 
 
5.2.1: Technical Set-Backs 
 
Space exploration has frequent occurrences of nature reminding participants that leaving and 
returning through earth’s thin atmosphere is inherently perilous. The Space Shuttle Columbia 
disintegrated on re-entry in 2003 killing all seven crew members. The entire fleet was grounded, and 
a wide-ranging enquiry was established to investigate the cause or causes. In a collaborative project 
such as the ISS, a set-back for one party immediately effects all the others.  
 
In the immediate aftermath the Russians stepped up with ROSCOSMOS undertaking fourteen re-
supply and crew rotation missions. In order to complete construction, there was a need to restore 
NASA’s technical reputation and get the Space Shuttle missions back on track. John Logsdon 
describes the consequences to the ISS project from a US perspective: “There are very specific 
moments in time where the international nature has helped preserve the project and its supporting 
elements. One was that the Space Shuttle was not terminated after the Columbia accident in 2003 
because we had not yet flown any of the partner modules. Each of the partners made it very clear 
how unhappy they would be – given their modules were already built – if they were left undelivered. 
There was no other way of getting them into space. When the Space Shuttle returned to flight in 
2005 there was major problem with the first post-accident flight and further considerations made on 
the future and the modules were still on the ground. The Head of NASA at the time Mike Griffin 
went to President GW Bush and pointed out the international agreements that were in place. This 
international collaboration glue has saved the project at these pinch points.” 
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The estimated number of Space Shuttle flights to complete construction, at the time of the Columbia 
tragedy, was thirty and Griffin was told by officials at the US Office of Management and Budget that 
there were only funds available for fifteen, some of which popular science sources report also had a 
non-ISS related, partial military payload [official records only show DoD related payloads up to the 
end of 1995; NASA History Office, 2019]. In addition to the high-level political canvassing described 
above. Griffin commented later how he dealt within NASA with the constraint: ‘I took money from 
science and other places, and I got yelled at for that, but I did it. Because I made the decision quickly, 
we stuck to it, and the actions that followed were obviously in support of the decision, it engendered 
a lot of trust on the part of the partners, for the United States and for NASA’ (Garan, 2015:21). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12; ISS in its final constructed configuration, photographed by 
the Crew of the Space Shuttle Atlantis after undocking on 23rd May 2010 (picture courtesy of NASA) 
 
The collaboration survived, and although much later than originally planned and reduced from the 
original aspirations of the Members, the ISS was declared ‘construction complete’ by the Space 
Shuttle Atlantis Commander when it departed for the last time in the summer of 2011. The 
combined launch manifests demonstrate the vast array of in-kind contributions and their 
importance to the respective national industrial supply base (NASA History office, 2019). I 
summarise the Modules and other major equipment here as it serves to underline the arguments 
drawn together in sub-section 6.3.8. regarding the case for inclusion of an 8th pathway to Beyond 
Gridlock theory (Smithsonian, 2018); Figure 12: 
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• Canada through the CSA: CANADARM 2 robotic arm, DEXTRA robotic servicing device and a 
Mobile Base System to ease the external movement of equipment and astronauts; 
 
• Europe through the ESA: COLUMBUS Science Laboratory and logistics and supply provided by 
the Automated Transfer Vehicle system; 
 
• Japan through JAXA: KIBO Science Laboratory including an exposed exterior platform and 
logistics transport vehicles; 
 
• Russia through ROSCOSMOS: ZARYA which was the first ISS module and is a functional cargo 
block, ZVEZDA Service Module, RASSVET a mini-Research Module, PROGRESS spacecraft cargo 
flights and the Soyuz spacecraft for crew transport to the station and return;  
 
• The USA through NASA: LEONARDO Multipurpose Module, DESTINY Science Laboratory, UNITY, 
TRANQUILITY & HARMONY connecting nodes, Solar Arrays, Truss Segment and Mating Adaptors. 
 
 
 
5.2.2: Political Turmoil 
 
In the ITER sub-section 4.2, I highlighted that overcoming global political turbulence from the ITER 
Agreement signature in 2006 to today while broadly maintaining funding took skill and 
determination by all the ITER Community Member States. This is also true for the ISS, but over an 
even longer period: 1998 to today. The same severe pinch points have applied to the ISS 
collaboration as with other long-running Big Science projects, but for the ISS they have needed 
different solutions.  
 
One example is the Crimea Crisis of 2014 where on the ITER project the Russians, when their 
currency devalued by a factor of three, acted internally by making cuts to other national projects in 
order to maintain their cash contribution. The effect on the ISS was potentially existential as the 
Russian in-kind contribution was vital to the collective effort. John Logsdon describes the high-level 
US space policy thinking that was necessary to circumvent this threat: “When the troubles with 
Russia started in Crimea and Ukraine [in 2014] there was a very conscious policy decision on behalf 
of the White House to build a wall around the station and not let our unhappiness with Russia in 
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these other areas have an impact on the integrity of the station collaboration including the access 
needed to get there. To be excluded from any restrictions, reparations or sanctions that might be 
put in place. The President agreed that as failure of the project at that point was not acceptable. We 
had put ourselves in a position both in the architecture of the station itself and by our failure to have 
a replacement for the shuttle where we had become mutually dependent on Russia.” 
 
The UK’s direct involvement in ESA is unaffected by the consequences of the UK notification to leave 
the EU as the ESA Convention is separate to EU membership (ESA, 1980). Indirect negative 
consequences on the general UK science and innovation landscape, and the effect on the UK’s ESA 
partners, are currently open to speculation.  
 
 
5.2.3: Partner funding shortfalls 
 
I have explained that the perception that the ISS is one integrated facility does not match the reality 
imposed by its modularity and national operational controls. This applies also to the Science work 
that is carried out by the crews during, what the community terms as their collective ‘Expeditions’. 
An unwelcome feature has been the steady failure of the parties to meet their original planned 
capacity to conduct science. Logsdon summarises the position: “The research done in the station is 
sponsored by the national space agencies. These have been subject to great budget constraints. The 
amount of science has changed a lot over time. NASA built the station but did not have the money to 
fully utilise it. Japan being Japan has delivered exactly what it promised in 1984. Europe had very 
ambitious plans and those shrunk over time. Canada has done what it said it would do and the US 
followed through on its commitments, but Russia did not. One of the disappointments if not 
disagreements has been the inability of Russia to follow through on its commitments. Russia 
originally was going to contribute laboratories and they never have.”  
 
Significant research has been achieved despite these funding squeezes in many science sub-domains 
including high energy particle physics, earth remote sensing, geophysics, protein crystallisation, 
human physiology, radiation, plant and cultivation experiments, fluids and combustion, materials 
science and biology (AAAS, 2018). Many experiments conducted on the ISS have applications to 
terrestrial medicine and the partners work hard to maximise the positives, nurture public good will 
and develop worthy spin-offs in areas such as immunology and DNA and RNA sequencing. However, 
there have been no major breakthroughs like the ‘Higgs Boson’ moment that CERN enjoyed. Logsdon 
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summarises a common view held by several other non-attributable interview sources: “There are a 
lot of peer reviewed published papers coming out of ISS research but very few of them represent 
social or economic benefit anywhere commensurate with the cost of getting the results. The 
proponents of the station will say that is because we have not been able to do full utilisation and the 
best years of the station are ahead”.  
 
The need to mitigate the science capability shortfalls have been known within the ISS Community 
since the start of the operational phase in 2000. With pressure mounting from the projects external 
critics and national leaders seeking results, the US Congress passed the NASA Authorization Act of 
2005 that designated the US ISS Scientific module as a National Laboratory (US Congress, 2005). This 
legislation directed NASA to increase utilization and to foster commercial interest in conducting 
research. Subsequently, the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 required NASA to enter into a 
cooperative agreement with a non-profit organization to manage at least 50 percent of the Agency’s 
available research capacity. In August 2011, NASA signed a cooperative agreement with the Center 
for the Advancement of Science in Space (CASIS) to manage non-NASA ISS research. A 2013 Office of 
the Inspector General Audit report confirmed that while progress had been made there was 
lingering push-back from some within the ISS community who questioned the approach and 
suggested that re-booting internal efforts could be more fruitful. The Audit Board noted this view 
but maintained that the success of CASIS was the best mitigation possible to improve utilisation and 
set NASA the task of identifying metrics to help manage that improvement: ‘In order to better assess 
the performance of CASIS, we recommended that the NASA Associate Administrator for the Human 
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate work with CASIS to develop precise annual 
performance metrics that measure CASIS’s success at fostering private research on the ISS… we 
continue to believe that CASIS’s success is critical to maximizing the research capabilities of the ISS.’ 
These initiatives mean that the project may be on the cusp of providing uncontested and improved 
value-for-money results. Efforts to improve utilisation rates will be given a boost when future US 
Space Policy decisions (sub-section 5.3.3) crystallise and bring a better research focus to the 
remaining ISS Expeditions.  
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Section summary 
 
Similarly, to CERN and ITER the ISS Community has had to deal with several severe technical, political 
and funding crisis. The negative consequences have been mitigated through a combination of 
actions that support Hypothesis 2. Three examples were cited: Firstly, the most notable technical 
set-back surrounded the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster on re-entry in February 2003 that 
threatened to terminate the ISS project. In the immediate aftermath the Russians filled the 
capability gap. This gave time for the US to deal internally with budget pressures and maintain its 
commitments to the programme thereby bolstering its technical and collaborative reputation with 
its international partners. Secondly, the Crimea crisis had the potential to end Russian involvement. 
The essential nature of the Russian in-kind contributions meant that there was a mutual dependency 
that could not be jeopardised. Only through the ring-fencing of the project from political, economic 
and social sanctions that were being imposed on Russia was the constraint mitigated. Thirdly, the 
failure of ISS Members to fully deliver on their start-up commitments for Science capacity had been 
a long running problem for the project. While results have been steady there is a common sense of 
unfulfilled potential. Mitigation actions have included emphasizing the positives, employing an 
intermediator to boost utilisation and nurturing public good will.  
 
This ability to counter these constraints strongly supports Hypothesis 2 and serves to support 
Hypothesis 3 that ‘sound internal governance and leadership dynamics improve global IGO 
performance.’ It relates mainly to two Beyond Gridlock pathways: Firstly, Pathway 2, autonomous 
and adaptive institutions, the central MCB, national Space Agencies and their dispersed Mission 
Control centres have been severely tested during the challenges of constructing a highly complex 
structure in low earth orbit. Secondly, Pathway 3, ‘technical groups with effective and legitimate 
processes’ where like-minded groups, such as scientists, meteorologists and administrators, 
dispersed throughout the members space agencies have worked together to overcome obstacles.  
 
This thesis has also shown that these constraints have taken their toll on the project. The 
construction period was longer and costlier than even the most pessimistic early estimates foresaw; 
the budgetary constraints have resulted in tension between the Partners that I have shown has even 
encroached in the two-sided nature of the on-board science operations. This has increased criticism 
of the project and is why the future of the collaboration is intrinsically bound up in the overall space 
policy and strategic policy of the Member States. The Pathway 2 and Pathway 3 efforts that have 
protected the project have been aided by Pathway 7 ‘innovative leadership’ that I will move on to in 
the next section and by comprehensive use of Pathway 8 ‘innovative funding’.  
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5.3: Governance and Leadership Dynamics 
 
To test Hypothesis 3 (that sound internal governance and leadership dynamics improve global IGO 
performance) I examine three organisational features. Firstly, the organisational culture where the 
analysis has taken account of the views that were expressed within the ISS community field work 
interviews. Secondly, I examine two characteristics of successful orchestrators: focality and 
legitimacy. Thirdly, I explore upcoming developments in the ISS collaboration in the context of 
international space policy and how the assessment of alternatives is connected to the Member 
States national interests. 
 
 
5.3.1: Leadership and Organisational Culture 
 
5.3.1.1: Leadership 
 
When considering leadership on a project as large as the ISS, it is important to distinguish between 
the leadership of the main contributing Member States together with all their governmental 
apparatus and the individual leaders who manage the endeavour on behalf of all the Members. In 
the case of ITER, the main Member was Europe whose group of Nations under EURATOM 
contributed most of the funds, enjoyed the largest workshare and hosted the project in France. For 
the ISS as I explained in sub-section 5.1.1 the dominant role of the USA in the management 
arrangements was accepted by all the parties when they agreed to Paragraph 2 of article 1 of the 
IGA: ‘The Partners will join their efforts, under the lead role of the United States for overall 
management and coordination, to create an integrated international Space Station.’  
 
The reputation of the US to deal with its partners fairly has therefore been under scrutiny from the 
outset. The ex-astronaut Ron Garan points out that some within the US ISS management hierarchy 
see the endeavour as a US project with international partners, others views it more as a 
multinational egalitarian concern (Garan, 2015: 38). When considering what the most significant 
factor has been in the long-standing, good collaboration between the member states and their 
respective agencies, Logsdon is clear: “The most significant factor that has allowed the project to be 
on a firm basis has been the US leadership. The US is clearly the managing partner of the enterprise, 
responsible for around 75% of the funding. Another influencing technical issue is that it could not be 
built without the shuttle. Others did not so much recognise the US lead; they had no choice. If they 
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wanted to join the project, they had to essentially accept US dominance in the project.” The main 
reason that the other member states could so readily agree to this compliant role is precisely the 
same as that driving the collaboration on CERN, ITER and other international Big Science projects: 
the advantages of contributing a portion but receiving the benefits of the whole.  
 
All the ISS interviewees cited that the community has been privileged in having remarkable 
individual leaders that have both provided internal examples of what it takes to be successful in 
international collaboration and have been excellent communicators to the wider public. Here I 
provide three examples, one from the USA (NASA), one from Canada (CSA) and the third from Russia 
(ROSCOSMOS): 
 
Dr Ellen Ochoa, a veteran US astronaut with over 1000 hours is space has a PhD from Stanford 
University in Electrical Engineering and became the 11th director of the Johnson Space Centre in 
2012. Her leadership style has been highly appreciated resulting in numerous awards including 
NASA’s highest, the distinguished service medal and the President’s Award for outstanding 
leadership by a Senior Executive in a Federal Agency. Ochoa even has five Californian Schools named 
after her. Ochoa was on three ISS Missions and therefore commanded authority in the decisions she 
made in her later high-level management career. In a speech made at the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Annual Meeting in Austin, Texas in 2018 she readily points out 
that international collaboration is not easy: “Maintaining that International Partnership is not easy, it 
requires constant cross-cultural diplomacy and negotiations at all levels, for example all parties have 
to agree to extend the life of the ISS…another manifestation of the peaceful cooperation is the 
world-wide control network that operates continuously twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, 
every day of the year, coordinated by our Mission Control Centre at the Johnson Space Centre and 
includes all the other parties Mission Control Centres.” 
 
The number of followers that Yuri Gagarin may have had if twitter had been available in the 1960’s is 
open to speculation. What is known is that he was the first serving Russian military officer to make 
the cover of Time Magazine (TIME, 1961). Neil Armstrong’s ‘small step for man; giant leap for 
mankind’ commentary on stepping onto the lunar surface in 1969 was heard by an estimated global 
TV audience of over 600 Million (Telegraph, 2012). The use of popular media to bolster a current Big 
Science project was expertly demonstrated by the Canadian ISS Commander Chris Hadfield. His 2013 
rendition of David Bowie’s Space Oddity song in the weightlessness of the ISS attracted over 7 
million views across all social media platforms. The importance of this in international relations 
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should not be underestimated. In a world of 24/7 global news coverage, the attention span of the 
public is fleeting. Keeping the project in the public’s consciousness is important in promoting 
environmental issues and the linked sub-agenda of the ISS Science programme (ISS US National 
Laboratory, 2019). Hadfield used the platform of his 2.4 million twitter followers and his book An 
Astronaut's Guide to Life on Earth (2013) to promote global collaboration and to fiercely defend 
Canada’s Space budget: ‘Many people object to ‘wasting money in space’ yet have no idea how 
much is actually spent on space exploration. The CSA’s budget, for instance, is less than the amount 
Canadians spend on Halloween candy every year, and most of it goes toward things like developing 
telecommunications satellites and radar systems to provide data for weather and air quality 
forecasts, environmental monitoring and climate change studies. Similarly, NASA’s budget is not 
spent in space but right here on Earth, where it’s invested in American businesses and universities, 
and where it also pays dividends, creating new jobs, new technologies and even whole new 
industries.’ 
 
Sergei Krikalev is an icon of Russian space exploration and became later in life a leader within 
ROSCOSMOS and the wider ISS Community. Following his early cosmonaut career that included the 
final days of the MIR space station he was the first Russian to fly the Space Shuttle in 1994 and was a 
member of Expedition 1 to the ISS in 2000. He was unique in straddling the two eras of space 
exploration when he was then selected to be the Commander of ISS Expedition 11. His calm 
leadership style was praised by all who served with him. His many honours include being a Hero of 
the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation, a recipient of the French Legion of Honour and 
the NASA Distinguished Public Service Medal. As the Director of the Yuri Gagarin Cosmonaut Training 
Center he has championed inter-operability with the ISS partner Space Agencies. He has an 
accumulated time in space of over 2 years and he provided the following insight on international 
space collaboration in a 2017 interview: ‘There are many angles to look at what we achieved [on the 
ISS], engineering experience for sure… physiological lessons for sure…but the main achievement has 
been learning how to trust and understand each other, how to collaborate in a difficult environment 
to achieve a common mission’ (Česká televize, 2017). 
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5.3.1.2: Organisational culture 
 
Like other Big Science endeavours, the ISS Community comprises several mini-epistemic 
communities of experts that are geographically dispersed but united in delivering their elements of 
the myriad of project tasks. Typical groups include: Scientists, Engineers, Programme Managers, 
Administrators and uniquely for this community, Astronauts. Haas (1992: 29) shows that the cultural 
differences are more likely to be between these groups than on traditional national boundaries. 
While the latter differences unquestionably linger and may surface during pressure points such as 
funding rounds, the day-to-day cultural differences are of a different type. It is one where the 
science group may have an issue with the technical group on the best way to implement a project 
solution or the ‘programme management group’ may be in conflict with the ‘administration group’ 
on a reporting issue.  
 
This research shows that the international astronaut cadre has found a way to navigate through 
national constraints and formed an effective expert community while building on and respecting 
their national space exploration heritage. In effect, they lead the project operationally as they 
represent the Member States through their presence and actions in space. The Apollo-Soyuz Test 
Project culminated in an Apollo spacecraft with a crew of three docking with a Soyuz spacecraft and 
its crew of two in July 1975. This mission can too easily be seen as one-off political event that served 
both the US and the USSR little tangible benefits. For this thesis, it is an important episode as it 
illustrates both, 1) the idea of a community ‘riding a wave of change’ that I recap when considering 
Pathway 1; Shifts in major powers core interests in sub-section 6.3.1 and 2) the limits of that idea.  
 
The mid-1970s saw a period of improved relations between the USA and the USSR. Henry Kissinger 
was US President Nixon’s national security advisor (from 1969 to 75) and Secretary of State (from 
1973 to 77) and introduced the concept of détente which led to an easing of strained relations 
between the superpowers; a controversial policy which he describes as having both avid supporters 
and discontents (Kissinger, 1994: 733). Successes included signing the Strategic Arms Limitations 
Treaty in 1972 and Willy Brandt’s West German government, pursing a détente off-shoot policy of 
Ostpolitik and formally recognising East Germany in the same year. However, criticism that the US 
was giving too much away for too little in return and was therefore naïve appeasement remained 
widespread in the US Congress. US State Department officials were also particularly resentful that 
back-channels of communication, that Nixon and Kissinger had set up as part of a twin-track 
negotiating strategy with several world leaders, bypassed the accepted way of doing diplomacy 
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(Berridge, et al., 2001: 200). Détente was therefore struggling to gain traction in official circles in the 
US long before it formally ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  
 
So, the window of opportunity for a community to take advantage of a shift in major power core 
interests was both narrow (in time) and lacking depth (in the number of proponents). Nevertheless, 
far-sighted individuals on both sides of the Space Race Cold War divide such as Anatoli Blagonravov, 
a scientist and diplomat who represented the Soviet Union on the UN Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the NASA Administrator Thomas Paine and his deputy Hugh 
Dryden, took the opportunity and made the Apollo-Soyuz mission happen. Both the US and USSR 
space communities did what they could to maximise the event and termed the astronauts and 
cosmonauts as a Joint Crew; see Figure 13. The reality was that their ethos, operating procedures, 
spacecraft and training regimes were separate. The only common feature was the [NASA designed] 
mechanical docking mechanism itself. The political wave of change had simply been too short for the 
community to make further immediate joint gains, but the event certainly made an important 
statement and paved the way for future international space collaborations (Launius, 2018: 212). 
 
 
 
Figure 13; Joint US-USSR Apollo-Soyuz Test Project - Crew Portrait (picture courtesy of NASA, 1975) 
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Several ISS astronauts have been inspired by their experiences to reach out globally, amplified by 
social media, on environmental topics and science diplomacy. Kofi Annan, the ex UN Secretary 
General commented that US Astronaut Ron Garan’s book The Orbital Perspective ‘reminds us of our 
common humanity and that the pressing challenges we face, we must face and resolve together 
through tolerance, dialogue and cooperation.’ Garan’s, NASA backed, video What kind of world do 
we want? captures this spirit of togetherness in tackling the world’s problems. Through the power of 
sharing on social media, the importance of these ISS inspired initiatives is advanced with widespread 
public support. The ‘Fragile Oasis’ project has the strapline: ‘Guided by the unique orbital 
perspective of men and women who live and work in Space, our vision is for Fragile Oasis to help 
people and organizations work together to overcome the challenges facing humanity on Earth.’ It is 
an example of the type of egalitarian, young people centric initiative that the Astronaut Corps have 
enthusiastically championed (Fragile Oasis, 2019). The astronauts embody, through their actions 
when they return, the idea of being a ‘global citizen’, ironically accentuated by journeying out of the 
earth’s atmosphere. 
 
Every safety incident ranging from the Space Shuttle disasters to less severe accidents in and around 
the ISS itself have led to improvements in management systems, quality control, launch escape 
system design, development of joint procedures and improved inter-operability (Foust, 2018: 2, 
NASA, 2003: 205; Reuters, 2018: 1). Overarching these improvements has been the steady 
engendering of trust; an essential ingredient to any successful collaboration. In addition to expert 
astronauts, the ISS crews now comprise a wide range of disciplines including geologists, engineers, 
teachers and medical doctors. Seven paying space tourists (5 Americans, 1 Canadian and 1 South 
African) have even made the journey. The training regimes use common procedures and 
interchangeable safety equipment and their work schedules are as integrated as the modularity of 
design allows. Every procedural document used in the station opens to a set of instructions in 
English on the left-hand page and Russian on the right-hand page.  
 
A welcome development is that the cadre now draws members from a wide variety of disciplines 
more familiar to the public than the five ex-military fast-jet test pilots, typical of the early space 
exploration years, shown in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project Crew Portrait; Figure 13. The ISS 
Expedition Crew 56, Figure 14, typifies the transformation in crew composition that has taken place 
in the 43 years since then, comprising: a US geophysicist, two Russian Cosmonauts, an American 
educator, a US physician and a German geophysicist (the Expedition Commander): 
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Figure 14; International Space Station Expedition 56 - Crew Portrait (picture courtesy of NASA, 2018) 
Regarding the set of arrangements that govern the ISS, Henry Hertzfeld pointed out that “One 
agreement that is not often published in the same way [as the IGA and MoUs discussed previously in 
sub-section 5.1.3] is the Code of Conduct for the astronauts and the mechanism for dealing with 
ground control and decisions in space; this has been agreed to by all the partners and works well. 
There is a de facto recognition of rotation of command. An example is the ESA astronaut Alexander 
Gerst took over the role of ISS commander from NASA astronaut Drew Feustel on 3 October 2018 for 
a three-month period. His background is as a Geophysicist and he has recently reflected on his 
experience in space: ‘Humans relate to Humans and that is the secret success of [space] 
exploration….One of the most important things that we do in space is look down on our planet to 
get a perspective of our home from the outside … and it is clear that it is very fragile and we could 
destroy the conditions that allow us humans to live comfortably and that is something we often 
forget…. If we use up our resources, we do not have a Planet B and that is a view that every 
astronaut I guess realises and it is in our nature to try and bring that perspective home’ (BBC, 2019). 
 
In contrast, Logsdon explained that the day to day cultural environment on the ISS is not as rosy a 
picture as news media may sometimes portray: “There is almost in a real sense two stations joined 
at the Functional Cargo Block. The Russians have their own food, their own supplies and basically 
spend most of their time in the Russian segment. The other original partners have the other side. On 
a day-by-day basis there is not that much interaction between the two sides. They meet for dinner!” 
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Motoko Uchitomi, the Head of the Legal Affairs Division at JAXA provided data, in a Legal Framework 
presentation to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal Subcommittee that 
confirms the starkness of this ‘old/new’ partners divide: the US Laboratory is shared between NASA 
and CSA, the European Laboratory is shared between ESA, NASA and CSA and the Japanese 
Laboratory is shared between JAXA, NASA and CSA. The Russian Laboratory, on the other hand, is 
solely for use by ROSCOSMOS (UN, 2013: 25). Despite this a common ethos and trust has built up 
between the astronauts themselves that is reflected in the many first-hand accounts of life in orbit 
by ex-ISS astronauts. Nevertheless, Logsdon captures the essence of the difficulty that the lack of full 
integration has produced: “They [the Russians] help a little with the others’ experiments but spend a 
lot of time on maintenance of their area. The overriding environment is cooperation but there is a 
soupçon of tension because unlike CERN it is not an integrated facility.”  
 
Building trust takes time and includes overcoming difficulties. Ron Garan cited one notable episode 
from the ISS construction period: “During the period immediately following the [Space Shuttle] 
Columbia tragedy, I too felt the solidarity of the Russians and other international partners. We 
mourned and grieved together, and through that dark period we became something more 
resembling family. We came to realize that being able to count on each other’s support when it’s 
needed is more important than trying to agree on things all the time. That is true collaboration”. 
(Garan, 2015: 44). 
 
Professor Mark McCaughrean, the Senior Advisor for Science & Exploration at ESA, provided a 
European perspective on the ISS in a follow-up provided for this research to an interview he gave to 
the BBC on 1 January 2019: “Space is very expensive of course, but we spend all of the money on the 
ground in our industrial companies, not actually in space, so there is always that national investment 
dimension. In the European Space Agency, we have 22 Member States [11 involved in the ISS] who 
give money to the Agency, but that money is then spent back in the countries according to the 
proportion in which it is given. As a result, there are national statements to be made about certain 
components, and yes, you can get to wave flags in your small sector, but the whole point of the 
Space Station is that is an international collaboration and it would not be there if we did not work 
together very actively. You do not shut separate chunks of the space station off and say this is our 
part and you cannot go in there.” 
 
The overarching effect reflected through the astronaut accounts of life in space has been the steady 
building of respect for what each party brings to the whole and the establishment of an espirit de 
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corps. In 2014, the influential German Economic Society for Westphalia and Lippe awarded the 
Peace of Westphalia Prize to the ISS Community in recognition of the station’s demonstration that 
peaceful international cooperation of partners from very different cultures has proven to be possible 
(Muenster, 2019). There were even calls leading up to the 15th Anniversary of continuous operations 
in 2015, from some within the space science community and popular press, for the ISS collaboration 
to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (Azriel, et. al., 2014 and Telegraph, 2015). The community has 
managed to embed in the public consciousness this model of collaboration despite the reality being, 
as this thesis has shown, somewhat less than ideal. 
 
 
5.3.2: Focality and Legitimacy 
 
This sub-section benchmarks the case study results against two of the characteristics of successful 
orchestrations that Abbott and Hale (2014: 9) outline within their Guide for Organizational 
Entrepreneurs: Focality and Legitimacy. 
 
5.3.2.1: Focality 
 
There is a manifest focality provided by the ISS edifice. However, as I have shown, it is an integrated 
product through the ingenuity of its modular component interfaces rather than a single tailored 
design. As I described in sub-section 5.1.3., there is no central IGO and no delegated authority to a 
dedicated Director General as in the previous two case studies. There are central features however, 
such as the MCB that carries out two main tasks. Firstly, it acts as an operations management board 
for the facility whereby it undertakes reviews of the project such as in 2010 when it reported on 
efforts underway to increase efficiency and further enhance the use of the ISS through 
standardization of interfaces (such as docking mechanisms), definition of common transportation 
requirements, and cost reduction strategies (NASA, 2010). Secondly, it keeps a tally of the results of 
the bartering deals regarding changes to the in-kind contributions that Members may propose 
and/or project circumstances may demand.  
 
These tasks help provide a focus to the project management through seconded staff still employed 
by their respective contributing agencies rather than a self-sufficient IGO executive management 
team. The primacy of the Member States is sacrosanct as demonstrated by them retaining the right 
to accept, decline or modify any MCB recommendations; the aim always being to reach a consensus.  
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5.3.2.2: Legitimacy 
 
The legitimacy of the ISS should be viewed from two perspectives: firstly, its standing in the 
worldwide public including the citizens, pressure groups and political class of the Member States and 
secondly within the ISS community including the space policy-makers, supplier base and customer 
communities. The two perspectives are interweaved firstly because enhancing public support is 
crucial in securing extra funding and building resilience when setbacks delay results and secondly 
because much of the dispersed ISS community is in competition with counterparts on other projects 
also seeking to bolster their legitimacy and thereby secure funds. Ellen Ochoa reminded the plenary 
session audience of the AAAS 2018 Annual Meeting that the ISS has been in the US public 
consciousness for a generation and any 18-year-old high school student has always lived with people 
in permanent space habitation (AAAS, 2018). This millennial generation and their children will expect 
space exploration to be a routine part of their national landscape. This legitimacy by presence 
naturally boosts the space study aspirations of youth in all the Member States as witnessed through 
the global uptake of the Space Station Explorers education programme. Space Station Explorers is 
funded by a range of US based educational institutions including NASA's Office of STEM Engagement 
and has a community of educators, learners, and organizations whose aim is to ‘make STEM learning 
fun and exciting through connections with the ISS’ (Space Station Explorers, 2019) 
 
The argument for legitimacy from science results is contested and dependent on which expert group 
is asked. All would agree it has carried out unique and valuable microgravity science in many fields, 
what is disputed is whether the results are commensurate with the huge costs. The difficulties in 
estimating costs, vital to providing any sense of ‘return on investment’ were considered in sub-
section 5.2.3: Partner funding shortfalls. 
 
A durable case for legitimacy is the collaboration itself which draws together parties that are 
adversaries in many other domains. Meaningful purpose means different things to different people 
and this research has shown that their perspective is closely linked to which mini-epistemic group 
they are a member of. For some, that the IGA exists at all and has survived the types of constraints I 
have analysed is good enough legitimacy to justify the costs. This view is captured by the recent ISS 
Commander, Alex Gerst: ‘Science is not the main purpose of why we fly to space and use the ISS, we 
are explorers, humankind has always been that way … in our planet we have looked in to almost all 
nooks and crannies … now we do the same in our cosmic surroundings, the Moon and Mars are not 
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that far away and the Moon is only half a days’ worth of trip on the ISS … and it is important for us to 
continue to learn more (BBC, 2019).’ 
 
The legitimacy has been hard fought for including the human costs to the ISS community and 
significant financial costs to the Member States. It is consequently there to be lost if the project 
takes the wrong steps in the future. This is something the field work revealed the ISS community is 
aware of and why it is taking its time to consider the next steps while continuing to carefully nurture 
its network of public and private backers.  
 
 
5.3.3: Future developments 
 
The unipolar position of the US in Space exploration and exploitation that it enjoyed at the height of 
the Apollo era, has long passed. Recent examples of rival agencies catching up and even overtaking 
NASA’s capability, in limited cases, include the ESA Rosetta 2014 mission being the first to deliver a 
lander to a comet’s surface (ESA, 2014) and China landing a probe on the far side of the Moon in 
January 2019 (CNSA, 2019a). Nevertheless, I have shown that the US is still in a leading position in 
the domain, is trusted by its ISS Community partners and with development of the Space Launch 
System (SLS) is positioning itself to re-exert its power (NASA, 2019). The world’s space powers are 
therefore waiting for a robust US Space Policy to emerge from the options currently being debated, 
so as they may judge where they could and should fit in.  
 
The ISS Member States have conflicting visions of the future in space both internally and between 
each other and have been examining potential follow-on collaborations since operations began in 
2000. Ellen Ochoa, the 11th director of the Johnson Space Centre believes that the fate of the ISS 
will, like all major decisions, be decided by consensus: “the life of the ISS which has now been 
extended out to at least 2024, from its original termination date of 2020, was agreed unanimously 
by all the partners. Future developments will be decided the same way (AAAS, 2018).” The next 
steps are certainly difficult to forecast and as Henry Hertzfeld outlines even the next collaborative 
agreement type is open to conjecture: “The general sense is that the next round of international 
collaboration may not use the same type of agreements as we have learned what works and what 
does not in both the IGA and the MoUs.” There is a desire within the US to widen international 
membership of a future ISS like community at least from a funding standpoint. This builds on the 
reasons I outlined in Partner Funding Shortfalls, sub-section 5.2.3, and is an area for potential 
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improvement on the current IGA as Hertzfeld explains: “it has proved very difficult to add 
participants and there is a desire to at least engage countries like India, maybe the Emirates as they 
have resources. These decisions are political acts and the trickiest question is what about China.”  
 
The opening statement of the ranking Democrat member, Donna Edwards, of the US Congressional 
Subcommittee on Space in September 2016, emphasised the parallels between the US-Russia Space 
Race and emerging rivalry posed by China: ‘How different would today’s world be if NASA had not 
responded to Presidents Kennedy’s challenge [to land a man on the Moon within the decade of his 
May 1961 Congressional speech]. Now, almost 50 years since that historic event, some are asking if 
we are again in a space race, but this time with China…. I look forward to hearing the panel’s views 
on whether the US should seek greater cooperation with other space-faring nations, including China, 
and what challenges we face if we choose to do so.’ (US Congress, 2016: 10)  
 
The militarisation of Space is at odds with the ISS Treaty, but is not immune to its affects. The expert 
evidence provided to the Subcommittee including the following from Dennis Shea, the Chairman of 
the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission which had reported to Congress in 2015: 
‘Unlike the US, China does not have distinctly separate military and civilian space programs… even 
ostensibly civilian projects, such as human space flight, directly support the development of People’s 
Liberation Army space, counterspace and conventional capabilities.’ (US Congress, 2016: 19) 
 
Any future link up with China by the US or other current ISS Member States would inevitably have to 
address this dual-use posture and the lack of transparency from China that surrounds it. The 
testimony of Dr James Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director Strategic Technologies Program, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, emphasised the difference between science goals and 
strategic decisions with respect to the US-China space competition: ‘The US is focused on the 
manned exploration of Mars, and from a scientific perspective, going to Mars makes sense, but it 
does not make sense strategically…. In the US and Soviet space race, the objectives were prestige 
and global influence. Having won the race, the US largely lost interest in space. In contrast, China 
uses its space programs to gain political advantage. Its human space programs serve important 
domestic and foreign policy purposes. (US Congress, 2016: 56) 
 
Despite these difficulties and the growing enmity between the US and China, the subcommittee  
agreed in its concluding statements with Ed Perlmutter, the Congressman for Colorado, regarding 
the positives that Science Diplomacy can bring to parties that are adversaries in other domains: ‘… to 
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have a back channel for diplomatic purposes sometimes is very important if the political systems 
between two countries are not working. So, scientists sometimes lend us that back channel.’ (US 
Congress, 2016: 78). Certainly, the Chinese Space Agency publicly backs the opening of such 
channels of collaboration. The CNSA used the world attention of their Chang'e-4 probe landing on 
the far side of the Moon, on 3rd January 2019, to announce at a press conference that ‘China is open 
to international cooperation in all its future space missions… so far, China has carried out 
cooperation in manned space mission with Russia, Germany, France and the ESA… [in the future] all 
member states of the United Nations are welcome to cooperate with China to jointly utilize the 
Chinese Space Station.’ (CNSA, 2019b).  
 
Whatever overall US space policy decisions do emerge the future of the ISS will need to be dealt 
with. Logsdon emphasises its importance in that debate: “The ISS has become the number one space 
policy issue; what to do with the station since we have declared we want to resume exploration. 
Many would now say the issue, frankly for the US Government is how do we get out of it gracefully 
or indeed can we? The right question is more a sense of how much of what we have done on the 
station collaboration can be applied to the next step… how much of it is applicable to going deeper 
into space. That justification also depends on whether you will carry through and do that.”  
 
Igor Porokhin, the ROSCOSMOS delegate to Legal Subcommittee of the 2013 UN Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal (COPUOS), reminded the ISS community that Article 1 of the IGA 
includes as one of the objectives: ‘[the] ISS will enhance the scientific, technological and commercial 
use of outer space’ [Porokhin’s highlighting]. He went on to suggest four new fields of commercial 
activities in space. Firstly, transportation services for delivery of people and cargo; this is now well 
established with private companies such as Space X providing an increasingly reliable service. 
Secondly, space tourism but Porokhin points out that, the ISS cross-waiver of liability for any space 
tourists, even if they were nationals of Member States would not apply and such persons would 
have to procure a liability insurance; this is one reason why take up to date has been limited to the 
world’s super-rich class of space enthusiasts. Thirdly, space advertising which has not yet been 
developed beyond the strictly controlled national logos that adorn Members in-kind contributions 
(e.g. the Canadian Maple Leaf flag on the CANADARM). Fourthly, space commercial experiments 
where there has been some take up through the non-profit intermediator CASIS has great potential 
to fill national public funding gaps (UNOOSA, 2013: 28-32). 
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Private, commercial flights to replenish the ISS, such as the SpaceX Falcon 9, have helped fill the gap 
left by traditional US national launch capability, fostered innovation and driven down costs. They 
have also allowed NASA to concentrate efforts on the future SLS that will take manned space flight 
to new frontiers; perhaps Mars. Henry Hertzfeld: “The Gateway project [The Lunar Platform Orbital 
Gateway] is being actively discussed, but the number of partners is still unknown. Even if we had the 
same partners the level of partnership and percentages and all of that details are to be negotiated 
and almost by definition would be different. When we actually come down to writing a new 
agreement, if we have one, for space exploration the one thing lawyers like is precedence. You are 
going to look at these ISS agreements and you are going to heavily negotiate… but I cannot see them 
not being a model for moving ahead.” 
 
Logsdon agreed that the lessons learnt form the ISS collaboration will continue: “The fact that the 
collaboration has persisted 34 years since Mr Reagan invited friends and allies to participate stands 
as a kind of example. You would need to argue, why not do it that international way. It stands as an 
example of the ability to do things cooperatively. There have been no high-level negatives of the 
collaboration program.” (Logsdon, 2019) 
 
Regarding the future of the ISS, the veteran cosmonaut Sergei Krikalev commented: ‘in the future, 
the involvement of Governments will reduce, and the involvement of private industry will increase. 
This provides an opportunity as Governments can then put all their collective resources on 
exploration beyond earth orbit…. the most interesting days [for space exploration] are in the future. 
Our future destiny is in space and for sure we will do this together [with our international partners]’ 
(Česká televize, 2017). 
 
 
Section summary 
 
Hypothesis 3 that ‘sound governance and leadership dynamics improve IGO performance’ is 
supported through the field work testimony and the analysis of ‘Science Diplomacy’ and ‘Mega-
Projects Governance, Leadership and Performance Issues’; Sections 3 and 4 respectively of the 
Literature Review. Secondary data has included independent audit review reports commissioned by 
the ISS Member States’ national Space Agencies. 
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The leadership of the main contributing Member, the USA was accepted by the other Members 
during the IGA negotiations and, despite set-backs has proven to be successful. The on-board 
organisational culture has been affected by the failure of many Members to deliver on science 
laboratory commitments. However, the collective collaborative spirit is epitomised by the cadre of 
international astronauts who train, work, eat, sleep and even space-walk together. This group has 
been affected by their time looking at the earth from space with several in later life, entering politics 
and leading initiatives to foster global collaboration. The project has also benefitted from a 
succession of inspirational individual leaders who have vigorously promoted the project. 
 
I have shown that focality and legitimacy, two characteristics of successful IGO orchestrations are 
present in the ISS and its community. I have explained that focality is present but is weakened due to 
the paradoxical governance structure whereby there is no classic Big Science IGO HQ and Director 
General but features that must be centrally coordinated are present. This arrangement leaves within 
the bailiwick of the Member States the operational control of their respective ISS assets and 
governance authority over the limited central bodies.  
 
The projects legitimacy is deep-rooted with a wide-ranging professional customer community and 
admiring global public. The ISS has a life of its own within each Members’ Space Agencies and 
arguably is now entering a golden period when it will bear greater results – particularly when 
focused by a clearer US space policy – and thereby further enhance its legitimacy. 
 
How US space policy should address the growing global US-China rivalry will be pivotal in steering 
the space policy of the other ISS Member States; the outcome is currently uncertain. I have shown 
that the ISS, and by inference its wider community, has a unique place in world perception of what 
good international collaboration looks like. In a world of relentless bad global gridlock news, the 
legacy of the project as a beacon of collaboration may be considered by future scholars as being 
broader than its science results. It is likely its IGA and MoUs will be heavily modified in any future 
projects, but key features such as legal arrangements and the separate Astronaut Code of Conduct 
will continue to provide a model for future negotiators. 
 
This governance and leadership dynamics section relates to three Beyond Gridlock pathways: 
Pathway 3, ‘technical groups with effective and legitimate processes’; Pathway 4, ‘multiple, diverse 
organisations and institutions coalesce around common goals/norms’ and Pathway 7, ‘innovative 
leadership as a reaction to gridlock’. 
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5.4: Evaluation of the Beyond Gridlock pathways and associated mechanisms 
employed by the ISS community 
 
As predicted by Beyond Gridlock theory this research shows that, like the previous two case studies, 
there is overlap between which pathways are utilised by ISS community. It is nevertheless again 
useful to show which principally apply: Table 10 cross-references the pathways that have been 
identified in the summaries of the preceding sections with the eight pathways set out in the 
Methodology Chapter.  
 
Hypotheses ITER Pathway 
1. IGO agreements and start-up conditions which are concise, fair, 
promote trust and mutual support, allow flexibility in problem solving, 
manage host state issues and emphasise the primacy of the State 
improve performance 
1, 3 and 8 
2. External constraints such as excessive stakeholder aspirations, 
changing legal landscapes, bureaucratic regulations, funding fluctuations 
and unforeseen events, while being mitigated as far as possible by IGO 
leadership actions, inevitably adversely affect overall performance 
2 and 3 (aided by 7 
and 8) 
3. Sound internal governance and leadership dynamics improve 
performance 
3, 4, and 7 
 
Table 10; Cross-reference between hypotheses and beyond gridlock pathways utilised by the ISS 
 
Hypothesis 1 is supported through the employment of three Beyond Gridlock pathways. Firstly, 
pathway 1, (shifts in major powers core interests) where the US decided to involve the Russians in 
the ISS IGA in addition to the original ‘Friends and Allies’ that had been invited to participate. The 
two driving reasons being that the Russians had invaluable technical and operational experience that 
could be tapped, and their participation would help limit technology transfer to what the US 
Administration and wider international community considered to be rogue states. Secondly, 
pathway 3 where the varied ISS epistemic groups gradually established effective and legitimate 
processes that are the modus operandi of today. Thirdly, pathway 8, (innovative funding) 
mechanisms that have as their baseline the bi-lateral MOUs between the US and Canada, Europe, 
Russia and Japan that detail the respective ISS modules and major equipment in-kind contributions. 
The fairness of the funding has been maintained through the central MCB keeping tally of the 
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Members in-kind contributions as project changes come into effect. The primacy of the state has 
been protected through the required national endorsement of MCB recommendations.  
 
The section on Managing Constraints shows that the ISS community has had to deal with significant 
technical set-backs, political turmoil and persistent partner funding shortfalls. While these have 
taken their toll on schedule, strained relationships and added to criticism of the project the 
employment of Pathway 2 (autonomous and adaptive international institutions) and Pathway 3 
(technical groups with effective and legitimate processes) efforts have mitigated the consequences. 
These efforts have been aided by Pathway 7 (innovative leadership) mechanisms such as the 
acceptance of US leadership and dispersed operational control. There has also been a wholehearted 
use of Pathway 8 (innovative funding) mechanisms through Members’ in-kind contributions being 
the constituent parts of the modular design. 
 
This Governance and Leadership Dynamics section relates to three Beyond Gridlock pathways. 
Firstly, Pathway 3, (technical groups with effective and legitimate processes) where legitimising 
expertise has been developed in the dual challenging environments of low earth orbit and earth-
bound politics. Secondly, Pathway 4, (multiple, diverse organisations and institutions coalesce 
around common goals/norms) where focality is manifested in the completed edifice space station is 
re-enforced by the behaviour and conduct of the astronaut corps A solid legitimacy also stems from 
a broadly satisfied scientific customer community and a high reputation with the public. US 
leadership has delivered results despite national adversities such as wavering Congressional backing 
and unforeseen technical set-backs. Finally, a series of inspirational individuals have provided strong 
leadership to maintain momentum at key points in the project’s history.   
 
The cross-reference Table 10 confirms that gridlock pathway 5 (mobilisation of domestic 
constituencies) and pathway 6 (civil society coalitions with reformist states) do not feature. Table 11 
provides a summarising commentary of the mechanism in use for each pathway that does apply. 
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Pathway ISS Community Mechanism 
1. Shifts in major powers' 
core interests 
• The US originally only invited Cold War ‘Friends and 
Allies’ to join the project 
• At the point of break-up of the Soviet Union, US 
strategic considerations to limit Russian technology 
transfer to rogue states, combined with unquestioned 
Russian technical and operational experience in space 
led to decision to extend offer of membership to Russia  
2. Autonomous and adaptive 
international institutions 
• There is no prescribed IGO HQ and no DG; the 
management structure is distributed between the 
Member States Space Agencies that exercise day-to-day 
operational control of their respective elements 
• Despite having no IGO HQ, a Multilateral Coordinating 
Board has been established to provide central functions 
• Primacy of the State is ensured through the MCB 
recommendation endorsement process 
3. Technical groups with 
effective and legitimate 
processes 
• Shared procedures and rescue protocols provide a 
vehicle for effective, dispersed operational authority  
• The Astronaut Corps enjoys common training regimes 
and non-partisan crew selection albeit within a de-facto 
agreement to rotate the selection of the Commander 
• In-Kind workshare means control of the supply chain 
rests with Member State national Space Agencies  
4. Multiple, diverse 
organisations and 
institutions coalesce around 
common goals/norms 
• Extensive global collaboration: the 5 members comprise 
15 developed nations 
• Recognised unique centre of excellence for Micro-
Gravity research in several science domains 
5. Mobilization of domestic 
constituencies  
 
Research confirmed that these Beyond Gridlock  
6. Civil society coalitions 
with reformist states 
pathways do not feature 
7. Innovative leadership as a 
reaction to gridlock 
• All IGA signatories accepted US leadership that has 
delivered despite technical set-backs, political turmoil 
and funding limits, thereby improving trust in the US 
• A series of inspiring individuals have occupied key 
decision-making roles and helped foster public support 
• Serving and retired Astronauts have championed global 
environmental initiatives gaining mass public support 
8. Innovative Funding • The project is funded by in-kind contributions whereby 
Member States provide their own modules, operating 
personnel, national Mission Control Centres and 
communication networks.  
• MoUs detailing in-kind deliverables between NASA and 
the other supporting Space Agencies provide the 
technical and funding baseline 
• The MCB keeps a tally of in-kind contributions that are 
bartered by the Space Agencies as project changes 
occur; subject to Member State endorsement 
 
Table 11; Pathways though and beyond gridlock, ISS mechanisms for implementation (adapted from 
Hale and Held, et. al., 2017)  
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
The research problem (section 2.2) is: How do global Science Mega-Project Communities achieve 
their effective collaboration pathways with Member States? There are two related research 
questions: 1) do the subject SMP Communities utilise common diplomatic approaches in negotiating 
their founding arrangements and functioning in a collaborative way? And 2) What - if any - are the 
political lessons learned by the subject SMP Communities that may provide clues in advancing global 
collaboration to overcome gridlock in other domains? In this chapter, the answer to the research 
problem and related questions are addressed through five sections.  
 
In section 1, I gather together the counterfactual arguments that span the three hypotheses and the 
case studies together with my response. 
 
In section 2, I analyse to what degree the Beyond Gridlock pathways have been utilised by the SMP 
communities to support the three hypotheses. The analysis is framed around the three boxed areas 
shown in Figure 3, the Global Conceptual Framework: 1) Formal Agreement and Creation where 
Hypothesis 1 is tested, 2) External Constraints where Hypothesis 2 is tested and 3) Governance and 
Leadership where Hypothesis 3 is tested.   
 
In section 3, I analyse the common and dissimilar diplomatic, governance and leadership 
mechanisms that have been used to implement the pathways. It is also in Section 3 where I make 
the case for the inclusion of an 8th pathway, innovative funding, to be added to Beyond Gridlock 
theory. This section serves to answer the first of the two related research question.  
 
In section 4, I summarise four common features of the SMP Communities that have emerged during 
the research. These features, while admirable [in the sense that they have been part of the SMP’s 
success] do not reach the bar as organisational structures or characteristics that would necessarily 
be recommended to be emulated elsewhere. Nor are they appropriate for me to suggest that they 
are contributions to fill a gap in knowledge. They are, however, worthy of separately distilling and 
discussing as they serve to provide the closing part of the answer to the research problem. 
 
Finally, in section 5 I propose two contributions to knowledge that the analysis of the three case 
studies has revealed. These contributions should benefit global gridlock academics and those 
involved in fostering effective international collaboration in other domains. This section serves to 
answer the second of the two related research question. .  
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6.1: Collation and examination of counterfactual evidence  
 
The three stages of research described in Chapter 2 (Methodology) are: desk research of literature 
(secondary data); field research interviews (primary data) and finally the analysis and validation of 
the data. During each of these stages and in parallel to the evidence that supports the thesis, three 
strands of counterfactual evidence emerged. Firstly, literature that challenges Beyond Gridlock 
theory, secondly literature and sporadic field work data that suggests SMP communities are atypical 
of international collaboration with little read across to other domains and thirdly the risk of 
optimism bias from some interviewees combining with confirmation bias from the researcher to 
slant the analysis to inapt conclusions. Here I examine and respond to each of these counterfactual 
arguments. 
 
 
6.1.1: Response to the argument that Beyond Gridlock theory is flawed 
 
Literature that challenged the notion of the global gridlock phenomenon, 1) questioned that the 
problems existed at all or 2) suggested that if there were examples of the phenomenon then these 
were exaggerated. As global gridlock affects many domains the criticising literature was spread 
across theses domains and was led, in some instances, by those who it could be argued had vested 
interests in playing down any impacts. Here I consider two domains that have attracted significant 
counter-evidence: climate change and global finance and provide a response to each. 
 
It is too convenient to dismiss climate change deniers as deluded or driven by ulterior motives. It is 
more pragmatic to recognise that 1) the denial movement is persistent in their opposition 2) they 
are well funded and 3) they have allies in the highest political offices. Indeed, a concern of the 
Trump Presidency is that he ignores, such as in his February 2019, State of the Union Address, widely 
held concerns on the climate more as a ploy to maintain backing from his domestic political base 
rather than any wider thought through alternative policy (Whitehouse, 2019). For this thesis, it is 
sufficient to place this denial movement and their literature within the framework of the self-
reinforcing gridlock that I described in section 1.2. The climate denial movement is a high profile 
example of the many elements that add fuel to the negative cycle of events depicted in Figure 2. By 
keeping this perspective, the actions of the climate denial movement [and associated literature] 
actually strengthens the case that gridlock theory is sound in that it is part of the problem rather 
than representing a compelling argument that the problem does not exist. 
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The converse way of looking at the global gridlock argument is to ask a series of questions as to why 
the blocking primacy of the state in combination with institutional inertia seem to prevail even in the 
aftermath of global calamitous events. Why was there no major reform of the IMF or World Bank 
after the 1980’s financial crisis? Was Daniel Drezner (2014), whose work I reviewed in sub-section 
1.2: Global Gridlock Issues, correct in his analysis that the financial system had worked in that the 
mid-1980s crisis had not resulted in a depression, so no major changes were deemed by the global 
order to be necessary? Drezner’s position crystallises the idea that critics of gridlock theory centre 
on, which is that they contest the underlying phenomenon itself. If we take this stance as correct 
and consider the situation across other domains such as security, migration, trade, etc., then the 
inference could be promulgated as: security crisis? What security crisis? Migration crisis? What 
migration crisis? Trade crisis? What trade crisis? I contend that these suppositions appear even more 
unlikely when viewed together.  
 
Another aspect of the counter evidence to gridlock theory is that crises are nothing new and indeed 
are to some extent an expected, if not welcome, correction to the global order. Kahler and Lake 
(2013) argue that the Great Recession is only the latest in a long history of international economic 
crises that, as the 1980’s events prove, were unlikely to be the last. They go on to argue that the 
networks of professionals tasked to oversee the system found a way to overcome the problems 
because of institutional as well as individual learning. Michael Clarke argues in Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Incremental Steps (Beyond Gridlock: Chapter 12) that one plausible way forward in 
addressing the need to reduce the stockpiles of nuclear weapons is reform of the current WMD 
control regime rather than seeking to install any new regime. In other words, while Clarke does not 
go as far as Drezner in suggesting that the current system ‘works’ he suggests that reform of existing 
structures is the only practical basis for making progress (Clarke, 2017). 
 
These types of argument are powerful and could, if accepted, be logically applied to other domains. 
My response is that we need to try harder, given the scale of problems that the world faces, than 
pinning our hopes that crises are inflated and/or that what we already have in place today to deal 
with them is adequate. Addressing Drezner’s argument I would counter that while the basic 
argument [that the crisis was ultimately dealt with without the world going into recession] is true, it 
also cannot be denied that the institutions, despite their knowledge systems, inspection regimes and 
qualified personnel, failed to predict and take preventive measures to the financial crisis itself. 
Stewart Patrick supported Drezner’s position with his 2014 essay The Unruled World; The Case for 
Good Enough Global Governance (Patrick, 2014). In it he dismisses the idea of any United Nations 
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based solutions to the world’s problems ever emerging and argues that realistically the most that we 
can strive for is a multilateral sprawl of solutions. The crux of my position aligns with that of Dan 
Plesch and Thomas Weiss (2015) that acceptance of this ‘good enough’ type of failure is no longer 
good enough. The negative effects of not tackling the problems more systematically demand more 
efforts to find a way through the gridlock effect. All methods of international collaboration need to 
be explored to ensure that collectively we have not missed any better way of dealing with wicked 
problems.  
 
My other position in tackling the counter-arguments to gridlock theory is that we must step up and 
respond to the commonly held view epitomised by the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz that existing 
global institutions have not kept up with and adapted to shifts in power politics. Stiglitz in 
Globalisation and its Discontents (2002) points out that it is no longer the USA or any group of 
advanced countries that now ‘set the rules’ of global governance, but rather corporate and financial 
interests within that set of nations led by those in the USA. It is outside of the scope of this thesis to 
examine if this interpretation is true, but it serves to demonstrate what is uncontested: the global 
governance landscape is dynamic. Consequently, our response to gridlock needs to keep up with the 
changes and design solutions that are nimble if they are to be reliably effective.   
 
 
6.1.2: Response to the case that SMP Communities are atypical examples of international 
collaboration 
 
There are three strands of argument that support the idea that the SMP Communities are 
uncharacteristic examples of global collaboration: firstly, that their Member States are an elitist club 
with the world’s nuclear powers at their core who therefore do not provide a model for other 
domains; secondly, that the individuals who comprise the key scientific staff are an elitist group who 
reach agreement through long-standing peer-to-peer networks rather than any shrewd collaborative 
method and, thirdly, that the projects themselves are given special preferential treatment which 
other domains cannot easily replicate. I provide a response to each of these arguments during the 
analysis that follows. 
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6.1.2.1: SMP Member States are an elitist club, with the world’s nuclear powers at their core, who 
therefore do not provide a model of collaboration for read-across to other domains 
 
The proposition that the Member States are an elitist club of the most powerful developed nations 
who work to their own hidden agenda does have supporting circumstantial evidence from the 
research. The case study SMPs all fail to include developing nations, and field work revealed that 
they have no meaningful plans to include any. Also, it is true that at the core of each project’s 
memberships are the world’s nuclear powers who certainly have strategic reasons for staying close 
to each other, including working within the bailiwick of the IAEA on safeguards and verification 
programs. The counterfactual argument continues with the reasoning that the case for nuclear 
powers to stay close to each other is weaker in other non-strategically relevant domains and 
therefore the same states do not make sufficient efforts to achieve meaningful collaboration in 
these other domains.  
 
This rival hypothesis also looks plausible if we simply cross-reference the nuclear powers to SMP 
membership, see Table 12. However, the situation is more complicated and fragmented than its 
premise assumes. India is a member of the ITER project even though it is a nuclear power that is a 
non-signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is involved due to the nuclear fusion 
research knowledge it brings and the prowess of the design and manufacture of its in-kind 
contributions. The achievement of commercial nuclear fusion will have major implications for world 
energy provision and geopolitics. The ITER Community therefore does ring fence project IP to its 
Members and their industrial base; nevertheless, the grouping represents over half the world’s 
population many of whom include underdeveloped regions of their respective territories. For the 
ISS, while certainly trying to disrupt technology transfer from Russia to rogue states was part of the 
reason for extending the membership invite to Russia, it was not the only consideration. 
 
This research also showed that CERN and the ISS consistently reach out far beyond the national 
boundaries of their Member States in global scientific and educational initiatives. 
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Table 12; Nuclear Power States membership of the case study SMPs 
(shading means state is a full member) 
 
6.1.2.2: The scientific staff of SMPs are members of an elitist group who reach agreement through 
long-standing peer-to-peer networks rather than astute collaborative methods 
 
The second strand of the counterfactual argument is that scientists, who are the main group of the 
SMP communities and are at the core of the IGOs (for CERN and ITER), are part of a global old boys’ 
network: a network of people who have had privileged educational opportunities, get special 
treatment in the international job market, enjoy lucrative renumeration packages and bask in the 
attention of an admiring public. They are therefore atypical when considering if their collective 
approaches reveal anything worthwhile in matters of collaboration.  
 
Circumstantial evidence for this emerged in sub-section 4.3.2: Focality and Legitimacy, where I 
examined the legitimacy of one aspect of the ITER Communities external review system that could 
be viewed as a too intramural community arrangement. Another isolated example came from the 
literature concerning the series of management studies conducted at CERN to assess the LEP project 
in the 1980s. SMPs, through conditions set in their founding documents, are subject to independent 
external management assessor scrutiny. In practice they have little choice, due to the nature of the 
specialist areas under review, but to include in these bodies individuals who may have a vested 
Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3
CERN ITER ISS
People's Republic of 
China
Yes / 1992 No Yes No
French Republic Yes / 1992 Yes
Yes, as a member of
EURATOM
Yes, as a member of
ESA
Republic
of India
No Associate Member Yes No
Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan
No Associate Member No No
Russian Federation
Yes / 1970
(as Soviet Union)
Observer Status Yes Yes
United Kingdom Yes / 1962 Yes
Yes, as a member of
EURATOM
Yes, as a member of
ESA
United States of 
America
Yes / 1970 Observer Status Yes Yes
Nuclear
Power
Accession to
UN Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons Treaty
 / Year
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interest in positive outcomes. The purpose in mentioning these here is not to comment on the 
veracity of the results of the reviews but to highlight that critics say that they may be influenced by 
those conducting studies due to their backgrounds and remits. The implication that critics make is 
that a group within an epistemic community that are themselves dependent on the success of the 
key component of that community’s flagship project, as may be the case with ITER and CERN, are 
unlikely to be free of optimism bias (even if subliminal) when assessing progress.  
 
While it is unquestionably true that no specialist group, organisation or SMP can impartially assess 
itself, the research revealed that the SMP communities are aware of this and design in checks and 
balances to their governance systems to counter it. Measures include the rotation of which Member 
State is responsible for the external review arrangements to keep the process fresh and authentic. 
Another response to this counterfactual argument is the high competency of CERN’s governance 
regime, which I analysed in sub-section 3.1.3., to show that the accepted protocol on the 
appointment of a DG is that if that person is a CERN ‘insider’ (i.e. an existing member of the central 
IGO staff) then his/her direct reports will then be from ‘outside’ CERN. The reverse would apply if 
the DG was an ‘outsider’ appointee. I explained that this process enables a regular freshening up of 
the top-level central management and helps break up any cliques that may form. Similarly, the CERN 
Council President, is limited to a 3-year term allowing the Member States, who elect the President, 
to have regular input into how governance is operationally exercised. For the ISS, Scientists are one 
of the key epistemic groups involved and have influence but were not, as I explained in sub-section 
5.1, the sole driving group in the founding negotiations.  
 
As explained in each of the SMP ‘organisational culture’ sub-sections, it would be wrong to imply 
that the SMP communities are beyond criticism. They reflect their members’ societies. All suffer 
from the same gender inequality issues, particularly at the highest levels of management, that blight 
many STEM IGOs, NGOs and natural sciences academia. Field work confirmed that they are all aware 
of the issue and are actively tackling the problem albeit, too slowly for many equality reformers. The 
SMP communities are also accused of tolerating a ‘community within a community’ sub-culture with 
a few interviewees describing the hidden hierarchy within the physicist community. A stereotypical 
‘old boys’ network’ whereby closely linked groups looked after their own advancements and careers 
was suggested to still be in play by only one interviewee.  
 
These minority reports need to be seen in the context of the overwhelming positive reports of the 
prevailing organisational culture in my field work interviews. The SMPs comprise broadly content, 
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well-educated, well-motivated, well-paid and hard-working individuals. Further evidence for this was 
in the ‘Organisational Culture’ sub-section 4.3.1. where 28 senior ITER Organisation staff who, when 
asked ‘Are you supportive of the new management?’, all responded positively (ICRG, 2016: 51). The 
organisation culture of each case study was encapsulated by the young, award-winning post-
doctoral physicist that I quoted in sub-section 3.3.1.; here I provide an abridged version of the full 
quotation: “as a scientist you are trained to think that there is a fundamental truth and this helps 
unify people… and so, when you bring people together at a place like CERN there is already a 
component that has had that exposure... they already have the mindset that to collaborate 
internationally is normal.” I repeat this here as I witnessed this mind-set throughout the field work. 
While the point is that scientists’ educational background and operational best practice when 
dealing with international papers helps foster the right cross-cultural attitudes, it does not mean 
that this skill of accepting other people’s views may not be transferable to other domains. To the 
contrary, it provides an important clue as to a feature that that could be transferred. Similarly, the 
counter-factual accusation that agreements are reached in the SMP communities primarily because 
those involved are members of an epistemic community of experts who all know each other and 
have long standing personal relationships is a self-defeating argument. If these connections do 
indeed produce results and help keep powerful states bound together, despite the global turbulence 
that buffets them, then that, in itself is a positive factor not a negative one. 
 
6.1.2.3: SMPs are one-off endeavours, benefiting from preferential set-up and governance conditions 
operating in distinct domains 
 
CERN is often cited as a model of good collaboration for solely peaceful purposes. Examples include 
Herwig Shopper (2009) in The Lord of the Collider Rings, Boisot, Nordberg, Yami and Nicquevert 
(2011) in Collisions and Collaboration: The Organization of Learning in the ATLAS Experiment and 
Hale, Held and Young (2013) in the Introduction to Gridlock. Countering arguments to the string of 
positive citing are few and tend to emerge to feed in to public concerns on safety such as during the 
start-up of the flagship LHC infrastructure. These narratives are often from unreliable tabloid 
newspaper sources, that I explain in sub-section 2.5, are purposively avoided and therefore were not 
within the scope of the literature review or the thesis as a whole. While the ISS is held in high regard 
as a model of collaboration its scientific results and the validity of spin-offs are contested. As I 
analysed in sub-section 5.2.3., lack of breakthrough results led to Congress passing the 2005 NASA 
Authorization Act (NASA, 2009 and US Congress, 2005). As I explained further in that sub-section, to 
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look purely at the economic return on investment fails to appreciate the Member States’ core 
strategic reasons for establishing the space station.  
 
It is when considering ITER that the levels of criticism of its community mount. The counter evidence 
is of three types. Firstly, ITER has had severe programmatic criticism not least from its own Member 
States independent management reviews. Secondly, the project has been also been subject to 
consistent criticism from those who doubt that fusion will ever bear fruit such as Charles Seife (2008) 
in Sun in a Bottle: The Strange History of Fusion and the Science of Wishful Thinking and Daniel 
Jassby (2018) with his derisive critique in ITER is a showcase … for the drawbacks of fusion energy. 
Finally, there have been persistent vocal demands from environmental pressure groups that scarce 
Members resources would be much better spent on other renewable sources of clean energy such 
as solar power or wind turbine technology. Examples include regular statements from Helga Trüpel, 
a prominent and influential Green Party Member of the European Parliament from Germany and the 
Green Group’s Energy adviser Michel Racquet (Euractiv, 2011). These criticisms increase in volume 
after notable set-backs in semi-related areas of nuclear power generation such as the Fukushima 
nuclear fission reactor disaster of March 2011.  
 
This third strand of counterfactual case is encapsulated by the notion that the research question 
could have been better phrased ‘why are SMPs not more successful than they already are?’ Indeed, 
they do enjoy preferential circumstances. CERN has an annual budget of over $1 BN and has 
negotiated an advantageous Protocol on Privileges and Immunities with the Member States (CERN, 
2014). Legal disputes between CERN and its suppliers and contractors are not submitted to national 
courts but to international arbitration. CERN as a distinct legal entity can negotiate favourable terms 
and conditions for purchase of equipment and services including exemption from value-added tax. 
ITER has an entire scientific community’s resources at its disposal. Many interviewees also echoed 
the recent US DOE report that ITER is both a first-of-a-kind machine and a first-of-a-kind organisation 
(US DOE, 2016). The ISS benefits from resources including launch complexes that up until quite 
recently, with the arrival of commercial platforms such as SpaceX (2019), only government agencies 
such as NASA, ESA and ROSCOSMOS could provide. Another tack to this line of thinking is that 
perhaps the projects were just blessed by some good fortune and do not warrant scrutiny as 
exemplars of collaboration. 
 
I contend that the counter evidence across the case studies of their unsuitability as exemplars of 
international collaboration paradoxically adds weight to the core message of this thesis, the twist 
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being that despite these issues the communities have developed what Boisot and Nordberg (2011) 
term as a ‘coherent legitimizing discourse and achieved results that continue to appeal to the 
contributing Member States more than competing alternatives.’ It is how the global SMP 
Communities achieve their effective collaboration pathways with Member States, including 
achieving these preferential starting conditions, substantial funding and advantageous operating 
conditions, that is the ‘answer to the ‘problem’ that this thesis addresses. The first step in seeing 
whether communities in other domains may profit from adapting some of the SMP pathways is to 
firstly understand what they are and how they have been implemented; either through brilliant 
planning, consummate negotiation skill, inspirational leadership, blind luck or any other mechanism. 
 
The literature review reinforced the idea that one action that academics can and should take is to 
thoroughly investigate and explain all possible paths through gridlock. I contend that this is true 
even if individual research results merely rule routes out. I demonstrate this last point in the 
collation of my evidence in Table 19 that shows the low usage of Pathways 5 (mobilisation of 
domestic constituencies) and the non-usage of Pathway 6 (civil society coalitions with reformist 
states) by SMPs. 
 
 
Section summary 
 
No data either primary (field work) or secondary (literature) has been dismissed as irrelevant or 
unreliable evidence. I have demonstrated that the data pool contained counter-evidence and the 
collation and examination of counter arguments has been done with equal rigour to that which 
supports the three hypotheses. Examination of alternative hypotheses has also served to understand 
the problem better and identify any weaknesses or simplifications in the thesis hypotheses.  
 
I have shown that there will always be an intransigent group who deny, in a particular domain, that a 
problem exists despite their being overwhelming evidence to the contrary. There will therefore be a 
group of climate-change deniers who will vociferously oppose efforts (academic and/or practical) to 
overcome gridlock issues in climate change negotiations as they see no need for the measures that 
would be agreed. Similarly, there will always be those who fervently believe that a market based 
economic system will find its own way of overcoming global financial crisis without intervention 
from well-meaning academics or practioners, that they would term as meddling. Their own version 
of realism theory dominates their thinking and they therefore see no need for gridlock theory.  
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I have also shown that while it may be comforting to critics to label the SMP leadership as a spoilt 
elite, it is a disparaging comment that does not pass scrutiny of the majority evidence collated 
during this research. On projects of this magnitude there will always be sporadic events where 
counterfactual evidence rings true; for example, where field work revealed that despite self-
reflection by the project communities, the commendable efforts to embrace peer review impartiality 
needed to be re-doubled. However, I have shown that these are minority cases only. While 
acknowledging the concerns regarding the preferential conditions that the SMPs enjoy, I made the 
case that it is the investigation of these very factors that adds credence to the thesis. 
 
The difficulty in maintaining impartiality in management reviews, difficulties in addressing gender 
imbalance and isolated occurrences of remnant old boys club behaviour are all regrettable, but they 
do not singularly or collectively disqualify the verifying of the hypotheses and the response to the 
research problems and associated questions. The balance of evidence is that SMP Communities are 
appropriate vehicles to investigate international collaborations. 
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6.2: Testing the Hypotheses 
 
6.2.1: Testing Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypothesis 1 (sub-section 2.4) is that IGO agreements and start-up conditions which are concise, fair, 
promote trust and mutual support, allow flexibility in problem solving, manage host state issues and 
emphasise the primacy of the State improve performance. Table 13 summarises which Beyond 
Gridlock pathways have been used by the case study communities in respect of Hypothesis 1.  
 
 
 
Table 13; Beyond Gridlock pathways used by the case study SMPs supporting Hypothesis 1 
 
For case study 1, CERN, I have shown that the organisation and its community have benefited from 
the solid foundation that the 1953 CERN Convention provides. Pathway 1, ‘shifts in major powers 
core interests’ was utilised during its formation in the period of European political rapprochement in 
the aftermath of World War II and have been maintained through an unwavering respect for the 
primacy of the state enshrined in the Convention. Pathway 2 mechanisms have included governing 
bodies, such as the Council, being given capabilities to adapt to unforeseen issues. The principle of 
fairness in the CERN Convention financial protocol and dispute resolution articles have allowed 
teams to establish Pathway 3 type workable rules and develop a project adhocracy. This has enabled 
expert groups of scientists and engineers to legitimately and effectively solve complex problems in 
whatever manner they see fit. This meaningful delegation of authority has aided the attraction and 
retention of the best scientific and technologist talent.  
 
For case study 2, ITER, Hypothesis 1 is supported through the employment of two pathways: Firstly, 
pathway 1, ‘shifts in major powers core interests’ whereby at the end of the Cold War a set of well-
placed nuclear fusion advocates overcame gridlock in superpower relations to push their niche 
science domain onto the world stage. The breakthrough at the 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev Fireside 
Summit in Geneva was the catalyst for the seven Member coalition of world powers that created 
Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3
CERN ITER ISS
Beyond Gridlock  Pathways employed
Hypothesis 1 1, 2 and 3 1 and 8 1, 3 and 8
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ITER in 2001. These powerful Members committed to the project, re-assured by the legal Articles 
respecting the primacy of the state and equitably sharing the effort, costs and risks. Secondly, the 
negotiating teams extensively used pathway 8, ‘innovative funding’ mechanisms that were 
embodied in the long negotiated common understandings which detail the Members’ in-kind 
contributions.  
 
For case study 3, the ISS, the research showed that a combination of two powerful factors led to the 
use of Pathway 1, shift in major powers (US and other original ISS participants) decision to extend an 
invitation to Russia to join the project in 1998. The first factor was the accepted experience that the 
Russians could bring to the endeavour and the second was the hidden agenda of seeking to limit 
Russian technology transfer to rogue states. Pathway 3 mechanisms, whereby the varied ISS 
epistemic expert groups gradually established workable and legitimate processes across national 
boundaries, led to the effective modus operandi of today. Finally, pathway 8, innovative funding 
mechanisms have as their baseline the bi-lateral MOUs between the US and the four other Member 
States that detail the respective in-kind contributions. The fairness of the funding arrangements was 
maintained through a bartering system, foreseen by the negotiators and encouraged in the IGA, to 
manage changes to those contributions. 
 
Opposing evidence to Hypothesis 1 centred around the argument that the SMPs are one-off 
endeavours, benefiting from preferential set-up and governance conditions. I addressed these 
concerns and provided a detailed response to each of them in sub-section 6.1.2.3.   
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6.2.2: Testing Hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 2 (sub-section 2.3) is that external constraints such as excessive stakeholder aspirations, 
changing political and legal landscapes, bureaucratic regulations, funding fluctuations and 
unforeseen events, while being mitigated as far as possible by IGO leadership actions, inevitably 
adversely affect overall performance. Table 14 summarises which Beyond Gridlock pathways have 
been used by the case study communities in respect of Hypothesis 2. 
 
 
 
Table 14; Beyond Gridlock pathways used by case study SMPs supporting Hypothesis 2 
 
For case study 1, CERN, the solutions to combat external constraints and threats have relied on 
sound leadership and the employment of innovative funding; Pathways 7 and 8 respectively. The 
CERN Community has progressively delegated authority to the centre from the Member States. This 
has enabled a succession of eminent DGs and their management teams to seamlessly guide the 
Organisation and its wider community through sixty five years of political and funding turbulence. 
Examples include 1) how CERN has masterfully maintained fundamental physics domain dominance 
without jeopardising the will of other, potentially rival, states and organisations to make in-kind 
contributions to key infrastructure, 2) how it dealt with technical set-backs through actions that did 
not generate acrimony between the parties, and 3) how it has scrupulously preserved fairness in 
cash contributions. The field work confirmed the findings from the literature analysis that negative 
effects, such as program delays persist but are much reduced from what would have occurred 
without the effective interventions that I detailed in section 3.2. The strength of the CERN 
Convention has led to it being adapted by several other science communities when they are forming 
IGOs; the Astronomy Community using it for the formation of ESO being one example.  
 
For case study 2, ITER, the pathways used to combat constraints have taken time to be put in place 
since the project’s inception in 2006. The major hurdles to progress outlined in Chapter 4 all had the 
Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3
CERN ITER ISS
Hypothesis 2
Beyond Gridlock  Pathways employed
7 and 8
2 and 3
(aided by 7 and 8)
2 and 3
(aided by 7 and 8)
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potential to seriously impede or even trigger project cancellation. A continual challenge has been 
how to keep the global powers that are the ITER Members together when they openly contest each 
other in other domains. Pathway 2 mechanisms included granting the central organisation increased 
authority to tackle project construction and integration challenges. Pathway 3 initiatives have 
allowed expert groups to gradually develop a project adhocracy to solve complex problems and 
navigate constraints. Although program delays persist, there is strong and independent evidence 
that these mechanisms have had positive influences. For example, had the ITER Community 
leadership delayed dealing with the multiple consequences of site selection (analysed in section 4.2.) 
this would have stored up problems. Another key supporting factor has been the dominant reliance 
on Members’ in-kind contributions. Although these have disadvantages such as the difficulty in 
controlling the dispersed supply chain, without the national support that they engender the project 
could have been cancelled at any of several pinch-points.  
 
For case study 3, the ISS, the Chapter 5 research shows that the ISS community has had to deal with 
significant technical set-backs, political turmoil and persistent partner funding shortfalls. These have 
taken their toll on schedule adherence and served to embolden critics. The employment of Pathway 
2 (autonomous and adaptive international institutions) and Pathway 3 (technical groups with 
effective and legitimate processes) efforts have been utilised to mitigate the consequences. The 
efforts have been aided by Pathway 7 mechanisms such as adept US leadership at critical points such 
as the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia in 2003. There has also been a wholehearted use of 
Pathway 8 (innovative funding) mechanisms through Members’ in-kind contributions being inherent 
in the ISS modular design and the central MCB keeping a tally of the value of Member’s 
contributions as changes are bartered.  
 
Opposing evidence to Hypothesis 2 centred around the argument that the SMP Member States are 
an elitist club, including the world’s nuclear powers, that overcome external constraints in the SMP 
communities mainly because of strategic concerns. Concerns that are much less of a factor in other 
domains where the Member States do not make the same high efforts to overcome the constraints. I 
addressed these concerns and provided a detailed response to each of them in sub-section 6.1.2.1.   
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6.2.3: Testing Hypothesis 3  
 
Hypothesis 3, described in sub-section 2.3, is that sound governance and leadership dynamics 
improve global IGO performance. Table 15 summarises which Beyond Gridlock pathways have been 
used by the case study communities in respect of Hypothesis 3. 
 
 
 
Table 15; Beyond Gridlock Pathways used by the case study SMPs supporting Hypothesis 3 
 
For case study 1, CERN, an analysis of ‘Science Diplomacy’ and ‘Mega-Projects Governance, 
Leadership and Performance Issues’, Sections 3 and 4 respectively of the Literature Review together 
with the evidence collected during the many field work interviews, showed that CERN’s governance 
and management teams consistently take timely and apposite actions. Sound governance is 
demonstrated in how the Member States’ representatives respect and help each other during 
periods of difficulty. Employment of light-touch leadership helps keep the workforce motivated. 
Analysis of GSN orchestration aspects such as focality and legitimacy have supported this argument. 
Focality is preserved by being a well-established, lively hub and by employing several measures in 
parallel to avoid fragmentation. Legitimacy is heightened through a meritocracy-based main policy 
advisory body, the vastness of membership, continual scientific and technological success, deep 
domain experience and external recognition by world forums including the UN General Assembly. 
These features correspond to Pathway 3, technical teams’ performance, Pathway 4, enthusiastic 
participation in the global, connected research network that is the CERN of today, and the 
employment of Pathway 7, innovative light-touch leadership. 
 
For case study 2, ITER, the governance and leadership dynamics relate to four Beyond Gridlock 
pathways. Firstly, the IGO leadership has developed, Pathway 3 type, legitimising expertise and 
exercised regulatory design authority over the project community. Secondly, the community has 
combined focality and legitimacy in such a way that the community depends on the success of the 
Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3
CERN ITER ISS
Beyond Gridlock  Pathways employed
Hypothesis 3 3, 4 and 7 3, 4, (limited 5) and 7 3, 4 and 7
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central entity and vice versa. This is a form of Pathway 4: ‘multiple, diverse organisations and 
institutions coalesce around common goals/norms.’ As I explained in section 4.1 the magnetic 
confinement fusion community and the ITER project are inexorably linked when addressing any 
issues that they must jointly tackle. Field work also showed that the IGO leadership and the Heads of 
the Member States Domestic Agencies are aware of this interdependency; they succeed or fail 
together. Thirdly, the community uses Pathway 5, ‘mobilisation of domestic, constituencies for 
cooperation and compliance’ processes whereby the close interdependence of the community and 
the project means that research and development studies are readily carried out world-wide to 
support the centre. Similarly, the national follow-on DEMO devices complement and learn from the 
central efforts. Finally, Pathway 7 innovative leadership was employed in the wake of the 
independent management assessor process that I analysed in sub-section 4.3.1. (Organisational 
Culture). This led, with eventual unanimous Member State support, to the earlier than previously 
planned replacement of the Director General and some of the first-order IGO management tier. As 
evidenced in my analysis, DG Bigot then led several initiatives to gain more central control from the 
Member States. This was innovative as it needed the Member States to accommodate measures 
that abated, to the extent necessary for the project, the natural situation that occurs whereby the 
power over the supply chain is predominantly with them.  
 
For case study 3, the ISS, the Governance and Leadership Dynamics, section 5.3., research has 
revealed three Beyond Gridlock pathways. Firstly, Member States have successfully developed and 
supported Pathway 3 type ‘technical groups with effective and legitimate processes’ in the dual 
challenging environments of low earth orbit and earth-bound superpower politics. Examples include 
the US Administration leadership ensuring the project was ring fenced and unaffected by sanctions 
being imposed in other domains on Russia in the aftermath of Crimea Crisis in 2013. Secondly, 
Pathway 4, ‘multiple, diverse organisations and institutions coalesce around common goals/norms’ 
where focality is manifested in the completed edifice space station re-enforced by the behaviour 
and conduct of the astronaut corps. A solid legitimacy also stems from a broadly satisfied scientific 
customer community and a high reputation with the public. US project leadership has delivered 
results despite national adversities such as wavering Congressional backing. Finally, a series of 
inspirational individuals have provided strong Pathway 7 type leadership to maintain momentum 
and bolster vital public support. They have had to be innovative in their style and actions as none of 
them have been afforded the delegated authority or supporting international staff that would come 
with Director General status. Evidence for how difficult this has been is provided in the field work 
interviews in sub-section 5.3.1: Leadership and Organisational Culture. 
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Opposing evidence to Hypothesis 3 centred around the accusation that the leadership and staff of 
SMP IGOs and the corresponding staff in the SMP Community Member State organisations are 
members of an elitist club who reach agreement with each other through long-standing personal 
contacts rather than any astute collaborative methods. I addressed these concerns and provided a 
detailed response in sub-section 6.1.2.2.   
 
 
Section Summary 
 
In the preceding three sub-sections I have mapped out how the utilisation of the Beyond Gridlock 
pathways supports the three hypotheses (section 2.3) as follows:  
 
Firstly, I showed in support of Hypothesis 1 that all three case studies needed a shift in major 
powers’ core interests to aid their foundation. This aid to their foundation was not taken up by 
chance; the communities were primed and ready to exploit it; I will develop this argument in section 
6.5. This essential base pathway was then supported by a combination of other pathways. These 
included the central organisation being granted autonomy and the means to adapt its institutions, 
giving its technical groups effective and legitimate processes and utilising innovative funding to 
engage the Members and help keep them on-board (Pathways 2 and 3 respectively).  
 
Secondly, in support of Hypothesis 2 I showed that the SMP Communities shrewdly grant the central 
organisation sufficient authority to tackle problems and combat external constraints. For CERN there 
has been a mature devolvement of authority to the centre over decades of operation. I showed that 
for ITER and the ISS, the central delegation is less deep, but the techniques used to overcome 
constraints are similar. It is the resilience and fairness of the ITER Agreement that has enabled states 
such as China, Russia and the USA to continue to share project data without interruption despite the 
external political turmoil that has affected them. For the ISS, the ring-fencing of the project during 
the Crimea Crisis, when US and other aligned states exercised sanctions against Russia in other 
spheres, was critical in shielding the project schedule from severe slippages. 
 
Thirdly, I showed in support of Hypothesis 3 that sound governance stems from, what are now 
widely seen (sub-sections 3.1., 4.1., and 5.1.) as, first-class founding documents that enshrine the 
primacy of the state while at the same time allowing the central organisation to perform its role. 
Multiple, diverse organisations and institutions then keenly and without fear of legal impediment 
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coalesce around common goals and norms. This allows the project communities to step up and get 
behind the technical groups who steadily establish effective and legitimate processes. These groups 
are backed up by leadership which supports and encourages a meritocracy-based organisational 
culture. For example, the light-touch leadership approach epitomised by the current CERN DG 
Gianotti has consistently been seen by staff and external collaborators as the optimal one to 
maintain delicate collaborations. Innovative funding is used whereby fairness in cash contributions is 
supplemented by in-kind contributions that bolster industry and institutions in Members’ territories. 
 
Counterfactual evidence to the three hypotheses was examined and responded to in Section 6.1. For 
Hypothesis 1 this examination and response was in sub-section 6.1.2.3, for Hypothesis 2 this was 
provided in sub-section 6.2.2.1 and for Hypothesis 3 it was provided in sub-section 6.2.2.2. As I have 
shown in this section the weight of evidence strongly supported each of the thesis Hypotheses. 
 
 
6.3: Common and different diplomatic, governance and leadership mechanisms that 
have been used to implement the Beyond Gridlock pathways 
 
6.3.1: Pathway 1; Shifts in major powers core interests 
 
A common feature of the formation of both CERN and ITER is that both sets of advocates were 
primed and ready to ride momentous waves of change as major powers shifted their core interests 
(sub-sections 3.1.1 and 4.1.1. respectively). Hindsight shows that the timing to step onto each wave 
was also flawless. For the ISS the take-up of shifts in major powers’ core interests were subtler. 
 
For CERN, a consensus in the fundamental physics community, led by several Nobel laureates 
emerged for the need for a world-class fundamental physics facility dedicated, as I described in 
Section 3.1, to ‘nuclear research of a pure scientific and fundamental character’. This call was 
matched by the 1950s European movement of reconciliation after World War II. forward thinking 
scientists, such as Pierre Auger, Raoul Dautry, Lew Kowarski, Edoardo Amaldi and Niels Bohr, aided 
by the establishment of UNESCO, strove to build bridges between nations in education, science and 
culture. The appreciated support of leading US scientists, such as Isidor Rabi, to a high energy 
physics ‘global laboratory’ being based in Europe also fell in line. The timely cooperation between 
the fundamental physicists and the politicians provided an opening that led to the CERN Convention. 
Nations were bound together in peaceful research that 10 years earlier had been at war; Figure 5 
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shows the dramatic improvement in international relations that the community had worked 
together to achieve.  
 
For ITER, the wave was the mid-1980s rapid thawing of the Cold War between the two global 
superpowers of the period: the USA and USSR. I have shown that the magnetic confinement nuclear 
fusion community had influential advocates in the very highest levels of both the US (Michael 
Roberts, Charlie Newstead, Alvin Trivelpiece and Richard Stratford) and Soviet (Vladimir Travin and 
Evgeny Velikhov) political establishments. They expertly nudged the negotiating teams in the 1985 
Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva Summit to include in the final protocol a commitment to jointly develop 
fusion energy. As others joined the idea of an international fusion project it was the determination 
of the EU to host the facility and the ensuing acquiescence of other Members to this offer that 
provided the necessary breakthrough surge for the Governments to enter the final negotiation 
stages. The research showed that national mechanisms also contained ‘mini waves’ of opportunity 
for funding that needed to be exploited if activities were to proceed smoothly. Evgeny Velikhov 
commented in 1990 on the quirks of the USA annual budgetary cycle: ‘the US system was akin to a 
sine wave that had to be overcome by rising with the up-side to hop over obstacles before readying 
for the next one’ (ITER Newsline, 2015b). 
 
US technological pre-eminence in space had been underlined by the Moon Landing in 1969. The 
peak of the period of US-USSR détente led to a false start in space collaboration with the Apollo-
Soyuz joint mission in 1975. Although this was a one-off event, it did provide a tantalising glimpse to 
the respective national space agency communities of what might come. Leading advocates in the US 
such as Daniel Goldin and Albert Holland were ready when the Cold War Space Race finally ended to 
lead the effort for an international approach. The ISS community has been led by the USA since US 
President Reagan in January 1984 invited ‘Friends and Allies’ to join the challenge and share the 
costs, risks and rewards. The motivation to involve the Soviets at the end of that decade was 
different. The Russian experience in space was certainly seen as valuable but there was an 
indubitable lingering Cold War inspired mistrust, from both parties. The strategic argument to 
involve the Russian space technological and science teams was partly to wrap them in a 
collaboration that would allow little spare capacity for anything else. There was a desire to limit any 
science and technology transfer to former Warsaw Pact states and Rogue States. In hindsight it was 
a masterful decision as it not only helped to achieve this restriction but was also vital in preserving 
the pace of the project when US launch capability was lost with the second Space Shuttle disaster in 
2003 and Russia stepped in to fill the gap.  
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Figure 15 provides an overview of the SMP project timings and shows [in yellow highlighting] the 
major waves of opportunity that helped provide the necessary breakthrough surge:  
 
• The establishment of UNESCO in 1946 and the birth of the first European Movement in 1947 
for CERN (Convention signed in 1953);  
 
• The period of US-USSR détente, 1967 to 1979 and US invitation to potential partners in 1984 
for the ISS (IGA signed in 1998) and 
 
• The collaborative stance taken by the US and USSR leaders at the Fireside Summit in Geneva 
in 1985 for ITER (Agreement signed in 2006). 
 
Figure 15 shows the increasingly long negotiation periods were needed to bring the world’s major 
powers together: 7 years (1946 to 1953) for the European Nations that formed CERN, 14 years (1984 
to 1998) for the five major powers that were to collaborate on the ISS and 21 years (1985 to 2006) 
for the seven world powers that were to form the ITER project to reach agreement. Literature and 
field work point provided a rationale for this growth, including: Member States negotiators being 
more knowledgeable and warier of contractual commitments than in the 1950s, the problems being 
tackled by the projects being increasingly wicked in nature, and laborious talks being required to 
agree higher proportions of in-kind contributions. 
 
Figure 15 also shows the longevity of the three case studies since their respective start dates of 1954 
for CERN, 1998 for the ISS and 2008 for ITER. This longevity has been achieved despite the series of 
significant constraints that have beset them and fall within three categories (cross reference to this 
research detailed analysis is shown in brackets): 
 
Financial: the German Funding crisis following reunification in 1990 (p 99), the Global Financial 
crisis of 2008 (p 225) and the Swiss Franc crisis of 2015 (p 99); 
 
Political: the Afghanistan crisis of 1979 (pp 122-123 and p 182) and the Crimea crisis of 2014 
(p142, p172, p174, p177 and pp 212-213) and  
 
Technical: the Columbia Space Shuttle Accident of 2003 (p 172, p 177, p 188 and p 210), the 
LHC Incident (pp 99-100) and the Fukushima Accident of 2011 (p 204) 
217 
 
 
Figure 15; Timing of establishment and major milestones of case study SMPs set against 
major political events and constraints affecting the Member States 
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6.3.2: Pathway 2; Autonomous and adaptive international institutions 
 
In the Methodological Approach, sub-section 2.4.2. I referred to the work of Claire Dunlop (2011: 5) 
who highlights that understanding the structure and power dynamics that exist within an epistemic 
community is important in understanding their behaviour. In this thesis, these dynamics can be 
viewed by the degree that the Members grant the central element autonomy and the performance 
of the community to adapt to shifts in organisational structure as more power is delegated to the 
centre as the project matures. The differing dynamics for each case study are summarised as follows.  
 
For CERN, the structural arrangement is that the embedded experiment instrument programs and 
core LHC infrastructure form one integrated research facility. The larger LHC complex provides the 
high energy beams that the experiment programmes need, and no results would be produced if they 
did not act in a fully integrated manner. However, as I showed in sub-section 3.1.3., the two 
elements are independently managed. The recognised management teams of the former do not 
overbear the more recently established teams of the latter.  
 
The early CERN management teams quickly established an international institution that commanded 
global respect and consistently drew funds from the Member States. The community has 
encouraged the embedded experimental projects to exercise autonomy in deciding how they tackle 
science enquiry. Interviewees from both the central teams and the Member States confirmed that 
this helps to attract and retain the world’s best scientific and technological talent.  
 
For ITER and the ISS there is less autonomy granted to the centre by the Member States than for 
CERN. However, I have shown (in Section 3 of both the ITER and ISS case study chapters) both 
management teams nevertheless actively manage the ensuing multi-polarity into good outcomes.  
 
For ITER, the central team is hampered in making autonomous decisions of substance beyond its 
legal obligations due to the interdependence of the in-kind management system. Design decisions 
reached by the IGO staff ripple through to all the participants. The impact on costs and resources 
then needed to be individually negotiated and agreed right down through the Member States supply 
chain. Central autonomy has therefore been hard fought for and only granted by the Member States 
in areas where it is seen to be necessary. For example, the project adapted to the special needs of 
the construction phase by the appointment of the central Construction Management Agent that 
manages and supervises the myriad of companies on site.  
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Similarly, for the ISS, central autonomy is controlled and limited to only those areas where it is 
strictly necessary. In the view of some (such as John Logsdon) the central MCB is the governing body 
for the station. For others (such as Henry Hertzfeld) is merely an operational necessity. I explained 
the full case for both positions in sub-section 5.1.3: Organs and Voting Rights. What is undisputed is 
that the ISS has no central IGO and no DG and accompanying international staff. The Members 
retain control of their programme elements through their national space agencies and retain full 
budgetary control of their science programmes. The ISS structure is an iconic emblem of what 
international collaboration can produce when major powers work together in peace, but the ISS 
research facility is far from being an integrated one. The US has adapted its operations within its 
own autonomous area by designating the US ISS Scientific module as a National Laboratory (US 
Congress, 2005). In August 2011, NASA entered into a cooperative agreement with the Center for 
the Advancement of Science in Space (CASIS) to manage and boost non-NASA ISS research. 
 
In summary, the SMP Community’s Management Teams exercise autonomy and adapt their 
structures through intelligent strategies to achieve results to the level that their set-up conditions, 
governance and funding regimes allow. 
 
6.3.3: Pathway 3; Technical groups with effective and legitimate processes 
 
For CERN, the infrastructure and experiment teams work seamlessly within an integrated research 
facility. They are managed separately but need each other for the collective effort to deliver results. 
Both sets of technical groups have devised legitimate and effective processes that the other groups 
respect. There is naturally competition between the experimental groups - as with events such as 
the Higgs Boson confirmation - but as I explained in sub-section 3.2.1 (Domain Dominance) it is a 
healthy rivalry. CERN also benefits from this healthy internal organisational culture when dealing 
with the outside world; it has a reputation as a centre of excellence and an intelligent buyer of goods 
and services that speaks with one voice. Four interviewees confirmed that industry has learned that 
it cannot play one element of the organisation off against another. 
 
For ITER, two interviewees believed that at the start of the project there was a power struggle 
between the central IGO HQ team based in France and the main Member (Europe) Domestic Agency 
team based in Barcelona and, to a lesser extent the six other Members Domestic Agency teams 
based worldwide. While the overall design authority rests with the DG and thereby his staff and is 
respected for areas such as nuclear safety, there has been a reluctance from the Members to 
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provide project control levers to the central organisation in other areas. Evidence for this was 
discussed in sub-section 4.3.3 in the analysis of independent Management Review Reports such as 
that provided by Madia and Associates in 2013.  
 
When DG Bigot took office in 2015, he set as one of his conditions of appointment that he and his 
team needed to be given more executive authority. While this has been done to some extent, three 
interviewees indicated that there is a lingering tension between the central team and the ring of 
supporting Members. This is one of the draw-backs of the in-kind funding system whereby the 
control of the supply base is not with a central team [who would need to be given the cash to place 
all the contracts] but remains with the contributing Members. What has emerged is sets of mini 
epistemic communities that have effective and legitimate processes within their expert areas; an 
example of this was Fusion neutronics mini-community that I analysed in sub-section 4.3.1. These 
then combine with similar groups to collectively form the engine room needed to deliver the project 
for the community. 
 
For the ISS the range of specialist groups needed to design, manufacture, construct and operate the 
station is vast; see sub-section 5.3. Added to this, the management structure is distributed between 
the contributing Member States’ Space Agencies with only a central coordinating administration 
based in Houston. I explained in sub-section 5.1.3. that this results in a project fragmentation that 
has taken monumental efforts to overcome. Remarkedly this has been done despite significant 
funding constraints. Like CERN and ITER, what has emerged is sets of mini epistemic communities 
that have effective, legitimate and respected processes within their expert areas. The most 
noteworthy group is the astronaut corps who I examined in sub-section 5.3.1. and will return to 
when covering Innovate Leadership in sub-section 6.3.7. 
 
The key to success of this pathway as a route through gridlock has been the emergence of epistemic 
communities of experts who have their own norms and expectations and operate within a shared 
belief system. As I stated in the Research Framework (sub-section 2.3), this belief system can be 
seen through the four knowledge elements that Peter Haas (1992) identified: 1) a shared set of 
normative and principled beliefs, 2) shared causal beliefs, 3) shared notions of validity and 4) a 
common policy enterprise. Interviewees invariably demonstrated a deep holding of these beliefs. 
They have overcome national boundaries [albeit with occasional set-backs usually because of 
national funding shortfalls] by working in their specialist areas to establish effective and legitimate 
processes to deliver their portion of the work.  
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This effective collaboration does not mean the total lack of conflict. To the contrary it means groups 
being passionate and caring about their areas. The groups have learned that, if they are to be 
effective, they must articulate and defend their position with other peer groups and with higher 
management. Crucially, the prevalent organisational culture also means that they have respect for 
each other and know when to compromise. It is constructive conflict which DG Fabiola Gianotti, 
described when speaking at the CERN / UNOG Symposium in 2015 as follows: “… Decisions are taken 
by consensus. Consensus does not mean that everyone agrees; this is impossible. Consensus means 
that problems, issues, strategy and plans are discussed all together in an open manner.” 
(CERN/UNOG, 2015). It is a form of the interaction capacity that Buzan, Jones and Little (1993) [that I 
featured in the Literature Review] suggested needs to be analysed on the same level as units and 
structure in order for the neorealism of Kenneth Waltz (1979) to fit the world we see before us. It is 
then all these groups operating to a single goal that form the reliable core of the projects.  
 
 
6.3.4: Pathway 4; Multiple, diverse organisations & institutions coalesce around common 
goals/norms 
 
In order to analyse the appropriateness of this pathway, I re-visit the focality and legitimacy analysis 
sub-sections from each case study. 
 
6.3.4.1: Focality 
 
In sub-section 3.3.2., I showed that CERN is a well-established fundamental physics hub that people 
look to and converge around. The scale of operations marks it out as a genuinely global collaboration 
with over 12 000 researchers from institutes in over 70 countries being actively engaged (CERN, 
2016). The risk of fragmentation is combatted by a constant renewal process at different levels 
within the CERN central organisations that is illustrated by three examples: first, through the 
constant flow of new-blood eager scientists engaged in cutting-edge work, second, by the regular 
change of the Council Chair and the DG and third by the accepted practice whereby the first reports 
of the DG when changeover takes place should be outsiders if the appointee is an insider and vice 
versa. Field work showed that the higher management respecting these processes helps foster 
vitality and a sense of inclusiveness throughout the community.  
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In sub-section 4.3.2., I highlighted the dilemma that the ITER Council faces when trying to provide a 
focal point for the project. On the one hand, the representatives are responsible for the delivery of 
their portion of the in-kind contributions while on the other hand they are collectively the highest 
body that the central organisation can appeal to when a Member fails to meet those very 
obligations. A Council Secretariat interviewee’s evidence was that if Council deliberations stepped 
that way then a Member’s representative would recuse themselves from that part of a meeting or 
vote. Despite this, the nature of the construction means that all roads lead to Cadarache in France. 
Figure 9 (sub-section 4.3.2) illustrate that the project is therefore an exemplar of focality by 
presence. 
 
In Chapter 5 on the ISS I showed that there is a manifest focality provided by the ISS edifice. 
However, it is an integrated product through the ingenuity of its modular component interfaces 
rather than a single tailored design. As I described in sub-section 5.1.3., there is no central IGO and 
no delegated authority to a dedicated DG as in the other two case studies. A limited central focus is 
provided by the Multilateral Coordinating Board (MCB) but power and influence remain firmly with 
the national space agencies with NASA leading in all important operational decisions.  
 
 
6.3.4.2: Legitimacy 
 
As I concluded in sub-section 3.3.2., CERN has a high legitimacy built up over decades of success, 
that can be summarised in five areas. Firstly, legitimacy is reinforced by the transparency of the co-
option process for the word-renowned experts that it uses for the its sub-organs such as the 
Scientific Policy Committee that advise Council. Secondly, legitimacy is bolstered by the moral 
authority to orchestrate events though the vastness of its membership. Thirdly, it has legitimacy due 
to its series of scientific discoveries given further kudos by the award of a succession of Nobel prizes 
for physics that are detailed in Table 2 and shown on the timeline in Figure 15. Fourthly, the 
legitimacy stems from the expertise that CERN possesses and uses in its commercial arrangements 
and contracting as I analysed in sub-section 3.1.4. Lastly, it has an increasing global legitimacy in 
domains outside of its scientific remit by its Convention being the model for other alliances, the 
granting of permanent observer status by the UN General Assembly in 2012 and its DG co-chairing 
sessions at the 2018 World Economic Forum.  
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As I explained in sub-section 4.3.2., it is vital that there is a belief among all the actors in a 
community that the central organisation and its bodies are appropriate to direct policy. The field 
work interviews confirmed that, at times, that belief has wavered in the ITER community. The early 
days of the project saw a power struggle between the main Member, Europe, and the central 
organisation both of which were going through their own organisational forming process. Today, the 
ITER IGO has increased its legitimacy through three features: Firstly, like CERN, its Council is 
legitimized by the expert support it receives from two of its subsidiary governing bodies: the MAC 
makes recommendations on the management arrangements and the STAC on both scientific and 
technical issues. Secondly, it has legitimacy due to the expertise that ITER possesses through the 
many scientific and technical mini-epistemic communities that contribute to the whole and which 
are led by renowned world experts in their respective fields. Thirdly, the legitimacy stems from its 
science diplomacy success in achieving the ITER Agreement in 2006 and surviving the international 
political disorder that has engulfed its global power Members since then. 
 
In sub-section 5.3.2. I proposed that the legitimacy of the ISS project should be viewed from two 
perspectives: its public standing and its standing within the ISS professional community. I explained 
that the two perspectives are closely linked. Firstly, because enhancing public support is crucial in 
securing extra funding and building resilience and secondly because much of the dispersed ISS 
community is in competition with counterparts on other space related projects that also seek to 
strengthen their legitimacy and access to funds. The facility being in space since 2000 has given it, 
certainly in the consciousness of the millennial generation who have known nothing else, a 
legitimacy by presence. I showed that for many, that the IGA exists at all and has survived the types 
of constraints I have analysed is good enough legitimacy to justify the costs. This view is strongly 
supported by the Astronaut Corps whose intrinsic message, from their numerous personal account 
books, is that while national agendas will always be present in projects of this magnitude, the notion 
that trumps these is the collective higher-level goal of the advancement of knowledge.  
 
In summary, I have shown that focality and legitimacy concepts are closely intertwined throughout 
the three case study SMP communities and that both concepts are vital in gaining the support of 
Members. By measuring the degree with which community actors look to and converge around the 
central teams and the quantity and quality of the connectivity of the centre with the dispersed 
project elements, it was possible to assess the level of focality. By analysing the track record of 
science results, moral authority within the community and standing with the public, the sense of 
achievement in legitimacy could be made. Table 16 provides a summary of both features. 
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Table 16; Attributes of focality and legitimacy across the case study SMPs 
(adapted from Abbott and Hale, 2014) 
 
 
6.3.5: Pathway 5; Mobilization of domestic constituencies for cooperation and compliance 
 
Examples of Pathway 5 type mechanisms from the Beyond Gridlock literature include the human 
rights domain where international initiatives often have the intent of mobilising domestic 
constituencies. Such efforts are often targeted on those states that have a poor track record in 
defending human rights. International pressure on Member States regarding combatting climate 
change, through the UN Sustainable Development Goals, No 13, (UN, 2019b) or the Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2016), are other examples of this pathway in action. The underlying 
aim, through initiatives at the international level, is to support the establishment of domestic 
movements and/or to help them overcome national impediments in existing efforts. 
 
All three case studies’ central organs encourage healthy domestic constituencies. CERN takes 
strength from its Member States fundamental physics facilities which carry out important research 
and development activities. Similarly, it needs, encourages and supports the personnel within these 
facilities and educational institutions, many of whom come to work at CERN and then return to their 
host institutions. The ITER IGO and the Member States’ Domestic Agencies are the major players in 
the management of the project. It is the capabilities of the Member States industrial base that 
Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3
CERN ITER ISS
Actors look to and 
Converge Around
the centre
VERY HIGH
accepted global hub for
fundamental physics
VERY HIGH
Project and Community are
united in achieving one aim
VERY HIGH
self-evident unique global lab for
micro-gravity research
Connectivity of
the centre with
the community
VERY HIGH
world-wide community share data 
through landmark comms network
HIGH
Connectivity has improved since early 
days of the project
MIXED
national operational communication
paths work alongside central 
coordination
Track record of
Science Results
VERY HIGH
several Nobel Prizes and
meaningful spin-offs
LOW
meaningful results only available in 
operations phase but potential is
VERY HIGH
CONTESTED
differing views of worth to date versus 
cost; commercialisation may bear fruit
Moral Authority:
Professional 
Community
VERY HIGH
infrastructure and embedded experiment 
projects work seamlessly together
MEDIUM
meaningful control of supply base rests 
with Members; central authority in some 
areas is contested
MEDIUM
limited central authority; national space 
agencies run operations
Moral Authority:
Public perception
VERY HIGH
well developed community, education 
and public outreach programs
LOW
broadly unknown to the public despite 
public outreach programs
VERY HIGH
well developed community, education 
and public outreach programs
Focality
Legitimacy
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provide the components to the central construction site. The ITER international staff are recruited 
through the Member States’ Domestic Agencies who need a good knowledge of this job market. I 
showed in sub-section 5.3.3: Future developments, that the ISS Member States’ space agencies have 
diverse and emerging agendas outside of the project. The station itself is operationally controlled via 
those national space agency control centres and the project needs these dispersed assets to be 
capable, well managed and seamlessly connected to the US operational control centre in Houston.  
 
The above SMP interdependencies are natural given the scale of the projects and the geopolitical 
nature of the communities that support them, but they are not within the meaning of this pathway 
that I outlined in the first paragraph of this sub-section above. There are a few exceptions (such as 
research and development studies carried out world-wide to support the central goals; see sub-
section 4.3.2.) that do fall within the remit of this pathway but overall, the mobilisation of domestic 
constituencies is not a pathway that any of the central teams have used for the purpose of their 
establishment (Hypothesis 1) or overcoming their own constraints (Hypothesis 2) or improving their 
governance or leadership dynamics (Hypothesis 3). It is, therefore, other than in the highly linked 
ITER IGO - ITER Community case, not a pathway of direct relevance to this thesis.   
 
 
6.3.6: Pathway 6; Civil society coalitions with reformist states 
 
This pathway concerns routes through global gridlock that come about through concerted civil 
society efforts. CERN has a history of dedicated staff who have strongly advocated for the 
advancement of human knowledge through fundamental physics research, ITER has nuclear fusion 
advocates who have devoted their professional lives to achieving the promise of commercial fusion 
power generation and the ISS has an active public network of supporting space exploration groups. 
All these individuals and groups contain activist members, but they operate firmly within the 
accepted establishment of the respective communities. 
 
There is no ‘occupy Wall Street’ type movement involved in these substantial projects. Beyond 
Gridlock (2017: 43) illustrates that the occupy movement was born out of low growth and justifiable 
resentment of inequality in society exacerbated by the 1980’s financial crisis. There is no such deep-
seated rage within the SMP communities; one reason being the high status in the world order of the 
Member States involved. The membership of these projects (see sections 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1) does not 
include any developing nations; nor is there a gateway that a pressure group in a reformist state 
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could readily use to gain access. I addressed this question of limited, elitist Membership of SMP 
Communities in the examination of counterfactual evidence in sub-section 6.1.2.  
 
It can be argued that civil society coalitions including eminent pressure groups could work more 
closely with Big Science projects. For example, environmental organisations such as Greenpeace 
could view the ITER Community positively in that it strives to bring long-awaited sustainable energy 
sources to the world. They could perhaps find the door more open in these broad-minded, long-term 
international project environments than has been the case with the more short- and medium-term 
conservative thinking of individual Member States. To date, for reasons known to them and outside 
the scope of this thesis, they have chosen not to do so (Greenpeace, 2019). The outcome of the 
analysis is that this pathway does not apply to the SMP Community case studies.  
 
 
6.3.7: Pathway 7; Innovative Leadership 
 
Here, I highlight two aspects of leadership that have strongly emerged from the research: Firstly, the 
concept of consensual governance by the lead entity and secondly an adept light-touch style of 
leadership being exercised by individuals in high management positions. 
 
6.3.7.1: Leadership by lead-entity 
 
Governance features when considering the leadership provided by lead entities in the SMP 
Communities. It concerns the approach taken by the central organisation leadership (as in the CERN 
case study) or by the principal Member’s leadership (‘Europe’ for the ITER project and the USA for 
the ISS) to other Members:  
 
• I explained in the sub-section 3.2 (Managing Constraints) that when Germany was forced to 
reduce its cash contribution to the central capital funds, just at the time when the organisation 
needed more funds for the LHC infrastructure, the decision reached was to reduce the cash 
contributions of all the Member States by the same proportion. The central management team 
realised that the overriding need was to maintain fairness, a judgement that was then endorsed 
by the Council.  
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• For ITER, the main Member is ‘Europe’ whose group of EURATOM states contribute most of the 
funds, enjoy the largest workshare and host the project in France. An ongoing advantage that 
this has provided to the whole community is financial stability (see sub-section 4.2.2., Project 
Delays and Funding Resilience). Europe operates on a 6 or 7-year funding cycle rather than a 1 or 
2-year funding cycle as is the case in most of the other Member States.  
 
• For the ISS as I explained in sub-section 5.1.1 the dominant role of the USA in the management 
arrangements was accepted by all the parties when they agreed to Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of 
the IGA: ‘The Partners will join their efforts, under the lead role of the United States for overall 
management and coordination, to create an integrated international Space Station.’ I have 
shown in the evidence of sub-section 5.2. that the US has consistently provided sound 
leadership and thereby gained the respect of the other Members in this domain. 
 
The lead entities (central organisation or principal Member) have found a way to maintain progress 
by acting fairly in times of crisis, providing funding stability and exercising sound leadership. This has 
been most strongly evident in potentially gridlock-inducing moments that could have otherwise de-
railed the projects. 
 
6.3.7.2: Individual Leadership 
 
The idea of individual leadership sits incongruously with the other Beyond Gridlock pathways. The 
others rely, to varying degrees, on collective actions by groups of players: major powers (Pathway 1), 
international institutions (pathway 2), technical groups (pathway 3), diverse organisations and 
institutions (pathway 4), domestic constituencies (pathway 5) and civil society coalitions and 
reformist states (pathway 6). 
 
Nevertheless, the field work data showed that the projects have benefited from individual leaders 
who I contend have exercised, to varying degrees, the required light-touch management approach 
that their environments demand. The best example of this is CERN, whose leadership have had 
longer to develop the approach. As I explained in sub-section 3.3.1., the present DG Gianotti fully 
embraced the concept as one of the key drivers for the success of the CERN model. This innovative 
approach is coupled by the way the leaders (known as ‘spokespersons’) of the embedded 
experiment teams are appointed by their peers not least because of their personal leadership 
abilities. 
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I showed in section 4.2 that early high-level appointments to the ITER IGO were political. One of the 
reasons that Japan had agreed to the project being hosted in Europe was that the IGO DG would be 
provided by Japan. I explained in sub-section 4.2.2., that the second incumbent was not seen as 
having all the necessary attributes to deal with the problems the project faced in its set-up phase. 
The current DG Bigot has restored faith in the IGO leadership through personal example and by a 
series of apposite and timely decisions. As all the field work interviewees attested, the central team 
have gained authority over the whole community; the improvement in morale being evidence by the 
executive staff survey results that were analysed in sub-section 4.3.1.   
 
Examples of effective leaders on the ISS project, that I provided in sub-section 5.3.1., included those 
from the USA, Canada, Germany and Russia. They come from different professional and cultural 
backgrounds: Ellen Ochoa, the first Hispanic woman to go into space; Chris Hadfield, a former fast-
jet military test pilot from Canada; Alexander Gerst, a German geophysicist and Sergei Krikalev a 
veteran cosmonaut. Three of them have commanded the ISS: Krikalev (Expedition 11), Hadfield, 
(Expedition 34) and Gerst (Expedition 56). The way that the project selects its ISS Commanders is 
based on a de facto agreement that the lead position should be rotated. These examples 
demonstrate that the USA does not exclude other Members from the lead person on ISS 
Expeditions. The USA could have used its pre-eminence in the project to not share or severely limit 
these types of appointments; it has chosen not to do so. Many large ventures pronounce that their 
organisations are a meritocracy, only those within these structures know if it is the case; ISS 
interviewees confirmed that there is a belief that this is so in their community. This confidence in 
each other is also something the community does not want to lose. It is one of the reasons why the 
US space policy, as I covered in section 5.3.3: Future developments, is taking time to finalise. 
 
In summary, pathway 7 has two applications for the case study SMPs. Firstly, in the approach taken 
to other Members by the central organisation (as with the CERN IGO) or to other Members by the 
principal Member (as with ‘Europe’ for ITER and the USA for the ISS). Sound governance was 
consistently exercised through the lead entities consistently acting fairly and openly and thereby 
gaining the other Members’ respect. This leadership has been strongly evident in times of crisis that 
could have otherwise de-railed the projects. Secondly, by the approach taken by individuals in 
leadership positions where the projects have benefitted from a series of inspirational individuals 
who have exercised the required light-touch management style that their settings demand. A 
meritocracy-based decision-making is demanded at the technical and science team level by the 
nature of their specialist operations. 
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6.3.8: Pathway 8; Innovative Funding 
 
The case for a new pathway to be added to Beyond Gridlock theory is set out below and draws on 
evidence from all three case studies. Firstly, I provide supporting evidence for the inclusion and I 
then outline the opposing evidence. The sub-section summary weighs up both sets of evidence and 
provides the rationale why the former argument prevails. 
 
 
6.3.8.1: Evidence supporting the inclusion of the new pathway Beyond Gridlock theory 
 
Mark Uhran was the Assistant Associate Administrator for the ISS at NASA HQ in Washington DC 
from 2005 to 2012. He is currently the Head of Strategic Communications at Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, USA and during field work for this thesis he stated: “For the first time in history, we find 
industrialized nations forming partnerships to design and build complex, technological assets for 
which no nation alone can bear the cost, or the risk. By partnering together, the effort and cost is 
shared; the risk distributed, and; the benefits accrue to all.” I included this quote in the preamble to 
the thesis (at page v) because Uhran, succinctly sums up the case for Big Science collaboration. 
When he rightly says that the effort and cost is shared, he also touches on a key point of the case for 
the inclusion of this new pathway to gridlock theory.  
 
Member States need persuasive reasons to provide large cash contributions to Big Science projects 
on the scale of CERN, ITER or the ISS. Even regional grouping of nations, such as the EU, may provide 
cash support to major projects but only when linked to juste retour terms and special conditions 
such as those in the EC Framework Programmes (EC, 2019). This situation applies to many domains 
and their IGOs. For example, Jan Beagle, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Management reported 
to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly at its 73rd session on 16 October 2018 that cash 
funding by Member States to the plethora of UN Agencies is ever more strained (UN, 2018). 
Secretary General António Guterres raised the detrimental effects of the negative trend in cash 
funding in an internal memorandum to all UN employees in the same year (Gladstone, 2018). Kenji 
Nakano, the Chief of the UN General Assembly Branch at the Department for General Assembly and 
Conference Management provided evidence to this research regarding adopting in-kind 
contributions to help fill the funding gap. The policy of Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) was 
adopted by the UN in 1996 to simplify the means by which countries are reimbursed for providing in-
kind contributions (equipment, personnel and support services). In that period this primarily related 
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to urgent contributions for peacekeeping missions (UN, 1996). Nakano highlighted that these 
measures have been repeatedly updated and reformed culminating in a COE Working Group being 
set-up to advise the Secretary General on suggested improvements including where the concept 
could be used more widely. The Working Group’s initial conclusions are scheduled to be presented 
in New York in January 2020 (UN, 2019c). 
 
Given the increasing scarcity of cash contributions the SMP founding negotiators also looked to in-
kind contributions as an essential additional element of funds. I provided evidence in Section 3.1, the 
CERN Convention, Section 4.1, the ITER Agreement and Section 5.1 the ISS Intergovernmental 
Agreement that the SMP founding documents enable fairness and promote trust and mutual 
support through their precision, aptness and depth of detail. In support of my argument for an 8th 
pathway, I draw attention to the fact that all of these principal founding documents also have 
supporting papers that detail the Members’ in-kind contributions, see row 1 of Table 17: 
 
• For CERN, Russia and the USA provide parts of the LHC accelerator ring as contributions in-kind 
in return for a voice in LHC operations. I provided details of this in sub-section 3.2.2: Funding 
Resilience and sub-sub-section 3.3.3.1: Management of future membership and innovative 
funding trends. In-kind contributions are also the means of funding the embedded experimental 
programs such as ATLAS and CMS.   
 
• For ITER, the in-kind contributions are detailed in the common understandings that are attached 
to the ITER Agreement and was one of the last documents to be agreed. I provided details of 
these in sub-section 4.1.4: Commercial, Contracting and Funding Arrangements. 
 
• For the ISS, in-kind contributions are detailed in four MoUs between NASA and the other Space 
Agencies: CSA, ESA, JAXA and ROSCOSMOS. I provided details of these in section 5.1.4: 
Commercial, Funding and Legal Arrangements.  
 
Big Science projects cannot function with in-kind contributions alone. CERN and ITER have dedicated 
IGO HQs with a DG and his/her staff who need resources to carry out their management and 
coordinating roles. I have shown that even the ISS, with its distributed control centres needs a 
central MCB to, amongst other tasks, keep tally of the changes to members in-kind contributions. 
For all three case studies, Members make cash contributions based on indices that reflect their 
relative economic strength such as Net National Income (NNI) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
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The share of in-kind and in-cash is dependent on the detailed workshare negotiations that take place 
and the level of authority that the Member States grant to any central entity. More delegated 
authority means a higher proportion of in-cash contributions and vice versa; see rows 2 and 3 of 
Table 17.  
 
 
 
Table 17; Case Study SMP’s founding documents and 
summary of share of funds provided in-kind and in-cash 
 
There are two appealing advantages to Members of funding Big Science projects by mostly in-kind 
contributions rather than solely cash and one advantage that also applies to the entire Community.  
 
Firstly, it keeps the majority of the spend in the Member States own territories and thereby 
embodies a practical structural realism. It fits in well with the neo-realism theory (sub-section 1.1.2), 
where Buzan, Jones and Little (1993) raise the importance of interactions between States to 
understanding how the modern world works. While there is no US Senator for Provence, France 
there are Senators for the 44 US States that benefit from over 300 ITER related contracts (Congress, 
2018). The US has consistently maintained its in-kind contribution commitments, not least the 
crucial Central Solenoid manufactured by General Atomics in California. This type of arrangement is 
replicated in the other six Member States. The local, actual real cost to a Member of designing, 
procuring, testing, accepting and delivering an item to the central organisation is a matter solely for 
them. Similarly, the contracting details are a matter for each Member within the overall provisions 
set out in the Procurement Arrangements that the central organisation sets. Effective control and 
Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3
CERN ITER ISS
PRINCIPAL 
DOCUMENT
plus
Collaborative 
Documents
CERN CONVENTION
plus
CERN IGO Bi-lateral MoUs: with
Japan, Russia and USA
plus
Embedded Experiment Agreements
ITER AGREEMENT
plus
Common Understandings
INTER GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT
plus
NASA bi-lateral MOUs with:
CSA, ESA, JAXA and ROSCOSMOS
Share of Total 
Funds provided 
In-Kind
MEDIUM
(USA and Russian elements of the LHC 
and high proportion of embedded 
experimental projects)
VERY HIGH
(85% of the Project Value
is provided by the
7 Members in kind deliverables)
VERY HIGH
(all ISS Modules and major components 
are provided by the
5 Member's Space Agencies)
Share of Total 
Funds provided 
In-Cash
HIGH
(Approximately 1 BN USD Annual Budget 
provided by all 23 Members, based on 
Net National Income, to central IGO)
LOW
(15 % of project funding is provided by 
Annual cash contributions of 7 
Members to the central IGO)
LOW
(some cash and seconded personnel 
are provided to central MCB 
administration body
Founding 
Documents/
Funding Type
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power therefore rests with the Members; this all adds substance to the principle that the primacy of 
the State is sacrosanct even in the camaraderie type atmosphere of SMP Communities. 
 
Secondly, it helps develop and maintain the Member’s industrial base and boosts the professional 
and social capital of the member’s scientists and engineers. This leads to an enhanced status for 
their respective national institutions that are part of the global communities. This distribution 
inherently recognises that it is the Members who ‘own’ and benefit from the project rather than a 
single all-powerful central organisation that could limit the sharing of these features. The very 
nature of these projects is that they push the boundaries of science and technology, therefore the 
distribution of the work to the Members is a major driver in fostering a community of innovators.  
 
A final advantage to the communities that embrace the in-kind management system is that they 
make the cancellation of the projects, once established, much less likely.  
 
• For CERN, the Russian and US in-kind contributions helped plug the funding gap left by the 
European funding crisis following the re-unification of Germany. Without it, in conjunction with 
the other measures that were employed to mitigate the Constraint which I covered in section 
3.2.2: Funding Resilience, the flagship LHC project could have been in jeopardy.  
 
• For ITER, the US had already withdrawn for a five-year period (1998 to 2003), during the 21-year 
negotiation phase. There was strong field work evidence from all the US interviewees (sub-
section 4.1.4: Commercial, Contracting and Funding Arrangements) that, without this funding 
method, the US would almost certainly have withdrawn again, probably permanently. 
Congressional records show that it is the stalwart support of representatives of States with ITER-
related contracts - together with recent improved performance and expert lobbying of DG Bigot 
- that have influenced the specialist committees to recommend continuance.  
 
• For the ISS, I provided evidence in sub-section 5.2.1: Technical Set-Backs, that the Russian’s 
providing greater frequency and access to their in-kind contribution elements, when the US 
launch capability was lost, was instrumental in preserving the project.  
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6.3.8.2: Evidence opposing the inclusion of the new pathway Beyond Gridlock theory 
 
The model of how the in-kind contributions system should work is met in practice by some harsh 
realities. These came particularly to the fore in interviewees in the ITER Community where many 
believed that the result is that the ITER device will be built in an unprecedentedly inefficient way. 
Collectively, they cited five issues that hamper progress. Firstly, the original common understandings 
valuations were too optimistic, and the Member States ended up having to pay far more than 
anticipated to produce components. Secondly, changes to the overall design meant that Members 
had to make only partly compensated changes to their components. Thirdly, there was waste in that 
many components could have been more easily produced by not duplicating some of the work 
share. Fourthly, despite the best efforts of the negotiators and technical teams who authored the 
specifications some items were missed and/or interfaces were unclear, and lengthy disputes 
resulted as to which Members were responsible for providing them. Finally, integration and testing 
on site meant that some components needed re-work the liability for which was disputed.  
 
This field work evidence confirms that there is greater mutual dependency between the participants 
when in-kind contributions are the main source of funding. This means that Member States must be 
more engaged than is often the case when only cash contributions are provided. A side effect of this 
arrangement is that ‘free riding’ by Members whereby they can appear to contribute or contribute 
to the minimum level necessary [for example to retain voting rights in an organ of governance] is 
more difficult. All the contributions are necessary for the whole entity and thereby the whole 
community to work; there is therefore no place to hide in a disciplined in-kind management system. 
Hiding that would, somewhat paradoxically, be easier if Members simply had to provide cash 
contributions. Providing in-kind contributions is harder for the Member States than simply donating 
cash. The in-kind management system needs a high interaction capacity from the Members who 
must raise their diplomacy skills, as well as their technical and scientific capacities, to make it work. 
 
Another underlying strain that permeates across the above Member State relations, that four ITER 
interviewees commented on, is that the long negotiated in-kind contributions procurement 
agreements are not nimble. The original commitments are carefully guarded by Members who wish 
to protect their hard fought for national interests. The research signposts that the in-kind 
arrangements give the Members - if they choose to exercise it - more power to limit the availability 
of noble scope (described in sub-section 3.1.2) than a regular Large Engineering Project joint venture 
community would tolerate. 
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The regular ITER Configuration Control Board agrees changes to the technical baseline and the effect 
on associated systems and the contributing Members’ in-kind deliverables. As I explained in sub-
section 4.1.4., the associated value of the change is often long and hard negotiated and ultimately 
must be balanced against the Members’ in-cash contribution. This balancing is to preserve the 
overall sharing ratios enshrined in the ITER Agreement (see Table 17). This effort consumes the 
energy of the central organisation staff and the Members’ teams. The ISS MCB carries out the same 
balancing function when it keeps tally of the changes to the ISS Members’ in-kind contributions. The 
large administrative burden is not carried out lightly; it is an essential feature of the contemporary 
Big Science international collaboration process.  
 
This inherent lack of central control and overhead costs mean that the in-kind management system 
has several vocal critics within the Big Science project management communities. Maria Spiropulu, a 
physicist at Caltech and vice-chair of the American Physical Society (APS) Forum on International 
Physics sums up the frustration: ‘of all the current international physics projects under development 
now, ITER receives the most comparisons to CERN, but the fusion project is years behind schedule 
and projected to be billions of dollars over budget…it tried to [carry out] the dream where there is 
an equal division of the responsibilities… the politics became more important than the project’ 
(Lucibella, 2014:1). The inference is that construction of the reactor was split up among the Member 
States who picked different components to build, based largely on national interests, rather than 
collective efficiency. A criticism that can be countered by the notion that the Members intentionally 
shared the work in order to learn lessons from the design and manufacturing processes that they 
would all need for the follow-on national programmes. The recollections of Akko Maas and Harry 
Tuinder (ITER, 2012), that I covered in sub-section 4.2.1., indicate that the truth was somewhere 
between the two positions and was one of the reasons why the common understandings that 
underpin the ITER Agreement took over 20 years to finalise.  
 
A note of caution was even applied to the idea of researching the entire topic by Tim de Zeeuw, the 
European Southern Observatory Director General from 2007–2017. In an interview for this research 
he emphasised the advantages of staying with an empowered central team approach: “while the 
science community could undoubtedly benefit from a study of in-kind and its consequences, we may 
not necessarily want to create guidelines or strategies that makes it easier to adopt given the 
weaknesses of IKM. The goal always should be to run projects with in-cash contributions.”  
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Sub-Section summary 
 
Given the range of difficulties it is reasonable to question the supposition that innovative funding 
should be included as an 8th pathway through and beyond gridlock. The overriding reason is 
straightforward and is the final one cited in sub-section 6.3.8.1: the in-kind arrangements have been 
pivotal in connecting and holding the Member States together. There is strong evidence (for 
example in sub-section 4.2.2. for ITER and sub-section 5.2.1 for the ISS) that it has been essential to 
the international collaborations both being established and surviving the project, economic and 
political turbulence that the long time-scales of SMPs inevitable span.  
 
Inherent in provision of the in-kind contributions means that the Members also share the 
technological and financial risks. The Members must weigh up these extra responsibilities against 
the benefits to their home industries and research institutions. This research has shown that 
Member States generally decide that the latter prevails. Exceptions, where in-kind contributions are 
not taken up a Member State may be when that Member State assesses that it already has expertise 
in that area or where it considers the technological or programmatic risks of late delivery too high.  
 
Evidence from the three case studies shows that the judgement on how much of each type of 
funding to provide will vary over time. For example, as trust builds within the community then the 
Member States may decide (as is the case with CERN and belatedly with ITER) to provide more 
authority to the centre with commensurate extra cash funding required to enable more autonomy in 
functions such as leadership, design authority, safety and host State regulatory matters. 
 
Table 18 illustrates the key factors that participants must consider when embarking on large 
international SMP collaborations that involve contributions -in-kind and in-cash. It is possible to map 
on the table where the three SMP case studies fall across the three categories of ‘High level of 
contributions in-cash to the Central IGO’ (the left column), ‘Appropriate blending of contributions in-
cash and contributions in-kind to the Central IGO’ (the middle column) and ‘High level of 
contributions in-kind to the Central IGO’ (the right column): 
 
CERN can be seen as predominantly being in the central column due to its start-up conditions 
being correct for the times and its expansion being judiciously managed by the Member States. 
Today, CERN benefits from having the appropriate mix of both cash and in-kind funding. It has 
enough cash [some critics would say an overly generous amount; see sub-section 6.1.2., 
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Collation and examination of counterfactual evidence] to run the autonomous central 
functions that the CERN Council has granted it and enough in-kind contributions to get it 
through cash shortfall periods and keep non-Member states engaged.  
 
ITER has been set-up to operate in the circumstances summarised by the right hand column. 
Currently, ITER is highly dependent on in-kind contributions, a situation which I have shown in 
sub-section 4.2.2. has advantages and disadvantages that both have to be actively managed. 
However, it is gradually moving to the centre ground as the Member States [interviewees 
would say grudgingly] allow more central autonomy to be established.  
 
The ISS is also in the right hand column as it is a de-facto conglomeration of Members’ in-kind 
modules and major equipment (text below Figure 12); an arrangement that has been managed 
with aplomb by the dispersed operational centres. 
 
Tellingly, no case study is in the left column or has plans to try and move to that circumstance. The 
period when mainly cash funding is provided to a large international SMP Community collaborative 
endeavour of the scale of CERN, ITER and the ISS are long over.  
 
In sum, this research, through the compilation and analysis of evidence from all three case studies 
has established a compelling case to add ‘Innovative Funding’ as a new, eighth pathway to Beyond 
Gridlock theory. 
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COMMUNITY 
ELEMENT 
 
High level of contributions in-cash 
to the Central IGO 
 
Appropriate blending of 
contributions in-cash and  
contributions in-kind 
to the Central IGO 
 
 
High level of contributions in-kind 
to the Central IGO 
 
 
 
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANISATION/ 
CENTRAL PROJECT TEAM 
 
 
 
• More autonomy and 
nimbleness in decision making 
• More potential for 
unauthorised [by the Member 
States] mission creep 
 
• Sufficient authority to tackle 
problems and combat external 
constraints is delegated to the 
centre 
• Sufficient project control levers 
are provided to the centre to 
work with Member States to 
control the project 
 
• Increased project resilience; 
less likelihood that the project 
could be cancelled 
• Less central autonomy 
• Cumbersome decision making 
• High administrative burden to 
manage changes 
 
 
 
 
 
MEMBER STATES 
 
 
 
• Harder to receive national go-
ahead and regular re-
authorisation from home 
national funding agencies 
• Simpler collaborative effort 
required 
• Free riding easier [although 
responsible Member States will 
not take up the opportunity] 
 
• Primacy of the Member States 
is sacrosanct protected in 
voting rights being retained in 
highest decision making body 
• Improved project performance 
and thereby better and more 
timely accrued results to the 
Member States 
• Easier to receive national go-
ahead and regular re-
authorisation from national 
funding agencies 
• Increased benefits to home 
industry and institutions 
• More interfaces with central 
organisation and other 
Member States is challenging 
for configuration control and 
schedule adherence 
 
 
Table 18; SMP Community, Central IGO Team and Member State factors 
positively and negatively affected by the level and blending of contributions provided in-kind and in-cash 
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Section Summary 
 
The common and different mechanisms that have been used in each of the Beyond Gridlock 
pathways are mapped out against the three case studies in Table 19. The overview shows those 
pathways that are used extensively (Pathways 1, 4, 7 and 8), those that are used more by some than 
others (Pathways 2 and 3) and those that are not applicable or used sparingly (Pathways 5 and 6). 
Two pathways emerge as core requirements for major international collaborations to be initiated, 
maintained and delivered: firstly, shifts in major power core interests (Pathway 1) and secondly, the 
need for common shared goals for multiple diverse organisations and institutions to coalesce around 
(pathway 4). These are aided by use of Innovative Leadership and Funding (Pathways 7 and 8 
respectively). This thesis has shown that it is through the combination of these pathways that 
substantial progress through gridlock can be made. This finding will now be taken forward into the 
next section of the Results Chapter covering common features of the SMP Communities. 
 
 
 
Table 19; Summary of Beyond Gridlock pathways and their mechanisms 
applicability to the case study SMPs (adapted from Hale and Held, 2017)   
Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3
CERN ITER ISS
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Partly Partly
Highly autonomous and 
adaptive
Yes Partly Partly
Infrasructure and Experiment 
Teams work seamlessly
Yes Yes Yes
No Partly No
No No No
Yes
Yes
(Belatedly)
Yes
Sound governance and
light-touch leadership
Slow establishment of 
effective central leadership
Collaborative operational 
leadership
Yes Yes Yes
8. 
All have high focality and legitimacy
This pathway does not apply to SMP Communities
Central organs do actively encourage healthy domestic constituencies but not in the sense 
of application of this Beyond Gridlock  pathway
All use a combination, at different levels, of
contributions in-cash and in-kind to fund the project
Innovative Leadership
Innovative Funding
Mobilization of domestic constituencies
Civil society coalitions with reformist states
4. 
Multiple, diverse organisations and 
institutions coalesce around
common goals/norms
5. 
6. 
7. 
All collaborations were long prepared for and advocates
successfully rode timely waves of political and strategic opportunity
Member States control/limit central autonomy
Central design authority hard fought for and
interface management achieved despite difficulties
Shifts in major powers core interests
Autonomous and adaptive international 
institutions
Technical groups with effective and 
legitimate processes
Beyond Gridlock Pathway
1. 
2. 
3. 
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6.4: Common Features of the three SMP Communities  
 
Here I summarise four common features of the case study SMP Communities that have emerged 
during the research. They are not lessons learned per se, but rather collectively, they help explain 
how the SMP Communities have overcome gridlock and delivered results. In doing so they serve to 
complete the answer to the research question. 
 
Feature 1: Each SMP has at its core a meaningful endeavour that generates and maintains 
strong binding forces between the major powers and the individuals involved. 
 
The case study SMPs are tackling some of the most difficult problems that face the world: increasing 
fundamental physics knowledge; providing an important step in developing carbon-free, nuclear 
fusion commercial power generation and undertaking space habitation, experimentation and 
exploration.  
 
The benefits of these endeavours are not necessarily seen early on; these are long term 
considerations. For example, scientifically, the field of fundamental physics research is important 
because it provides knowledge, whose immediate consequences are unknown, but which is foreseen 
to be potentially momentous. This makes the projects harder to sell to a political class who crave 
short term results to bolster popularity and to a sceptical public who can easily point to other more 
pressing immediate societal needs. 
 
Long term vision is needed to reach the decisions to back these projects. Although the idea of 
developing a large international collaboration in fusion research was the last agenda item in the 
Reagan-Gorbachev Fireside Summit in 1985 Geneva summit and the last entry to be agreed by the 
parties for inclusion in the joint communiqué, in the end it was the one with the farthest reach (ITER 
Newsline, 2015a). This thesis has shown that the SMP advocates appreciate that this long-term 
vision needs to be expertly nudged into the mainstream policy decision making process. They have 
learned that sustained backing will not be achieved by the sudden seizing of political agendas.  
 
I showed in sub-section 5.3.2., that while national agendas will always be present in projects of this 
magnitude, the driving factor that trumps these is the collective higher-level goal. Interviewees were 
unanimous that these are ventures which generate high emotions with one or two even suggesting 
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that the projects have a soul of their own. One Executive level interviewee and veteran of the cause 
to bring the vision into reality stated: “there are many great science projects; but this one is mine.” 
 
An example of the passion that these projects generate is the way that the Communities mark their 
project inaugurations. Like LEPs they may plant a tree or lay a foundation stone; or in the case of the 
ISS deliver a first module in low earth orbit! What sets them apart is that they also feel the need to 
emphasise and celebrate the meeting of minds between major powers. At the signature of the ITER 
Agreement on 21st December 2006 the host of the event, President Jacques Chirac of France, noted 
that the occasion marked a memorable moment in the history of science: ‘Exceptional for its 
scientific ambition to harness the sun´s power to take up the challenge of ecological energy, and 
exceptional for its international scale: the unprecedented association of seven major partners from 
the North to the South. It is the hand held out to future generations, in the name of solidarity and 
responsibility’; rousing rhetoric that I contend would have seemed embarrassingly out of place for 
something of less importance. In this research I have cited similar speeches by President Kennedy in 
his address to the UN General Assembly calling for a joint Moon Landing mission with Russia (JFK 
Presidential Library, 1963) and President Reagan in his address to a Joint Session of the Congress on 
21st November 1985 where he extolled the benefits of fusion energy and urged international 
collaboration (Reagan Presidential Library, 2017a). These moments matter, they help legitimise the 
projects, raise their profile beyond the ordinary and, as the field work revealed, are cited by the 
project participants to this day.  
 
The fact that these events linger in the minds of those involved is exemplified by William Flynn 
Martin, who served as Special Assistant to President Reagan for National Security Affairs in the mid-
1980s. He wrote in 2012 to Alvin Trivelpiece, the former Director of the Office of Energy Research at 
the US DOE, evoking the spirit of the times: ‘I then gave my okay for the project and it was the only 
tangible product agreed upon at the first and historic Geneva Summit of 1985 between Reagan and 
Gorbachev. I was at the meeting, as you know, and I recall meeting Velikhov who was wearing a 
Princeton tie. Interestingly, the resulting joint communiqué concludes with the sentence "The two 
leaders emphasized the potential importance of the work aimed at utilizing controlled 
thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes and… advocated the widest practicable development of 
international cooperation in obtaining this source of energy, which is essentially inexhaustible, for 
the benefit for all mankind." By the way, I enjoyed our celebration with Velikhov years later (with 
Nick and Chris pouring the vodka) when Velikhov toasted us as the “fathers of ITER.” Indeed, the 
three of us were the fathers of ITER – especially the two of you!’ (Martin, 2012). 
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The notion of high meaningfulness in the mission is also encapsulated by Maria Spiropulu, a physicist 
at Caltech, vice-chair of the American Physical Society (APS) Forum on International Physics and a 
member of the CMS collaboration at CERN: ‘Being a fundamental physics lab inherently played a big 
role in pushing competing nations to work together…the goal is the same, and it’s very clear that it is 
fundamental research …. That alleviates a lot of the conflict…because we’re all going towards the 
same fundamental goal and the same dream (Lucibella, 2014:1).’ The astronaut, Ron Garan also 
summarised the situation well: ‘If you create something meaningful then the inevitable bumps in the 
road do not derail the partnership’ (Garan, 2015: 43). 
 
 
Feature 2: The SMP’s benefit from having creditable start-up conditions 
 
Lord Browne of Madingley (2013: 3), points out that time spent on start-up considerations for major 
projects is never wasted: ‘the lowest standards that are set at the start of a project are the highest 
standards that can be expected for the rest of the project. As one contracts and procurement 
interviewee put it [regarding a lengthy negotiation] “the pain was worth the certainty gain.” Here I 
highlight two start-up areas that were seen across all the case studies as vital in achieving and 
maintaining a successful international SMP collaboration: first-class founding documents and 
choosing the site wisely. 
 
Founding Documents 
 
Big Science project negotiators certainly need to agree clear and succinct technical specifications. A 
need amplified by the fact that they have to distribute the work amongst themselves and allow the 
complex parts to be integrated and tested in the construction phase. The achievement of a technical 
baseline is far from easy in these ground-breaking endeavours. The problems with a grossly 
overestimated maturity of design was attested by ITER interviewees in Section 4.2.2. This optimism 
in the baseline certainly contests the position that the SMPs are invariably exemplars of first-class 
start-up conditions. However, these types of problems, though painfully time-consuming to address 
were solvable.  
 
Negotiators of major international collaborations need to also provide a series of pseudo political 
assurances to Members in order to gain their support. These assurances are very difficult to correct 
once the agreements are signed as often, they have been reached in partisan trade-off’s with other 
Members. The belief that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ certainly applies to SMP 
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founding agreements. That is why Member States are highly reluctant to re-open the CERN 
Convention, the ITER Agreement or the ISS IGA. Indeed, the only amendment that has been made to 
any of these was to the CERN Convention when in 1971 a second laboratory administrative unit was 
added; this change was reversed some 10 years later. 
 
Member States need certainty on these issues not least in order to sell the founding documents to 
their domestic constituencies. Domestic harmony is needed to achieve national ratification. Essential 
areas include cast iron certainty that the primacy of the state will be respected [through equal 
representation and voting rights enshrined in cogent legal articles], that protection of background 
intellectual property is protected [through adherence to international standards] and that that there 
is unambiguous legal jurisdiction, dispute resolution and cross-waiver liability provisions. For ITER 
(and the Canadian contribution to the ISS), the negotiators also set punitive withdrawal penalties. 
Crucially, attachments to the main agreements also need to entice the Members with the prospect 
of good quality, contributions in-kind (that will create and/or protect home based industries and 
institutions) and show in the financial agreements that there will be scrupulously fair, NNI or GDP 
based, sharing of contributions in-cash. 
 
The SMP Communities have learned that there is no need to start from scratch; successful IGO 
collaboration documents are available that can be tailored to new circumstances. As James Gillies, 
former Head of Communication for CERN points out: “The governance model is one of the things 
that really makes CERN work… There are several more [such collaborations] now, and they’ve based 
their models on CERN.” The project to build a synchrotron light source in Jordan has brought 
together nations normally hostile to one another, including Israel, Iran and the Palestinian Authority. 
Chris Llewellyn Smith, a previous CERN DG and President of the SESAME Council commented that: 
“SESAME is modelled on CERN conceptually… the SESAME statutes are modelled on the CERN 
Convention, as is the governance structure. They have worked very well in the circumstances.” The 
International Linear Collider (ILC) is in the very early stages of development. The Nobel Laureate 
Barry Barish is the Director of the global design effort for the ILC and pointed out, in a lecture at the 
2018 annual conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, that this 
project also uses CERN as a guide. ‘For something like a new international collaboration, this serves 
as a well-made model that all we have to do is tweak.’ (ILC, 2019). 
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Site Selection 
 
Geographical features such as low susceptibility to earthquakes and high availability of natural 
resources play an important part in the selection of SMP sites. In astronomy there are clusters of 
ground-based observatories that are in remote areas such as the Atacama Desert of Chile (Domain 2 
in the selected overview of SMPs at Appendix A). I have shown for the case study SMPs that political 
considerations also feature in deciding which Member will host the concern. The ramifications of 
this start-up decision are many due to the trade-offs that have to be made for other potential 
hosting Members to give way (ITER site selection negotiations at sub-section 4.2.1). Other tangible 
factors emerged during the research that have impacted on the selection of a site. Reliable 
international air travel links, a safe welcoming environment and a good international school, can all 
improve Member buy-in through attracting and retaining key staff and their families. It is no chance 
co-incidence that both Geneva (CERN) and Provence, France, (ITER) are eminently suitable locations 
to attract the best scientific and technological talent (Ecole International PAC, 2018). 
 
 
Feature 3: The Member States in all three SMPs consistently exercise consensual governance 
 
As I have shown in the three case study sections (3.2, 4.2 and 5.2) on managing constraints, fairness 
to all parties must outweigh any short-term political or economic gains in order to keep the 
collaborations intact. Particularly during times of project stress, consensual governance exercised 
through respect for the primacy of the state is vital. Dominant members have shown leadership in 
foregoing weighted voting wherever possible and seeking agreement by consensus on all major 
issues; the overriding priority being to keep the collaboration itself intact. 
 
A shared mission alone cannot sustain a laboratory for sixty-five years, and CERN’s administration is 
designed to accommodate the Member States’ scientists and politicians as much as possible. The 
ultimate authority for the laboratory rests in CERN’s governing Council. Each Member State gets two 
seats: one reserved for a scientist and the other reserved for an administrator (sub-section 3.1.3.). 
One Member, one vote has been maintained throughout CERN’s existence and the Member States 
have appropriately empowered the central management team. The former DG, Llewellyn Smith 
summarised the position: “The governing structure was pretty hands-off… there was never a 
tendency to micromanage; they let the CERN management just get on with it.” 
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For ITER (sub-section 4.1.3.) the Members are both Stakeholders (through the Council) and Suppliers 
(through the in-kind contributions they are responsible for). This is a dilemma that must be 
sensitively handled if the legitimacy of the Council is to be maintained. The project delays that the 
Council has also had to deal with have added to the pressure on them to collectively keep the 
project on track. All ITER interviewees agreed that the situation in this regard has improved since the 
early days of the project. Publicly at the very least, consensus has prevailed as without it the 
project’s critics would have exploited any major conflicts between the Member States. 
 
For the ISS (section 5.3) Governance of the project is inexorably linked to the leadership that the 
dominant Member State has provided. As I explained in sub-section 5.1.1 the lead role of the USA in 
the management arrangements was accepted by all the parties when they agreed to take part. The 
international reputation of the US to deal with its partners fairly has therefore been under scrutiny 
from the outset. Interviewees attested that reaching consensus with the other Space Agencies has 
been at the centre of NASA’s approach to ISS operations throughout the project’s life-cycle (sub-
section 5.3.1.). The success of the US in doing so has elevated the ISS to become an iconic beacon of 
what can be done when there is a collective will for peaceful collaboration.  
 
A further reason for the members states tendency to exercise consensual governance stems from 
the supporting arguments for the new pathway through gridlock detailed in sub-section 6.3.8: 
Innovative Funding. The need to maintain the institutions and industries in their own territories 
bound by the project’s detailed in-kind contribution commitments is an important consideration for 
the member states. Consensus decision making to maintain the long negotiated balance of 
contributions embodies a practical structural realism. It fits in well with the neo-realism theory (sub-
section 1.1.2), where Buzan, Jones and Little (1993) raise the importance of interactions between 
States to understanding how the modern world works.  
 
Finally, consensus is maintained through a need for community survival. As explained in sub-section 
4.3.2.1., ITER interviewees all emphasised that the project’s focality added to the pressure on the 
community to deliver. There is a realisation that the set of circumstances that established this 
nuclear collaboration (section 4.1: The ITER Agreement) would be very difficult to repeat in today’s 
increasingly nationalistic political climate. There will therefore be no second chance for generations; 
failure is not an option for the planet or the fusion community. National interest from non-European 
ITER member states also features whereby they want to avoid the possibility of Europe taking over 
the remnants of the project should the international collaboration collapse. 
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Feature 4: The management teams in all three SMP communities exercise a light-touch 
leadership approach and inspire an inclusive organisational culture 
 
The SMP communities are a product of complex social interdependencies and reflect ongoing 
relationships between their aims and the constraints of the everyday world. Consequently, the IGOs 
that manage the projects are estimable examples of an epistemic community of knowledge-based 
experts. They comprise groups of motivated people who are highly employable in their SMP 
Communities and in the broader science and technology sectors. It would be unfair to label them as 
high maintenance employees, but they are certainly a group who need special considerations with 
respect to working conditions and being given the freedom to solve problems as they see fit.  
 
The IGO leadership employ a light-touch leadership management style with international staff and 
visiting external collaborators. All ideas and contributions are considered regardless of what level 
they have originated from, whatever nationality the person is or which Member State organisation 
or institution the person has originated from. Nurturing staff to accept the principle that 
international collaboration is normal and fostering the right cross-cultural attitudes is essential in the 
international environments that the SMP Communities occupy.  
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6.5: Contributions  
 
This thesis has been driven by the research problem detailed in sub-section 2.2: How do global SMP 
Communities achieve their effective collaboration pathways with Member States? Chapters 3, 4 and 
5, addressed this question for each case study and in section 1 of this chapter, I summarised, using 
the framework of the three hypotheses, the findings. In section 2, I addressed the first of the two 
related research sub-questions: do the subject SMP Communities utilise common diplomatic 
approaches in negotiating their founding arrangements and functioning in a collaborative way? by 
showing to what degree each of the Beyond Gridlock pathways are used by the case studies.  
 
In this section, I consider the second related research sub question: what - if any - are the political 
lessons learned by the subject SMP Communities that may provide clues in advancing global 
collaboration to overcome gridlock in other domains? In answering this question, I will suggest two 
contributions to knowledge. 
 
Ron Garan in his 2015 book The Orbital Perspective asks a number of searching rhetorical questions 
of his readers: ‘How did we go from those early days of mistrust and suspicion to building and 
operating the ISS? What was the secret ingredient that enabled a coalition of fifteen nations to work 
together systematically, in a fully integrated manner, to construct and operate the most complex 
structure ever built in space? Is there something we can learn from how the members overcome 
differences and cultural misunderstandings in order to accomplish remarkable things together? And 
can we use these same techniques to reach agreement on things such as alleviating poverty, 
mitigating climate change, or achieving peaceful solutions to long-term conflicts?’ He also somewhat 
challengingly suggests that you do not have to be in orbit in the ISS to have the orbital perspective 
he espouses.  
 
Garan, in answer to the questions he posed, suggests several lessons learned from his ISS experience 
(Garan, 2015: 35, 39 and 42), here I collate them and add a short note in parenthesis of where my 
research has revealed similar cases: 
 
• “Be in for the long run” [use of Pathway 1; shifts in core interests where nation states agreed to 
make long-term legal commitments through international conventions, treaties and 
agreements]; 
• “Plan for incremental collaboration” [use of Pathway 2, autonomous and adaptive international 
institutions]; 
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• “Establish relationships and build trust. This is made more difficult by changes in staff, 
ROSCOSMOS is more stable than NASA in that respect” [use of Pathway 3, technical groups with 
effective and legitimate processes showed the importance of fostering expert mini communities 
who are the backbone of the communities]; 
• “Effective information sharing, and communications is important” [use of Pathway 4, the focality 
sub-sections of each case study chapter echoed the importance of this]; 
• “Check pride at the door, solutions can come from anywhere” [use of Pathway 7, innovative 
light-touch leadership that is particularly prevalent at CERN where scientific and/or technological 
solutions are encouraged from anyplace and any level in the organisation]; 
• “Live up to commitments” [use of Pathway 8, innovative funding that helps provides resilience in 
overcoming external constraints]. 
 
This cross-refencing to Garan’s worthy list of lessons learned is reassuringly coherent but is general 
in nature. I will now suggest two contributions that have emerged from this thesis that are worthy of 
consideration by academics who study global gridlock. The suggestions should also be of interest to 
diplomats, negotiators and management teams involved in major international collaborations in 
other domains. In doing so, it is not anticipated that they provide a universal panacea to the wide-
ranging phenomenon of global gridlock, but nevertheless are thought provoking ideas.  
 
 
Contribution number 1: Global communities need to exploit any opportunities provided by a 
change in major powers’ core interests to establish their endeavours 
 
Advocates of major international collaborations need to take advantage of political waves of change, 
when major powers shift their core interests to advance their agendas. Communities need to have 
allies of the necessary calibre in key positions in order to influence policy makers and maximise the 
timing advantage. Ingenious preparation by the SMP Communities included positioning key 
respected individuals within influential circles of policy makers.  
 
I showed in section 3.1 that CERN was first conceived in the late 1940s as Europe was still recovering 
from World War II. Fascism and war had depleted most of the continent’s resources and many of the 
top scientists had fled to the United States. CERN did not triumph over rival science laboratory 
concepts by chance; the fundamental physics community made their own luck. As I showed in sub-
section 6.3.1. a series of scientists joined forces, put aside national interests and made it happen. 
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French physicist Louis de Broglie first proposed a multi-national European lab in 1949. After years of 
lobbying spearheaded by Isador Rabi, a Nobel laureate and the U.S. envoy to UNESCO, twelve 
European nations came together to sign the convention, officially forming CERN in 1954. “The 
physicists needed CERN to work in order to be able to participate in frontline particle physics; so, 
they felt compelled to make it work,” said Christopher Llewellyn Smith (CERN DG from 1994 to 1999) 
in an interview for this research. At the time of CERN’s founding, the United States was emerging 
onto the global scene as a major leader in scientific research. European physicists wanted to 
compete, but no single country could match the resources of the emerging superpower. “If Europe 
wanted to do high energy physics, the only way is by having governments collaborating with each 
other because it’s such an expensive field…pooling resources is the best way.… That’s the only way 
they’re going to be able to afford it.” said John Krige (a historian at Georgia Institute of Technology 
who specializes in the history of CERN) in an interview for this research. It was high-level strategic 
lobbying by like-minded individuals who had personal relationship developed over decades that held 
the key.  
 
For ITER, as I showed in sub-section 4.1., the nuclear fusion community had passionate advocates 
who could directly influence the US administration and the USSR leadership. Evgeny Velikhov had 
long-standing good relations with counterparts such as Michael Roberts (DOE) and Charlie Newstead 
(State Department) in the USA and was instrumental in establishing a joint approach with them. The 
ITER Agreement took 21 years to negotiate from the Reagan-Gorbachev Fireside Summit, but it 
would never have gotten under way without the expertise of Velikhov and his US counterparts to 
have the joint commitment to develop fusion included in the final summit joint communiqué.  
 
For the ISS, sub-section 5.3., contacts between US and USSR space exploration practioners had been 
steadily increasing from the, détente inspired, first joint Apollo-Soyuz mission. Personal relations 
between the US and USSR space communities developed and trust between the two camps was 
steadily reinforced. This trust gave credibility to the idea of inviting Russia to take part in the ISS 
when the opportunity came along in the late 1980’s. ISS advocates successfully canvassed the 
cautious officials in the US State Department to, somewhat counterintuitively, collaborate with the 
Russians in a domain that had seen fierce Cold War rivalry.   
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Contribution number 2: For a meaningful global collaboration to be agreed and maintained, 
contributing Member States must agree the correct balance of contributions in-cash and in-
kind 
 
The case for inclusion of Innovative Funding, to Beyond Gridlock theory was made in sub-section 
6.3.8. What is important to stress here is that the set-up phase needs to take as long as necessary to 
stipulate the in-kind deliverables, time-scales and relative value. As I showed in Table 17 the suite of 
high level documents of all three case studies include those that detail the sharing of the Member 
States’ contributions. The funding of major international collaborations needs a balanced mixture of 
in-cash and in-kind contributions. The skill of the negotiators is to ensure that there are enough cash 
contributions to the central entity to let it function effectively and enough in-kind contributions to 
allow the Members to maintain backing for the project in their home territories. I also showed in 
Table 18 that the degree of one type of funding versus the other depends on the level of autonomy 
that the community wishes the central entity to have. 
 
For CERN, Members contribute to a central fund for the infrastructure of the Laboratory as a whole. 
However, the embedded experiments are not funded from central cash funds but rather by in-kind 
contributions of those taking part in that research. This means that while the LHC was built by CERN 
using the money contributed to the central fund, the four giant detector experiments were funded, 
designed, and built by independent collaborations of nations. This way, if one falls behind, it does 
not necessarily mean the entire high energy research effort will suffer. Many interviewees attested 
that CERN has developed the optimum balance between the two types of funding. 
 
The task of providing for and promoting cooperation among the diverse group of ITER Members was 
a challenge during the negotiations that continues to this day. Not least in the difficulties facing the 
central ITER Organisation was the balancing act of keeping Members content with their respective 
work-share and project progress while exercising actions to maintain that progress through the 
Members’ own dispersed organisations.  
 
For the ISS, the nature of the construction is that the Members provide their respective modules to 
the central entity. It is a consummate in-kind jigsaw puzzle assembled and operated in space by 
remarkable co-ordinated efforts, not least of the universally respected astronaut corps. As I showed 
in sub-section 5.1.4., there are central cash contributions for the coordinating MCB body but only to 
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the level necessary for its limited functions. There is no IGO, DG or large international staff to fund. It 
is to the ISS Communities credit that despite this imbalance they have made the collaboration work.  
 
The three SMP communities have exercised consummate power relations at a distance that David 
Held highlighted as one of the requirements of managing globalisation (Held, et. al., 1999). The 
figures at the start of each case study chapter (Figure 4 for the CERN Community, Figure 7 for the 
ITER Community and Figure 10 for the ISS Community) illustrate the breadth of membership of the 
communities at IGO level. The Member States involved are the power houses of the industrialised 
world; power houses who fiercely compete with each other in many other domains.  
 
The in-kind management system that the SMP Communities employ demands close cooperation 
between the Member States. There is a need for constant dialogue and tight interface management. 
There is no room for ambiguous political positions or free riders. The mastery of the in-kind 
management system is far from easy and adds a level of effort to the Member States that they 
would not need with a simple delivery of in-cash contributions. However, once mastered and under 
control it is an important reason for them staying bound together. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Today, the world news, amplified by social media, is dominated by continuing armed conflicts, 
migration and environmental problems that span borders. Many of these grave problems are also 
insidious in nature: climate change inexorably threatens the populations of low lying geographic 
areas and increases the frequency and depth of extreme weather events; higher resistance to 
antibiotics raises the prospect of a future global pandemic being an existential threat to human life, 
and tensions between the populations of global developed nations and those of developing nations 
adds to the number and ferocity of regional conflicts.  
 
The urgent and essential need to make progress in several domains means that advocates of 
progress run the risk of jumping at any solution or struggling through painful workarounds, both of 
which courses of action will no longer do. There is a desire from diplomats, subject matter experts 
and the public to improve performance and to find a way through these impasses. There can be no 
more important question in this field than what could work to improve global collaboration.  
 
Looking up at the ISS provides a welcome respite to this gloom and offers inspiration to many as a 
beacon of higher level collaborative human behaviour. Similarly, CERN inspires people that there is a 
better way to collaborate in peace on the fundamental questions of nature. ITER provides hope of a 
carbon-free commercial power source for the benefit of mankind.  
 
Robert Keohane in After Hegemony (1984: 12) makes the point that, once the arguments have been 
won and the effort has been made to bind major powers and establish a collaboration, then 
hegemony is less important for the continuation of cooperation than for its creation. I would 
contend that the case study SMPs show that if we can create a global collaboration of major nations 
around meaningful endeavours, knowing the strength of a free and broad international 
collaboration of people with common beliefs and sharing a powerful vision, then anything is 
possible. Keohane was also correct when he said: ‘cooperation is not easy’ and this thesis confirms 
that this is certainly true for Big Science projects. The technical and engineering challenges of 
designing, constructing and operating facilities that are at the outer limits of what today’s 
technology can achieve by multiple partners working together make them extraordinarily difficult to 
manage. This degree of difficulty is present even before factoring in the international relations 
considerations of major nuclear powers who comprise the core of the membership. All of this makes 
their self-evident success even more noteworthy. 
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In this thesis I have described how SMPs achieve their collaborations amongst states that are 
adversaries in other domains. I have shown where they share common features including having at 
their core a meaningful endeavour that generates buy-in, binds the major powers together and 
sustains their collaborative spirit through major political and programmatic constraints. This sense of 
meaningfulness also transfers to the individuals who take part and gives them a sense of pride in 
themselves and their communities. Utilising science diplomacy approaches in negotiating credible 
founding arrangements is also a common feature, together with exercising consensual governance. 
All of this does take time and leadership, and it requires the use of multiple Beyond Gridlock 
pathways to keep on track.  
 
Two contributions emerged for consideration by others in the International Relations field. The first 
shows that communities should be primed and ready to exploit shifts in major power core interests 
in order to launch new endeavours and the second is how an ingeniously designed funding system 
allows Member States to commit to projects, permits the central IGOs to operate effectively and, at 
the same time, maintains support in the Member States’ homelands. 
 
 
Further Research 
 
There are four areas that are ripe for further research: 
 
First suggestions arise out of the factors covered in Research Limitations (section 2.5). As Appendix 
A, Selected Overview of SMPs and their Communities shows, a suitable area for further research is 
to add SMP case studies for detailed analysis. With more time, a quantitative survey of SMPs could 
also be conducted to strengthen the available data (Booth, Colomb, and Williams, 2008: 81). This 
expanded pool of data could help answer the question of whether a new type of SMP structure 
could fundamentally change the science business landscape for the better. 
 
Secondly, the hypotheses could be tested in other domains. Initial candidates for non-science 
related case studies include:  
 
• The Universal Postal Union which coordinates global postal policies in addition to the 
worldwide postal system. It was founded in 1874 and incorporated into the UN in 1945 and 
is based in Bern, Switzerland; 
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• The International Civil Aviation Organisation which is responsible for implementing the 
principles of the Convention on International Civil Aviation to ensure the safe and orderly 
development of global civil aviation. It was founded in 1947 and is based in Montreal, 
Canada; 
• The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which is the UN body for assessing 
the science related to climate change. The IPCC was created by the UN Environment 
Programme and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 and has 195 
Member countries; 
• The International Maritime Organization which is responsible for managing and regulating 
international shipping. It was founded in 1948 and is based in London, UK and  
• The Arctic Council which is the IGO forum promoting cooperation, coordination and 
interaction among the Arctic States [Canada, Denmark; representing Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States] and was 
formally established by the Ottawa Declaration of 1996. An agreement on Enhancing 
International Arctic Scientific Cooperation was signed in 2017. 
 
Thirdly, the applicability of the eighth pathway, concerning funding, to other domains outside of this 
research is unknown. A thorough systematic investigation of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the in-kind management system as it applies to intergovernmental collaboration is needed. For 
example, could academics and practioners combine to design an in-kind management system to 
help overcome constraints and improve collaborative performance for the United Nations?  
 
Fourthly, if the premise of the first contribution is accepted, that “Global communities need to 
exploit any opportunities provided by a change in major powers’ core interests to establish their 
endeavours” then it is worth considering what the next major wave may be. I would argue that, 
given the urgency of addressing the wicked problem that face the very existence of humankind, to 
simply await the next wave of change that may galvanise global collaboration is too complacent. 
Instead, research could be focused to determine how an artificial wave of change could be designed 
in each domain to provide a tailor-made plan to overcome global gridlock that major powers, 
expertly nudged by strategically placed advocates, could then rally behind.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Selected Overview of SMPs and their Communities 
 
An overview of international SMPs within their broad science community domain is shown below. 
The selection criteria for SMPs, together with the case study selection justification is described in 
Section 2.1. The three case studies are highlighted in yellow. The nomenclature used in this overview 
is the project title, usual abbreviation and (where applicable) the host State and/or leading State. 
 
Domain 1: High Energy Physics Community 
 
• European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), Switzerland/France; (CASE STUDY ONE) 
• Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE), USA; 
• International Linear Collider (ILC), Japan; 
• Future Circular Collider (FCC), Switzerland/France; 
• Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME), 
Jordan; 
• Facility for Antiproton and Ion Research GmbH (FAIR), Germany and 
• European Spallation Source (ESS), Sweden. 
 
Domain 2: Ground Based Astronomy Community 
 
• European-Extremely Large Telescope (ESO – E-ELT), Germany/Chile; 
• Southern African Large Telescope (SALT), Namakwa, South Africa; 
• Square Kilometre Array (SKA), UK, South Africa and Australia; 
• Atacama Large Millimetre/submillimetre Array (ALMA), Germany/Chile; 
• LIGO/VIRGO; USA and Europe (Italy) and 
• Five-hundred-meter Aperture Spherical Telescope (FAST), China. 
 
Domain 3: Global Health/Life Sciences/Genome Mapping Community 
 
• International Human Cell Atlas Initiative, US and worldwide; 
• Global BRAIN Initiative, US and worldwide; 
• Human Genome Project, worldwide; 
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• European Life Sciences Infrastructure for Biological Information, worldwide; 
• European Molecular Biology Laboratory, Germany; 
• International Health Partnership, UK and worldwide; 
• International Mouse Phenotyping Consortium, worldwide and 
• National Ecological Observatory Network, USA. 
 
Domain 4: Nuclear Fusion Community 
 
• International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER); IGO HQ, France; (CASE STUDY TWO) 
• High Power laser Energy Research facility (HiPER), UK; 
• EUROFusion JET, UK and 
• National Fusion Devices worldwide. 
 
Domain 5: Space Science/Earth Observation Community 
 
• International Space Station (ISS); US (NASA), Canada (CSA), Europe (ESA), Japan (JAXA) and 
Russia (ROSCOSMOS); (CASE STUDY THREE) 
• Copernicus; EU-EC; 
• European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites, EU-EC; 
• Galileo; EU-EC and 
• In-Service Aircraft for a Global Observing System; EU-EC. 
 
Domain 6: Oceanography/Antarctic Studies 
 
• Antarctic Treaty; 12 original Members States from 1959 that retain voting rights: Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia (Soviet Union at time of 
signature) South Africa, UK and the USA plus 41 other, non-voting, Member States that later 
acceded to the Treaty; 
• Ocean Observatories Initiative, USA and worldwide; 
• ‘Citizens’ Observatory for Coast and Ocean Optical Monitoring/EyeOnWater, worldwide; 
• Deep Sea Scientific Drilling Vessel, Japan; 
• Ocean Networks, Canada; 
• International network for scientific investigation of deep-sea ecosystems, worldwide and 
• Naval Enterprise Partnership Teaming with Universities for National Excellence, USA.  
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Appendix B: Interviewee Details 
 
The methodology for field data collection is described in sub-section 2.4.2. Data was gathered 
through over seventy field work interviews: around twenty for each of the case studies and around 
ten from the general field of Big Science projects and Science Diplomacy. This data was 
supplemented by previous expert panel narratives from interviewees that were available on-line. 
 
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Durham University 
Research Ethics Committee. All interviews were conducted within the considerations of informed 
consent, confidentiality and anonymity. Any participant that has exercised the right for anonymity 
has had that view respected and complied with. In circumstances of anonymity the quotations have 
been included with agreed descriptions of the role of the person. Recording were made of some 
interviews for transcription purposes only. In accordance with the agreements on the handling of 
data, all recordings have been deleted on submission of this thesis. 
 
The alphabetical list below contains those interviewees who have agreed to be named and/or 
already have their comments publicly available, where the latter is the case the data is cited in the 
bibliography. The list shows the interviewees current position and/or former role or affiliation to a 
case study community. Some interviews have no direct affiliation to a case study community but 
have been interviewed because of their overall SMP and/or science diplomacy knowledge; in these 
cases, they are recorded as ‘other’ in the case study column. The details of the remaining 
interviewees are retained confidentially, and their names and affiliation are shown as Anon (to 
indicate the entry has been anonymised). 
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Case
Study
Role Comments
1 Anon Anon Anon Departmental Safety Officer Field Work interview
2 Anon Anon Anon Member State Audit Team Member Field Work interview
3 Anon Anon Anon Scheduler Field Work interview
4 Bernard Bigot ITER Director General
Archive Video Testimony to US Congress
(see bibliography)
5 Ken Blackner ITER Deputy Head of Department for Operations Field Work interview
6 Anon Anon Anon Head of Systems Functional Integration Field Work interview
7 Maurizio Bona CERN
Senior Advisor for Relations with Parliaments
and Science for Policy
Field Work interview
8 Micheline Calmy-Rey Other
Former Foreign Minister of Switzerland
(2003 to 2011)
Archive Video contribution to
 UNOG/CERN conference (see bibliography)
9 Laban Coblentz ITER Head of Communications Field Work interview
10 William Colglazier Other
Fourth Science and Technology Adviser to
the US Secretary of State (2011 to 2014)
Field Work interview
11 Anon Anon Anon Former Ombudsperson Field Work interview
12 Anon Anon Anon International Relations Team Member Field Work interview
13 Anon Anon Anon Member State Legal Advisor Field Work interview
14 Anon Anon Anon Project Management Consultant Field Work interview
15 Tim de Zeeuw Other
Former Director General of the
European Southern Observatory (2007–2017) 
Field Work interview
16 Anon Anon Anon Technical Section Leader Field Work interview
17 Anon Anon Anon Public Outreach Team Member Field Work interview
18 Alexander Gerst ISS
Geophysicist and
 Former ISS Commander (Expedition 56)
Archive BBC Radio Interview
(see bibliography)
19 Fabiola Gianotti CERN Director General
Archive Video contribution to
 UNOG/CERN conference (see bibliography)
20 Anon Anon Anon Head of Contracts and Procurement Division Field Work interview
21 Anon Anon Anon Council Member Field Work interview
22 Anon Anon Anon Project Officer Field Work interview
23 James Gillies CERN
Strategic Planning and Evaluation
Former Head of Communications (2003 to 2015)
Field Work interview
24 Sabina Griffith ITER Senior Communications Officer Field Work interview
25 Henry Hertzfeld ISS
Director of the Space Policy Institute
Elliott School of International Affairs, GW University
Field Work interview
Name
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26 Rolf Heuer CERN
Former Director General
(2009 to 2015)
Archive Video contribution to
 UNOG/CERN conference (see bibliography)
27 Anon Anon Anon Member State Negotiator Field Work interview
28 Anon Anon Anon SMP Archivest Field Work interview
29 Norbert Holtkamp ITER
Former Deputy Director General (2006 to 2009)/
currently Deputy Director at SLAC, California
Field Work interview
30 Anon Anon Anon Council Secretary Field Work interview
31 Anon Anon Anon Project Management Consultant Field Work interview
32 Anon Anon Anon Member State Negotiator Field Work interview
33 Anon Anon Anon Member State Advisor Field Work interview
34 Anon Anon Anon SMP IGO Director Field Work interview
35 John Krige Other Science Diplomacy Historian and Author Field Work interview
36 Sergei Krikalev ISS ROSCOSMOS Cosmonauts Director
Archive Video Interview to Česká televize
(see bibliography)
37 Don Lessard Other
Emeritus Professor of International Management
MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, USA
Field Work interview
38 Chris Llewellyn Smith CERN
Former Director General
(1994-1998)
Field Work interview
39 Anon Anon Anon US Science Diplomacy Academic Field Work interview
40 Anon Anon Anon Head of SMP Member State Organisation Field Work interview
41 Anon Anon Anon Science Advisory Committee Member Field Work interview
42 John Logsdon ISS
Director of the Space Policy Institute, DC/
Former member of the Columbia AIB 
Field Work interview
43 Michael Loughlin ITER
Co-ordinator for Nuclear Analysis and Shielding/
Deputy Leader of the Nuclear Integration Unit 
Field Work interview
44 Timothy Luce ITER
Head of Science and
Operations Directorate
Field Work interview
45 Akko Maas ITER Science Engineering Officer
Archive ITER Video Interview
(see bibliography)
46 Mark McCaughrean ISS
Senior Advisor for Science & Exploration
European Space Agency
Field Work interview
47 Anon Anon Anon Head of External Relations Field Work interview
48 Michael Møller Other
Director-General of the
United Nations Office at Geneva
Archive Video contribution to
 UNOG/CERN conference (see bibliography)
49 Kenji Nakano Other
Chief General Assembly Affairs Branch
Department of the General Assembly
Field Work interview
50 Markus Nordberg CERN
Head of Resources Development
 Development and Innovation Unit
Field Work interview
Name
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51 Ellen Ochoa ISS
Former Director of the Johnson Space Centre/
ISS Commander
Archive NASA Video Interview
(see bibliography)
52 Anon Anon Anon Council Secretariat Member Field Work interview
53 Patrick Owen CERN
Physicist and sub-group leader within
the LHCb experiment team 
Field Work interview
54 Alexander Petrov ITER
Head of Communications
Russian Federation Domestic Agency
Field Work interview
55 Richard Pitts ITER Science and Operations Team Section Leader Field Work interview
56 Michael Roberts ITER
Former Director of International Programs
Office of Fusion Energy, US DOE/lead US negotiator
Field Work interview
57 Ned Sauthoff ITER Head of USA ITER Domestic Agency
Archive Video Testimony to US Congress
(see bibliography)
58 Herwig Schopper CERN
Former Director General
(1981 to 1988)
Field Work interview
59 Anon Anon Anon Collaboration team member Field Work interview
60 Janet Smart Other
Reader in Operations Management
Saïd Business School, University of Oxford
Field Work interview
61 Anon Anon Anon IGO Director Field Work interview
62 Anon Anon Anon Senior Project Officer Field Work interview
63 Carl Strawbridge ITER
Deputy US ITER Project Office
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, USA
Field Work interview
64 Harry Tuinder ITER
Legal adviser EC Research & Innovation Directorate
Fomer ITER Head of Legal Affairs
Archive ITER Video Interview
(see bibliography)
65 Anon Anon Anon Operations Division Team Member Field Work interview
66 Anon Anon Anon Personal Assistant Field Work interview
67 Anon Anon Anon Sub-section Leader Field Work interview
68 Mark Uhran ISS
Former Assistant Associate Administrator for the ISS
NASA HQ in Washington DC (2005 to 2012)
Field Work interview
69 Anon Anon Anon
Member of the G8 Science Ministers
Group of Senior Officials 
Field Work interview
70 James Van Dam ITER
Acting associate director, Fusion Energy Sciences
Office of Science, US DOE 
Archive Video Testimony to US Congress
(see bibliography)
71 Anders Wallander ITER Head of Control System Division Field Work interview
72 Anon Anon Anon Head of Department Field Work interview
73 John Womersley Other
Director General of the
European Spallation Source (Lund, Sweden)
Field Work interview
74 Ryuji Yoshino ITER
Head of Japanese Domestic Agency (2007 to 2009)
Former Head of ITER Project Office (2009 to 2015)
Field Work interview
Name
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Appendix C: Interviewee Questions 
 
 
INTRODUCTORY QUESTION PUT TO ALL INTERVIEWEES 
 
Q1. You work as part of the senior management team here, please tell me about your role 
and responsibilities.  
 
CORE QUESTIONS PUT TO ALL INTERVIEWEES 
 
Q2. This project has reportedly long-standing, good collaboration between the member 
states and the central organisation, what would you say is the most significant factor that 
has led to this? 
 
Q3. What would you say have been the greatest disagreements and difficulties with the 
members states on this project and are there any lingering, unresolved problems?  
 
Q4. Given that this is a science related project to what extent has this affected international 
relations with the member states? 
 
ELECTIVE QUESTIONS PUT TO CERTAIN INTERVIEWEES DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
Q5. What would you say are the most effective diplomatic approaches that have been used 
with the member states to negotiate the founding arrangements and support the project 
operations?  
 
Q6. What new measures would you say could be introduced to the project management 
that would improve schedule and cost performance? 
 
CONCLUDING QUESTION PUT TO ALL INTERVIEWEES 
 
Q7. What - if any - are the political lessons learned by the project governance and 
management regimes that may provide clues in advancing global collaboration more 
generally?  
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